place infirmities of the man. Who has not heard, in the former, of instincts superior to reason, and of a reasoning sagacity,- of equity and affection, of magnanimity, pity, and repentance,of social propensities, and the contrivances of a civil polity from which man might take example? On the other hand, he enlarges upon the happiness and virtue of the ignorant, the evils of imagination, the madness of great wits, the proneness of the human faculties, in their greatest vigour, to unprofitable studies, and the chimeras of all theologies but one-Man is certainly stark mad: he cannot make a flea, and yet he makes gods by dozens.' Then follows an unrelenting tornado of the metaphysical kind. There is no foundation for the sciences, history, morals or jurisprudence, because there is no axiom in any of these branches beyond dispute; the very ideas of time, space, motion, and truth are but the visions of individual minds. The senses are no less the beginning than the end of all our knowledge. Whoever should make up a faggot of the fooleries of human wisdom, would produce wonders. I willingly muster up these for a pattern.'

In this treatise, the reader will find distinct anticipations of all the sceptical philosophy of the eighteenth century; and it cannot be denied that the mischief which it has wrought has been scarcely less extensive than its influence. More, however, must have been allured by the felicity of the author's vein in this discourse than subdued by the force of his reasons; for the sophistry is, on the whole, far too apparent: and, at any rate, there are worse foundations for a creed than the degradation of human nature. In the meantime, it will be observed, that this sweeping scepticism still professes to hold in reverence whatever has been communicated by faith; and that Montaigne, while a sceptic in his philosophy of human nature, is by no means so, or professedly so, in his religion. That distinction has been generally overlooked; and in treating of his personal character, it has been the fashion to consider him as not more credulous in religion than became such a Pyrrhonist in philosophy and after all, even in his Pyrrhonism, he appears to have been not much in earnest. 6 Very often for the sake of exercise and argument, I have undertaken to maintain an opinion contrary to my own; but in the course of bending and applying my mind in that direction, I have become so thoroughly attached to it, that I no longer discern the reasons of my former belief, and forsake it.' This is explicit; and we perceive now the unfortunate influence exerted on his philosophy, by that extraordinary facility of temper, and indiscriminate toleration

of

of all forms of opinion, which we have already noticed as among the elements of his character.

We have submitted these remarks on the genius and character of Montaigne in those parts of both, which appear to have been liable to some misconception. We have said nothing of what has been too well defined to have admitted of any difference of opinion: we have said nothing of his defects--of his capricious and incoherent meditations,-of his paraphrastic versions of the Ancients under an appearance of novelty,or of the obscenities so frankly and so joyously expressed in the Essay that bears the modest title of Remarks on some verses of Virgil.' Our readers will forgive this recurrence to a writer with whom they have been long well acquainted, if we have offered plausible reasons for representing him as retaining, with all his affectations, the sensibility of genius to the pulcrum et honestum ; as an egotist without vanity; inconstant from temperament, and yet a great thinker; as a Pyrrhonist and yet a Christian. We are not of the opinion that Montaigne is to be esteemed chiefly for the minute and graphic portrait which he has presented of himself; nor as Mr. Stewart has expressed it, for the liveliness and felicity with which he has embodied in words, the previous wanderings of our own imaginations." This is but a degrading account of the writings of Montaigne-reducing them from the highest aspirations of morality to a level with the fashionable conversations of Swift, and representing every ordinary reader, as a forerunner in his noblest career of meditation.

as

We have alluded to the extensive influence of Montaigne on the subsequent literature of Europe, and might have adduced some curious illustrations, which we shall reserve for another occasion. In England, as in France, he has been read, admired, and followed. Our own writers, however, have been most ready, in general, to relish and to imitate what was best in the writings of Montaigne. They have taken example for the relaxation of their own style, from the freedom and artlessness of his; they have profited by his conversational manner, gracefully dealing with the topics of philosophy; they have learned something from his ingenuity, his humanity, and even from his idiosyncrasies. But in France Montaigne appears to have operated in a manner altogether injurious: nothing in his writings has been so influential in that country as his scepticism, the seeds of which were scattered so abundantly in his apology for Sebonde: not a hint was there dropped that was not afterwards taken up and fully developed by the more patient and

penurious

penurious thinkers that formed the sceptical philosophy of France. In the one country his ascendancy has been altogether malignant; in the other, it has, on the whole, favourably affected literature, if not morality; and it is remarkable that, in accordance with that diversity of influence, the Essays of Montaigne have at this day a greater estimation in this than in their native country.

ART. X.- Mémoires de Vidocq. Vols. iii. and iv. 8vo. Paris. 1829.

NEVER

EVER was imitation of foreign laws carried to a greater extent than within the last few years, in matters strictly connected with, nay of the very first and most vital importance to our liberty; against the spirit, practice, and express words of our ancient laws and constitution. Whilst other nations, where there is a government police, are endeavouring with all their strength to shake it off, and to have such power intrusted to the people, we, who for a thousand years have possessed this system of popular right, now destroy it, and seek to introduce a practice, which the constant experience of those among whom it is received, proves to be the most dangerous and effective engine of despotism. Whilst the passport system, so strictly connected with the police, is loudly complained of, deprecated, hated by all the‍ thinking part of the population where it is received, we are tampering with it, and heedlessly breaking an express article of that Magna Charta of which we have hitherto been so proud.* In France, where the jury is denied in most misdemeanors, or petty offences tried before minor tribunals (tribunaux correctionels), strong efforts are made to have this custom abolished, whilst we, against the most sacred and open disposition of the Magna Charta, are daily introducing the principle that Englishmen may be condemned without a jury.† Let those, who speak of the progress of liberty in this country, and who laugh at the fears of such as evince uneasiness

* Omnes mercatores habeant salvum et securum exire ab Anglia et venire in Angliam, morari et ire per Angliam. Yet this law was not so liberal as that published about the same time by Emperor Frederic II. Omnes peregrini et advenae libere hospitentur ubi voluerint. A pope confirmed this law, which despotism has rendered a dead letter; but no pope nor government has solemnly abolished it, as we have done the above article of the Magna Charta.

