county cess would be divided between owner and occupier, the occupier below that amount being relieved altogether. Wednesday, Feb. 16. MARRIAGE WITH A DECEASED WIFE'S SISTER. At a quarter-past twelve, there being then but a small body of members on the Ministerial side and scarcely half a dozen on the Opposition, Mr. T. CHAMBERS rose to move the second reading of this Bill. He said the object of the Bill had been explained so often that he would now simply move that it be read a second time. Mr. M'LAREN gave notice that when the Bill thould go into committee he would move that the words applying its operation to Scotland should be omitted.-The Bill was then read a second time. WOMEN'S DISABILITIES. Mr. JACOB BRIGHT obtained leave to bring in a Bill to remove the electoral disabilities of women. JURIES. Viscount ENFIELD' in moving for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the laws relating to the qualifications, summoning, attendance, and remuneration of special and common juries, said that the Bill was identical with the one he had the honour to introduce last year, and which had passed a second reading, with the understanding that it was not to proceed further at the time. The Bill was the result of a select committee which sat two years, and had examined a great number of witnesses.--Leave was given. LAW BILLS IN PARLIAMENT. MARRIAGE WITH A DECEASED WIFE'S SISTER. -The Bill brought in again this session by Mr. Thomas Chambers, M.P., to legalise marriage with a deceased wife's sister, has been printed. This Bill provides that, Nothing herein contained shall render valid any marriage with the sister of a deceased wife where either of the parties has afterwards, during the life of the other and before the passing of this Act, lawfully intermarried with any other person." It also provides that the Act, so far as it relates to any marriage with the sister of a deceased wife, celebrated or contracted before its passing, shall not invalidate or affect any right to any dignity or title of honour, or any estate, right, title, or interest, legal or equitable, in or to any lands, hereditaments, chattels, or effects vested in any person before the passing of this Act, nor any contingent estate or interest, legal or equitable, in any lands, hereditaments, chattels, real chattels, or effects created by or derived from any settlement, grant, conveyance to uses, release, appointment, or other instrument bona fide executed before the passing of this Act, or by or from any devise or will which shall have become operative by the death of the devisor or testator before the passing of this Act. ESTATE AND INVESTMENT JOURNAL. STOCK AND SHARE MARKETS. The fluctuations of the week are as follows:- ENGLISH FUNDS. 921 923 ... 242 240 242 93 93 REPORTS OF SALES. NOTE. -The reports of the Estate Exchange are officially supplied in the following list. Auctioneers whose names are registered there will oblige by reports of their own sales.] Tuesday, Feb. 15. Middlesex-sold for 10,1007. By Messrs. DEBENHAM, TEWSON, and FARMER, at the Mart. Freehold 25a. Or. 37p. of land at Gunnerbury, near Acton, Leasehold residence, No. 4, North Bank, Regent's-park, term 88 years from 1821, at 67. per annum-sold for 8007. Leasehold residence, No. 267, Queen's-road, Peckham, let at 501. per annum, term 80 years from 1861, at 57. per annumsold for 5001. Leasehold, No. 271, Queen's-road, let at 557. per annum, term 80 years from 1861, at 67. per annum-sold for 5001. Leasehold three houses, Nos. 46, 47, and 49, Loddige's-road, Hackney, producing 787. per annum, term 854 years from 1861, at 137. 10s. per annum-sold for 6207. Contingent reversion to one-third of a moiety of the following properties, viz. :-Two freehold houses at Surbiton and Kingston, 40007. invested on mortgage, and 8507. Three per Cent. Consols, receivable on the death of a lady aged 78 NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. DOMICIL.-A domiciled American subject made a will in the United States, by he directed his property in this country to be paid over, after the discharge of certain specified legacies, to his executors in America, and to be by them distributed according to the provisions of a trust-deed also executed in the United States. The deed did not affect the devolution of property in this country, and the court therefore allowed probate to go without incorporating, an affidavit being filed in the registry identifying it by date and name of trustees: In the Goods of Peabody, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 730. Prob.) SURVIVORSHIP.-T. G., with his wife and three children, perished in shipwreck. There being no evidence as to survivorship, and no will, the court granted administration of the estate of T. G., as having died a widower, to the maternal grandfather of the surviving children, and directed that the administrator's oath, instead of being in the usual form, should state that there was no reason for believing that the wife had survived her husband: (In the Goods of Grinstead, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 731. Prob.) TESTAMENTARY SUIT-SEPARATE DEFENCESCONSOLIDATION. Two executors had commenced separate defences, and two records had been made up. The court, on motion, ordered the records to be consolidated, but gave the defendants leave to be represedted by counsel separately: (Lime v. Holden, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 731. Prob.) PROBATE-ATTESTATION CLAUSE DEFECTIVE -Affidavit disPENSED WITH.-The attestation clause to a seaman's will was defective, in that it did not state that the witnesses had signed in each other's presence. One of the witnesses was in India, the whereabouts of the other was unknown. The court, under the circumstances, on the consent of the widow being filed, dispensed with the usual affidavit from an attesting witness: (In the Goods of Benson, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 731. Prob.) DESERTION-SEPARATION-DEED.-A husband deserted his wife, but before the two years expired a deed of separation was executed between the parties, by which the husband covenanted to pay her a certain sum yearly. No part of it 92 92 92 had ever been paid. The court held that the deed disentitled the wife to petition for divorce on the ground of desertion without cause for two years: (Parkinson v. Parkinson, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 732. Div.) EVIDENCE IN DIVORCE.-A witness who is called to prove adultery with one of the parties to a suit may claim the protection of the proviso in the 3rd section of the Evidence Amendment 92 92 92 92 Act; but if he or she do not claim it, the evi1111111dence is admissible. The judge may refuse to allow the question to be put if the witness claims the protection of the proviso, but the counsel 100 100 100 100 100 100 cannot exclude it: (Hebblethwaite v. Hebblethwaite, 21 L. T. Rep. Ñ. S. 732. Div.) India 5 Cent. for Acc. India Stock,5 Cent. India Bonds (10001.) 4 Do. (under 10001.) 4 per Ex. Bills, 10007. Do. 5001. 