to have obtained it already, in the eye of him to whom past, prefent, and future, are all present, who quickeneth the dead, and caileth the things that be not as though they were. For that the fuppofition of free-will, in the philofophical fenfe, cannot folve this difficulty, will appear, I think, in the next propofition.

COROLLARY. It may be reckoned fome confirmation of religion, that the voluntary powers which it requires, according to this propofition, are an evident fact, and alfo that they are deducible from the frame of our natures, i. e. from our original faculties, and the law of affocation, taken together. For thus religion may be faid to harmonize with obfervation, and with the nature of man, its fubject.

PROP. XV.

Religion does not prefuppofe Free-will in the philofophical Senfe; i. e. it does not presuppose a Power of doing different Things, the previous Circumstances remaining the fame.

FOR, first, It has been fhewn, in the foregoing. part of this work, that we do not, in fact, ever exert any fuch power in the important act ons of our lives, or the ftrong workings of our affections, all these being evidently determinable by the previous circumstances. There are therefore no actions or affections left, except trifling and evanefcent ones, in which religion can pre-fuppofe philofophical free will, or liberty; and even here the evidence for it is merely an argumentur ab ignorantiá. But if religion requires philofophical liberty at all, it mult require it chiefly in the most important actions and affections. It does not therefore require it at all. We cannot

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fuppofe religion to be at variance with common obfervation, and the frame of our natures.

Secondly, Some reasons have been given already, in the first part of this work, and more will be added in the next propofition, to fhew that philofophical liberty cannot take place in man, but is an impoflibility. It is therefore impoffible, that religion fhould require it.

Thirdly, It appears from the course of reasoning ufed under the foregoing propofition, that all which religion does require and prefuppofe, is, first, a fufficient defire, hope, fear, felf-intereft, or other fuch like motive, and then fufficient voluntary powers, whereby to regulate our affections and actions agreeably to the will of GOD. But philofophical liberty, or the power of doing different things, the previous circumftances remaining the fame, is fo far from being required, in order to our obtaining any of these requifites, that it is inconfiftent with them. For the fufficient defire, &c. unlefs it be given by GoD in a fupernatural way, is of a factitious nature, and follows the previous circumstances with a rigorous exactnefs; in like manner the voluntary powers are all generated according to the law of affociation, which law operates in a mechanical, neceffary way, and admits of no variations, while the circumstances remain the fame; all which is, I prefume, fufficiently evident to thofe who have well confidered the foregoing part of this work. Thefe requifites are therefore inconfiftent with philofophical liberty, inafmuch as this implies, that though there be a defire fufficient to cause the exertion of the will, this exertion may or may not follow; alfo, that though the voluntary powers depending on this exertion be completely generated by affociation, they may or may not follow it in fact. This fuppofition is indeed abfurd at first fight; however, if it be admitted for a moment, in

order to fee what would follow, it is manifeft, that the man will be rendered lefs able to comply with the will of GOD thereby, and that it will not add to, but take away from, the requifites propofed by religion. Philofophical liberty does not therefore help us to folve the difficulty mentioned under the last propofition, but, on the contrary, increases it.

If it fhould be faid, that we are not to suppose the defire fufficient, and the voluntary powers complete, and then farther to fuppofe that thefe may or may not take effect, but only to fuppofe defire in general, fufficient or infufficient, and voluntary powers in general, complete or incomplete, and that thus it will not be unreafonable to fuppofe that they may or may not take effect; whence the manifeft abfurdity mentioned in the laft paragraph will be removed; I anfwer, that this is to defert the hypothefis of philofophical liberty, the previous circumstances being fuppofed different, that fo their confequences may be different alfo. If any particular degree of defire or voluntary power be fixed upon, and all the other concurring circumftances of body and mind fixed likewife, i. e. if the previous circumstances be rigorously determinate, which is the fuppofition of philofophical liberty, this one fixed, determinate degree of defire, or voluntary power, cannot have the two oppofite epithets of fufficient and infufficient, or of complete or incomplete, both predicated of it with truth, define fufficiency or completeness as you please. Philofophical liberty does not therefore allow us to fuppofe defire or voluntary power in general, in order that they either may or may not take effect.

Fourthly, It will appear, that religion does not prefuppofe philofophical liberty, if we enter upon the examination of thofe arguments which are commonly brought to fhew that it does. These are, that unless philofophical liberty be admitted, there will be no

foundation for commendation or blame, and confequently no difference between virtue and vice; that all punishment for actions, usually called vicious, will be unjuft; and that GOD will be the author of fuch actions, which it is impious to fuppofe; inafinuch as the notion of popular liberty is not fufficient to obviate thefe difficulties. Now, to this I anfwer, that there are two different methods of fpeaking, and, as it were, two different languages, ufed upon thefe fubjects; the one popular, and, when applied to GOD, anthropomorphitical; the other philofophical; and that the notion of popular liberty is fufficient to obviate these difficulties, while we keep to the popular language alone; alfo, that the philofophical language does of itself obviate thefe difficulties, while we keep to it alone; but that, if we mix thefe languages, then, and not till then, infuperable difficulties will arife, as might well be expected. Let us confider each of thefe pofitions particularly.

First then, I fay that the fuppofition of popular liberty is fufficient to obviate the fore-mentioned difficulties, whilft we keep to the popular language alone. For, in the popular language, a man is commended and blamed merely for the right or wrong use of his voluntary powers; the firft is called virtue, the laft vice; and rewards and punishments are faid to be respectively due to them. Thus, when a man, having an opportunity to do a beneficent action, exerts an act of will, and, in confequence thereof does

he is commended for it; it is called a virtue, or a right use of his voluntary powers, and is faid to deserve a reward; whereas, had he, in like circumftances, done a malevolent action, he would have been blamed for it; it would have been called a wrong ufe of his voluntary powers, or a vice; and a punishment inflicted upon him, in confequence hereof, would have been faid to be juft. This is a mere

history of the fact, and a narration of the method in which the words here confidered acquire their proper fenses; and I appeal to the general tenor of writings and discourses for the fupport of what is here afferted. If no voluntary action be exerted, the words commendation, right ufe, virtue, reward, on one hand, alfo the words blame, wrong ufe, vice, punishment, on the other, become entirely unapplicable. If there be, and the motive be good, fuppofe piety or benevolence, the first set of words takes place; if the motive be bad, the last. Men, in the common use of language, never confider whether the agent had it in his power to have done otherwise, the previous circumstances remaining the fame; they only require that he should have done a beneficent action, from a benevolent intention. If they find this, they will apply the words commendation, right ufe, &c. And the fame holds in refpect of injurious actions, and malevolent intentions. The agent will, in this cafe, be blamed, and faid to be justly punished, without any farther inquiry. Sometimes, indeed, they do inquire farther, viz. into the original of these intentions. But then this comes to the fame thing at laft; for if these intentions were generated voluntarily, it enhances the commendation of blame due to them; if, in great measure, involuntarily, abates it. Popular liberty, or voluntary powers, do therefore afford fufficient foundation for commendation and blame, for the difference between virtue and vice, and for the justice of punishing vice according to the popular language. Where it is to be remarked, that whatever will justify punishments inflicted by men, will justify thofe inflicted by GoD in like circumftances, fince juftice is afcribed to GOD only in a popular and anthropomorphitical fenfe.

And as popular liberty fuffices for the forementioned purposes, whilft we ufe the popular language,