rudeness, etc., no matter to whom, when the answer alleges and the evidence shows that rudeness to customers and others was also relied on as justification for the discharge. The instruction, however, does not apply to any rudeness other than the rudeness to the president. The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that if there was any rudeness to customers it was at the command and direction of the president, who was practically the owner of all the stock of the defendant company and its sole active administrative officer present in the store at the time of such alleged rudeness. The instruction does not apply to any rudeness to customers, but only to rudeness alleged by defendant to have been displayed to the president. cerning it admissible, unless character is in | fendant company in discharging him for any issue by the nature of the proceeding, or unless it is first brought in issue by an attack thereon from the other side. On crossexamination the plaintiff had been asked if he had not been convicted and fined $100 in the Kansas City police court for disturbing the peace. He admitted that he had. In addition to this admission, the defendant, in putting in its testimony, offered in evidence the record of said police court showing such conviction. This opened the door for plaintiff to introduce evidence concerning his general reputation. 2 Wig. on Ev. § 1106; Jones on Ev. § 867; Walker v. Insurance Company, 62 Mo. App. 209; Gertz v. Railroad Co., 137 Mass. 77, 50 Am. Rep. 285; Paine v. Tilden, 20 Vt. 554; Isler v. Dewey, 71 N. C. 14. Hence the admission of such testimony was not error. [3] The next assignment is that the court erred in giving plaintiff's instruction No. 3, which told the jury that if plaintiff was rude, discourteous, and impolite to defendant's president, yet if he had reasonable cause for so being, such behavior toward the president would not justify plaintiff's discharge. Complaint is made that this rule does not apply in a case of this kind. In other words, defendant appears to contend that no matter what the master may have done to provoke his servant to rude and discourteous behavior, if the servant gave way to it, he thereby furnished the master good reason for discharging him. Stated differently, and in its last analysis, this means that although the master may goad the servant into desperation, yet if the servant does not meekly submit, he thereby forfeits all right to retain his place under his contract. This would permit a master, who was de sirous of breaking a contract with his servant, to so treat the servant as to drive or compel him to give the master the right to discharge him. The instruction is not erroneous on the ground just stated. [4] The next objection to the instruction is that the words "reasonable cause" are not defined. But defendant asked and was given an instruction on the same point which used the words "good cause" without definition, and no instruction defining the words "reasonable cause" was asked by defendant. It has been held that a failure to define "reasonable care and diligence" is not reversible error where no instruction embodying such a definition has been asked. Johnson v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 96 Mo. 340, 9 S. W. 790, 9 Am. St. Rep. 351. Where an instruction contains a word or a phrase which a party wishes to have defined, such party should request a definition of that word or phrase. Crapson v. Wallace, 81 Mo. App. 680, loc. cit. 684. [5] Another complaint against this instruction is that it tells the jury that if plaintiff was rude, discourteous, and impolite to the [6] The final assignment of error is in regard to the measure of damages. The court's instruction on this point was as follows: "The court instructs the jury that, if you find for the plaintiff, you will fix your verdict for the whole amount that would have been due the plaintiff if he had continued to work for the defendant under the contract sued upon, from the date of his discharge until the expiration of the contract, after allowing a credit for anything which the evidence shows the defendant may have paid him since that time and for anything which plaintiff may have earned from services rendered to others, and after allowing a further credit of an amount equal to what the jury may believe from the evidence he will be able to earn between now and the date of the expiration of said contract. Appellant's contention is that when the trial takes place before the expiration of the stipulated term of employment, the servant ought to be allowed to recover damages only to the time of trial, subject to the reduction of the sums the servant has earned or might have earned between