258.c a March 24 per cent. 48. pm. b March 24 per cent. par.; June 21 per cent. par. e Premium. d June 23 per cent. par. the husband's petition for dissolution on the ground of adultery, pleaded that in a former suit she had been judicially separated from him. The court refused to hold the prior decree as a bar to the husband's suit: (Yeatman v. Yeatman, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 733. Div.) COURT OF CROWN CASES RESERVED (IRELAND). REG. v. LAWRENCE CLINTON AND OTHERS (a). An indictment for larceny of seaweed washed on shore before said seaweed has been reduced into possession does not lie, Morris. J., dissentiente. The prisoners were convicted at the commission held in Green-street in June 1869, for larceny of ungathered and uncollected seaweed cast on prosecutor's shore. The shore was that strip extending between high and low water mark. The prisoners came in the middle of the night of the 9th May last, and privately took the seaweed away. On this case being called on, MORRIS, J. deli. vered his judgment, which substantially is as fol. lows:-Lawrence Clinton and several others were indicted at the last commission at Green-street, for larceny of seaweed, the property of Patrick that he had held and paid rent for forty-five years M'Cabe. The prosecutor Patrick M'Cabe proved for the "sea shore, growing and running weed of the strand at Ardgillan, in the county of Dublin. He proved a map, that the shore let to him went to low water mark. That on Sunday, the 9th May, a considerable quantity of seaweed was cast on his shore, and that he gave directions to have it collected the next morning (Monday). It was proved by other witnesses that upon Sunday night, it being then midnight, the prisoners carried away the seaweed that had been so cast on the shore, and which was lying between high and low water mark. It was proved that the Taylor family (under whom M'Cabe held) were the owners of the shore upon which the running seaweed had been cast, and from whith the prisoners had taken it. Evidence was given extending back to the year 1835, that M'Cabe and a person named Murtagh held the shore, the growing and running seaweed, and Mr. Hamilton proved it from the year 1843, and that shore demised to M'Cabe extended to low water mark, and that M'Cabe held no land." Mr. Curtis, counsel for the prisoners, contended, "That as there was ro evidence that the seaweed was gathered by M'Cabe or his men, and as it lay the prisoners, it was not the subject of larceny. between high and low water mark, when taken by The question the court has now to consider is whether or not this article seaweed, under the circumstances of the case, can be the subject of larceny. Larceny is defined by Roscoe to be the wrongful taking of the goods of another. The jury convicted the prisoners, and the court are now pressed by counsel that there was no precedent, and that there was no such indictment to be found as an indictment for stealing seaweed. It might be very difficult to find a precedent for an indictment for stealing a coat. In the case of the Bailiffs, Burgesses, and Commonalty of the Borough of Dunwich v. Sterry (1 B. & Ad. 831), it was held that the grantee of a wreck has a special property in all goods stranded within his liberty, and may maintain trespass against a wrong-doer for taking them away, though such goods were part of the cargo of a ship, from which some persons escaped alive to land, and though the owners within a year and a day claimed and identified them, and though the taking was before any seihad a special property in the wreck cast on his zure on behalf of the grantee. There the grantee shore. Here seaweed is cast on the shore of the owner, who too was entitled to the enjoyment of the right to take running weed on the shore. I am of opinion that the owner is entitled to it; it is his property, and it is the subject of larceny. The prisoners take it at night-take this article, the property of another. Every element that is in Roscoe's definition of larceny exists here. I take exactly the same view here of this case that I did in the court below-that is, that the conviction was good, and ought to be affirmed. consideration of the court was, WHITESIDE, C. J. said that the question for the "that as there was no evidence that the seaweed had been gathered by M'Cabe or his men, and as it lay between high and low water mark when taken by the prisoners, it was not the subject of larceny." In support of the conviction no precise authority was quoted either in the statute or at the common law. As to the statute law there are enactments against plundering ships in distress, or wrecked or cast on shore; and again, persons in possession of articles belonging to vessels wrecked, and not giving a satisfactory account thereof, may be summoned before a justice and imprisoned for six months, and obliged to restore the articles found to the rightful owner. So there are enactments against stealing oysters from oyster fisheries in (a) From the Irish Law Times. UNCERTIFICATED PRACTITIONERS. The following is a copy of a bill sent in to a lady by a law clerk not admitted, and, consequently, not certificated : : AS TO PURCHASE OF Nos. 10 AND 11, LAWRENCE-STREET, May 27th. Attending at auction room, 165, June Cab and omnibus fare 31.-Having received abstract from ven- ......... 2.-Attending at the office of Mr. Thomas, Fair copy for perusal of Mr. Thomas.. 23. Having received letter from vendor's Engrossing deed of covenant-fo. 18 110 220 1 1 0 068 0 13 4 0 6 8 38 6 0 5 0 068 1 00 4 0 0 0 11 8 0 15 0 068 29.-Having received letter from vendor's solicitor, with appointment to complete, writing and informing you of same... Attending searching for judgments, lis pendens, &c...... Paid fee stamp... Attending Middlesex registry, searching for incumbrances Paid search and reference 050 0 68 068 020 I'ANSON (Edward), jun., Clapham Common, Surrey, and I'ANSON (Catherine), his wife. 257. Three per Cent. Con. sols Annuities. Claimant, said I'Anson, formerly junior. STUCLEY (George), Esq., Hartland, Devon, SMITH (Thomas McKenzie), Bideford, Devon, Surgeon, and WILLCOCK (Stephen Cleverly), of the same place, wine merchant. 597. 138. Three per Cent. Consols Annuities. Claimants, the said Sir George Stucley Stucley, Bart., formerly George Stucley, Esq., and Stephen Cleverly Willcock. TATTERSHALL (Richard), jun.. Sloane-street, Chelsea, and LEWIN (George H.), Esq., Pall Mall, attorney. 17617. 178. 2d. New Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Richard Tattershall, late junior. