Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 156 S. W. 472. 8147 (Mo.App.) In the judicial interpretation of contracts, the most important rule is that which requires the court to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as expressed in the instrument.-Gate City Nat. Bank v. Chick, 156 S. W. 743. $169 (Mo.App.) In ascertaining the intention of a contract, it should be read in the light of the circumstances of the parties at the time of its execution.-Gate City Nat. Bank v. Chick, 156 S. W. 743. $170 (Mo.App.) The construction placed on an ambiguous contract by the parties will be adopted by the courts.-H. W. Kastor & Sons Advertising Co. v. Elders, 156 S. W. 737. (B) Parties. § 186 (Tex.Civ.App.) No person can sue upon a contract except he be a party to it or in privity with it.-United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Thomas, 156 S. W. 573. 187 (Mo.App.) Where purchaser of stock and bonds agreed to release seller from the company's obligations on which he was indorser, and to pay certain of his personal obligations, held, that they could release him from the company's obligations without paying them, and hence this promise was not for the benefit of the holder of a note or enforceable by it.-Gate City Nat. Bank v. Chick, 156 S. W. 743. An action lies on a promise made by the defendant upon a valid consideration to a third person, although plaintiff was not privy to the consideration, but the contract must be made for plaintiff's benefit as its direct object, and it is not sufficient that he should be indirectly and incidentally benefited.-Id. (C) Subject-Matter. V. PERFORMANCE OR BREACH. $275 (Ky.) Under a switching contract between the owner of a coal elevator and a railroad, held, that the duty of repair was mutual, and that the owner complaining of the railroad's breach should in some substantial way manifest his readiness to repair his part.Frankfort & C. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 156 S. W. 103. $278 (Tex.Civ.App.) One who breaches his contract cannot complain of a subsequent breach by the other party.-Peck v. Morgan, 156 S. W. 917. § 284 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under provision of a building contract to that effect, the decision of the architect as to matters relating to the construction is binding and conclusive on the parties, in the absence of fraud or gross mistake.Buchanan & Gilder v. Gibbs, 156 S. W. 914. The provision of the specifications, made part of a building contract, "wainscoting, pilasters, etc., in all corridors, * * and all stairs where shown" to be of marble, * all lavatories can well be construed by the architect to require marble wainscoting in the basement.-Id. Provision of a building contract held to justify the ruling that certain wash basins were to be furnished without other compensation than the contract price of constructing the building. Id. Provision of a building contract for the furnishing of details by the architect, if omitted decide as to material of a wainscoting if not from plans and specifications, authorizes him to shown.-Id. CONTRADICTION. See Witnesses, § 406. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. See Negligence, §§ 89, 98. CONVERSION. 8199 (Tex.Civ.App.) A provision of a building contract, after one for wainscoting and certain other things to be of marble, "in fact wherever See Trover and Conversion. marked 'marble' in plans" a certain kind of marble to be used, is not a limitation on the wainscoting to be of marble only when so marked on the plans, but an addition to the enumerated parts that are to be of marble.-Buchanan & Gilder v. Gibbs, 156 S. W. 914. (F) Compensation. CONVEYANCES. See Homestead, § 118; Husband and Wife, §§ 119, 131; Infants, § 100; Insane Persons, 61; Licenses, § 62. CONVICTS. § 229 (Mo.App.) An advertising contract, au- See Witnesses, § 48. thorizing an advertising agent to place for a specified period for defendant advertising for the lowest rate, the commission to be paid by COPY. the publications, referred to the lowest rate ob- See Evidence, §§ 332, 341, 343. III. MODIFICATION AND MERGER. § 242 (Ky.) Where a written contract between the owner of a coal elevator was certain, mutual, and based upon a consideration, a verbal renewal contract merely continuing the contract in force made all its provisions a part of the renewal contract, which therefore was not void for uncertainty, lack of mutuality, or want of consideration.-Frankfort & C. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 156 S. W. 103. IV. RESCISSION AND ABANDONMENT. CORAM NOBIS. See Appeal and Error, § 1185. CORPORATIONS. See Abatement and Revival, § 82; Banks and Banking; Carriers; Commerce, § 40; Constitutional Law, $$ 197, 240; Electricity; Evidence, 423; Forgery, § 29; Fraud. §§ 13, 27, 37, 58; Insurance, § 17; Monopolies, §§ 10-26; Municipal Corporations; Parties, $76; Principal and Agent, § 116: Railroads; Removal of Causes, § 26; States, § 88; Telegraphs and Telephones; Witnesses, § 304. I. INCORPORATION AND ORGAN IZATION. § 262 (Mo.App.) One who with knowledge of $14 (Tex.) The Daughters of the Republic of the facts unequivocally does any act which im- Texas organized for patriotic purposes connectplies an intention to abide thereby cannot sub-ed with the war for the independence of Texas sequently disaffirm the contract, and sue for is an "educational" corporation within Rev. a rescission.-City Light, Power, Ice & Stor- Civ. St. 1911, art. 1121.-Conley v. Daughters age Co. v. St. Mary's Mach. Co., 156 S. W. 83. of the Republic, 156 S. W. 197. 830 (Ky.) Where articles of a corporation | der its corporate name.-Wilcox v. Citizens' to purchase and sell lands of an incorporator Laundry Co., 156 S. W. 436. provide that the authorized stock should be § 428 (Tex.Civ.App.) Notice to an agent of $400,000, of which $275,000 should be paid for a corporation which is a creditor of a firm that the land, a payment of $55,000, the selling a partner has retired is notice to the corporaprice of that amount of stock was in payment tion.-Rodgers-Wade Furniture Co. v. Wynn, for the land.-Chilton v. Bell County Coke & 156 S. W. 340. Improvement Co., 156 S. W. 889. Where an incorporator of a corporation, organized to purchase, hold, and sell his real estate, delayed tendering a conveyance, due to litigation over the lands between himself and third persons, the incorporator was not entitled to interest on the price before tendering a deed, but he should be allowed interest from the date of the deed.-Id. IV. CAPITAL, STOCK, AND DIVI DENDS. (B) Subscription to Stock. § 88 (Tex.Civ.App.) A subscriber of stock, who paid for the stock, may, on the failure of the corporation to issue stock, recover back the money paid with interest.-Ferrell v. Millican, 156 S. W. 230. (C) Issue of Certificates. 899 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Const. art. 12, § 6, prohibiting the issue of stock or bonds except for money paid, labor done, or property actually received, a note given for corporate stock being neither money paid nor property is void and uncollectible.-Mason v. First Nat. Bank, 156 S. W. 366. V. MEMBERS AND STOCKHOLDERS. (C) Suing or Defending on Behalf of Corporation. § 206 (Ky.) Minority stockholders may sue for a wrong done the corporation, where the officers refused, after request, to take any action, or where they are so concerned in the wrong that it is reasonably certain that a request would be unavailing.-Chilton v. Bell County Coke & Improvement Co., 156 S. W. 889. VI. OFFICERS AND AGENTS. (C) Rights, Duties, and Liabilities as to Corporation and Its Members. §316 (Ky.) An officer of a corporation cannot contract for the corporation with himself. or act for the corporation in a meeting of directors to make a contract with himself.Chilton v. Bell County Coke & Improvement Co., 156 S. W. 889. VII. CORPORATE POWERS AND LIABILITIES. (A) Extent and Exercise of Powers in General. V. § 381 (Tex.) A corporation may act as a trustee for any purpose within the scope of its charter or the governing statute.-Conley Daughters of the Republic, 156 S. W. 197. § 388 (Mo.App.) Lessors who had dealt with a corporation in its corporate name, recognized its corporate capacity, and received and retained the rent, held estopped to plead ultra vires as a defense to a suit for specific performance of an agreement in the lease to renew.-Lemp Hunting & Fishing Club v. Hackmann, 156 S. W. 791. (F) Civil Actions. § 523 (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, § 2248 et seq., providing for the examination of a judg ment debtor after return of execution unsatisfied, does not include officers of a corporation against which an execution has been returned unsatisfied, notwithstanding section 8054, providing that the word "person" shall include corporations.-Ex parte Koehler, 156 S. W. 982. An affidavit for the examination of a judgment debtor, a corporation, and its officers, after return of execution unsatisfied, which avers that the property subject to execution and which has been concealed is the unpaid liability of stockholders, and that the officers know the stockholders, their residence, and their liability, etc., is insufficient to support an order for examination.