named, were backing it. Isman knew his principal was a foreign corporation, and is presumed to have known that it had not registered in this state, and could not, therefore, legally transact any business here; but, with this knowledge, he induced the appellee to contract with him as agent for a principal having no corporate existence in this state. In entering into the contract he held himself out to the appellee as an agent for a company designated as owner of a building situated at Broad and Walnut streets, in the city of Philadelphia, and known as the Hepner Hair Emporium. This was presumably the place of the company's business, in which a part of its capital had been invested, and in which, by the terms of the contract with the appellee, Isman, as its agent, undertook to invest more for alterations and additions to the building. When the contract was signed, the Hepner Hair Emporium Company was utterly without authority to do any business within this commonwealth, and what it could not do itself it could not authorize any one else to do for it. Isman is presumed to have known its incapacity to do business here, and must bear the consequences of knowingly inducing another to contract with him as the agent of such a principal. He has shown nothing to relieve him from the rule as laid down in Lasher v. Stimson, 145 Pa. 30, 23 Atl. 552, where, in passing on the liability of Stimson, who had undertaken to contract for the Sudsena Manufacturing Company, a foreign corporation which had not registered here, we said, through Mr. Justice McCollum: "It is clear that the company could not authorize him to do business for it in this state, and that he must be regarded as cognizant of its noncompliance with the terms prescribed by our statute, and of its consequent incapacity. When a person assumes to act for another, knowing that he is not authorized to do so, he becomes personally liable to the party with whom he deals for or on account of his alleged principal. This doctrine is so familiar and well established that citation of authority for it is unnecessary. We think the case before us falls clearly within this principle. The appellant was not charged with the duty of inquiring whether the Sudsena Company was a foreign corporation, and, if so, whether it had complied with the laws which allowed it to transact business here, when, as the special verdict finds, he did not know 'that it was a corporation at all.' A citizen of this state, who has a business transaction with another as agent of a foreign corporation, may rely on the representation of the agent as to his authority, without releasing him from his common-law liability as principal, if it turns out that his action was unauthorized. In other words, his failure to make search in the office of the secretary of the commonwealth for the statement which the corporation ought to file there will not inure to the benefit of the person who falsely pretended that he was its duly constituted agent. We think that as the appellee acted without authority from the Sudsena Company, and it was nonexistent as to Pennsylvania, he is clearly liable to the appellant for the work done and goods furnished on his order while professedly acting in its behalf." [2] But it is contended by the appellant that, even if he is liable on the contract with the appellee, he cannot be held accountable for $4,042.72 of the balance claimed to be due, because these figures represent the cost of work done, either under verbal orders given by the architects or under their written orders, in which they failed to state the amount to be paid for the extra work. A requirement of the contract was that no alterations—that is, changes in the work as defined by the specifications-should be made except upon the written order of the architects, in which the amount to be paid for such alterations was to be stated. Unless this provision was waived, the appellant's right is to call for its enforcement. It is not disputed that the appellee did the extra work and furnished the extra materials charged for. On the contrary, in addition to an admission in the affidavit of defense, which was offered in evidence, it was admitted by appellant's counsel on the trial that the bill for the extras was correct in amount, and liability to pay for them was denied solely on the ground that they had not been ordered in the manner provided for in the contract. On December 11, 1907, appellant's architects wrote the appellee as follows: "On December 5 we sent to Mr. Felix Isman's office final certificate covering the balance due you on the Broad and Walnut street job. We enclose herewith memo. as to just how we made the account up." The admission of this letter is the subject of the first assignment of error. Its admission could not have injured the defendant, and we have not been informed by counsel for appellant why it should not have been admitted. It was a mere notice from the architects to the appellee that, as he had performed his contract, they had, in pursuance of their duties, sent to Isman, with whom he had contracted, a final estimate showing the amount due. The appellee was entitled to this notice, and proof that it had been given him by the architects did the appellant no possible harm. After the architects had approved the appellee's bill and given him a final certificate, he handed the same to the appellant, and the latter paid on that final certificate, without questioning it, $5,000, as follows: Two thousand five hundred dollars by his two individual notes, given December 23, 1907. and $2,500 by two similar notes, given February 19, 1908. The