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. ALLCHIN (Mary), Rochester, Kent. March 5; Prall and Son, BYTHEWAY (Edward), Stottesdon, Salop, butcher. March 31; A. P. Trow, solicitor, Clesburg Mortimer, Salop; April 12; V.C. S., at noon. CANDY (Charles P., Esq., 47, Grosvenor-street, Middlesex. April 25; G. M. Clements, solicitor, 60, Threadneedlestreet, E.C. May 9; V.C. S., in the afternoon. CARTWRIGHT (Richard), 118, Mile-end-road, Middlesex, sur. veyor of taxes. March 9; Walker, Smith. and Co., solicitors, Chester. March 16; M.R., in the forenoon. CATTELL (William'. Weston-under-Lizard, Stafford, gentleman. March 14; Bailey, Shaw, and Co., solicitors, 5, Berners-street, Middlesex. March 24; V.C. S., in the afternoon. CLEVERLY (Samuel), 43, Queen Ann-street, Cavendishsquare, Middlesex, M.D. March 5; Lydall and Sweeting, solicitors, 12, Southampton-buildings, Chancery-lane, Middlesex. March 12; M.R., in the forenoon. COULSON (Thomas), Dray, York, gentleman. March 14; E. E. Clark, solicitor, Snaith, Yorks. March 24: V.C. S., in the afternoon. DAVY (Joseph), Kelling, Norfolk, farmer. March 11; Miller and Sons, solicitors, Norwich. March 26; M.R., in the forenoon. EDDISON (Eliza), Mansfield, Nottingham. Feb. 28; Payne, Ford, and Co., solicitors, 70, Albion-street, Leeds. March 8: V.C. S., at noon. GREEN (John B.), Wolverhampton, currier and leather HEATON (Thomas), Wigan, Lancaster. March 14; Thomas JONES (John), Lyddyn Frier, Llansahwm, Anglesey, farmer. noon. LEES (James), Stamford-crescent, Ashton-under-Lyne, Lancaster, cotton spinner and manufacturer. March 7; Wm. Orford, of the firm of Earle, Son, and Co., solicitor, 44, Brown-street, Manchester. March 21; V. C. J., at noon. MAYNARD (Henry), 2, Portland-place, Kensington, Middle sex, licensed victualler. March 3; A. C. Rhodes, solicitor. 63, Chancery-lane, Middlesex. March 10; V.C. J., at noon. MAYSTON (William), Redgrave, Suffolk, gentleman. Feb. 28; A. Field, solicitor, 2, Suffolk-lane, Cannon-street, E.C. March 9; V.C. J., at noon. beds, being the property of any other persons, and sufficiently marked out and known as such, and lesser punishments for dredging in such a bed so marked out and known. Yet the subject of taking seaweed cast on the shore between high and low water mark has been left wholly untouched, and therefore it is as it was at common law. Precedents are for known offences abundant, yet not a single case nor indictment, nor prosecution for a felony such as this, for taking seaweed, has been produced or referred to. This, therefore, is a prosecution f the first impression, although the common law has been in force for many centuries. This consideration would be almost in itself conclusive against the prosecution. The learned counsel who opened for the prisoners is experienced in the civil law. Counsel for the Crown argue-first, that the directions given to gather the seaweed next day amounted to a reduction into possession. This is wholly untenable. Secondly, he insisted that he who had the shore between high and low water mark had a constructive possession of the seaweed cast up on land by the sea, enough to enable him to maintain this indictment. The modern authority of Reg. v. Reede (1 Dears. 257) is very good law and wholly indisputable. There a servant was indicted for stealing his master's coals, which in sacks were put into his master's cart; on his way home he made away with the coals and it was held he was guilty of larceny. his master having a constructive possession of the coals, Lord Campbell declaring in the Court of Appeal that it was the same, whether the coals were placed on the prosecutor's cart as if deposited in his cellar. It was next insisted that the right to seaweed was analogous to the right to take wrecks, and that a grantee of wreck may bring trespass before seizure. Therefore, an indictment might be maintained for taking seaweed before the seaweed was gathered and collected by the grantee. But this by no means follows; it is a pure assumption, and when we examine the older and the later authorities, we find it to be so: Constable's case, 5th Reps. 105; The Corporation of Alnwick v. Henry (1 B. & A. 845). We perceive the reason of the rule of the common law that the King and therefore his grantee might maintain trespass as owner of wrecks cast upon the shore before seizure. By the rule of the common law, where no man can claim property in any goods the King shall have them by his prerogative. The right to the wreck is often a right merely to the custody of it until the true owner appears, and of necessity a special property is in the Crown or its grantee, in order, meanwhile, to save the property for the true owner, and if he do not appear for the Crown, to whom it ultimately may belong by the common law. This reasoning and doctrine cannot apply in principle to seaweed carried to and from the shore by the flux and reflux of the tide; there is no analogy between the two things. There is not the same necessity or reason for the possession of property in seaweed, and there is no trace of the application of the same doctrine thereto. But, again, although there may be a property in certain things it does not follow that felony can be committed in respect of them. The following passage from Hale is expressive (Hale's Pleas of the Crown, vol. i., p. 510):-" Larceny cannot be committed of such things whereof no man hath any determinate property, the things themselves are capable of property as of treasure trove and wreck till seized, then he that hath them in point of franchise may have a special action against him that takes them. Larceny cannot be committed of things that are foræ naturæ unreclaimed, and nullius in bonis, as of deer or conies though in a park or warren, fish in a river or pond, wild fowl, wild swans, pheasants, but if any of these are killed, larceny may be committed of their flesh or skins because now they are under property." The word determinate in the above sentence is significant. It would be difficult to say a man had a determinate property in seaweed, floating as was boldly insisted between high and low water mark, and that he could pursue a bed of seaweed which had once touched his part of the shore. Hale's authority is decisive that larceny could not be committed of such things. Hawkins (1 Pleas of the Crown, 215) is to the same effect, but he cannot add to the authority of Hale. A passage from 1 Gamble's Criminal Law, 568, is to the point. Mr. Byrne, in his argument, relied on Howe v. Stamnull (A. & N. 348, 350), a case which certainly when looked at does not help the prosecution (vide pp. 351, 357). It is impossible to believe, after reading this case in Alcock and Napier, that the public may not take seaweed floating between high and low water mark, but it is impossible to argue even plausibly that for such a taking an in- UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE DOUGHTON (Hannah), Lee, Kent. March 25; W. H. Tillett dictment for larceny could be maintained, and yet on principle it could if the indictment in this case was good. Upon the whole the majority of the court are of opinion that larceny cannot be maintained for taking seaweed under the circumstances stated in this case, and therefore the conviction must be quashed. 0 13 4 068 070 068 £25 2 10 ,, Stamps and deed of covenant Memorial stamp and parch- Registering deed 4 0 0 050 070 ,, Letters, postages, cab hire, &c. 1 3 6 £10 1 6 JOINT-STOCKCOMPANIES WINDING-UP ACTS. BURNLEY SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY (LIMITED).— PHOTOGENIC GAS COMPANY (LIMITED).