wherever situated, unless the owner shall sub- | 1909, which was upheld in Reading v. Miller, mit his dairy and herd to inspection, and is not void because it provides for an inspection of places of licensees in the city limits and within 20 miles thereof, and a revocation of the license, if the premises are unsanitary, or inspection is refused. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Food, Cent. Dig. § 1; Dec. Dig. § 1.*] 45 Pa. Super. Ct. 28. But, whilst there the ordinance was attacked upon certiorari to the judgment of a magistrate inflicting its penalties, this proceeding is, in affirmance complainant of a license to sell milk under of its validity, to compel the issuing to the it. Relying upon it for the right he asserts Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, and the duty he asks to have enforced, he is Berks County. Petition by Henry K. Hill for writ of mandamus to George R. Fetherolf. From an order refusing the petition, petitioner appeals. Affirmed. bound to bring himself within it by showing compliance on his part with its provisions. The utmost he can be permitted to do in the way of questioning any one of those is to show that it does apply to him, or that, ap The title and material portion of the or- plying to him, it imposes upon him a condi tion which cannot be lawfully imposed. In of the ordinance, he may be heard to contend that event, conceding the general validity that he is entitled to its benefits without conforming to the disputed provision. So circumscribed, this case presents, upon the pleadings as amended by agreement of counsel, the single inquiry whether the defendant, as meat and milk inspector for the city of Reading, was justified in refusing to plaintiff the license he sought under the or dinance because the owner of the herd from which the milk came declined to permit a previous inspection of his herd and prem "In section 3, the ordinance enjoins upon the inspector strict observance of the rules and regulations of the board of health. The answer sets forth and the demurrer necessarily admits (Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 Pa. 132, 143, 53 Am. Dec. 450; Miller v. Canal Com'rs, 21 Pa. 23, 26: Commonwealth v. Dickinson, 83 Pa. 458, 460; Getty v. Pa. "Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the inspec-ises. tor to visit as often as may to him seem necessary in the city of Reading and within twenty miles of the city limits, the butchering shop and business places of all persons holding a license to sell meat or milk in the city of Reading, or where animals are slaughtered or meat or meat food products are prepared or stored, or where milk is kept, for the purpose of ascertaining wheth-Inst. for Instruction of Blind, 194 Pa. 571, er such places are in a sanitary condition, and take samples for chemical analysis, and if found unsanitary, or if such person shall refuse to allow said inspector to examine said premises, then the inspector shall immediately certify said fact to the board of health, and after due notice to such licensee, and after a hearing before said board of health, said license may be revoked. 575, 45 Atl. 333) that those rules and regulations require, before issuance of a license to sell milk in the city, an inspection, by the inspector, of the herd producing the milk to be sold by the applicant and of the premises where such herd is kept, and that they also require the application for the license to be made in the form in which it was in this case demanded. In addition, it is pro"Sec. 6. On and after the passage of this vided in section 6 that the order of the inordinance all dealers and vendors, and all spector entitling an applicant to a license persons who sell or offer for sale milk, meat upon payment of the license fee shall be and meat products in the city of Reading, made after inspection. Granted, as it must shall, upon order of the milk and meat in- be, that the regulation of the sale of milk spector, after proper inspection as to the within its limits is among the lawful police sanitary conditions, pay into the city treaspowers of a city, there is no reasonable ury the sum of ten dollars ($10.00) and re-ground for doubting that an examination inceive therefor a receipt, presentation of to the sanitary conditions of the herds and which at the office of the milk and meat in their surroundings is an essential part of spector shall entitle him to a license; Pro- it. Indeed, without that every other method vided, that all the provisions and require of regulation must inevitably fall far short ments as contained in the following sections of accomplishing its main and legitimate are complied with." Endlich, P. J., filed the following opinion in the common pleas: "This case arises under an ordinance of the City of Reading approved February 4, purpose. "But it is objected that, in so far as the inspection of herds and of the premises where they are kept is to be made beyond the territorial boundaries of the city, the lat ter has no authority to require it to be made, or to make it, through its officer. This contention is well answered in State v. Nelson, 66 Minn. 166, 68 N. W. 1066, 34 L. R. A. 318, 61 Am. St. Rep. 399 (reaffirmed by the same court in State v. Elofson, 86 Minn. 103, 90 N. W. 309), where, under statutory authority to provide by ordinance for the