be ever so true, yet such is in fact our condition and the natural course of things, that, whenever we apply it to life and practice, this application of it always misleads us, and cannot but mislead us, in a most dreadful manner, with regard to our present interest. And how can people think themselves so very secure then, that the same application of the same opinion may not mislead them also, in some analogous manner, with respect to a future, a more general, and more important interest? For, religion being a practical subject, and the analogy of nature shewing us, that we have not faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true one, to practical subjects; whenever we do apply it to the subject of religion, and thence conclude, that we are free from its obligations, it is plain. this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There will still remain just reason to think, whatever appearances are, that we deceive ourselves; in somewhat of a like manner as when people fancy they can draw contradictory conclusions from the idea of infinity. From these things together, the attentive reader will see, it follows, that if, upon supposition of freedom, the evidence of religion be conclusive, it remains so, upon supposition of necessity; because the notion of necessity is not applicable to practical subjects; i. e. with respect to them, is as if it were not true. Nor does this contain any reflection upon reason, but only upon what is unreasonable. For, to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition to practical principles which the Author of our nature gave us to act upon, and to pretend to apply our reason to subjects, with regard to which our own short views, and even our experience, will shew us it cannot be depended upon, and such, at best, the subject of necessity must be,—this is vanity, conceit, and unreasonableness. But this is not all. For we find within ourselves a will, and are conscious of a character. Now, if this, in us, be reconcileable with fate, it is reconcileable with it in the Author of nature. And, besides, natural government and final causes imply a character and a K will in the Governor and Designer; * a will concerning the creatures whom he governs. The Author of nature, then, being certainly of some character or other, notwithstanding necessity, it is evident this necessity is as reconcileable with the particular character of benevolence, veracity, and justice in him, which attributes are the foundation of religion, as with any other character; since we find this necessity no more hinders men from being benevolent than cruel; true, than faithless; just, than unjust; or, if the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. For it is said indeed, that what, upon supposition of freedom, would be just punishment, upon supposition of necessity be-comes manifestly unjust; because it is punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could not avoid doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy the injustice of murder, for instance, would not also destroy the injustice of punishing it. However, as little to the purpose as this objection is in itself, it is very much to the purpose to observe from it, how the notions of justice and injustice remain, even whilst we endeavour to suppose them removed; how they force themselves upon the mind, even whilst we are making suppositions destructive of them for there is not, perhaps, a man in the world, but would be ready to make this objection at first thought. But though it is most evident, that universal necessity, if it be reconcileable with any thing, is reconcileable with that character in the Author of nature, which is the foundation of religion; "Yet, does it not plainly destroy the proof, that he is of that character, and consequently the proof of religion?" By no means. For we find that happiness and misery are not our fate, in any such sense as not to be the conse * By will and character is meant that, which, in speaking of men, we should express, not only by these words, but also by the words temper, taste, dispositions, practical principles; that whole frame of mind, from whence we act in one manner rather than another... quences of our behaviour, but that they are the consequences of it. * We find God exercises the same kind of government over us, with that which a father exercises over his children, and a civil magistrate over his subjects. Now, whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning liberty and necessity, it evidently appears to us, that veracity and justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this authority, or government, to a Being, who can have no competitions, or interfering of interests, with his creatures and his subjects. But as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its truth, may be perplexed with difficulties which run up into the most abstruse of all speculations, and as the opinion of necessity seems to be the very basis upon which infidelity grounds itself, it may be of some use to offer a more particular proof of the obligations of religion, which may distinctly be shown not to be destroyed by this opinion. The proof, from final causes, of an intelligent Author of nature, is not affected by the opinion of necessity; supposing necessity a thing possible in itself, and reconcileable with the constitution of things. † And it is a matter of fact, independent on this or any other speculation, that he governs the world by the method of rewards and punishments; and also that he hath given us a moral faculty, by which we distinguish between actions, and approve some as virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert. § Now, this moral discernment implies, in the notion of it, a rule of action, and a rule of a very peculiar kind; for it carries in it authority and a right of direction; authority in such a sense, as that we cannot depart from it without being self-condemned. || And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are *Chap. 2. Chap. 2. Sermon 2d at the Rolls. + Page 104, &c. by nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, laws in a sense including sanctions, may be thus proved. Consciousness of a rule or guide of action, in creatures who are capable of considering it as given them by their Maker, not only raises immediately a sense of duty, but also a sense of security in following it, and of danger in deviating from it. A direction of the Author of nature, given to creatures capable of looking upon it as such, is plainly a command from him ; and a command from him necessarily includes in it, at least, an implicit promise in case of obedience, or threatening in case of disobedience. But then the sense or perception of good and ill desert, which is contained in the moral discernment, renders the sanction explicit, and makes it appear, as one may say, expressed. For, since his method of government is to reward and punish actions, his having annexed to some actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and to others of ill, this surely amounts to declaring upon whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and his rewards be bestowed. For he must have given us this discernment and sense of things, as a presentiment of what is to be hereafter; that is, by way of information before-hand, what we are finally to expect in his world. There is, then, most evident ground to think, that the government of God, upon the whole, will be found to correspond to the nature which he has given us, and that, in the upshot and issue of things, happiness and misery shall, in fact and event, be made to follow virtue and vice respectively; as he has already, in so peculiar a manner, associated the ideas of them in our minds. And from hence might easily be deduced the obligations of religious worship, were it only to be considered as a means of preserving upon our minds a sense of this moral government of God, and securing our obedience to it; which yet is an extreme. ly imperfect view of that most important duty. *Dissertation 2d. Now, I say, no objection from necessity can lie against this general proof of religion: None against the proposition reasoned upon, that we have such a moral faculty and discernment; because this is a mere matter of fact, a thing of experience, that human kind is thus constituted: none against the conclusion, because it is immediate, and wholly from this fact. For the conclusion that God will finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked, is not here drawn, from its appearing to us fit* that he should, but from its appearing, that he has told us he will. And this he hath certainly told us, in the promise and threatening, which, it hath been observed, the notion of a command implies, and the sense of good and ill desert, which he has given us, more distinctly expresses. And this reasoning from fact is confirmed, and, in some degree, even verified, by other facts; by the natural tendencies of virtue and of vice; and by this, that God, in the natural course of his providence, punishes vicious actions, as mischievous to society, and also vicious actions, as such, in the strictest sense. So that the general proof of religion * However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God is determined by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; though one chuses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to say, that it is fit and reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness, then fitness of action, or the right and reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end, to be the ground of the preference; as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not therefore, appear, that moral right is any more relative to perception than abstract truth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than to speak of abstract truth as thus founded. † Page 58. Page 51, &c... |