tion district of said county "for the term of two years from the first Monday in May, 1912, or until duly discharged therefrom." The appellant on the 7th day of May, 1912, attempted to qualify by submitting a bond, as required by the Acts of 1892, c. 334, to the county commissioners for Anne Arundel county, but, as alleged in said petition, said commissioners refused to approve his bond, "not because it was not sufficient or in conformity with the laws of the state providing therefor, but solely upon the ground that under the Constitution of the state the aforesaid John B. Wells and John N. Davis held over in their aforesaid office of justices of the peace, that there was no vacancy in said offices, and that the Governor of Maryland had no right to make the appointment of the said Dennis Claude aforesaid, and that they had accordingly already, to wit, on the 23d day of April, 1912, approved the bonds of John B. Wells and John N. Davis submitted to them for approval." And on the said 7th day of May, 1912, he further attempted to qualify by offering to take the oath of office prescribed by the Constitution and laws of this state before George Wells, clerk of the circuit court for Anne Arundel county, one of the defendants, but he refused to administer the oath thus tendered because of the acts of the county commissioners in refusing to approve the bond, and for the reasons assigned by the said commissioners.

stable, the county commissioners of the county in which the vacancy occurs, or the mayor and city council of Baltimore, as the case may be, shall appoint a person to serve as constable for the residue of the term."

By section 19 of article 4 of the Constitution of 1851, justices of the peace and constables were elected by the legal and qualified voters of the election districts and wards of the city, respectively, and held their office for two years from the time of their election and until their successors in office were elected and qualified. It will be observed that this extension of the term of office "until their successors in office are elected and qualified" is not found in section 42 of article 4 of the present Constitution. And it is because of this omission that the appellant contends that the term for which the said Wells and Davis were appointed justices of the peace expired at the end of two years from the first Monday in May, 1910, and that, inasmuch as no action was taken by the Senate upon the nomination made to it by the Governor, as above stated, no appointment of their successors in office was made by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and thus after the expiration of said term of two years from the said first Monday in May, 1910, as contended by the appellant, the of fice became vacant, and the Governor was empowered to fill such vacancy.

It is, on the other hand, contended by the

appellees that we must not look alone to section 42 of article 4 of the Constitution to as

[1] The question here presented is the validity of the appointment of the appellant by the Governor. The power of the Governor to make this appointment is said by the appellant to be found in sections 42 and 43 of article 4 of the present Constitution, which are practically the same as sections 47 and 48 of the Constitution of 1864. These sections, so far as they are pertinent to the questioned by the Governor and Senate shall be nomhere presented, are as follows:

certain the full term of office for which Wells and Davis were appointed, but that in connection with section 42 we are to consider section 13 of article 2 of the Constitution, which provides that “all civil officers appoint

inated to the Senate within fifty days from the commencement of each regular session of the Legislature, and their term of office, except in cases otherwise provided for in this Constitution, shall commence on the first Monday in May next ensuing their appointment and continue for two years (unless removed from office) and until their successors, respectively, qualify according to law; but the term of office of the inspectors of tobacco shall commence on the first Monday in March next ensuing their appointment."

"Sec. 42. The Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint such number of justices of the peace, and the county commissioners of the several counties, and the mayor and city council of Baltimore, respectively, shall appoint such number of constables, for the several election districts of the counties, and wards of the city of Baltimore, as are now, or may hereafter be prescribed by law. * The justices of the peace and constables, so appointed, and commissioned, shall be conservators of the peace, shall hold their office for two years, and shall have such jurisdiction, duties and compensation, subject to such right of appeal, in all cases, from the judg-tively, qualify according to law," be made to ment of justices of the peace, as hath been heretofore exercised, or shall be hereafter prescribed by law.