inspection of milk and dairy herds within the limits of a city, the latter was held warranted in exacting that an applicant for a license to sell milk in the city consent to an inspection by the municipal officer of the herds yielding the milk to be sold though such herds be kept beyond the city limits. The language of the former decision so fully and exactly covers the question as it arises in this case that it may be here adopted without attempting to add anything to it. Says the court: "The objection is that the provisions of the ordinance are not within the limits prescribed for it by the statute, for the reason that it is attempted to make its operation extraterritorial, in that it provides for the inspection of dairies and dairy herds outside the city limits. There is no merit in this point. The manifest purpose of the statute under which this ordinance was passed was to enable the city council to adopt such reasonable police regulations as would prevent the sale of unwholesome milk within the city. * It is a matter of common knowledge that much of the milk sold in a city is produced in dairies outside the city limits. Any police regulations that did not provide means for insuring the wholesomeness of milk thus brought into the city for sale and consumption would furnish very inadequate protection to the lives and health of the citizens. It is also a matter of common knowledge * that the whole someness of milk cannot always be determined by an examination of the milk itself. To determine whether it does or does not contain the germs of any contagious or infectious disease, it is necessary to inspect the animals which produce it. The inspection of dairies or dairy herds outside the city limits provided for by this ordinance applies only to those whose milk product it is proposed to sell in the city. The provisions of the ordinance in that regard go only so far as it is reasonably necessary to prevent the milk of diseased cows being sold within the city. This inspection is wholly voluntary on the part of the owner of the dairy or dairy herd. If he does not choose to submit to such inspection, the result merely is that he or the one to whom he furnishes the milk cannot obtain a license to sell milk within the city. The ordinance has no extraterritorial operation, and there has been no attempt to give it any such effect. The only subject on which it operates is the sale of milk within the city.' "Logically this disposes also of the plain tion of herds and premises beyond the city limits by the city's inspector the ordinance contravenes the declaration of section 8, Act May 25, 1907 (P. L. 234), that 'local meat inspectors shall have jurisdiction only within the limits of the city * * by and for which they are appointed,' even if that limitation, occurring in a statute exclusively relating to meat and meat food products, could be understood as applying to the defendant in his capacity as milk inspector, which, it would seem, it cannot. It thus appears to be plain that under the ordinance of February 4, 1909, an applicant for license to sell milk in the city of Reading must secure his supply from a person who is willing to submit to a previous inspection of his herd and premises, and that, if he does not choose to do so, the inspector, the defendant in this case, is not only justified in refusing the application, but forbidden to allow it. It may be added that this case properly presents no question under section 5 of the ordinance, which, it is argued, discriminates between herd owners within or beyond 20 miles of the city in a manner conflicting with Sayre Boro. v. Phillips, 148 Pa. 482, 24 Atl. 76, 16 L. R. A. 49, 33 Am. St. Rep. 842, and similar cases. Without stopping to note the obvious objections to this view, it is to be observed that the record does not disclose as a fact that the herd supplying the plaintiff is kept within twenty miles of the city. If not, the alleged discrimination cannot affect the plaintiff, and he has no standing to object to the ordinance on that ground, both because of the nature of this proceeding above pointed out, and because of the principle laid down in Rothermel v. Meyerle, 136 Pa. 250, 20 Atl. 583, 9 L. R. A. 366. But, apart from this, section 5 does not provide for the inspection of herds and premises preliminary to the granting of a license (which is all we have to do with here), but for recurring subsequent inspections of premises and a revocation of the license if they be found unsanitary or if permission to inspect them be refused. The point made by plaintiff with reference to the provisions of this section can become pertinent, if at all, only in a case where a license once granted is attempted to be revoked. "And now, June 24, 1911, judgment is entered for the respondent that the peremptory mandamus be refused, and that the respondent have his costs." Argued before FELL, C. J., and BROWN, MESTREZAT, ELKIN, and STEWART, JJ. William Kerper Stevens, of Reading, for appellant. Henry P. Keiser, of Reading, City Solicitor, for appellee. ELKIN, J. The questions involved in this case have been so fully considered in the opinion of the learned court below that little need be said here in disposing of this appeal. was sustained in Reading v. Miller, 45 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, and we see no reason to disturb