the time of the discharge and the time of trial; but that in this case the jury were instructed to give damages for the entire period up to the expiration of the contract, which expiration was after the trial. Two federal cases and a case in Wisconsin are cited in support of this view. Schroeder v. Cal. Co. (D. C.) 95 Fed. 296; Darst v. Mathieson Works (C. C.) 81 Fed. 284; and Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355. A careful analysis of these cases will disclose that the reason those courts laid down the rule contended for by appellant was because, owing to the length of time the contracts had to run and the lack of evidence as to what plaintiff's loss would be during the portion of the unexpired term after the trial, the damages for such portion would be largely speculative. In the case we are considering, however, the unexpired term was only three months, and the evidence was amply sufficient to enable the jury to determine what the probable loss for the remaining true that Wood on Master and Servant, at page 250, says that the drift of American decisions is to the effect that, in a suit brought before the expiration of the term, the judgment is limited to the servant's actual loss up to the day of trial, and that in a case, where there was a prospect of a considerable loss of time, a suit brought before the expiration of the term would be an unsafe experiment; yet he also says, on page 237, that a servant may sue for a breach of the contract and recover his probable damages from the breach, or he may, in some cases, wait until the term has ended and sue for the actual damages he has sustained. It would seem that, if he can sue for his probable damages, the only thing to prevent his recovery for loss sustained after the trial and to the end of the contract term would be the inability to ascertain with any certainty what the damages would be for that portion of the term elapsing after the trial. But whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, the rule in Missouri is the same as that followed in England. This allows a servant, even in a suit brought and tried before the expiration of the contract, to recover for the whole contract period, less the amount earned from other sources until the time of trial and the prospective earnings to the end of the contract period. Boland v. Glendale Quarry Co., 127 Mo. 520, 30 S. W. 151, and cases therein cited. It is true in the Boland Case the trial is stated on page 522 of 127 Mo., 30 S. W. 151, to have taken place January 9, 1894, which, if correct, would be after the expiration of the contract term, which ended on March 31, 1893. But inasmuch as the instruction set out on page 523 of 127 Mo., on page 151 of 30 S. W., speaks of the time between "now and the 31st day of March, 1893," and inasmuch as the whole opinion is based on the fact that the trial did take place before the end of the term, we are constrained to believe that the year "1894" was a mere clerical error and should have been "1893." This would appear also to be the case because the suit was instituted September 10, 1892, and was determined in the Supreme Court in 1894, so that it must have been tried in 1893. And on page 523 of 127 Mo., 30 S. W. 151, the opinion says the instruction was assailed because it permitted plaintiff to recover for the whole contract period less his earnings up to the day of trial and his prospective earnings to the end of the contract. In Miller v. Boot & Shoe Company, 26 Mo. App. 57, one of the many cases cited with approval by the Supreme Court in the Boland Case, the trial was had before the end of the term and the rule as contended for by respondent was followed. Other Missouri cases announce the same measure of damages. Estes v. Desnoyers Shoe Co., 155 Mo. 577, 56 S. W. 316; Lambert v. Hartshorne, 65 Mo. 549. And while the date of trial is not clearly shown, yet if it was intended to make the rule announced apply only in those cases in which the trial was had after the expiration of the contract, this distinction would have been made to clearly appear. It must be held, therefore, that the measure of damages contained in the instruction given for plaintiff in this case is correct according to the rule announced by the Missouri courts. But if no ruling on the question had been made, we see no reason for limiting the damages to the day of trial in a case where the evidence is amply sufficient to enable the jury to say what the loss will be for the portion of term elapsing after the trial. The case having been tried without reversible error, the finding of the jury and the judgment of the trial court based thereon must not be disturbed. Hence judgment affirmed. All concur. GOFF v. MURPHY et al. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky. May 8, 1913.) 1. WITNESSES (§ 188*) - COMPETENCY - HUSBAND AND WIFE. A wife, who sues to set aside a deed executed by herself and husband, is not competent to testify as to what took place between herself and her husband, inducing the execution of the deed, in the absence of evidence connecting the grantee therewith or charging him with notice thereof. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 734, 736; Dec. Dig. § 188.*] 2. EVIDENCE (§ 313*)-DECLARATIONS-BIRTH -FAMILY RECORDS. A record of a person's birth, made in a Bible by a stepfather on information received by him several years after the person's birth, is not of much weight in determining the date of birth. Cora Goff. This deed was made in the year 1905. This suit was brought by her on March 2, 1909, against Mrs. Murphy to cancel the deed, on the ground that she was an infant when she executed it, and that the deed was obtained by fraud and duress. Mrs. Murphy, in defense of the suit, traversed the allegations of the petition, and pleaded that Cora Goff represented herself to be of age when, the deed was made, and by means of this representation obtained from her the money paid for the land. This allegation was denied by a reply, which also alleged that the land was conveyed for a grossly inadequate price. Proof was taken, and on final hearing the circuit court dismissed the plaintiff's petition. She appeals. [1] We do not find in the record any evidence that the deed was obtained by fraud or duress. Mrs. Goff testifies that her hus [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1166, 1167; Dec. Dig. § 313.*] 3. INFANTS (§ 29*)-CONTRACTS-REPRESENTA- band compelled her to sign the deed; but TIONS AS TO AGE-ESTOPPEL TO DENY. An infant representing himself to be of age, and thus securing the price of property conveyed by him, is estopped to set up his infancy against the purchaser, who was misled, where the contract was fairly made and the consideration adequate. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Infants, Cent. Dig. §§ 37-40; Dec. Dig. § 29.*] 4. INFANTS (§ 100*) — ACTIONS - EVIDENCE CONTRACTS-MISREPRESENTATIONS. Evidence held to sustain a finding that a conveyance by an infant representing himself to be of age was fairly made and for an adequate consideration. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Infants, Cent. Dig. § 295; Dec. Dig. § 100.*] 5. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1009*)-FINDINGSCONCLUSIVENESS. The rule that the findings of the chancellor will not be disturbed, where on the whole case the mind is left in doubt as to the truth, will be applied to the chancellor's finding on questions of value of land at a given time. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3970-3978; Dec. Dig. § 1009.*] Appeal from Circuit Court, Pike County. Action by Cora B. Goff against Dixie Murphy and another. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Auxier, Harman & Francis, of Pikeville, and Sheppard, Goody Koontz & Scherr, of Williamson, W. Va., for appellant. James Goble, of Prestonsburg, and M. C. Kirk, of Paintsville, for appellees. there was nothing to connect Mrs. Murphy with this, or to charge her with notice of it. In fact, Mrs. Goff's testimony as to what took place between her and her husband is incompetent. [2] The proof as to Mrs. Goff's exact age The deed was is by no means conclusive. made in March, 1905. She testified that she was born in August, 1884, and if she is correct she lacked some months of being 21 years of age when the deed was made. But no one who really knew her exact age was introduced. Her stepfather was introduced; but he knew nothing about her age, except what he had learned from his wife after their marriage. He introduced as a part of his testimony a record which he had made But this record, he in a New Testament. testified, he had made 10 or 12 years before he gave his deposition, and he made it on information he had received. This was not a cotemporaneous record, and, as it was not made by one who knew anything about the facts, adds little to the strength of the plaintiff's case. [3] But passing this we think the evidence satisfactorily shows that Mrs. Goff represented herself to be of age when the deed was made, and by means of this representation secured the payment to her of one-half the consideration. We have held in a long line of cases that an infant representing himself to be of age, and thus securing the price of property, is estopped to set up his infancy against the purchaser, whom he has thus misled, where the contract was fairly made and the consideration adequate. County Board of Education