-Id. VIII. INSOLVENCY AND RECEIVERS. § 553 (Ky.) Where a corporation, organized to purchase the real estate of an incorporator, made no settlement with the incorporator, or with his son, who acted as president of the corporation, and who had charge of the property for a number of years after the death of the incorporator, the court, at the suit of minority stockholders, must refer the case to a commissioner, but will not appoint a receiver.Chilton v. Bell County Coke & Improvement Co., 156 S. W. 889. XI. DISSOLUTION AND FORFEITURE OF FRANCHISE. § 592 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Sayles Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 5243i, an entry by the Secretary of State in his ledger that a charter was forfeited for the 1895 tax, but without the date of entry, held insufficient to forfeit the corporation's right to sue.-Harvey v. Provident Inv. Co., 156 S. W. 1127. § 613 (Mo.App.) Where quo warranto to forfeit respondent's franchise as a corporation was first denied, but after the taking of testimony respondent filed an application to withdraw its answer, with a written consent and forfeiture of its charter, the answer will be withdrawn and the franchise forfeited.-State ex inf. Mason v. Springfield Athletic Club, 156 S. W. 496. XII. FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. § 642 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a foreign corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing powder contracted with a resident to sell its powder, and shipped powder direct to a buyer the corporation and took the buyer's note, from such resident, who remitted the price to which he sold and transferred to the corporain the state within Rev. Civ. St. 1911, arts. tion, the corporation did not transact business 1314, 1318.-Erwin v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co., 156 S. W. 1097. § 388 (Mo.App.) Ultra vires was not available as a defense to a suit by a corporation for specific performance of an agreement in a lease to renew, where the original lease had been fully performed and the rent received and retained by the lessors.-Lemp Hunting & Fish-ed ing Club v. Cottle, 156 S. W. 799. § 672 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action by foreign corporation on judgment, petition held not demurrable where it appeared that plaintiff had a permit to do business when it obtained the judgment and did not appear why it surrenderthe permit, or that it was such a corporation as the law required to obtain a permit; Rev. St. 1895, arts. 745-749, not applying.(B) Representation of Corporation by Of Kingman Texas Implement Co. v. Borders, 156 S. W. 614. ficers and Agents. § 399 (Ark.) Corporation held liable for debt incurred by its lessee whom it had knowingly CORROBORATION. permitted to do business, and to get credit un- See Criminal Law, §§ 510-511. 1225 COSTS. services under Acts 31st Leg. (1st Called Sess.) c. 39, § 8, providing that, if the reporter ren See Judgment, § 531; Justices of the Peace, 8 dered more services than the act provided for, 159; Mandamus, § 10. 896 (Tex.Civ.App.) Suit against the comptroller to reinstate a retail liquor license annulled by him being to all intents and purposes one against the state costs should be assessed against him as comptroller, and not personally. -Lane v. Hewgley, 156 S. W. 911. VII. ON APPEAL OR ERROR, AND the judge should certify the amount the reporter should receive.-Etter v. McLennan County, 156 S. W. 251. (C) Rules of Court and Conduct of Business. § 85 (Tex.Civ.App.) The Court of Civil Appeals will enforce the Supreme Court rules if they are not in conflict with the statutes.Peck v. Morgan, 156 S. W. 917. (D) Rules of Decision. Adjudications, Opinions, and Records. § 90 (Ky.) Where a statute, fairly open to two constructions, either of which will carry out its purpose, has been construed by a decision of the Court of Appeals, the decision should be adhered to.-Jackson's Adm'r v. Asher Coal Co., 156 S. W. 136. 236 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a person was required to appeal to the district court to obtain relief from an erroneous judgment of the county court appointing another a guardian, the costs of the district court should be taxed against the § 90 (Ky.) Where the record on motion belatter.