work was done by the STRUCTION. CON er or operator of an automobile outside the county in case of injuries done by negligent operation, etc., is a new provision, and does not amend Act July 9, 1901 (P. L. 614), regulating the service of process in actions at law, or any other act, and therefore does not violate Const. art. 3, § 6, relating to the amendment of statutes. appellee, was accepted by the appellant, and, | 5. STATUTES (8 141) — AMENDMENT upon the final certificate, which was in his hands, he gave his own notes to the appel-viding for service in actions against the ownAct April 27, 1909 (P. L. 272) § 24, prolee for $5,000 in payment on account of what was due. In giving a written order to the appellee to do some extra work, the architects, instead of stating the amount to be paid for it, merely directed the appellee "to keep an account of the cost of it." The clause upon which the appellant relies to relieve him from paying for a portion of the extra work must be regarded as having been waived. Upon a review of the whole case, we are of opinion that the direction of a verdict for the plaintiff was proper. The assignments of error are all overruled, and the judgment is affirmed. GARRETT v. TURNER. Cent. Dig. 88 48, 209; Dec. Dig. § 141.*] [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Appeal from Superior Court. Action by Harvey Garrett against Thomas Turner. From a judgment for plaintiff, affirmed by the Superior Court (47 Pa. Super. Ct. 128), defendant appeals. Affirmed. The opinion of the Superior Court, by Porter, J., was as follows: "The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for injuries to his person and (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. March 18, property, alleged to have been caused by the 1912.) 1. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 722*)-APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT-ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. On an appeal from a superior court, the assignments of error filed in that court to the judgment of the trial court should be set forth, and the alleged error in acting on those assignments specified. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2990-2996; Dec. Dig. § 722.*] negligence of the defendant in driving his motor vehicle on York road, a public highway in Montgomery county. The action was brought in Montgomery county, in which the damages were sustained; and the sheriff of that county deputized the sheriff of Philadelphia county, wherein the defendant resides, to serve the writ of summons, and the sheriff of the latter county, made a return of service, which is in all respects regular. The defendant moved to set aside the service upon the ground that the 'return is inAct April 27, 1909 (P. L. 265), providing correct, in that the person to whom the that, in actions for damages against the ownaforesaid summons and statement were ers of automobiles for injuries sustained in the handed was not an adult member of the famoperation thereof, service may be had in anily of the aforesaid defendant, nor did the other county than that where the accident occurred and the suit is brought, does not vio- said copy of the statement have indorsed late Const. art. 3, § 7, prohibiting the passage thereon a rule to plead; that, therefore the of local or special laws regulating the practice summons and statement have not been servor jurisdiction of courts, or changing the rulesed upon the said defendant in accordance of evidence in any judicial proceeding or inquiry before them. 2. STATUTES (8 85*)-SPECIAL LEGISLATIONAUTOMOBILES ILLEGAL OPERATION-PRACTICE OF COURTS. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 94, 95; Dec. Dig. § 85.*] 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 249*)-PROCESS (§ 49*)-EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS-CLAS sification. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 710; Dec. Dig. § 249;* Process, Cent. Dig. § 48; Dec. Dig. § 49.*] 4. VENUE ($ 19*)-CHANGE OF VENUE-STATUTES. Act April 27, 1909 (P. L. 265), authorizing service in actions for injuries caused by the negligent operation of automobiles in a county other than that in which the action is brought and the accident occurred, does not change the venue of the action, which cannot occur until the defendant has been brought in to court. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Venue, Cent. Dig. 33; Dec. Dig. § 19.*] with the provisions of the act of assembly for such case made and provided.' The court granted a rule to show cause why the service of the summons and statement should not be set aside. The defendant, this appellant, in support of this motion to set aside the service of the summons, took testimony tending to establish that his daughter, to whom the summons was handed at his place of residence, was only 19 years of age, thus contradicting the return of the sheriff that service had been made on an adult member of his family. "The question whether the rule to plead was properly served is entirely distinct from that of the service of the summons, and has been eliminated from the case by the act of the defendant in pleading without any rule having been taken upon him to do so. The court, after argument, overruled the motion to set aside the service of the summons and statement of claim, and the first four specifications allege error in this action. The only ground for setting aside the serv ice of the summons and statement suggested | consistent with the provisions of this statute, in the court below was that the return of the sheriff that they had been served on an adult