the conclusion reached in that case. It is contended for appellant that the ordinance is, in effect, a trade regulation, and not an exercise of police power. This position was sufficiently answered by the learned court below on the authority of State v. Nelson, 66 Minn. 166, 68 N. W. 1066, 34 L. R. A. 318, 61 Am. St. Rep. 399, and State v. Elofson, 86 Minn. 103, 90 N. W. 309. city of Reading, regardless of the number of miles he may live from the city. The ordinance deals primarily with the sale of milk in the city, and the inspection of herds is but incidental to this general purpose. The owners of herds cannot be compelled to submit to inspection, but the city can say that the milk cannot be sold within the city without such inspection. It is entirely voluntary on the part of owners whether they shall have their herds inspected or not, but when the milk is offered for sale in the city either by the owner, or by a dealer, it is the right of the city under its police power to say that such sale cannot be made until there has been a proper inspection, and that no dealer shall be licensed to sell milk from any herd no matter where located without such inspection. The law and the ordinance are based upon the power of municipalities to protect the health of the people by providing for the sale of pure milk, and such laws have been uniformly sustained by the courts. If an applicant can produce the written consent of a single owner to inspect his herd, and the inspection of that herd is satisfactory, he would be entitled to his license, but he could only sell milk from the herd thus inspected, and could not under a license thus granted sell milk from herds not inspected, nor from herds, the owners of which refused to give their consents to inspect. Under the ordinance involved in this case all applicants are put upon the same basis, and there is no such discrimination as was pointed out in Sayre Boro. v. Phillips, 148 Pa. [2] But it is argued that section 5 of the ordinance provides, as a condition precedent to the granting of the license, that the applicant must secure the consents of the owners of herds and premises for the purpose of inspection within 20 miles of the city of Reading, and need not secure such consents from persons residing beyond the 20-mile limit. The effect of this limitation, it is urged, is either that no milk purchased beyond the limit can be sold in the city, or that such milk can be sold without an inspection; and, in either event, the result would be unjust discrimination. This construction would give the section under consideration an effect not warranted by its language and not intended by the municipal authorities. Section 5 imposes the duty of inspection upon the inspector, and does not relate to the licensing of applicants to sell milk. It does not provide for the inspection of herds and premises preliminary to the granting of the license; but for the inspection after a license has been granted and for a revocation of such licenses if the premises are found to be unsanitary, or if permission to inspect be refused. We therefore agree with the suggestion made by the learned court below that these "provisions of this section can become pertinent, if at all, only in a case where a license once granted is attempted to be revoked." Then, again, the record here presented is barren of any facts upon which to raise the question of the duty of the inspector to inspect either within or without the 20-mile limit. The duty of inspection generally is entirely foreign to the question here involved, which is the right of the inspector to refuse a license to appellant because he has not complied with the antecedent conditions upon which his application depends. The licensing of dealers in and vendors of milk is provided for by section 6 of the ordinance, and is dependent upon the HILLIARD et al. v. STERLINGWORTH RY. provisions and requirements of that and subsequent sections, and not upon the provisions of section 5, which relate to the duties of the inspector after the license has been granted. We agree with the contention of the learned counsel for appellee that under the provisions of section 6 all premises and herds are required to be inspected before the issuance of the license without reference to the 20-mile limit. This applies to every owner of a herd who desires to sell milk in the St. 482, 24 Atl. 76, 16 L. R. A. 49, 33 Am. Rep. 842. That case and the line of cases relied on to sustain it have no application to the facts of the present case. In no proper legal sense can what was done in the case at bar be considered a trade regulation. Under the ordinance, all dealers in or vendors of milk in the city are subjected to the same regulations, and must submit to the same kind of inspection. There is no discrimination, and all are required to obey the provisions of the law intended as a protection to the consumers of milk. Judgment affirmed, with costs. SUPPLY CO. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. April 15, 1912.) 1. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 733*) — ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR-ORDER OR DECREE. An assignment of error to an order or decree which does not quote the order or decree of which complaint is made is incomplete, and will not be considered. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3025-3027; Dec. Dig. § 733.