III. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
(A) Persons Injured in General.
§ 65 (Conn.) The contributory negligence rule has no practical application except in cases where defendant has been guilty of actionable negligence.-Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 84 A. 301, 524.
$ 66 (Conn.) On an issue of negligence, full means of knowledge by a person when he acts are under ordinary circumstances treated as the equivalent of knowledge.-Nehring v. Con- necticut Co., 84 A. 301, 524.
§ 121 (Pa.) In an action against the pro- § 67 (Conn.) One's duty for his own self-pro- prietor of store for injuries to a customer fall- tection involves the making of reasonable use ing on an alleged negligently oiled floor, a non- of his senses under penalty of forfeiture of re- suit held properly entered, under the evidence. covery for resulting injury.-Nehring v. Con--Spickernagle v. Woolworth, 84 A. 909. necticut Co., 84 A. 301, 524.
§ 82 (Conn.) Contributory negligence, to bar recovery, must have been the proximate cause of the injury.-Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 84 A. 301, 524.
If a person placed himself in peril through his own negligence, and the injury could not have been avoided after discovery of his danger, that negligence, and not negligence of the other person in failing to use reasonable care to avoid the accident, will be regarded as the sole proxi- mate cause.-Id.
A person's negligence must be deemed the proximate cause of his injury, where it contin- ued as an active agent in producing the condi- tions under which his injury was received down to the time of its occurrence, or at least until it was too late for the other, with knowledge of his peril, to have saved him by using reasonable care.-Id.
§ 82 (Pa.) Where the owner of a building supplies an inadequate fire escape, he cannot claim that injuries sustained by an employé es- caping from the burning building would be due to her want of familiarity with the means of escape provided.-Kohn v. Clark, 84 A. 692.
$83 (Conn.) The last clear chance doctrine relates only to cases where an injured person has been guilty of negligence not proximately causing the injury.-Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 84 A. 301, 524.
Where, after plaintiff has placed himself in peril through his own negligence, and defendant has discovered the danger, the latter introduces into the situation a new and independent act without which there would have been no injury, that act must be deemed the sole proximate cause of the accident.-Id.
Where a person places himself in peril of an agency operated by another, but in time to en- able the latter by using reasonable care to avoid injury, negligence of the latter will be deemed the proximate cause of the accident, though means of escape were open to the in- jured person by using reasonable care if it was apparent to the other person that he would not avail himself thereof.-Id.
Contributory negligence cannot be said to be a remote cause of injury merely because it is reasonably apparent to the one who inflicts the injury that the injured one is careless of his safety and that in continuance of his careless-
ness he is about to place himself in a position of danger, which he subsequently does.-Id. Under the last clear chance doctrine, knowl- edge of the injured person's peril, which ought to have been known to the person in control of the agency causing the injury in the use of due care, has the same effect as actual knowledge.
(C) Imputed Negligence.
93 (Pa.) Negligence of driver of private conveyance cannot be imputed to a passenger having no control over him, unless he volun- tarily goes into a patent danger he could have avoided.-Trumbower v. Lehigh Valley Transit Co., 84 A. 403.
(C) Trial. Judgment, and Review. § 136 (Pa.) Where the measure of duty is or- dinary and reasonable care, varying according to circumstances, and the facts are disputed, the issues must be submitted to the jury.- Stewart v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 84 A. 38.
136 (Pa.) Whether one external fire escape was an adequate provision, considering the size of the building and the number of inmates, is a question for the jury.-Kohn v. Clark, 84 A. 692.
§ 136 (R.I.) Where, in an action for injuries, the evidence was conflicting as to whether the plaintiff recklessly brought the injury on him- self, it was a jury question.-King v. Whiting, 84 A. 601.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
See Bills and Notes.
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. See New Trial, § 102.
See Appeal and Error, §§ 262-274, 553, 1005, 1178; Equity, § 382.
I. NATURE AND SCOPE OF REMEDY. §6 (Conn.) The supervision which a trial judge has over a verdict is an essential part of the jury system and involves the exercise of discretion by the trial judge.-Cables v. Bristol- Water Co., 84 A. 928.
(A) Errors and Irregularities in General. $18 (Conn.) Mispleading is not a ground for setting aside a verdict, under Gen. St. 1902, § 805.-McCaffrey v. Groton & S. St. Ry. Co., 84 A. 284.