-Creditors to send in BANK OF ENGLAND. [Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the MELLOR (John), Liverpool, Lancaster, coal merchant, SAUNDERS (John), Esq., The Lodge, Batheaston, Somerset. SHARP (George), South Mims, Middlesex, whitesmith. March CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. ANSTRUTHER (Ellen), 12, Oxford-row, Bath. April 11; H. H. ARCHER (Martha, 18, Hans-place, Sloane-street, Chelsea, BANNISTER (John S., Weston, Pembridge, Hereford, gentle- BARTON (Walter), 28, Queen's-road, Norland-square, Not- CHAPLIN (George), Spital-street, Dartford, Kent, wine mer- CLARKE (George). Wolverton, Buckingham, gentleman. CROCKER (J. P.. or Garritson. John G.), 81, Regent-street, and Co., solicitors, St. Andrew's-street, Norwich. FINCH (Charles H. M.), Esq., Bemerton-lodge, Bemerton, Wilts. April 15; C. Dew, solicitor, Salisbury. FOLEY (William H.), Esq., 24, Connaught-square, Hydepark, Middlesex, gentleman. April 1; Walker and Jerwood, solicitors, 12, Furnival's-inn, Middlesex. GIFFORD (Frederick), Esq., Exmouth, Devon, May 1; J. P. Sweetland, solicitor, 59, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex. HALLOWES (Francis), Esq., Glasswell-hall, Bolsover, Derby. Captain in the Royal Navy. March 23: Tooke, Hallowes, and Co., solicitors, 39, Bedford-row, W.C. HEARNE (Dora H.), 5, Melcombe-place, Dorset-square, 11, Essex-street, Strand, W.C. JOHNSON (George), Crown Bank, Talk-o-th'-hill, Stafford, colliery manager. March 25: Wards and Coopers, soli citors, Newcastle. LAWSON (Clementina), 71, Hereford-road, Bayswater, Middlesex. March 1; Uptons, Johnson, and Co., solicitors, 20, Austinfriars LEA (Thomas S.), Esq., Astley Hall, Astley, Worcester. April 2; Bray, Warren, and Co., solicitors, 99, Great Russell-street, Bloomsbury. Salop. LLOYD (Lord Kenyon, Gredington, Flint, and 12, Portman- MCKERNAN (John, Manchester, draper. April 15; Sutton 5, Union-street, Birmingham. RICHARDSON (Henry), 1, Oxford-terrace, Edgware-road. April 1; W. J. Fraser, solicitor, 78, Dean-street, Soho. RICHARDSON (William), The Cottage, Old Charlton, Kent, assistant commissary. March 10; W. Farnfield, solicitor, SPREAD (Christopher E., Esq., 3, Victoria-grove, Bayswater, Middlesex. March 31; J. F. Weymouth, solicitor, 19, Essexstreet, Strand. SOUTHWELL (James), Armley-road Iron Works, and Victoria-road. Headingley, both in the parish of Leeds, spade manufacturer. March 31; Snowden and Son, 2, Church court, Clement's-lane, E.C. solicitors. Leeds. Tows (William), Priory Arms, Priory-road, South Lambeth, Surrey, licensed victualler. March 2; Nash, Field, and Co., solicitors, 2, Suffolk-lane, Cannon-street, E.C. TOWNELEY (Rev. Wm. G., Beaupré Hall, and rector of Upwell St. Peter, Norfolk, clerk. May 9; Young, Jackson, and Co., 12, Essex-street, Strand, Middlesex. WARLOW (Mary), 30, Belgrave-road, St. John's-wood, Middlesex. March 25 Blakeley and Beswick, solicitors, 10, Bedford-row, W C. WINTHROP (Edward G.), 13, Palace-villas, Bromley, Kent. March 31; H. H. Walford, solicitor, 27, Bolton-street, Piccadilly, Middlesex. ACTION AGAINST A SOLICITOR.-In the Court of Exchequer, the case of Cox v. Wright was tried. This was an action by the public officer of the Derbyshire Bank, against Mr. Herbert Wright, solicitor in Birmingham, to recover about 40001, being a balance of principal and interest on nineteen bills of exchange, three of which he had accepted, and the remainder indorsed. The trial occupied the greater portion of Wednesday, and at the sitting of the court on Thursday the parties came to an arrangement under which a verdict was declared for plaintiff -damages 20007. TRANSFER OF A SUIT.-The case of Evans v. Haigh has been before Stuart, V. C. for three or four days. It was a bill filed by Mrs. Evans, the plaintiff, a married lady, but independent of her husband, and it charged the defendant with a breach of trust in reference to certain deeds of settlement with respect to her interest as tenant for life of property by the will of her first husband. The trustees had instituted a suit in another branch of the court. Stuart, V. C. had expressed a wish that the cross-suit should be transferred to his court in order that he might deal with the whole matter in issue between the litigants. On Thursday morning Giffard, L. J. ordered that course to be taken. CHANCERY REFORMS.-At the Rolls Chambers, on Monday, in an application for time to file an answer to a suit in Chancery, Mr. Hawkins, the chief clerk, took occasion to remark on the numerous applications made in Chancery suits for time to file answers, and to express his conviction that something shonld be done on the subject. The taxing masters had represented that the bills of costs before them contained heavy charges for applications for time to answer. The course adopted was to take no notice of the month allowed to answer, and then afterwards to make frequent applications. He refused to allow the costs of the application. THE BENCH AND THE BAR. IRELAND. THE BAR AND THE BENCHERS.-We have recently had occasion more than once to remark on the strange delusion under which the Benchers of the Honourable Society of King's-inns are suffering. In their conduct towards the Incorporated Law Society we find traces of the same hallucination which is apparent in their treatment of the representatives of the Bar. They seem to imagine that they are a corporation, existing in some mysterious manner for their own sakes, irresponsible, and not accountable to those whose interests are committed to their care. On no other hypothesis can we account for their refusal to hold a conference with the representatives of the Bar on the points in dispute between them, or for their neglect to comply with the most reasonable request of the Incorporated Law Society, and render an account of the money which they had received upon an express trust. This idea seems to be peculiar to self-elective bodies, and is one of the reasons why they have been generally discarded by modern enlightenment. If the committee of the Bar were guilty of any fault, it is that the reform which they propose is not sufficiently thorough. The history of the question may be learned from the admirably drawn up report, which we print in another column. It will be seen that by a gradual series of encroachments, the proportion of judicial and ex officio Benchers and Bar Benchers was increased from 14 to 32 (the numbers contemplated by the rules), to 27 to 19. But these 19 are in no sense of the word representatives of the Bar. They are not chosen by the Bar. Many of them have retired from practice, and have no means of informing themselves of the wants and feelings of the practising members of the Profession. There is not a single stuff. gownsman among the number-none, we believe, who has not for many years left the ranks of the junior Bar. It would be sheer folly to assert that, however chosen, they, in fact, represent the working element of the Profession. It is sufficient to say that neither Mr. Palles, Mr. Macdonogh, Mr. Butt, Mr. Falkiner, Mr. Jellett, Mr. Heron, Mr. Walsh, Mr. Purcell, nor Mr. May are Benchers. the Chancery and Common Law Bar, and a These gentlemen are unquestionably the leaders of governing body which includes not one of the number, can hardly be a satisfactory one. The present Bar Benchers are excellent and esteemable men, and some of them eminent lawyers, and in all cases the honour of "cooption " was thrust upon them. We do not simply ask one question. If the Bar Benchers mean to say a disrespectful word of them. We ballot by the members of the Bar, how many of were selected (as we hope they soon will be) by the nineteen would be among their chosen representatives. The committee suggests, first, that the benchers should consist of forty-six