member of the family of the defendant at his residence was untrue, in that the member of the family to whom the summons and statement were delivered was not an adult. The return was good on its face, and it ought not to have been set aside upon evidence aliunde tending to establish that it was not true. Park Bros. & Co., Ltd., v. Oil City Boiler Works, 204 Pa. 453, 54 Atl. 334; Ben Franklin Coal Co., Ltd., v. Penna. Water Co., 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 628. This having been the only question raised by the appellant in the court below, and he having gone to trial upon the merits, the first four specifications of error might properly be dismissed upon this ground. and had made it unlawful for such local authorities to exclude such motor vehicles from any 'public road open to horse-drawn vehicles.' The use and operation of any motor vehicle, as aforesaid,' referred to in the twenty-fourth section, is the use authorized by the preceding sections of the statute; that is, of every public road in the commonwealth, by duly registered motor vehicles. This section of the statute applies to all civil actions for damages arising from the use and operation of motor vehicles upon every highway in the state. The courts of the county where such damages were sustained always had jurisdiction of actions of this character. This section of the statute made no change in the jurisdiction of the courts; the only effect of the section, chal"The appellant now contends that the lenged by the appellant, related to the servtwenty-fourth section of the act of April 27, ice of process outside of the county in which 1909 (P. L. 265), entitled 'An act relating to the action was brought, when the residence motor vehicles,' etc., under the provisions of of the defendant was in another county. which the sheriff of Montgomery county, This provision as to the service of process where the damages were sustained, deputized | applies to the courts of all the counties of the sheriff of Philadelphia county, where the state. It cannot, therefore, be said to the defendant resided, to serve the process be local. in this proceeding, offends against that paragraph of article 3, § 7, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, which provides that the General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law 'regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing rules of evidence in, any judicial proceeding or inquiry before courts,' etc., and that, therefore, there was no authority for the service of this summons in Philadelphia county. The twentyfourth section of the act of 1909 (P. L. 272) provides that: 'All civil actions for damages arising from the use and operation of any motor vehicle, as aforesaid, may be brought in the city or county in which the alleged damages are sustained, and service of process may be made by the sheriff of the county where the suit is brought, deputizing the sheriff of the county wherein the defendant in the suit, or his registered agent, resides, or where service may be had upon him, under the existing laws of this commonwealth, in like manner as process may now be served in the proper county.' "The contention of the appellant is that it is special, in that it imposes a peculiar burden upon owners of motor vehicles, for the exclusive benefit of those who are injured by and have a right of action against them. This section of the statute does not relate simply to actions for damages against the owners of motor vehicles. It applies to all who become liable under existing laws to answer in damages because of the manner in which they use and operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway, whether they have owned, hired, or borrowed the vehicle. The owner or operator of a motor vehicle enjoys the benefit of this section of the statute with all other citizens, upon equal terms. If his motor vehicle is injured, or he suffers personal hurt, through the negligence, recklessness, or intentional misconduct of one operating another motor vehicle, this section of the statute puts it in his power to have his right to damages determined within the jurisdiction where the injury was suffered. The complaint of the appellant is that the recovery of damages for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, as well as for negligence in the management of horses upon a public highway, must both be in an action of trespass, and that all the proceedings in such actions, including the manner of the service of the writ, should be precisely similar, in order to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. "This section of the statute does not confer upon any court jurisdiction of any cause of action which it did not already possess, nor does it take from any court any jurisdiction with which it was already vested. The actions to which it relates are those 'for damages arising from the use and operation of any motor vehicle as aforesaid.' The preceding sections of the statute had provided for the registration of motor vehicles, pro- "The invention, development, and use of hibited their operation upon any public the automobile introduced an entirely new street or highway in the commonwealth un-element and revolutionized travel upon all til so registered, had provided regulations the highways of the state. The operation as to the manner of their use on the public roads, had taken away from the local au of these modern vehicles at exceedingly high rates of speed introduced a new element of lic highways. Negligence in the operation | is a legislative question, subject to judicial of motor vehicles