A petition for new trial for mispleading must be made as provided by Gen. St. 1902, § 815, specifying mispleading as a ground for new trial.-Id.
§ 22 (Vt.) It was ground for a new trial that dy by the deputy sheriff who arrested her on a an important witness was furnished with bran- bench warrant, and appeared in court and gave her testimony while in an intoxicated condi- tion.-Green v. Cross, 84 A. 22.
§ 26 (Me.) As a general rule, points not made at the trial are considered as waived, and are not open to the parties at the hearing before the law court.-Coan v. Auburn Water Com'rs, 84 A. 145.
The point that under Priv. & Sp. Laws 1895, c. 243, under which defendant water commis- sioners were operating a water system, the de- fendant is not liable for negligence, when not made at the trial, will not be considered by the law court.-Id.
§ 69 (Conn.) In an action tried to a jury, it was error to set aside a verdict for plaintiff, on the ground that the jury should not have be- lieved him.-Bergh v. Spivakowski, 84 A. 329.
§ 70 (Me.) In an action by a landlord for in- jury to property caused by bursting of pipe con- stituting part of a sprinkler system, defendant held, under the evidence, entitled to new trial on verdict for plaintiff.-Estabrooks Shirt Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 84 A. 270.
$71 (Me.) The Supreme Judicial Court will not, on motion for new trial, disturb a verdict, where the evidence is conflicting.-Lawry v. Ramsey, 84 A. 268.
871 (Me.) A verdict based on conflicting evi- dence will not be disturbed, on motion for new trial in the Supreme Judicial Court.-Sanfacon v. Parent, 84 A. 465.
$71 (Me.) A verdict on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed by the Supreme Judicial Court on motion for a new trial.-Guptill v. Pine Tree State Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 84 A. 529.
§71 (Me.) A verdict based on conflicting evi- dence will not be disturbed by the Supreme Judicial Court on motion for new trial, unless clearly erroneous.-Howard v. Dirigo Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 84 A. 742.
§ 72 (Me.) The Supreme Judicial Court will not, on motion for new trial, disturb a verdict, where the only question involved is one of fact, though a different conclusion might have been reached.-Merritt v. Wyman, 84 A. 268.
$ 76 (R.I.) A verdict assessing plaintiff's dam- ages for personal injuries at $4,000 held so ex- cessive as to entitle defendant to a new trial, unless plaintiff remitted all of the verdict but $1,000.-Pilling v. Benson, 84 A. 1005.
(H) Newly Discovered Evidence. $ 102 (Me.) One is not entitled to a new trial for newly discovered evidence which could have been procured before the trial by reasonable dil- igence. Shallow v. Roux, 84 A. 999.
III. PROCEEDINGS TO PROCURE NEW TRIAL.
a term subsequent to the trial term in viola- $117 (Me.) A motion for new trial filed at tion of rule 19 of the superior court of Cum- berland county is not seasonably filed.--Cate v. Merrill, 84 A. 897.
to prove the misconduct of a juror, and not § 140 (N.H.) Affidavits which merely tended that such misconduct produced the verdict, were properly excluded as irrelevant.-Blodgett v. Park, 84 A. 42.
for alleged refusal of a tipstaff to report a re- § 140 (Pa.) A new trial will not be granted quest by the jury for further instructions, nor on the ground that a juror had told the tip- staff that his health would be endangered by remaining out longer, where there was no evi- dence as to such grounds.-Kelley v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 84 A. 754.
$ 150 (Me.) Moving papers to procure a new trial for newly discovered testimony should show that the testimony was unknown at the trial and could not have been discovered by rea- sonable diligence.-Shallow v. Roux, 84 A. 999.
$157 (Me.) Special motions for new trial for newly discovered evidence must be overrul- ed, where such evidence is not certified and re- corded by the justice, as required by Rev. St. c. 84, § 53.-Shallow v. Roux, 84 A. 999.
See Carriers, § 53; Chattel Mortgages, § 204: Constitutional Law, § 281; Depositions, § 56; Eminent Domain, § 10; Evidence, § 96; Exceptions, Bill of, $ 48; Highways, § 203; Insane Persons, §§ 33, 36; Insurance, § 535; Judicial Sales, §§ 11, 37; Landlord and Ten- ant, §§ 94, 152, 169; Mechanics' Liens, $$ 120, 296: Municipal Corporations, §§ 518, 586, 792, 812, 816, 821; Officers, § 35; Plead- ing, § 384; Principal and Agent, §§ 24, 177; Taxation, §§ 658, 734; Towns, § 19.