*] 2. RECEIVERS (§ 203*)—ACCOUNTING-VOUCH- | Supply Company. The exceptions were disING ACCOUNT. missed, and the accounts were confirmed. Both of the exceptants have appealed from the decree. The assignments of error are identical in each appeal, and the appeals were argued as one, and both will be disposed of in this opinion. The refusal to vouch the accounts of a receiver will not be reversed where the account contains hundreds of items, and, though warned by the court to file specific exceptions, the exceptants filed only an exception of a general character. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Receivers, Cent. Dig. §§ 404-406; Dec. Dig. § 203.*] 3. RECEIVERS (§ 114*) - ACCOUNTING BURSEMENTS. DIS Where an order of court authorized a receiver to employ certain persons, and no appeal was taken, and the compensation was not improper, exceptions to the payment will not be sustained. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Receivers, Cent. Dig. §§ 201, 202; Dec. Dig. § 114.*] 4. RECEIVERS (§ 203*)-ACCOUNTING-SALES [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Receivers, Where no abuse of discretion is shown in the allowance of counsel fees and compensation to a receiver, exception to the allowance will not be sustained. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Receivers, Cent. Dig. §§ 404-406; Dec. Dig. § 203.*] 6. RECEIVERS (§ 203*)-SALES-PURCHASE BY RECEIVER Where, with the leave of court, a receiver purchases property of the trust estate, and after confirmation of the sale operates it on his own account and organizes a corporation for that purpose, no question can be raised at the audit of his account as to his conduct of the business after the confirmation of the sale. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Receivers, Cent. Dig. §§ 404-406; Dec. Dig. § 203.*] Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Northampton County. Action by Clinton Hilliard and others against the Sterlingworth Railway Supply Company. From a decree dismissing exceptions Frank W. Coolbaugh, a creditor, and Edward Van Orden, trustee in bankruptcy, of the Supply Company, to account of William J. Kuebler, receiver of defendant company, exceptants appeal. Affirmed. Argued before MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, STEWART, and MOSCHZISKER, JJ. [1] Counsel for appellee filed a motion to quash these appeals, upon the ground of informality in several respects. The final decree of the court below is not assigned for error; nor were the opinions of the court below printed, or presented by appellants, when the appeals were argued in this court. Assignments of error to orders and decrees have been made, without quoting the order or decree of which complaint is made. Such assignments are incomplete, and should not be considered. Cessna's Estate, 192 Pa. 114, 43 Atl. 376. The motion to quash might very properly be sustained. [2] But of the 14 assignments of error filed, only one was pressed at the argument, or supported in the printed brief. That was the fourteenth, which alleged error in the refusal of a request that the accounts of the receiver be vouched by the court. In denying this request, the court referred to the reasons for its action set forth at length in its opinion filed April 11, 1911. He there said: "We have carefully examined these acCounts. If there was anything the matter with the accounts, it would have been easy for the exceptant to indicate it. We will not require an accountant to bring all his books and vouchers before the court on a general exception." This position was well The requirement that an exceptant should specify wherein as account is wrong, instead of relying upon a general objection, is so reasonable that it needs no argument taken. in its support. Aside from this, by a previous order, the court below had warned exceptants that the exceptions to the accounts of the receiver must be specific, and not general, and must be filed in writing, verified by affidavit. The record shows that the receiver filed three accounts; one covering the period from the date of his appointment, February 12, 1907, to April 1, 1908. A supplemental account brought it down to May 1, 1908, and the final account covered the period from May 1, 1908, to February 23, 1911. These accounts contained hundreds of items of the receipts and expenditures in the ordinary routine of the business as conducted by the receiver. Apparently the entries were made as a matter of clerical routine by those in charge of the POTTER, J. The accounts of William J. accounts; and it was asking but little of the Kuebler, as receiver of the Sterlingworth exceptants to point out any items deemed Railway Supply Company, were filed in the objectionable among so many which presumcourt of common pleas of Northampton coun- ably were correct. The final account was ty. Exceptions were filed thereto by Frank filed February 27, 1911. The case was set W. Coolbaugh, a creditor, and by Edward down for hearing on March 27th, upon moVan Orden, trustee in bankruptcy of the tion for the absolute confirmation of the John G. Johnson and Bernard Gilpin, both of Philadelphia, for appellants. H. J. Steele and F. W. Edgar, both of Easton, for appellee. made to the credit claimed for the payment of the purchase money to the receiver