involves great danger to revision only so far as to see that it is foundthe lives and property of others lawfully used on real distinction in the subjects classiing the highways. In former times, vehicles fied, and not on artificial or irrelevant ones, drawn by horses or oxen moved at a compar- used for the purpose of evading the constituatively low rate of speed, and, even in cases tional prohibition. If the distinctions are of a runaway, others upon the highway but genuine, the courts cannot declare the classiinfrequently had difficulty in avoiding injury | fication void, though they may not consider or danger. When vehicles so drawn were negligently managed, and injured the person or property of others, there was usually but little difficulty in locating the person responsible for the injury. Such vehicles did not usually travel long distances, and the person responsible for the injury inflicted by them could usually be found somewhere within the region where the cause of action arose. The modern vehicle, driven by an engine, is capable of traversing the state from one end to the other within a single day. Such vehicles make journeys far distant from the residence of the person responsible for negligence in their operation, thus making it difficult for the person injured, in person or property, to even ascertain the identity of the person responsible for his injuries, | classification or otherwise produce some diand still more difficult for him to obtain redress, in case he has to follow the negligent operator of the engine to some distant part of the state. it to be on a sound basis. The test is, not wisdom, but good faith in the classification.' Seabolt v. Commissioners, 187 Pa. 318, 41 Atl. 22; Foster Township Road Tax, 32 Pa. Super. Ct. 51; Durkin v. Kingston Coal Co., 171 Pa. 193, 33 Atl. 237, 29 L. R. A. 808, 50 Am. St. Rep. 801; Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, 43 Atl. 985; Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl. 198; Commonwealth v. Winkelman, 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 497. The constitutional requirement is that laws, upon the subjects designated by the section of the Constitution in question, shall be gen eral, not local or special, and uniformity of result is only one of the judicial tests applied to laws for the determination of their character as to generality. A law may by versity of result, and yet be general; for, where the classification is based on genuine distinctions, its expediency is for legislative determination. Stegmaier v. Jones, 203 Pa. 47, 52 Atl. 56. "These considerations led, in the earlier years following the introduction of this class "The act of April 27, 1909, established a of traffic, to the adoption of stringent police universal rule, which applies to all persons regulations with regard to the running of who operate motor vehicles upon any public motor vehicles on the highways of numerous highway within the commonwealth, and it is municipalities of the commonwealth. Each a general statute. Strine v. Foltz, 113 Pa. municipality had its own code of regulations, 349, 6 Atl. 206. The wide extent of country and the numerous codes greatly varied. covered by the movement of a motor vehicle Some of the requirements were perhaps un- renders it much more probable that, when reasonable. The operator of an automobile negligently operated, an accident may occur could form no idea, from reading the rules and an injury be inflicted in a county other of one municipality, what new regulations than that in which the operator has his resihe might have to observe when he crossed the dence. The ease and rapidity with which line into the jurisdiction of some municipal the operator of a motor vehicle may vanish neighbor. This was the condition of affairs from the scene where he has inflicted an inwhen the Legislature of the state assumed jury renders it much more difficult for the the duty, in the exercise of the supreme po- party injured to call the wrongdoer to aclice power with which it was invested, to count in the county where the injury was inestablish uniform regulations with regard to flicted and where the witnesses, by whom the this matter and limit the power of local au- negligence of the defendant must be estabthorities to the ordaining of regulations lished, reside, than is the case where injury which were not inconsistent with the uni- results from the negligent management of a form code. The act of April 27, 1909 (P. L. horse-drawn carriage. The operator of a 265), is the final expression of the legisla- motor vehicle, whose negligence has caused tive will upon this subject, and supersedes an injury on a public highway in a county all prior legislation inconsistent therewith. other than that in which he has his place This statute regulates the use of all public of residence, may not only at the time quickhighways within the commonwealth, and with ly withdraw from the county where the inregard to that use constitutes as a distinct jury has been inflicted but the speed at which class all those who operate motor vehicles he is able to move along the roads would upon public roads. Since the adoption of permit him to subsequently revisit that counthe new Constitution the right of the Legis- ty at his pleasure, without any risk of being lature to properly classify subjects of legis- served with legal process while he was withlation has been frequently declared and is in its boundaries. The negligent operator of now firmly established. 