v. Hensley, 147 Ky. 441, 144 S. W. 63, and cases cited. HOBSON, C. J. John B. Goff owned at his death 10 tracts of land in Pike county, all aggregating something over 5,000 acres. He left surviving him seven children. One of his children, J. D. Goff, conveyed to his wife, Cora Goff, one-half of his interest in the land. The deed was not recorded, and [4] The plaintiff introduced several witthree or four months later he and she united nesses, who testified that they knew the in a deed to his sister, Dixie Murphy, by value of such lands at the time they testiwhich they conveyed to her his entire in-fied, and from the valuation they fixed it terest in the land for $500, one-half of which would appear that the consideration for the was paid to him and one-half to his wife, deed was very inadequate; but, on the oth RUPT-POWER OF COUrt. quired the title of the bankrupt to his property er hand, it is shown by the proof for the 15. BANKRUPTCY (§ 219*)-PROPERTY OF BANKdefendant that at that time a part of the land was in litigation, and other parts of it had been sold for taxes and bought by the state, and that several of the other children of the deceased had sold, or were offering to sell, their interest in the estate for $500. The plaintiff's husband began the negotiation by offering to sell the property for $500, and several witnesses acquainted with the property and with local values at that time testify that $500 was a fair price for the property under existing conditions. is a matter of common knowledge that the value of coal lands in that part of the state has advanced greatly in the last six or eight years. It [5] We give some weight to the finding of the chancellor on questions of fact, and we do not disturb his finding, where on the whole case the mind is left in doubt as to the truth. This rule should be applied especially to the chancellor's finding on questions of the value of land at a given time; for this depends often on local conditions, and he is better qualified than we are to judge of the weight to which the testimony of the different witnesses is entitled on a subject like this. On the whole case we cannot say that the chancellor erred in holding that the contract was fairly made and for an adequate consideration. Judgment affirmed. BROWN et al. v. WHITE et al. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky. April 29, 1913.) 1. BOUNDARIES (§ 3*)-CALLS-DISTANCES. Calls in a deed for courses and distances must give way to calls for established corners. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Boundaries, Cent. Dig. §§ 3-41; Dec. Dig. § 3.*] 2. ADVERSE POSSESSION (§ 14*)-ACQUISITION OF TITLE-NECESSITY OF POSSESSION. A grantee of land cannot acquire title to additional land by merely claiming beyond his deeded boundary. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Adverse Possession, Cent. Dig. §§ 77-81; Dec. Dig. § 14.*] 3. CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE (§ 7*)-JUDICIAL SALE-VALIDITY-ADVERSE POSSESSION. A sale of land by a trustee in bankruptcy is a judicial sale and is valid, though the land be adversely held. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Champerty and Maintenance, Cent. Dig. 88 54-110; Dec. Dig. § 7.*] 4. CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE (§ 7*) [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 356; Dec. Dig. § 219.*] 6. EVIDENCE (§ 343*)-CERTIFIED COPIES. Under the direct provisions of Ky. St. § 519, a certified copy of a properly acknowledg ed and recorded deed is admissible in evidence. Cent. Dig. §8 1315-1330; Dec. Dig. § 343.*] [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, 7. BANKRUPTCY (§ 265*) — TRUSTEE'S DEED EVIDENCE OF TITLE. While a commissioner's deed proves itself, [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Action by J. D. White and others against Ethel Brown and another. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded. Robbins & Robbins and Gus Thomas, all of Mayfield, and Joe W. Bennett, of Clinton, for appellants. R. L. Smith and L. L. Hindman, both of Clinton, and D. O. Myatt, of Frankfort, for appellees. CLAY, C. Plaintiffs, J. D. White, S. U. Haworth, and W. J. White, brought this acBrown and Ethel Brown, to recover about tion of ejectment against defendants, Luther 10 acres of ground lying in three tracts in Hickman county, Ky. The defendants denied the title of the plaintiffs and pleaded title in themselves, both by record and adverse possession. They also pleaded that certain deeds constituting plaintiffs' chain of title were champertous. A trial before a jury resulted in a verdict in favor of plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. The facts developed by the