+ Two magistrates have of late been empowered to condemn persons to six months, or even one year's imprisonment, in a great number of cases. Acts being passed without reference to one another, it follows, that the principle being once admitted, is introduced into more laws than the legislators are generally aware of,

at

at the power which the government may gain over the people, look in the legislative history of the last hundred years in England, and find an act more openly attacking our constitution than those which we have mentioned.

It is said, that a noble and learned Lord called history 'an old almanack,' which expression was particularly agreeable to those who attempt to put down by laughter the adversaries whom they are unable to oppose by sound reasoning. Yet, on this occasion, the definition of the noble Lord was more correct, than that learned personage himself suspected. History is, to be sure, an old almanack, in which an old woman will look for Moore's prophecies, and display her ingenuity in finding their correctness; whilst others will from an old almanack guess exactly for some future year the astronomical facts which are therein noted. Prince Metternich once answered a foreign Minister who appealed to history, 'Bah! l'historie; nous la faisons.' And that is true; and so the almanack-maker collects from old almanacks the materials necessary to form a new one, as any statesman from ancient history learns how to make that of his time. The Englishman, being possessed of the best practical constitution which has hitherto existed for any considerable number of years, thinks himself the best possible judge on all political subjects. He laughs at foreign politicians, whom he holds very cheap, looking with pride at the immense difference between other countries and his own with respect to government. But this confidence in his own knowledge renders him too apt to condemn or absolve without being at all aware of the point under discussion, and obstinately refuse to listen to facts and experience which may be alleged to put him in the right way. Ninety-nine out of a hundred foreigners, speaking of the complicated machine of our government, of checks on government, of liberty of the press, of trial by jury, of aristocracy, of elections, &c., utter such downright nonsense, that we are really forced to pity them. But this does not mean that they are incapable of forming correct opinions, or that their organs and faculties are not so good as our own. We must reflect that we commit precisely the same errors with respect to their countries, that they do respecting ours; and that as we know our own affairs best, so they are likely to know theirs. If it be difficult to make a slave understand all the machinery by which a free government is moved, it is not less difficult to form a correct idea of all the parts of the machinery by which despotism is supported. It is absurd rashness in foreigners when they pretend to instruct us concerning our government;

but

but it is no less a presumption in us to believe that we understand theirs better than themselves. Concerning police, passports, trial without jury, levying taxes without the consent of the people, and the like, they are likely to know more than ourselves; for they have seen and felt the causes and effects of those various principles which they detest. Why should we, then, pretend to know more than they do about things on which they (unhappily for themselves) can speak ex cathedra?

Before proceeding to treat of this subject further, we must be allowed to say, that we utterly disclaim all desire of imputing sinister or treacherous motives to any person or persons whatsoever. We assume that the projectors and supporters of the measures which we firmly believe dangerous to our liberty, are honest and upright men, and that they are guided by motives like our own, viz. the good of our common country. That remedies were required, we do not pretend to deny; but we deny the extent of the evil, and contend that the remedies are likely to cause evils of far greater importance. Possibly we are ourselves mistaken; we only claim the same credit for purity of intention which we are inclined to give to others; and we do not despair of showing the abyss into which the measures which we deprecate may eventually plunge the nation. Should we be so fortunate as to point out the full extent of the danger, we feel confident that the innovators will have the manliness to confess their error-they have the power to correct it.

The constabulary force of England, by which the peace of the country was kept for so many ages, is composed of civil officers appointed for that purpose, from their very origin, by the people, independently of government. Their office was not unknown to the Roman laws, in which the Irenarchae* are mentioned; but although their importance vastly increased with despotism, they being a race of men of which despots are prodigiously fond,† yet their appointment was left to the local authorities, and particularly to the corporations of towns, till even these were

* Irenarchae munus institutum ut per eum provinciae tutela, quietis ac pacis per singula territoria concordia stet. Aristides 4. igav Irenarcham vocat púλana Ts Ειρήνης, leges Gothorum pacis adsertorem τὸν τῆς του δήμου εὐταξίας ἐπιστατοῦντα. Gothof. ad L. un. Cod. de Irenarch.

+ Curiosi et stationarii munus fuit crimina investigare et judicibus nunciare: ita reges Medorum in eam rem suos habuere xaraonómovs. Herodot; et hi quidem curiosi quasi quaesitores quidam. Eam in rem Darius, teste Plutarcho, multos semper habuit auTaxovoras, qui principis aures appellabantur, et delatorum munere apud eum fungebantur. Et Maecenas agens cum Augusto de his quae ad Remp. videntur necessaria, delatorum quidem ministerio utendum monet, sed non temerè fidem esse eis adhibendam. Dion. 52. Gothof. ad L. 1 C, de Curios, et Station.

‡ L. un. Cod. de Irenarch.

destroyed