§ 72 (Me.) Defendant is entitled to a new trial, where the evidence is so overwhelming in See Criminal Law, § 814. his favor as to indicate that the jury did not give his evidence the weight it was entitled to, or were influenced by prejudice in finding for plaintiff.-Whitley v. Bean, 84 A. 268.
874 (Conn.) A new trial should not be grant- ed for error in insignificant items.-Cruthers v. Donahoe, 84 A. 322.
§ 74 (Me.) A verdict fixing the amount of loss in an action on a fire policy will not be disturbed by the Supreme Judicial Court, on motion for a new trial, where no bias, preju- dice, or improper motive on the part of the jury appears, though insured's evidence tended to show a loss considerably greater than the amount awarded, while insurer's evidence tend- ed to show a loss much less than that award- ed.-Guptill v. Pine Tree State Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 84 A. 529.
§ 76 (Conn.) In determining whether a dict should be set aside as excessive, the trial .court has a large discretion.-Cables v. Bristol
II. PUBLIC NUISANCES. (A) Nature of Injury, and Liability There-
§ 64 (N.J.Sup.) On an indictment charging a railroad company with creating and maintain- ing a nuisance by the negligent and excessive use of soft coal, proof to that effect, whereby a public nuisance was created, was sufficient to justify a conviction.-State v. Erie R. Co., 84 A. 698.
§ 67 (N.J.Sup.) Instructions given by defend- ant railroad company to its servants as to the proper and improper method of using soft coal is no defense to an indictment for a nui- sance created and maintained by the use of such coal.-State v. Erie R. Co., 84 A. 698.
(D) Criminal Prosecutions.
§ 93 (N.J.Sup.) While the use of soft coal by a railroad company is not per se a nui-
in a built-up and populous community is a
nuisance is for the jury.-State v. Erie R. Co., See Abatement and Revival, § 71; Contracts. §
See Sheriffs and Constables, § 10.
OBJECTIONS.
See Appeal and Error, §§ 185-255, 1078; Evi- dence, § 582.
186; Divorce, § 76; Insurance, § 156; Judg- ment, 668; Libel and Slander, § 73; Prin- cipal and Surety, § 119; Schools and School Districts, § 115.
V. DEFECTS, OBJECTIONS, AND
$95 (Me.) The allowance of an amendment to a writ, describing defendant as the "Atlan- tic Shore Railway Company, otherwise known as the Atlantic Shore Line Railway Com-
See Highways, § 68; Railroads, § 102; Waters pany," by striking out the word "Company" in and Water Courses, §§ 61, 162.
both places, was proper.-Berry v. Atlantic Shore Ry., 84 A. 740.
See Appeal and Error, § 1044.
II. ACTIONS FOR PARTITION. (B) Proceedings and Relief.
§ 81 (Pa.) Where a bill for partition shows that one defendant had a life interest only in a share of the estate, with remainder to his children, the court may, after decree and be- fore sale, appoint a trustee to represent the contingent rights of unborn children.-Shields v. Aitken, 84 A. 662.
§ 103 (Md.) A person who holds as trustee an undivided interest in property being parti- tioned is not precluded from purchasing the property at the sale, much less his wife.-White- ley v. Whiteley, 84 A. 68.
§ 106 (Md.) It was not ground for refusing to ratify a proper trustee's sale that a bidder labored under a mistake of law, and subse- quently from sentiment bid higher than the successful bidder.-Whiteley v. Whiteley, 84 A. 68.
§11 (N.J.Sup.) Since, under Act March 22, 1900 (P. L. 168) § 11, the term of office of wardens of penitentiaries of counties of the See Executors and Administrators, § 118. first class, appointed by the chosen freeholders under authority of section 6, is fixed at two years, an order of the Civil Service Commis- sion, placing such wardens in the classified serv- ice, was unauthorized.-Hosp v. Civil Service Commission, 84 A. 614.
(C) Eligibility and Qualification.
§ 35 (Md.) One's knowledge that he has been appointed to an office constitutes "notice" to him, within Code 1912, art. 70, § 11, which provides that an office is forfeited by failure to qualify within 30 days after receiving commis- sion or notice of appointment.-Little v. Schul, 84 A. 649.