-Threatt v. Johnson, 156 S. W. 1137. fore a justice of the Court of Appeals to re8247 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff, on ap-instate a temporary injunction showed that nopeal from a justice to the county court, was successful, he was entitled to recover costs in that court unless the trial court, for good cause to be stated in the record, adjudged otherwise. -Conner v. Skinner, 156 S. W. 567. COUNTIES. See Highways; Jury, § 58; Schools and School Districts, 135; Sheriffs and Constables, 88 54, 74; Venue, §§ 22, 32, 77. II. GOVERNMENT AND OFFICERS. (B) County Seat. § 29 (Ky.) The vote of the people to determine the location of the county seat of a county is an election within Const. § 147; and, where such an election is held void by the Court of Appeals, so much of the act as directs an election to be held within 90 days after the act becomes operative is void, but that part directing submission to the voters is still good, and should be carried out.-Walker v. Goode, 156 S. W. 893. (D) Officers and Agents. § 64 (Ky.) One having been elected to fill a vacancy in a county office need not qualify on the first Monday in January following, but can do so after receiving his commission.-Jones v. Williams, 156 S. W. 876. COUNTY SEATS. See Counties, § 29. COURTS. See Abatement and Revival, § 12; Appeal and Error, 8888; Clerks of Courts; Criminal Law, 890; Executors and Administrators, §§ 9, 24, 250, 454; Garnishment, § 70; Guardian and Ward, 8; Insane Persons, §§ 26, 70; Judgment, $8 17, 251, 475; Justices of the Peace; Religious Societies, § 24; Removal of Causes; Sheriffs and Constables, § 54; Taxation, §§ 530, 639; Venue, §§ 22, 32. tice was given of the intended application for an injunction, and that the adverse party resisted the temporary injunction issued, or at least had an opportunity so to do, the opinion of the justice in reinstating the injunction was not extrajudicial.-Walker v. Goode, 156 S. W. 893. § 90 (Mo.App.) A decision of one of the several Courts of Appeals, when approved by the Supreme Court, must be followed by the others. -Harwood v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 156 S. W. 475. 891 (Mo.App.) The Court of Appeals must defer to the opinion of the Supreme Court upon the same evidence in a former appeal of the same cause.e.-Tetwiler v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 156 S. W. 3. 891 (Mo.App.) The appellate court is bound to follow the rulings of the Supreme Court.Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Kansas City Hydraulic Press Brick Co., 156 S. W. 749. 891 (Tex.Civ.App.) A decision of the Supreme Court is binding upon and must be followed by the Court of Civil Appeals.-National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Walker, 156 S. W. 1095. General. (A) Grounds of Jurisdiction in § 207 (Tex.Civ.App.) A county court can under the Constitution, compel a justice of the peace by mandamus to send up a transcript in order that an appellant may perfect his appeal, as "necessary to the enforcement of that court's jurisdiction."-Hart v. Wilson, 156 S. W. 520. (B) Courts of Particular States. $ 231 (Mo.) Where a judge of a court of appeals believes a decision in conflict with prior decisions, and the cause is thereupon trans § 231 (Mo.App.) An action to redeem land from a sale to one of the defendants under a deed of trust given by plaintiffs' ancestor to another of the defendants, as trustee, to secure a note to defendant bank involved title to real estate, within Const. art. 6, § 12, and hence, on appeal from the circuit court, would be transferred to the Supreme Court.-House v. Clarke, 156 S. W. 495. § 231 (Mo.App.) The Court of Appeals will determine its jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an appeal though want of jurisdiction is not insisted on by the parties.-Bingaman v. Hannah, 156 S. W. 496. The Court of Appeals in determining its jurisdiction on appeal from a judgment in a proceeding to contest a will, not indicating that testator left real estate, will look beyond the pleadings and judgment silent on the question and examine the testimony in the bill of exceptions to determine whether title to real estate is involved.-Id. An appeal from a judgment in a proceeding to contest a will disposing of real estate involves title to real estate within Const. art. 6, $ 12, vesting appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in cases involving title to real estate, and the Court of Appeals will, as required by Rev. St. 1909, § 3938, transfer the cause to the Supreme Court.