record are as follows: Bro. Company (hereinafter called the Mengel Company), a corporation organized under the laws of this state, owned a tract of land situated in Hickman county, Ky., containing about 500 acres. The whole tract at that In the spring of 1890 C. C. Mengel, Jr., & time was in the shape of a rectangular parallelogram, with the Mobile & Ohio Railroad beginning at the southeast corner and running diagonally across the east end of the tract. On May 1, 1890, the Mengel Company conveyed to Joseph Crossland, a colored man, about 1412 acres off the west end of For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes 1908. the 500-acre tract. The land so conveyed | cepts therefrom the tract of 141 acres, is described in the deed as follows: "All of sold to Joe Crossland on May 1, 1890, and that certain tract of land in the county of also the tract of about 80 acres sold to Joe Subsequently Hickman and state of Kentucky, bounded Crossland on May 26, 1891. and described as follows, to wit: Beginning Bodkin sold the land conveyed to him to at a large white oak in Dobson's line; thence W. L Salmon by deed, dated October 15, Salmon sold and conveyed to the south 61% degrees east, 109 poles and 3 links, to a stake in McLane's branch, with elm Hardy Grain Company, a corporation, by and sweet gum pointers; thence S. 28 de deed, dated March 16, 1909. Thereafter the grees W., 210 poles, to a hickory, dogwood, Hardy Grain Company went into bankruptand elm; thence north 61 degrees W., 102 cy, and S. Waddell and others, trustees in poles, to a sweet gum; thence N. 284 de bankruptcy of the Hardy Grain Company, grees E., 384 poles, to a sweet gum; thence conveyed the land to plaintiffs on July 11, N. 61% degrees W., 7 poles, to Joseph Crossland's southeast corner; thence N. 281⁄4 degrees E., 1714 poles, to the beginning; the said tract being the northwesterly portion of the tract of land conveyed by deed to Joseph Huffaker &c. to said first party therein called C. C. Mengel, Jr., & Brother Company, instead of its correct name of C. C. Mengel, Jr., & Bro. Co." On May 26, 1891, the Mengel Company conveyed to Joseph Crossland about 80 acres of land lying in the north central part of the 500-acre tract, and just west of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad. The description in the deed is as follows: "Beginning at a stake on the M. & O. Railroad 50 feet from the center of the right of way and running thence north 634 degrees west, 166 poles and 16 links, to a stake with gum and elm pointers; thence south 28 degrees west, 75 poles, to a stake with red oak, elm, and hickory pointers; thence south 634 degrees east, 166 poles and 16 links; thence north 28 degrees, 75 poles, to the beginning." On May 21, 1894, Joe Crossland conveyed the 80-acre tract of land to his son, Samuel Crossland, by the same description contained in the deed from the Mengel Company to Joe Crossland and above set out. Sam Crossland died intestate and without issue, and his father, Joe Crossland, inherited the 80acre tract from him. On December 23, 1908, Joe Crossland conveyed the land to defendants, Luther Brown and Ethel Brown, his wife. In the latter deed the land is described as follows: "Beginning at a stake 50 feet west of the center of the M. & O. R. R. in the line of the R. R. land; thence N. 614 degrees west, 170 poles, to a stake in the branch; thence south 281⁄2 degrees west, 76 poles, to a stake with pointers; thence S. 611⁄2 E., 205 poles, to a stake 50 feet west of the center of said railroad with elm pointers; thence northward with said railroad to the beginning, containing 89 acres." After selling the two tracts, one consisting of 1411⁄2 and the other consisting of about 80 acres, the Mengel Company continued to own the balance of the land until June 10, 1905. On that day it sold the balance to Isaac Bodkin. The deed describes the land conveyed as the whole tract of 500 acres, giving its metes and bounds, and then ex 1910. It will be observed that both plaintiffs and defendants claim through a grantor, the Mengel Company. The following plat shows the land in controversy: JOE CROSSL P SWEET GUM FIRST DEED TO JOE CROSSLAND 141/2 ACRES common CORNER ON WHITE DISPUTE MCCLAIN'S BRANCH BY PLAINTIFF DOTTED LINES ARE CLAIMED Now OWNED BY LUTHER BROWN DISPUTE DISPUTE R. R. The land in controversy is divided into three tracts. The first tract is a narrow strip of land about 3 poles and 9 links wide and 75 poles long, and lying between the lines E-F and B-C, on the west side of the 80-acre tract conveyed by the second deed to Joe Crossland. The second tract lies between the line C-D and the line F-G up to the point of that line opposite to D. The OAK LANE STAKE |