See Judgment, §§ 68, 393.
See Evidence, §§ 471-547.
(B) As to Third Persons.
841 (Me.) Where persons purported to con- stitute themselves a manufacturing corpora- tion, but no legal organization was effected, they were liable to creditors as partners; and, there being an understanding that profits should be shared equally, they are equitably entitled to an equal division on cessation of the enterprise.-Smith v. Schoodoc Pond Pack- ing Co., 84 A. 268.
VI. DEATH OF PARTNER, AND SUR- VIVING PARTNERS.
§ 258 (Pa.) In an action by a bank against a son, as surviving partner of a firm composed of the defendant and his father, on a note in- dorsed by the father in the firm name as an accommodation of the maker, a verdict for plaintiff held sustained by the evidence.-Le- high Valley Nat. Bank v. Ott, 84 A. 507.
VII. DISSOLUTION, SETTLEMENT, AND ACCOUNTING.
See Municipal Corporations, §§ 63, 106, 281, (D) Actions for Dissolution and Account- 370, 625, 657, 721, 897, 907, 977.
ORPHANS' COURTS.
See Courts, §§ 2002, 202.
PARENT AND CHILD.
See Adoption, § 21; Damages, § 163.
PAROL EVIDENCE.
See Evidence, §§ 417-468.
8325 (Me.) Where persons engaged in a manufacturing enterprise become partners through invalidity of corporate organization, a receiver is properly appointed to wind up the affairs and distribute the profits, they hav- ing ceased business.-Smith v. Schoodoc Pond Packing Co., 84 A. 268.
§10 (Pa.) A bill to restrain maintenance of windows in a party wall and for damages held
properly dismissed where the wall was within the defendant's line, and land along the side of the lot was subject to the easement of an alley. -Benner v. Cassatt, 84 A. 780.
See Carriers, §§ 280-383; Shipping, § 166. PAUPERS.
See Charities, §§ 5, 22.
See Accord and Satisfaction, § 12; Insurance, § 604; Mortgages. § 567; Municipal Corpora- tions. §§ 859, 894. 898, 904, 977; Principal and Agent, § 92; Subrogation; Tender. I. REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY. § 22 (Del.Super.) The landlord, by retaining possession of a check sent him by the tenant as payment for his portion of the crops until aft- er the bringing of this suit to recover rent, without any attempt to return the check, es- topped himself from denying the sufficiency of the check as a tender of rent.-Donovan v. Ma- loney, 84 A. 1032.
V. RECOVERY OF PAYMENTS. § 89 (Del.Ch.) Ordinarily an action at law is the proper remedy for the recovery of mon- ey paid through the mistake of a debtor or the fraud of a creditor.-Clark v. Sipple, 84 A. 1.
§ 89 (Me.) In an action to recover money paid by executors to an attorney, evidence held to show that the payment was voluntary and with- out mistake of law or fact.-Hayes v. Lamond, 84 A. 411.
issue then living of any deceased brother or sister leaving no child was repugnant to the statute.-Sumner v. Westcott, 84 A. 921.
PERSONAL INJURIES.
See Appeal and Error, § 671; Bankruptcy. § 320, 391; Carriers, §§ 280-321, 331: Dan- ages, §§ 58, 62, 95-100, 130, 131; Estoppel, $ 68; Evidence, § 544; Innkeepers, § 10: Insurance, § 451; Master and Servant, §§ 85- 302; Mines and Minerals, § 118; Municipal Corporations, §§ 706, 796, 812, 816, 819, 821, 827; Negligence; New Trial. § 76; Rail- roads. §§ 275, 282, 324-350, 400; Shipping, § 166; Street Railroads, §§ 98-117; Trial, § 253; Witnesses, §§ 270, 379, 395.
See Constitutional Law. § 67; Eminent Do main, § 188; Equity, § 430.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS.
See Deeds, $$ 70, 196; Evidence, §§ 537, 544, 547; Good Will, § 6; Witnesses, § 270.
holding of oneself out to the public as a physi- 86 (Vt.) Under Acts 1904, No. 133, § 10, the cian and surgeon, without having a license, con- stitutes an offense, without actual practice as a physician and surgeon.-State v. Lindsay, 84 A. 612.