"Sec. 43. In the event of a vacancy in the office of a justice of the peace, the Governor shall appoint a person to serve, as justice of the peace, for the residue of the term,

If section 13 of article 2 of the Constitution is to be read into section 42 of article 4, and the provision thereof in respect to the term of office, "until their successors, respec

apply to the office of justice of the peace, then we would have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion contended for by the appellees, that the term of office of Wells and Davis continued until the qualification of their successors appointed by the concurrent action of the Governor and the Senate, and, as there

ed. In deciding the question there raised it was not necessary for the court to have held. as it did, that the termination of the term of office of justices of the peace was regulated and fixed by section 47 of article 4 and section 16 of article 2 of the Constitution of 1864. Hebden, the appellee in that case, was in November, 1863, elected justice of the peace under the Constitution of 1851 for the term of two years from the time of his elec tion, and until his successor in office was elected and qualified, and upon the adoption of the Constitution of 1864 he was protected in his tenure of office by section 6 of article 12 thereof, which provided that he should hold and exercise his office according to his present tenure until he should be superseded pursuant to its provisions, and until his suc cessor be duly qualified. Such successor was to be nominated by the Governor to the Sen ate within 50 days from the beginning of a regular session of the General Assembly, and. upon confirmation by the Senate, his term of office was to commence on the first Monday of May thereafter. To this extent only were the provisions of section 16 of article 2 involved in the determination of the question

could be said to exist to be filled by the Gov-| Senate at an extra session, and not at a regernor. It thus becomes necessary for us in ular session of the General Assembly, that the determination of the question presented the validity of the appointment was assaïlby this appeal to determine whether or not section 13 of article 2 of the Constitution should be read into section 42 of article 4 of the Constitution, and made to apply to the term of office of justices of the peace. Our predecessors in discussing the case of Taylor v. Hebden, 24 Md. 202, relied upon by the appellees, said: "Whilst [the appellee was] thus in office, the people of the state in convention assembled framed and adopted a new Constitution, which went into effect on the 1st day of November, 1864. By it the tenure of office of justices of the peace was changed from election by the people to appointment by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the term of office to be two years. Article 4, p. 6, § 47. And by article 2, § 16, it is provided that 'all civil officers appointed by the Governor and Senate, shall be nominated to the Senate within fifty days from the commencement of each regular session of the Legislature; and their term of office, except in cases otherwise provided for in this Constitution, shall commence on the first Monday in May next ensuing their appointment, and continue for two years (unless sooner removed from office) and until their successors, respectively, qualify accord-presented in that case. The provision therein ing to law.' (It will be observed that this section is practically the same as section 13 of article 2 of the present Constitution.) "These provisions regulate the original appointments of justices of the peace (as distinguished from filling of vacancies), and fix the time for the commencement and termination of their office. The regular sessions of the General Assembly are biennial, the appointments of justices of the peace are to be made at each regular session, and their term of office shall commence on the first Monday in May next ensuing their appointment. No other time is fixed for this purpose in the Constitution. This mode allows a full session for the appointments to be made, and reasonable time for issuing their commissions and for their qualification for office. By it order and regularity are observed, and, after the first appointments under the Constitution shall have been made, the machinery of government in this branch of the public service will move on without interruption. Such is the obvious design of the Constitution in this respect." In the case from which we have just quoted, the appellant was in December, 1865, nominated to and confirmed by the Senate at an extra session of the General Assembly for justice of the peace. Section 16 of article 2 of the Constitution of 1864, then in force, provided that all civil officers appointed by the Governor and Senate should be nominated to the Senate within 50 days from the beginning of each regular session of the General Assembly. It was because of the

contained that those to whom the section was applicable should continue in office "for two years (unless sooner removed from office). and until their successors, respectively, qualify according to law," was in no wise involved in the determination of the question there presented. And therefore, as we have said. in deciding the question presented in that case, it was altogether unnecessary for the learned judge who delivered the opinion to have held, as he did, that this section considered in connection with section 47 of article 4 regulated and fixed the termination of the term of office of justice of the peace. It stated the time when the nomination should be made to the Senate and fixed the commencement of the term, for in these particulars section 47 of article 4 of the Constitution is silent.

As we have said, the extent of the term of office of justice of the peace, under the Constitution of 1864, was not presented in the case of Taylor v. Hebden, but in this case it is, and we are now to determine whether or not the extent of such term of office shall depend solely upon section 42 of article 4, which provides that they shall hold their office "for two years," or whether we shall read into that section, in extension of that term, the language found in section 13 of article 2. "and until their successors, respectively. qualify according to law." As we have said. under section 19 of article 4 of the Constitution of 1851, justices of the peace and constables were elected by the people. The lan

sors.

