Sixthly, It is, in like manner, infeparable from true humility, to take fhame to ourselves where we have deserved it, to acquiefce under it where we think we have not, and always to fufpect our own judg ment in the last cafe. There is no way fo fhort and efficacious as this to mortify that pride, and overweening opinion of ourselves, which is the refult of our frame in this degenerate state. Nay, we ought even to rejoice when we are meanly efteemed, and defpifed, as having then an opportunity offered of imitating him who was meek and lowly in heart, and of finding reft to our fouls thereby.

Seventhly, It may conduce to eradicate that tendency which every man has to think himself a nonpareil, in fome respect or other, to confider natural productions, flowers, fruits, gems, &c. It would be very abfurd to affirm of one of thefe, that it was a nonpareil in its kind, because it is endued with great beauty and luftre; much less therefore ought we to fancy this of that degree of beauty, parts, virtue, which happens to be our lot, and which is certainly magnified beyond the truth in our own eyes, from the intereft which we have in ourselves.

Eighthly, There is fcarce a more effectual' method of curbing oftentation and felf-conceit, than frequently to impose upon one's felf a voluntary filence, and not to attempt to speak, unless where a plain reafon requires it. Voluntary filence is, in refpect of oftentation and felf-conceit, what fafting is, in refpect of luxury and felf-indulgence. All perfons, who fpeak much, and with pleasure, intend to engage the attention, and gain the applaufe, of the audience; and have an high opinion of their own talents. And if this daily, I may fay hourly, fource and effect of vain-glory was cut off, we might with much greater facility get the victory over the rest. When a perfon has, by this means, reduced himself to a proper

indifference to the opinions of the world, he may by degrees abate of the rigour of his filence, and fpeak naturally and eafily, as occafion offers, without any explicit motive; juft as when fafting, and other feverities, have brought our appetites within due bounds, we may be directed by them in the choice and quantity of common wholesome foods.

Ninthly, The doctrine of philofophical free-will is the cause and support of much pride and selfconceit; and this fo much the more, as it is a doctrine not only allowed, but even infifted upon and required, and made effential to the distinction between virtue and vice. Hence men are commanded, as it were, to fet a value upon their own actions, by esteeming them their own in the highest fenfe of the words, and taking the merit of them to themselves. For philofophical free-will fuppofes, that God has given to each man a sphere of action, in which he does not interpofe; but leaves man to act entirely from himfelf, independently of his Creator; and as, upon this foundation, the affertors of philofophical free-will afcribe all the demerit of actions to men, fo they are obliged to allow men to take the merit of good actions to themselves, i. e. to be proud and felf-conceited. This is the plain confequence of the doctrine of philofophical free-will. How far this objection against it over-balances the objections brought against the oppofite doctrine of mechanism, I do not here confider. But it was necessary, in treating of the methods of attaining true humility, to fhew in what relation the doctrine of free-will stood to this fubject.

But we are not to fuppofe, that every man, who maintains philofophical free-will, does alfo claim the merit of his good actions to himself. The fcriptures are fo full and explicit in afcribing all that is good to GOD, and the heart of a good man concurs fo readily

with them, that he will rather expose himself to any perplexity of understanding, than to the charge of fo great an impiety. Hence it is, that we fee, in the writings of many good men, philofophical free-will afferted, on one hand; and merit disclaimed, on the other; in both cases, with a view to avoid confequences apparently impious; though it be impoffible to reconcile thefe doctrines to each other. However, this fubjection of the understanding to the moral principle is a noble inftance of humility, and rectitude of heart.

As the affertors of philofophical free-will are not neceffarily proud, fo the affertors of the doctrine of mechanism are much less neceffarily humble. For, however they may, in theory, afcribe all to GoD ; yet the affociations of life beget the idea and opinion of felf again and again, refer actions to this self, and connect a variety of applaufes and complacencies with these actions. Nay, men may be proud of those actions, which they directly and explicitly afcribe to GOD, i. e. proud that they are inftruments in the hand of God for the performing fuch actions. Thus the pharifee, in our Saviour's parable, though he thanked GOD that he was no extortioner, &c. yet boasted of this, and made it a foundation for defpifing the publican. However, the frequent recollection, that all our actions proceed from GOD; that we have nothing which we did not receive from him; that there can be no reason in ourselves, why he fhould felect one rather than another for an inftrument of his glory in this world, &c. and the application of thefe important truths to the various real circumstances of our lives; muft greatly acce lerate our progress to humility and felf-annihilation. And, when men are far advanced in this state, they may enjoy quiet and comfort, notwithstanding their palt fins and frailties; for they approach to the pa

radiGacal state, in which our first parents, though naked, were not afhamed. But the greatest caution is requifite here, leaft by a fresh difobedience we come to know evil as well as good again, and by defiring to be gods, to be independent, make the return of fhame, punishment, and mystical death, neceffary for our re-admiffion to the tree of life.

Tenthly, It will greatly recommend humility to us, to confider how much mifery a difpofition to glory in our fuperiority over others may hereafter occafion. Let it be obferved, therefore, that every finite perfection, how great foever, is at an infinitely greater distance from the infinite perfection of GoD, than from nothing; fo that every finite being may have, and probably has, infinitely more fuperiors than inferiors. But the fame difpofition which makes him glory over his inferiors, muft make him envy his fuperiors he will therefore have, from this his difpofition, infinitely more caufe to grieve than to rejoice. And it appears from this way of confidering things, that nothing could enable us to bear the luftre of the invifible world, were it opened to our view, but humility, felf-annihilation, and the love of GOD, and of his creatures, in and through him.

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Eleventhly, If we may be allowed to fuppofe all GOD's creatures ultimately and indefinitely happy, according to the third fuppofition made above for explaining the infinite goodnefs of God, this would unite the profoundeft humility with the highest gratification of our defires after honour. For this makes all God's creatures equal in the eye of their Creator; and therefore, as it obliges us to call the vileft worm our fifter, fo it transfers upon us the glory of the brightest archangel; we are all equally made to inherit all things, are all equally beirs of GoD, and

co-heirs with CHRIST.

SECT. V.

OF THE REGARD DUE TO THE PLEASURES AND PAINS OF SELF-INTEREST IN FORMING THE RULE OF LIFE.

PROP. LXV.

The Pleafures of Self-intereft ought not to be made a primary Purfuit.

SELF-INTEREST is of three kinds, as has been already explained; viz.

First, Grofs felf-intereft, or the pursuit of the means for obtaining the pleasures of fenfation, imagination, and ambition.

Secondly, Refined self-intereft, or the purfuit of the means for obtaining the pleasures of fympathy, theopathy, and the moral fenfe.

Thirdly, Rational felf-interest, or the pursuit of fuch things, as are believed to be the means for obtaining our greatest poffible happiness, at the fame time that we are ignorant, or do not confider, from what particular fpecies of pleasure this our greatest poffible happiness will arife.

Now it is my defign, under this propofition, to fhew, that none of these three kinds of felf-interest