members, seventeen to be ex-officio benchers, and twenty-nine to be chosen from the practising members of the Bar-four, at least, of the Bar Benchers being members of the Outer Bar. The ex-officio members should, they suggest, consist of the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, Lord Justice of Appeal, Vice-Chancellor, the twelve judges of the Superior Courts of Common Law, and the judge of the Court of Probate, all for the time being. They propose that each elected bencher should vacate his seat on his promotion to such a judicial office as involves the relinquishment of his practice, or on his otherwise permanently ceasing to practise, and that any bencher who, when elected, shall be a member of the Outer Bar, should vacate his seat on being called within the Bar. "Your com mittee believe," they add, "that the only course now remaining to the Bar, or compatible with the dignity of their Profession, an application to the Legislature for an Act of Parliament to establish the constitution of the Inns on such a basis as will restore to the Profession the right of self-government, and protect this right from all future encroachment.' The reforms here suggested would be much better than nothing, and if the Benchers had cheerfully agreed to them, would probably have been gratefully accepted by the Bar. Indeed, if even now at the eleventh hour the Benchers were to accept the unanimous deciside the Profession, it is more than probable that sion of the Bar, supported hy public opinion outall differences would be amicably arranged. But if the Benchers persist in holding the Bar at arm's length, and refuse to entertain their suggestions for the reform of a constitution which they admit to be unsatisfactory, the Bar must carry out their resolution of appealing to the Legislature. In this event, we see no reason why they should not seek a more thorough measure of reform, and exclude ex-officio members altogether. Let the whom there should be a right of appeal, as visitors, judges, as in England, form a separate body, to from decisions of the Benchers. But let the governing body of the Bar be men thoroughly identified with the Profession by sympathies, pursuits, and interests, and let them owe their selection to the suffrages of their brethren.-Irish Law Times. says, this to his adoption of ether-inhalation as a stimulant-sedative. "A few whiffs are," he "sufficient at once to quiet spasm and pain, and to induce a general tranquillity of the nervous system." As nervous irritability is a common complaint in these days, and by no means confined to octogenarians, it might be well if Sir Frederick Pollock's example would induce "fashionable dram-drinkers" to substitute inhalation for imbibition. A LEGAL UNIVERSITY.-The London correspondent of the Manchester Guardian writes:The legal profession are all on the qui vive regarding the measure of the Lord Chancellor said to be fully prepared, and about to be introduced into the Upper House on an early day. In the best informed quarters the belief is that Lord Hatherley contemplates two measures-one affecting legal education, and the other the constitution of an entirely new court of appeal. The Chancellor contemplates the erection of what will, I understand, be called a Legal University, to which the constituted bodies I have alluded to are to be affiliated, as colleges and halls are to the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford. From the heads of houses will be chosen, it is supposed by election, the members of the senate or governing body; and by their authority degrees of different grades and values will be given, attesting the proficiency of the student in knowledge of equity or law. When one comes to think of it the wonder is why an organisation so simple and useful has never been created before." MAGISTRATE AND PARISH LAWYER. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. HIGHWAYS ACT-RIGHT OF BOARD TO CUT WOOD BY THE ROADSIDE.-B. was seised of lands on each side of a highway through a common, the highways board cut down some of these trees on land being covered with valuable fir-trees. The the plea that they were an obstruction to the highway. It was held that primâ facie the board had a right to do so, and an injunction to restrain them refused: (Turner v. The Ringwood Highways Board, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 745. V. C. J.) magistrate cannot refuse to state a case on the APPEAL-STATEMENT OF CASE--PRACTICE.-A ground that an objection has not been formally brought to his notice, where the objection is of such a kind as goes to the root of the whole matters before him for adjudication, and one therefore which he must be presumed to have known. In making absolute a rule to compel a magistrate to state a case under such circumstances, the court refused to allow the appellant the cost of the rule, because he had not raised (Ex parte Markham, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 748. the objection distinctly before the magistrate: Q. B.) MUNICIPAL CORPORATION - ELECTOR - BURGESS LIST NOTICE OF OBJECTION. The notice of objection to a voter being retained upon the burgess list need not state the parish in which the objector resides. Where, therefore, the objector described himself as Glendower-street, in the borough of Mon"of borough for a house described to be situate mouth, on the burgess list of the said a good description. In such a notice it is not in Almshouse-street, in the said borough:" Held, necessary to describe the qualifying property of the burgess objected to. Where, therefore, the notice was as follows: "I hereby give you notice that I object to the name of Robert Gooden, Bridge-street, in the township of Great Bolton," &c., not naming the nature of the qualifying property: Held sufficient: (Reg. v. The Mayor, &c., of Monmouth and Bolton, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 748. Q. B.) IMPRISONMENT FOR COSTS OF AN APPEALDEBTORS' ACT 1869.-Sect. 4 of the Debtors' Act 1869, abolishes imprisonment for debt, but excepts "default in payment of any sum recoverable summarily before a justice of the peace." The costs of an appeal to quarter sessions were held to be within this exception: (Ex parte Cole, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 750. Q. B.) GOODS OBTAINED BY FALSE PRETENCES-SUBSEQUENT SALE-Seizure of ORIGINAL OWNERS from the defendants by A. by false pretences, -EFFECT OF CONVICTION.