-Id. § 246 (Tenn.) An order of the probate court of Shelby county denying a petition to set aside the probate of an alleged last will was properly taken to the Court of Civil Appeals under Acts 1870, c. 86 (Shannon's Code, § 387), and the statute creating the Court of Civil Appeals.Shaller v. Garrett, 156 S. W. 1084. § 246 (Tenn.) The prohibition that appeals from the Shelby county probate court should be taken only to the Supreme Court, contained in Acts 1870, c. 86 (Shannon's Code, § 387), was repealed as to appeals from such probate court not involving more than $1,000 by Acts 1907, c. 82, providing that such appeals should be taken to the Court of Civil Appeals.-Eason v. Gaines, 156 S. W. 1084. VIII. CONCURRENT AND CONFLICTING JURISDICTION, AND COMITY. (B) State Courts and United States Courts. § 489 (Tex.Civ.App.) The state courts have jurisdiction of an action against a carrier for the conversion of an interstate shipment.-Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Porter, 156 S. W. 267. COVENANTS. See Estoppel, § 28. II. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA TION. (B) Covenants of Title. $42 (Tex.Civ.App.) A covenant against liens and incumbrances is distinct from a warranty of title and protects the grantee against interests in third persons which, though consistent with the fee being in the grantor, will diminish the value of the estate conveyed.-Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. El Paso & N. E. R. Co., 156 S. W. 561. See Abduction; Animals, § 36; Arrest; Assault and Battery; Bail: Burglary; Embezzlement; False Pretenses; Food, § 20; Forgery; Gaming; Hawkers and Peddlers, § 7: Homicide; Indictment and Information; Infants, § 69; Intoxicating Liquors, $§ 132239; Kidnapping; Larceny; Perjury; Rape: Receiving Stolen Goods; Rewards; Robbery; Seduction; Statutes, § 241; Trespass. III. PARTIES TO OFFENSES. $59 (Ky.) The term "accomplices" includes all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether as principals in the first or second degree or merely as accessories before or after the fact.-Commonwealth v. Barton, 156 S. W. 113. § 59 (Tex.Cr.App.) Person who assisted in an assault with intent to commit robbery held a principal under Pen. Code 1911, art. 74, although he claimed that he thought his codefendant was a detective and that he was helping him to arrest the prosecuting witness.-Drysdale v. State, 156 S. W. 685. $59 (Tex.Cr.App.) "Accomplice" defined, and held that an employé who, with the knowledge of his employer, agreed to and did inform defendant of the arrival of a car of feed which defendant was charged with breaking into a warehouse to steal, was not an accomplice.Holmes v. State, 156 S. W. 1172. IV. JURISDICTION. § 87 (Ky.) Under Ky. St. §§ 1073, 1074, 1075, and 1076, relating to the trial of misdemeanor cases by the county judge, held, that the county judge could try such cases sitting either as the quarterly or county court.-Hickman County v. Jackson, 156 S. W. 391. V. VENUE. (A) Place of Bringing Prosecution. 8112 (Ky.) Where accused, keeping whisky for sale in a local option county, agreed with a buyer there to sell him a specified amount, and then put the whisky into jugs, and took it across a river into an adjoining county, and there delivered it to the buyer, who then paid the price, the sale was in the local option county.-Duff v. Commonwealth, 156 S. W. 150. VII. FORMER JEOPARDY. § 165 (Ky.) To constitute former jeopardy, it must appear that in each prosecution the accused, the sovereignty whose law has been violated, and the offense, not only as to the act but as to the crime, were identical.-McIntyre v. Commonweath, 156 S. W. 1058. $195 (Ky.) That accused was indicted for an offense in which the habitual criminal act (Ky. St. § 1130) was pleaded does not bar the pleading of such act in a prosecution for a subsequent offense.-McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 156 S. W. 1058. § 195 (Tex.Cr.App.) Acquittal for incest held not a bar to subsequent prosecutions under other indictments, although the woman was asked about the other alleged acts, but denied them, and no further proof thereof was offered or conviction asked therefor.-Ex parte Burford, 156 S. W. 686. $200 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under the express provision of Pen. Code 1911, art. 1317, a conviction of burglary of a place would be no bar to a prosecution for theft of goods after the entry had been effected.-McDonald v. State, 156 S. W. 209. X. EVIDENCE. (A) Judicial Notice, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof. $ 304 (Mo.) While the court could not 'judicially notice that bottlers of milk, ale, etc., do business just as bottlers of mineral and soda water, yet it might officially notice that others engaged in vending beverages, etc., in bottles might desire to take advantage of the law (Rev. St. 1909, §§ 4829-4833) relating to bottlers of soda and mineral water, and be protected from the loss of their property by the criminal provisions of section 4831.