individually on account of the mortgage which he held upon the property sold. The sale for the price received and the application of the purchase money to the mortgage were both expressly authorized by order of the court made November 9, 1907. Subsequently the court granted, and afterwards discharged, a rule to show cause why the order of sale should not be vacated and set aside. No appeal was taken from this or der. The fifth, sixth, and seventh assignments allege error in dismissing exceptions requesting that the receiver should be charged with the value of certain patent rights, furniture and fixtures, patterns, etc. These were sold under an order of sale of September 24, 1908. and the sale was afterwards confirmed, and no appeal was taken from the decree of confirmation. three accounts and final report of the re- | upon that account, and objection was also ceiver, and for his discharge. On March 18, 1911, exceptions were filed to the accounts by each of the present appellants, being the same in each case, and on March 27th argument was had on these exceptions. On April 11th the court made an order dismissing the exceptions other than the first, ninth, tenth, and eleventh, which were reserved for further hearing. On April 24th a hearing was had on the reserved exceptions, and testimony taken. It was not until after this date that exceptants filed a paper requesting that the accounts be vouched by the court. Under the circumstances, and in the absence of any specific exception to any item of the accounts, we think that the court below very properly exercised its discretion in refusing to reopen the case and require the production of the mass of vouchers, which would have been required to meet the general request of exceptants for the vouching of all the items. In its opinion of April 11, 1911, the court below points out that it had given notice that any questions legitimately arising as to the surcharge of the receiver, and as to the propriety of any of the credits claimed by him, would be, considered upon exceptions to the accounts, filed with definite specifications in accordance with the rules of court. If appellants had any meritorious objections to make to the accounts, they were at liberty to present them in the proper way. They apparently did not see fit to do so. We are satisfied that the fourteenth assignment, which is the only one which was pressed upon the oral argument, is without merit. While the other assignments of error were not urged in the argument, they were not formally abandoned, and they have therefore been carefully examined. [3] The first assignment is to the dismissal of an exception to the payment of salary to the general manager employed by the receiver. He was employed by an order of court made March 23, 1907, to which there was no exception; nor was there any appeal taken therefrom. It is not contended that the salary paid to him was excessive or more than his services were worth. [4] The second assignment alleges error in dismissing an exception to the purchase by the receiver of the real estate and plant of the company. Express permission was given by the court to the receiver to bid at the sale. Exceptions to the sale were filed May 24, 1909, by Van Orden, trustee, one of the appellants, and these exceptions were dismissed, and the sale confirmed absolutely. No appeal was taken from the decree confirming the sale. The third and fourth assignments allege error in dismissing exceptions relating to the sale by the receiver of machinery, tools, etc., for less than the alleged value thereof. The eighth assignment alleges error in dismissing the eighth exception, which asked that the receiver be surcharged with the amount of certain receiver's certificates used for the payment of claims of creditors, which had matured prior to the receivership. Appellants pointed out nothing in the accounts upon which this particular exception was based. [5] The ninth and tenth assignments allege error in dismissing the ninth and tenth exceptions to the allowance claimed by the receiver for counsel fees and for his own compensation. Appellants do not show that there was any abuse of the discretion which is vested in the court below in such matters; nor did they offer any evidence to overcome the presumption that the allowance made by the court below was proper. The eleventh assignment alleges error in dismissing the eleventh exception, to the payment of the compensation of one of the skilled mechanics employed by the receiver in conducting the business. There was tes timony that the services rendered by this employé were both necessary and profitable, and that the compensation was reasonable. There was no testimony to the contrary. [6] The twelfth and thirteenth assignments of error are to the exclusion of offers of testimony made by appellants on the final hearing. The first offer was to show that the receiver, after he had purchased the plant of the company by leave of the court, and after the sale to him had been confirmed, operated on his own account, and afterwards organized a corporation for that purpose. Any evidence as to his conduct of the business thereafter was entirely irrelevant to the inquiry. The second offer of evidence was to show that the manager employed by the receiver had been paid for services in matters not included in the accounts. No |