-Goods were obtained and were afterwards sold by him to the plaintiff, retaken and removed by the defendants; and in from whose possession they were subsequently trover against the defendant, for such seizure and conversion, the plaintiff recovered a verdict for 145., the value of the goods. At the time the action was brought and tried, the plaintiff was aware that A. was in custody awaiting his trial for the above offence, and A. was, in fact, tried and convicted thereof on the day after the -plaintiff had recovered the aforesaid verdict. Upon a rule for a new trial, on the ground that the jury should have been directed to take into consideration the probability of A.'s conviction for false pretences, and that the damages were excessive, it was held, by the Court of Exchequer (Kelly, C. B. and Martin, B.), that, by the effect and operation of sect. 57 of the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, upon the conviction of A. there was relation back to the time of the fraud committed by him upon the defendants, and that the goods remained the property of the defendants from the first, the property therein never having been out of them, and that what they did was simply to retake possession of their own property; and the court made the rule for a new trial absolute, subject to the plaintiff's assenting to a stay of proceedings upon payment of the costs of the action and of the rule, with 40s. damages. Scattergood v. Sylvester, 15 Q. B. 506; 10 L. J. 447, Q. B., considered and approved: (Nickling v. Heaps, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 754. Ex.) EMBEZZLEMENT TRADES UNION. - An unregistered friendly society or trades union may prosecute its servants for embezzlement of its property, though some of its rules may be void as being in restraint of trade, and contrary to public policy. Rules in a trades society or union imposing fines upon members for working beyond certain hours, or for applying for work at a firm where there is no vacancy, or for taking a person into a shop to learn weaving where no vacant loom exists, though void as being in restraint of trade, do not render the society criminally responsible: (Reg. v. Stainer, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 758. Cr. Cas. Res.) REFORM OF THE GAME LAWS. THE following letter, containing a proposition for the abolition of the Game Laws eo nomine, and substituting for them an extension of the provisions of the Injuries to Property Act, has been addressed by Mr. Serjt. Cox to the Field. He invites suggestions, and we invite them too, for it is a question on which experienced lawyers are peculiarly qualified to advise: Sir,-Monday next is to witness the long-threatened assault upon the game laws. The argument of their opponents is a plausible appeal to a popular prejudice: "Why should there be exceptional laws for the protection of game preserved for the purposes of a section of the community?" It is in vain to answer that exceptional property of all kinds is in this, as in all other countries, protected by exceptional laws; that other classes are protected in the same manner; that we have special laws to protect the coin, to preserve from spoil the machinery and materials of manufacturers, the ore of mine owners, the goods of shopkeepers, the cash of friendly societies; that severer punishments protect horses, cattle, and sheep, which, being necessarily exposed, offer peculiar temptations to the dishonest; and that we visit with exceptional severity the stealing of a watch or pocket handkerchief from the person. In vain may we contend that if game is not to be protected by the law because it tempts to poaching, much more would we deny protection to the diamond pin, the gold watch chain, the goods hung at a shop door, and the costly jewels only parted from the thief by a show glass. In vain we turn to Mr. Bright and ask why the salmon is to be preserved, and not the partridge, or why the fishing he delights in is to be protected, while the shooting he does not care for is to be outlawed. It will be impossible to oppose to the outery raised by jealous demagogues a merely dogged resistance. The landlords and farmers, whom alone this question properly concerns, must face the fact that a popular odium has attached itself to the title of Game Laws, and that if they would maintain for the produce of their land the same protection which the law gives to all other property, it behoves them to be prepared with an efficient substitute for the existing laws, which, if such a substitute could be found, it would be prudent for them volunarily to abandon. I take the liberty of submitting to them through your columns a plan by which this object can, I believe, be effectualiy secured. It is the outline of a measure which I had prepared last year for the purpose of laying it before the House of Commons, but was prevented from doing so by the strange and unprecedented decision which removed me from my seat for Taunton. May I hope that, if approved by those whom it affects, it will find a foster-parent in some one of the landowners in the House of Commons. My proposition has at least the advantage of simplicity, and I hope it will be found equally practicable and efficient. In one sentence it may be described broadly as a suggestion to abolish the Game Laws entirely; to sweep the very name from the statute book; and to place the property those laws were designed to protect under the provisions of the Injuries to Property Act (24 & 25 Vict. c. 97), s. 52. carrying of arms for the purpose of fowling (also very desirable in itself), and a close time during the breeding season. Thus offences of this class would cease to be game offences. The conviction would be for wilful or malicious spoil of property, and under that name it would cease to enlist the sympathies of sensation-writers for the newspapers. I hope that your readers will favour me with their opinions on this proposition, and any sug gestions for its amendment that may occur to them. EDWARD W. Cox. 1, Essex-court, Temple, Feb. 8. S.L. It is there enacted that "Whosoever shall wilfully or maliciously commit any damage, injury, or spoil, to or upon any real or personal property whatsoever," shall on conviction be subject to imprisonment or to a pecuniary penalty, together with such further sum as reasonable compensation for the damage, injury, or spoil so committed, not exceeding 51. And it is expressly REAL PROPERTY LAWYER AND provided that the statute is "not to extend to any case where the party acted under a fair and reasonable supposition that he had a right to do the act complained of." Trespass in pursuit of game is expressly excepted, as being punishable under the Game Laws. CONVEYANCER ELEMENTARY PRECEDENTS IN CON- A Collection of practical Forms designed for pro- (Continued from page 260.) By simply repealing so much of this section as excepts Game Law offences, and enacting that all animals feræ naturæ shall for the purposes of this Act be deemed to be the property of the owner or occupier of the land on which they were at the 186. Will of real and personal estate in favour of time of the alleged injury or spoil, all the protec tion that could justly be given by the law would be provided; and that protection would be neither more nor less than is given to all the other products of the land, and to all that it contains, as well as to all personal property. It may be objected that such an enactment I should add that when title is bona fide dis. There are objections to a stringent law against mere trespass, unaccompanied by an act or intent to kill or injure something upon the land, which are entirely avoided by the reform I propose. Whether the wild animals on an estate should be the property of the landlord or of the tenant, or if the law should interfere with the liberty of contract with respect to them, are questions upon which I do not enter here. They concern none but the two parties. But I assume that tenants and landlords would alike agree that, in which of them soever the right