-State v. Baskowitz, 156 S. W. 945. § 304 (Tex.Cr.App.) The court will take judicial notice that beer is intoxicating where there is no issue raising the question whether it is intoxicating.-Jones v. State, 156 S. W. 1191. (B) Facts in Issue and Relevant to Issues, and Res Gestæ. § 338 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for homicide, evidence that there had been a good deal of gambling among negroes and Mexicans in the vicinity in which accused lived some time prior to the killing was irrelevant and improperly admitted.-Roberts v. State, 156 S. W. 651. § 346 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for kidnapping, where the place of jurisdiction of the offense was in issue, testimony of a witness who was at the place eight days thereafter, as detailing facts tending to show that the place of the offense was in fact in this state, was admissible, especially where it was not suggested that conditions had changed during that time.-Nunez v. State, 156 S. W. 933. § 346 (Tex.Cr.App.) A witness, who testified to seeing accused and a third person together at a named place, could, to fix the time, state that he saw them the night before he learned of the crime charged.-Castenara v. State, 156 S. W. 1180. § 361 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where deceased had said that a sister-in-law of defendant who was living at his house with her married sister was a prostitute, evidence that she was only 14 was admissible as tending to lessen the probability that a child of that age would be a prostitute. -Walker v. State, 156 S. W. 206. $ 364 (Tex.Cr.App.) On a trial for assaulting with a pistol, with intent to murder, a man who was paying attentions to a woman to whom accused was attached, evidence that in the fight, immediately after the shooting, accused struck the woman with his fist and attempted to strike her with a chair was admissible as a part of the res gestæ, and as throwing light on his state of mind and intention.-Irving v. State, 156 S. W. 641. § 364 (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence of statements made by accused 10 or 15 minutes after the killing, upon his return home, whence he had ridden rapidly after shooting deceased, is admissible as part of the res gestæ.-Garcia v. State, 156 S. W. 939. § 368 (Ark.) What deceased's companion at the time of an altercation between deceased and accused shortly before a homicide subsequently said and did at another place when accused was not present was not admissible as a part of the res gestæ.-Carter v. State, 156 S. W. 443. $ 368 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for killing the husband of accused's stepdaughter, evidence of a declaration made by her at the time of the shooting that she told accused "not to do that" was admissible as res gestæ.-Smith v. State, 156 S. W. 214. (C) Other Offenses, and Character of Ac cused. $ 371 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for the theft of cattle, evidence that, when defendants were making up a herd to be driven for shipment, they observed strange cattle and turned them from one part of the pasture into another so as to prevent their mingling with the herd was inadmissible upon the theory that defend ant had stolen them, in the absence of anything in connection with those cattle.-McKnight v. showing contemporaneous and fraudulent acts State, 156 S. W. 1188. (D) Materiality and Competency in Gen eral. 8412 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where defendant was accused of falsely testifying, in the trial of her husband, that he did not strike her at a given time, evidence as to declarations by accused upon being examined by a physician, and of her statements to the county judge, tending to show that she was beaten, was admissible to show that she falsely testified.-Smith v. State, 156 S. W. 645. $413 (Tex.Cr.App.) Accused on trial for horse theft may not show that long after the commission of the alleged offense he brought a civil action for the recovery of the alleged stolen property.-Haley v. State, 156 S. W. 637. $413 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused claimed that he mistook deceased for another, which alleged mistake was denied by the state, held, that accused's acts, words, and conduct upon learning, as he claimed for the first time, whom he had killed, should have been admitted, but other conversations after so learning and after time for reflection were properly excluded.Wilson v. State, 156 S. W. 1185. |