'Legislation for a an automobile has thus a manifest advantage elass distinguished from a general subject over the driver of a horse, in avoiding serv ed in the proper county." It is argued that the provision just quoted is special legislation, regulating the practice and jurisdiction in a judicial proceeding or inquiry before courts, and for that reason is in violation of the language of article 3, § 7, of the Constitution. negligence has caused an injury, and the in like manner as process may now be servparty injured is at a corresponding disadvantage in obtaining redress. It is on this difference that the discrimination in the act of 1909, with regard to the service of process, is founded, and it is a fair and constitutional basis for the legislative discretion. Kennedy V. Insurance Co., 165 Pa. 179, 30 Atl. 724; Clark's Estate, 195 Pa. 520, 46 Atl. 127, 48 L. R. A. 587. The first four specifications of error are dismissed. The contention of appellant is fully answered in the opinion of the Superior Court, where the question is carefully discussed, "The evidence produced by the plaintiff, and it is shown that the distinctions made if believed, was certainly sufficient to sustain by the act are genuine, and are based upon a finding that the defendant had operated his public needs which afford a proper basis for motor vehicle negligently upon the public the discretion exercised in the matter by the Legislature. As is pointed out by the Suhighway, and that the plaintiff had been injured in person and property as the direct perior Court, the section of the statute in result of such negligence. The defendant question neither adds to nor takes away testified, as did his witnesses, in a manner from the jurisdiction of any court in the which, if believed, entirely relieved him from commonwealth. The new element in the secall responsibility for the accident. The question is the authorization of service of process tion thus presented was one not of law, but of fact. That question was for the jury, and it would have been error for the court to have entered a judgment of nonsuit, or to have given binding instructions in favor of the defendant, or to have entered judgment in favor of the defendant non obstante veredicto. "All the specifications of error are overruled. The judgment is affirmed." Argued before FELL, C. J., and BROWN, POTTER, STEWART, and MOSCHZISKER, JJ. J. Ambler Williams and J. O. Eberhard, Jr., for appellant. Samuel H. High and John Faber Miller, for appellee. POTTER, J. This is an appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court, affirming the judgment of the court of common pleas of Montgomery county, in an action of trespass, to recover damages for the negligent operation of an automobile. outside of the county in which the action is brought, when the residence of the defendant is in another county. This provision applies to courts of all the counties of the state. It applies to all persons who render themselves liable, under existing laws, to answer in damages for the manner in which they operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway. [3] The people who own, use, or operate automobiles may very properly be classed together, and made subject to legislation which, though distinctive, is appropriate to them, provided the legislation applies to all within the class and affects them all alike. Trades, occupations, and professions are proper subjects of classification. Wheeler v Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338. In no proper sense can this statute be regarded as special in its application. It includes all the members of the class to which it applies; that is, all who negligently use or operate motor vehicles. The principle here involved was well illustrated in Clark's Estate, 195 Pa. 520, 46 Atl. 127, 48 L. R. A. 587, where it was held that a separate classification of surety, companies becoming security upon bonds of receivers, assignees, etc., so that the person for whom they were surety might claim credit in their accounts for the fees paid. was held to be within the power of the Legislature. The advantage afforded by corporate security over the individual surety was held to be sufficient to justify discrim[2] Appellant attacks the constitutionality ination in the act under consideration, and of that part of the twenty-fourth section of to afford a fair and constitutional basis for the act of April 27, 1909 (P. L. 265), which the legislative classification. As was there provides that "all civil actions for damages said by Mr. Justice Mitchell: "Constitutions arising from the use and operation of any are not to receive a narrow or technical or motor vehicle, as aforesaid, may be brought too literal construction. They get their auin the city or county in which the alleged thority from the adoption of the people, and damages were sustained; and service of they are to be read in a broad, and as far process may be made by the sheriff of the as possible untechnical, way to carry out county where the suit is brought deputizing their real purpose." Another illustration of a sheriff of the county where the defendant the principle that difference in conditions in the suit or his registered agent resides, constitutes a sufficient and proper basis for or where service may be had upon him, un- classification appears in Com. v. Fisher, 213 [1] The error assigned is that the Superior Court erred in affirming the judgment of the court below. This is not a proper specification. The assignments filed in the Superior Court to the judgment of the court of common pleas should be set forth, and the alleged error in acting upon those assignments should be specified. Mellick v. Railroad Co., 203 Pa. 457, 53 Atl. 340. |