to take those animals be vested, the poacher at least has no title to them; and that they would equally demand the protection of the law against the spoiling of their property by him. It was always admitted that the abolition of the Game Laws must be accompanied by a more stringent law against trespass; and I hope the suggestion I have here made will provide a sufficient protection for the things upon the land without resort to a law against trespass generally, which might be employed here, as it is in France and Germany, for the restriction of the enjoyments of the innocent pedestrian. And I presume, also, that few would be found to advocate the unrestricted licence for anybody to kill any wild animal anywhere. Apart from the intolerable nuisance and danger of such licences, it would speedily annihilate all the creatures who now preserve the necessary balance of nature. In Republican France they abolished the Protective Law, and re-enacted it in three years. During the Revolution in Germany the Game Laws were swept away, but restored in eighteen months by the Republican Parliament that abolished them, and with greater severity than before. Even in Democratic America and in "Universal Suffrage and Ballot" ruled Australia it has been found necessary to enact an Animal Protection Law as the only means for saving the animal world from extinction. My plan would accomplish the same purpose without the odium that attaches to the name of Game Law, and, moreover, it would have the further advantage of protecting other portions of the animal world that need it even more than that to which the name of game has been given. The other alterations in the law required to square with this one would be a duty upon the natural children. Ultimate trust for executors. This is the last will of me A. B. of &c. I revoke every testamentary instrument by me heretofore made, and I appoint C. D. and E. F. of &c., to be executors and trustees of this my will and guardians of my illegitimate infant children here. inafter mentioned, during their respective minorities. I devise and bequeath unto the said C.D. and E. F. all the real and personal estate, and property of, or to which I shall be seised, possessed, or then have any power to appoint or dispose of by entitled, at the time of my decease, or which I shall will, to hold the same unto and to the use of the said C. D. and E. F., their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, according to the tenures and legal natures thereof, upon trust to pay and apply the net proceeds thereof for, or towards the maintenance, education, and preferment of my two illegitimate children, known by the names of B. B. and C. B., until they shall respectively attain the age of twenty-one years. And upon the younger of the said children attaining the age of twenty-one years, to divide in equal shares between them, or pay to the survivor of them, any balance that may not have been applied in the maintenance, education, and advancement, of the said children respectively. But in case both the said children shall die under the age of twenty-one years, then I direct that such part of my said estate and effects as shall not have been previously applied in the maintenance, education, and advancement, of my said children shall be divided equally between the said C. D. and E. F., and their respective executors, administrators, and assigns, and I give and bequeath the same to them accordingly. I direct that my said children shall be educated in the Protestant faith. In witness, &c. 187. Will of widow of real and personal estate. Trust for sale and investment. Income to be divided between two daughters for separate use for life, and afterwards income to be divided between their children. If one daughter die in the lifetime of the other without issue, whole income to survivor and capital to survivor's children. If both die without issue, to next of kin. Provision for payment or deduction of debt due from one daughter's husband to testatrix. This is the last will of me A. B. of &c. I revoke every testamentary writing by me heretofore made, and I give, devise, and bequeath unto C. D., of, &c., all, &c. [continue trust for sale down to payment of debts as in precedent 184 (supra), then proceed], and shall invest the residue of the said moneys in the name or names of the trustee or trustees, for the time being of this my will in or upon any securities he or they may deem advisable, whether authorized by statute or not, with power from time to time to alter, vary, or transfer all, or any of such investments for others of a like nature, or to continue any investments subsisting at the time of my death, and shall pay one moiety or equal half part of the income of the said trust premises, unto my daughter E. F. the wife of F. F. of &c., during her life, and shall pay the other moiety, or equal half part thereof unto my daughter G. B., during her life. And I declare that the respective shares of my said daughters shall be for their respective separate use, without power of anticipa tion, and their receipts alone shall be sufficient discharges for the same respectively. And subject to the trusts hereinbefore expressed and declared, I give and bequeath one moiety, or equal half part of the said trust investments unto all the children, or any the child, of the said E. F., and if more than one, in equal shares. And subject to the trusts hereinbefore expressed and declared, I give and bequeath the other moiety, or equal half (a) By Thomas Wilkinson, Esq., Liverpool. part of the said trust investments unto all the children, or any the child, of the said G. H., and if more than one, in equal shares. But in case of the death of either of my said daughters without issue, then I hereby will and declare that the moiety of such daughter so dying, and the accumulations and income thereof, shall be held in trust for the other of them my said daughters during her life, and after her death for any her children or child in like manner as the original moiety is hereinbefore given to her and them. But in case both my said daughters shall die with out issue, then I give and bequeath the whole of the said trust investments and the accumulations and income thereof unto my next of kin according to the statutes for the distribution of the effects of intestates. And whereas the said F. F. is indebted to me in £ for money lent by me to him. Now I declare that if such sum shall not be repaid in my lifetime, the same shall be deemed an advance to the said E. F. on account of her share, but if the said debt, or any part thereof, shall be repaid in my lifetime, then I direct that the said E. F. shall have so much more added to her share as will make up her share equal to that of her said sister. And I declare that the share to which any child of my said daughters shall be entitled under the trusts aforesaid shall be paid (if a son) on his attaining twenty-one, or (if a daughter) at that age or marriage [add advancement maintenance and accumulation clauses; devise of trust and mortgage estates; and appointment of C. D. as executor]. In witness, &c. 188. Will of widow exercising a power contained in her marriage-settlement appointing property comprised therein, and