of the author. As a speculative work it is certainly inferior to the earliest regular treatise on government, the Politics of Aristotle; and it must now be considered rather as a subject of literary history than a living oracle of political wisdom. Mr. Bentham, on the other hand, sets out, like a German professor, with a regular apparatus of scientific principles. The object which (according to Mr. Dumont) he always has in view, is the prevention of evil; the standard by which he judges all actions and institutions is, general utility, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number.* The two false principles which have (he conceives) chiefly misled political writers are, religious ascetism and caprice; which last is resolved into two branches, sympathy and antipathy. He supposes that human nature is every where essentially the same, being subject only to accidental varieties. So far, it must be owned, there is no great novelty. The doctrine, that the happiness of the community is the object of government, is at least as old as the Politics of Aristotle; and even Montesquieu, if it had been mentioned to him, must have admitted it. But it seems to us, that Mr. Bentham's great merit lies not in discovering but applying this criterion, and shewing the importance of constantly keeping it in view. Clavum adfixus et hærens Nusquam amittebat, oculosque sub astra tenebat. There are many truths which, though known to mankind, are practically neglected and overlooked. For this reason, we think, that some late remarks of a contemporary journal on Mr. Bentham's greatest happiness principle,' (as he is pleased to call it,) are not quite fair. Although this phrase may degenerate into a mere catchword, like the Protestant Consitution,' or the Rights of Man,' it is of the first importance that a political writer should keep in mind the proper object of his speculations. That such simple truths may be known, and yet not used, is proved by Montesquieu's three ends of government-honour, moderation, and virtue. If Montesquieu can prove, that any institution, however barbarous or oppressive, would lead to honour in a monarchy or to virtue in a democracy, the matter is finished.† Whatever nickname, therefore, * Mr. Bentham has now rejected this phrase on account of its ambiguity. By 'greatest number' he meant greatest possible number.' It has been construed to mean, the majority,' or the 'greater number.' We could add many other examples, if it was necessary. For instance, Hume says, 'that the ends for which government was originally instituted, are the distribution of justice and the equal protection of the citizens.'-History of England, App. II. These, no doubt, are two of the principal, but not the only objects of government. Mr. Mr. Bentham may give to this principle, he is highly to be praised for making it the pole-star of his course, nor suffering himself to be led astray by any delusive meteors which might cross his path.* But it is on his discoveries of new means for attaining this end that Mr. Bentham's fame must ultimately rest. And here he seems to have been frequently guided by one of those false principles which he so much decries, viz.-antipathy. Seeing the bad effects of prejudice and attachment to the wisdom of ancestors, Mr. Bentham rushes to the opposite extreme, and seems always to think that the existence of an institution is a positive reason why it should not exist. So captivated is he with the beauty of his own inventions, that he overlooks the advantages which established institutions sometimes possess, and uses arguments in favour of his own proposals which he will not allow to weigh in favour of the customs which he attacks. Thus, in the book before us, he will not admit the division of labour to be any argument in favour of the separation of civil and criminal courts, because this separation exists: but he urges it as a reason for the separation of the professions of lawyers and judges, because it does not exist. The general character of his suggestions is novelty, ingenuity, and contrivance. He evidently loves his own speculations wit the affection of a father; and this frequently blinds him to their imperfections, and to the merits of other more common sys ems. Hence it is especially necessary, in reading his works, totkeep the judgment free and the belief suspended; which makes it the more unfortunate that he should have become the object of worship to a sect who would esteem it a sin to question his authority, and who exhibit the usual sectarian failings of clinging, with the greatest tenaciousness, to the worst errors of their High-Priest. We hardly ever remember to have read a book which contained more that is valuable and more that is worth * Mr. Dumont praises his author's method of reasoning from the general principles of human nature, and not, like Montesquieu, by collecting insulated facts. This method, in the excess to which Mr. Bentham has carried it, is liable to great danger; but we cannot accede to the objections which have lately been made to this mode of argument generally. If the first principles are true and the reasoning correct, the conclusions must likewise be true. The great danger is, that the general principles will either be false or contain ambiguous words. It is singular, that in the criticism alluded to, the writer has detected both the assumption of false propositions and the ambiguity of middle terms: and yet he lays the fault with the syllogistic method of reasoning, or the absence of induction. In inductive reasoning it is just as possible to assume false premises or to argue incorrectly.—See Edinburgh Review, No. 98. pp. 161, 188. The remark of Aristotle, on Plato's political speculations, applies with great aptitude to Mr. Bentham's. Τὸ μὲν οὖν περιστὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι, καὶ τὸ κομψὸν, καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον, καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν, Polit. ii. 4. p. 320 Α. N 2 less less than the work which we have just examined. The whole, moreover, whether true or false, is laid down in the same magisterial and dogmatic air, and the same quiet assumption of superiority. Mr. Bentham can scarcely ever refrain from calling the doctrine which he attacks a prejudice, and imputing interested motives to those who maintain it. In a part of his book which we have not noticed, he says that the opponents to a code are divided into two classes, impostors or dupes-as if it was impossible that a person could dissent from Mr. Bentham on sincere and solid conviction! In which of these two classes he may include us, for the opinions which we have expressed in this article, we neither know nor care. There are very many institutions in our Utopia different from the established order of things but neither the exclusion of lawyers from the judicial office, nor their total suppression, is among them. In the meantime, we have no doubt that Mr. Bentham has adopted these notions after diligent and anxious consideration; and we are willing to consider him neither a dupe nor impostor, although he happens to differ from us in opinion.