With these facts before us, it is unrea

office was that they "shall hold their office any words extending the term of office to for two years from the time of their election the appointment and qualification of their and until their successors in office are elect- successors, was agreed upon. ed and qualified." Vacancies in such offices were to be filled until the next general elec-sonable to assume that words similar to tion of said officers-those in the office of jus- those found in the Constitution of 1851, extice of the peace, by the Governor, and those tending the term of office of justices of the in the office of constable, by the county com- peace to the appointment and qualification missioners of the several counties and the of their successors, were unintentionally mayor and city council of Baltimore, re- omitted from the Constitution of 1864, and spectively. Under the Constitution of 1864, also from the Constitution of 1867. On the justices of the peace and constables were ap- contrary, we are rather forced to the conpointed, the former by the Governor, by and viction that the convention deliberately and with the advice and consent of the Senate, intentionally made the distinction between and the latter by the county commissioners justices of the peace and constables and other of the several counties and the mayor and officers provided for in the Constitution. The city council of Baltimore, respectively. Both provisions of section 16 of article 2 of the the justices of the peace and constables were Constitution of 1864 (practically the same as appointed for "two years," with no additional section 13 of article 2 of the Constitution of words such as are found in the Constitution 1867) are found in section 14 of article 2 of 1851, extending their term until the ap- of the Constitution of 1851; the only differpointment and qualification of their succes- ence therein being the insertion in the ConIn case of a vacancy in these offices stitutions of 1864 and 1867 of the italicized the same were to be filled for "the residue of words "except in cases otherwise provided the term." The vacancies in the office of for," which appear in section 16 of article justice of the peace were to be filled by the 2 of the Constitution of 1864 hereinbefore Governor, and those in the office of consta- fully set out. It cannot be said that section ble were to be filled by the county commis- 14 of article 2 of the Constitution of 1851 sioners of the several counties and the mayor applied to justices of the peace, for, under and city council of Baltimore, respectively, that Constitution, justices of the peace were as in the previous Constitution of 1851. The elected by the people, however much it may provisions of the Constitution of 1864, as to be contended that like words, "and until these offices, were practically copied into the their successors, respectively, qualify accordConstitution of 1867. In respect to all other ing to law," found in section 13 of article 2 appointive offices mentioned in the Constitu- of the Constitution of 1867, should be made tion of 1867, as we recall, words are found to apply to justices of the peace in extensimilar to those appearing in section 19 of sion of their term of two years, provided article 4 of the Constitution of 1851, extend- for in section 42 of article 4 of said Constiing the term of office "until their successors tution. Section 13 of article 2 of the presin office are elected and qualify," and, so far ent Constitution, under which the question as we have discovered, this is also true of here presented arises, as we have said, prothe elective offices, except judges of the or- vides that the term of the offices therein phans' court, surveyors, and wreckmaster of mentioned, to which the same is applicable, Worcester county. The absence of such shall commence at the time therein stated words in respect to these offices may be ex- and continue "for two years (unless removed plained by the fact that the authorities are from office), and until their successors, realmost unanimous in holding that if a Con- spectively, qualify according to law," except stitution or statute, without expressly fixing in cases otherwise provided for in the Conthe term of office, merely provides that there stitution. Therefore to make this section, shall be an election or appointment annually or at stated periods, the one so elected holds over until his successor qualifies. 23 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 1013.

As disclosed by the debates of the convention of 1864, different views were entertained by the different members thereof as to the manner of filling the office of justice of the peace. Some were for the appointment of them by the judges, others favored their appointment by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, while some advocated their election by the people as under the previous Constitution. After much discussion, with the provisions of the Constitution of 1851 constantly before the convention, the section as we now

in respect to the extent of the term of office, applicable to justices of the peace, or in fact to any other office, it must be shown that no provision has been made elsewhere in the Constitution for such term of office. This cannot be said of the term of the office of justice of the peace, when by section 42 of article 4 it is expressly provided that justices of the peace shall hold their office for two years.

The term of office of justice of the peace is for two years, and not two years and until their successors are appointed and qualify, as it would be if the language found in section 13 "until their successors, respectively, qualify according to law," were made applicable thereto. If the term fixed by sec

for example, instead of two, it could not be expiration of the term for which he was pretended that section 13 of article 2 would apply, as it would have been in direct conflict with section 42, which made special provision for these offices. How, then, can it be said that it can change the "two years" to "two years and until their successors qualify" simply because the term named in section 42 happens to be two years? It does not say that all civil officers appointed for two years shall continue for two years and until their successors qualify, as the Constitution nowhere says that all officers appointed or elected for a definite term shall continue until their successors are elected and qualified.