Acts 1908, No. 151, § 5, amending P. S. 5371. held not to affect the offense of holding oneself out as a physician or surgeon, created by Acts 1904, No. 133, § 10 (P. S. 5370), so that any invalidity in the act of 1908 would not affect the constitutionality of section 5370.-Id.
See Bail, § 62; Civil Rights, § 14; Damages, See Equity, §§ 169, 330. §§ 76-86.
I. OFFENSES AND RESPONSIBILITY
§ 12 (Del.Gen.Sess.) Perjury can be committed by an applicant for a marriage license in in- correctly stating the age of his intended wife, in violation of 26 Del. Laws, c. 244, only in case he knew the age of the woman to be dif- ferent from that stated, and either knowingly or willfully made a false answer as to such age. -State v. Dryden, 84 A. 1037.
"Knowledge," as used in the law of perjury, defined.-Id.
§ 13 (Del.Gen.Sess.) Subornation of perjury is the procuring of the commission of per- jury by inciting, instigating, or persuading a witness to swear falsely.-State v. Johnson, 84 A. 1040.
$14 (Del.Gen. Sess.) An attempt at suborna- tion of perjury held to be an attempt to in- duce a witness to swear falsely in a particu- lar case.-State v. Johnson, 84 A. 1040.
II. PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT. $ 27 (Del.Gen.Sess.) An indictment for subor- nation of perjury held to sufficiently charge the offense.-State v. Johnson, 84 A. 1040.
§ 4 (Conn.) Devises of the income of real estate to a son for life and upon his death to his son for life, with remainder to the brothers and sisters of the testatrix, or upon their de- cease within the duration of the life estates to their children, were not repugnant to the stat- ute against perpetuities, but a remainder over
See Abatement and Revival, § 3; Accord and Satisfaction, § 12; Action, § 27; Appeal and Error, §§ 172, 193, 197, 843, 870, 960, 1008, 1040, 1043, 1203; Bills and Notes, & 489; Carriers, §§ 183, 184, 314; Constitutional Law, §72: Contracts, §§ 338, 346; Corporations, §§ 513, 614; Courts, § 202; Divorce, § 91; Ejectment, §§ 26, 69; Equity, §§ 142-330; Executors and Administrators, § 85; Frauds, Statute of, § 152; Mandamus, § 165; Master and Servant, §§ 258-264; Mortgages, §§ 454- 459; Municipal Corporations, § 586; New Trial, 18: Partition, § 81; Replevin, § 69; Sales, $8 377, 379, 396, 435; Tender, § 22; Trial, 251; Trusts, § 387.
I. FORM AND ALLEGATIONS IN
$8 (Md.) Where fraud in obtaining a judg ment in justice's court is made the basis of an injunction to restrain further prosecution of the case appealed to the circuit court, the facts constituting the fraud must be set out.-Balti- more & O. R. Co. v. Latimer, 84 A. 377.
§ 18 (Del.Super.) Allegations in a declara- tion that defendant negligently and carelessly furnished an employé with "unsafe cars," "un- safe tracks," and "unsafe cars and tracks," were insufficient as too general.-Valerii v. Breakwater Co., 84 A. 222. II. DECLARATION, COMPLAINT, PE-
TITION, OR STATEMENT.
§ 64 (Del.Super.) Allegations in a declara- tion that defendant furnished an employé cars loaded with stone in a specifically unsafe man- ner, and furnished unsafe tracks upon which
XIII. DEFECTS AND OBJECTIONS, WAIVER, AND AIDER BY VER- DICT OR JUDGMENT.
§ 432 (Me.) In an action against an electric company for injury to an employé, variance be- tween allegation that a guy wire was in contact with an uninsulated part of an electric wire, and proof that the contact was at an insulated tiff.-Dunbar v. Hollingsworth & Whitney Co., portion, held immaterial, after verdict for plain- 84 A. 992. PLEDGES.
See Corporations, § 123.
VI. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS AND REPLEADER. $236 (Md.) Though Code Pub. Gen. Laws § 18 (Pa.) An assignment as collateral secu- 1904, art. 75, § 35, as to amendment of plead-rity, must be strictly construed.-In re De Ha- ings, is extremely broad in its terms, some de- ven's Estate, 84 A. 676. gree of discretion is necessarily reposed in courts in their exercise of the power to permit or refuse applications to amend.-Long v. Long, 84 A. 375.