* ART. VIII.-Prose e Versi di Giovan Battista Niccolini. Milano. Silvestri, 1826. MR. R. Niccolini's name is not unknown in this country to lovers of Italian literature, and we ourselves have had occasion to speak of one of his tragedies in a former number.† The little volume before us contains but one of his tragedies, namely, Polissena. We regret this the less, as we have no intention to occupy ourselves at present with the dramatic writings of Niccolini, proposing at some future time to consider Italian tragedy generally, when this author's character as a dramatist will be duly estimated. Let none, therefore, form an opinion of Niccolini's merits from what we are about to say of him now. The reader's attention should here confine itself to the works noticed, more out of respect to the author's name, than because they deserve it. Of his translation of Eschylus I sette a Teba,' we shall not speak, since a mere translation of a Greek tragedy in a foreign *Since this Article was written, we have heard, with regret, that Mr. Dumont's death has put an end to all hopes of the continuation of his very useful labours. We cannot expect that the remainder of Mr. Bentham's papers will again fall into such able hands; but we trust that the translation of that writer's penal code, which Mr. Dumont mentions, in the book before us, as having been completed by him (p. 435), will be given to the public as a posthumous work. + See For. Rev. vol. 1., page 647. tongue tongue cannot interest our readers. It is, however, singular that Mr. Niccolini should have chosen one of Eschylus' plays for translation, since he is highly indignant, and speaks in very harsh terms (and, as he spoke before the Academy della Crusca, this is natural enough) of any one, who should prefer Æschylus to Sophocles.* Nor should we have thought it necessary to notice his translation of Ovid's Epistle from Sappho to Phaon, had we not been grievously deceived by his expressly promising us an imitation, not a translation of Ovid's verses. The author probably wished to spare us disappointment, when he advised us not to compare his translation with the text, but non omnia possumus omnes. During the perusal of the so-called imitation, Ovid's lines continually recurred to our recollection. We found nothing added to the original. Ovid's thoughts are given in Italian; and we, in conformity with general custom, are inclined to call this process-translation. An imitation would imply that, by some omissions and the original addition of ideas, fine, poetical and suitable to the subject, Ovid's verses have been improved. Now, this has never been done in any degree worthy of notice: the few differences between the Latin and Italian being such as must necessarily exist between the same work in two different languages; and when any diversity does occur, it is manifestly to the advantage of the Latin author. Take the following, for instance. Ovid says, Quicquid erit, melius quam nunc erit. Aura, subito! Tu quoque, mollis Amor, pennas suppone cadenti, Niccolini says, E che avvenir mi può? del mio dolore O affaticato dal furor dei venti Gema il flutto, e la rupe ov' ei s' aggira Nome infamato in ogni età diventi. Now here we first of all see four Latin verses diluted into nine Italian ones, in which some omission and addition is re Quanti si fanno discepoli di Barbari prosontuosi i quali Eschilo a Sofocle antepongono ?-p. 98. Ho creduto non doverlo tradurre, ma imitare. Sotto questo aspetto e non confrontandolo col testo, io bramo, o Lettore, che tu consideri il mio tenue lavoro. -p. 122. markable. markable. Mr. Niccolini has omitted the beautiful and unexpected apostrophe to the air, Aura subito, by which Sappho's passion is strongly impressed on our imagination. She at once breaks forth with that apostrophe as if she were actually leaping into the sea, so violent is her passion and impatience. The delicacy of the epithet mollis is lost when it is taken from Amor (mollis Amor), and added to piume (molli piume). Mollis Amor awakes in us the idea of all that is soft and delicious, and the Molli piume is too well known an expression in Italian poetry, denoting idleness, and approximates too much to what is (Anglice) called a feather-bed. Then all the verses added by Niccolini concerning the smoothness or roughness of the sea, with the allusion to the birth of Venus, are out of place. Sappho was too violently agitated to enter into such particulars. She might be drowned whether the sea was rough or smooth, and accordingly her wishes are exclusively that she may be rescued from drowning.-Ne sim Leucadiae mortua crimen aquae.' In conclusion we think the performance to be a fair translation of one of the most passionate pieces of poetry in existence; but nothing more. The prose writings of Niccolini contained in the volume before us are on detached subjects, in which we cannot be very much interested. The style is rather good, but not remarkably So. The ideas seldom, if ever, either new or striking, although the author is inclined to be oracular, and to put forth, as self-evident truths, assertions, which are, to say the least of them, extremely questionable. Speaking of Sarchiani, he tells us that he recommended the abolition of entails; and that the writings of this philosopher were the forerunners of the sovereign's blessings,' that is, of the abolition of entails. Now this is any thing but a blessing. Entails formed part of the legislation of Italy for ages and ages, before strangers imposed a foreign legislation upon her, and the peninsula flourished under them. They were abolished by the French revolution, and the abolition was confirmed by the French code. Has Niccolini never examined how far this question is connected with the important one of despotism and liberty? Has it never struck him that where there is a monarch and a nobility, if the latter be poor, the former is uncontrolled, and has in every noble pauper a ready instrument for despotism? Let him consider this before he talks of the blessings of abolishing entails altogether. Another remark which we have made in perusing our author's works is that, for the sake of saying a fine thing, he utters what we are constrained to call downright nonsense, respecting literature |