$238 (Vt.) In determining whether an amend- ed declaration pleaded a cause of action differ- ent from that stated in the original declara- tion, it is proper for the court to take testi- mony outside the record.-Spear's Adm'r v. Armstrong, 84 A. 817.
§ 243 (Conn.) Where the complaint in a pro- ceeding before a court of limited jurisdiction failed to show jurisdiction, the court had no authority to authorize its amendment, since this would have constituted an exercise of ju- risdiction.-Woodmont Ass'n v. Town of Mil- ford, 84 A. 307.
§ 248 (Vt.) An amended declaration held not to plead a new and different cause of action.- Spear's Adm'r v. Armstrong, 84 A. 817.
$347 (Del.Super.) The statute requiring that plaintiff shall make the affidavit of demand is complied with, so as to prevent a judgment for defendant, where from an inspection of the af- fidavit the court is satisfied that the af- fidavit was made by plaintiff, though affiant does not swear that he is the plaintiff.-Newlin v. Adair, 84 A. 1028.
The affidavit of demand and caption, con- strued together, held to sufficiently show that the affidavit was made by plaintiff, so as not to prevent a judgment for plaintiff.-Id.
$50 (Pa.) Where a person holds stock as col- lateral under the agreement that on default he may either sell the stock or keep it on returning the note, he cannot on default have the stock transferred to his own name and keep the note. O'Neil v. Jamieson, 84 A. 911.
See Municipal Corporations, §§ 181, 757. POLICE POWER.
See Master and Servant, § 11; Municipal Cor- porations, § 625.
See Adverse Possession; Chattel Mortgages, § 162 Execution, § 278: Frauds, Statute of, § 139; Game, §§ 7, 9; Trespass, § 20.
See Trusts, § 169; Wills, §§ 692, 693. II. CONSTRUCTION AND EXECUTION.
33 (Pa.) Where there are sufficient funds in the estate of the donee of a power to pay her pecuniary legacies in full, there is no necessity for applying Act June 4, 1879 (P. L. 88), so as to throw them upon the trust fund: and it will not be assumed that the donee of the power in- tended so to exercise it.-In re Huddy's Estate, 84 A. 909.
§ 36 (Pa.) Under Act June 4, 1879 (P. L. 88), a power of appointment may be validly exercised without a recital thereof or direct reference thereto.-Lloyd v. Fretz, 84 A. 450.
§ 348 (Pa.) In an action to recover balance due on a building contract, an affidavit of de- fense alleging that the building had not been completed within the contract time, that de- fendant was entitled to liquidated damages un- PREPONDERANCE. der the contract, and that defendant, a bank, See Evidence, §§ 596, 598. was prevented from beginning business because of such delay and obliged to carry salaried of- ficers whose services were of no benefit because of the lack of the building, held sufficient to prevent summary judgment.-Price v. People's Bank of Borough of Parsons, 84 A. 790.
See Adverse Possession; Easements, § 9; Limi- tation of Actions.
XII. ISSUES, PROOF, AND VARIANCE. $384 (Del.Super.) Under the notice of re- See Appeal and Error, §§ 907-934. coupment, the defendant may prove any dam- ages growing out of the transaction between them.-Hawthorne v. Murray, 84 A. 5. $392 (Pa.) Where a suit is brought in the
name of an administratrix on a contract, and thereafter an amended statement is filed set- ting out a later agreement, and the cause of ac- tion is declared to be in the heirs and not in the administratrix, the action cannot be sus- tained by evidence of the earlier writing show- ing that defendant had failed to comply with its terms.-Pursel v. Reading Iron Co., 84 A.
Plaintiff cannot recover where he pleads a cause of action in one party, and proves a right to recover in another.-Id.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
See Attorney and Client; Brokers: Corpora- tions, §§ 281-333, 513, 653; Evidence, § 244; Executors and Administrators, § 118; Fraud, § 28; Insurance, $$ 59, 378. 379; Landlord and Tenant, § 94; Limitation of Actions, 142; Mechanics' Liens, § 120; Trial, § 60.
I. THE RELATION.
(A) Creation and Existence.
§ 23 (Me.) A salesman, in rendering services for a buyer of agricultural implements, held the buyer's, and not the seller's, agent.-Doyles-
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