devising other property to trustees. Trust for sale. Bequest of numerous pecuniary legacies with provision against lapse. Residue to brother. This is the last will of me, A. B. of, &c. Whereas by an indenture dated, &c., and made between myself (then A. C., spinster) of the first part, B. B. of the second part, and W. X. and Y. Z. [trustees] of the third part (being a settlement made in consideration of the marriage shortly afterwards solemnised between myself and the said B. B.), certain hereditaments and premises were granted and conveyed unto the said W. X. and Y. Ž.. their heirs and assigns upon trust after the solemnisation of my marriage with the said B. B., that they, or the survivor of them, or the executors or administrators of such survivor should, with my consent, during my life, and after my decease at the sole discretion of the said trustees, make sale of the said hereditaments and premises in manner therein mentioned, and should stand possessed of the moneys to arise from such sale (after payment thereout of all expenses) upon such, and the same trusts, and subject to such, and the same powers and in such manner respects, as were or should be declared of and conin all cerning a certain sum of £ in and by a certain indenture, bearing even date with the now reciting indenture. And whereas by another indenture, also dated, &c., and made between M. N. of the first part, the said W. X. and Y. Z. of the second part, myself of the third part, and the said B. B. of the fourth part, it was thereby agreed and declared between and by all the said parties thereto, that the said W. X. and Y. Z., their executors, administrators, and assigns, should stand possessed of the said sum of £ upon trust that they or the survivor of them, and the executors or administrators of such survivor, should, as soon as conveniently might be after the execution of those presents, lay out and invest the same in their or his names or name, in or upon the securities therein authorised, in trust as to the income thereof for myself, for my separate use for life, without power of anticipation, and after my death in trust as to both capital and income as I should, by my last will and testament, appoint. And whereas I am desirous of exercising the power given or reserved to me by the lastly-recited indenture, and of devising and bequeathing all my property, both real and personal, in manner hereinafter mentioned. Now by virtue and in execution of all and every power and authority, powers and authorities, whatsoever to me given or enabling me in this behalf, whether special, general, or otherwise, I hereby appoint the said hereditaments and premises comprised in the hereinbefore firstly recited indenture, if remaining unsold at the time of my decease, or if then sold, the moneys which shall have arisen from the sale thereof; and the investments of the same, and the accumulations and income or so much thereof respectively as shall not have been applied under any of the trusts or powers in the hereinbefore secondly recited indenture contained. And also all and singular the said sum of £ and the stocks, funds, and securities for the same, and the dividends and annual produce thereof to the use of the said W.X. and Y.Ż., their heirs, executors, and administrators, upon the trusts and subject to the powers hereinafter expressed concerning the same, İgive, devise, and bequeath all the real and personal estate and property of or to which I shall at my decease be seised, possessed, or entitled, or which (To be continued.) respec tures:" (Anderson v. The London and NorthWestern Railway, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 756. Ex.) LANDS CLAUSES ACT-ARBITRATION-AWARD -TIME FOR PAYMENT OF PURCHASE-MONEY— POSSESSION-COSTS.-The plaintiff, being lessee of lands for building, opposed a Bill which the Bill passed, an agreement was entered into that defendants were then promoting, and, before the he should withdraw his opposition on the terms that, if the Bill passed, the defendants should purchase his interest in a portion of the lands, subject to an apportionment of the head rent, should pay to him compensation for damage to his adjoining property, for loss of profit resulting from the taking of the land, and for alteration of drainage; that the purchase should be completed, and the compensations paid with costs within six months of the passing of the Bill. Further, that the sums to be paid should, in case of difference, be referred to a surveyor to be agreed upon "in the usual manner," but that the purchase-money should be ascertained by taking the value of the improved rents which could be made by the plaintiff beyond the ground-rent, subject to deduction in respect of the time which would be occupied in making such improved rents, and the plaintiff was at once to cease from further building. The Bill received the Royal assent on the 28th June 1866. The parties could not agree as to the amount to be paid, and the whole matter was referred to made his award on the 13th March 1868, and accompanied it by a statutory declaration that a surveyor, whose award was to be final. He he did so under the provisions of the Lands Clauses Act. The defendants at once tendered the amount awarded, but the plaintiff refused it on the ground that he was entitled (1) to the 28th Dec. 1866 till the tender; and (3) to the costs of the arbitration; (2) to interest from the ground-rent which he had paid antecedently to specific performance, claiming also payment the date of the award, and he filed his bill for under these three heads: Held (reversing the decision of Malins, V.C.), first, that, as the agreement was made before the special Act passed, the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act had no operation; and, as the arbitrator had not dealt with costs in any manner, the plaintiff was not entitled to them. Secondly, that although the contract was in yet as the mode agreed to by both parties of terms a contract to complete by a stated day, fixing the purchase-money could, by no default of either party, not be acted upon before that day, and as the agreement was altogether silent by the company previously to the date of the on the subject of interest, none became payable award. And, thirdly, that the position of fixing the price was made, and therefore that vendor and purchaser continued till the award until that date the ground-rent, and all other outgoings in respect of the land, must be borne by the vendor. Where an agreement for sale provides for completion on a stated day, that circumstance alone does not in this court give JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES' LAW the vendor interest from that time, when delay JOURNAL. By a NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LIABILITIES OF RAILWAYS.-Framed pictures (a) As the Legacy Duty Act (36 Geo. 3, c. 52) has not duty is effected by directing it to be paid out of the subjected to legacy duty money which is to be appropriated in payment of the duty on legacies, a saving of general estate: (Hayes & Jarm. 192.) in completion is not attributable to the default. of the purchaser: (Catling v. The Great Northern Railway Company, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 769. L. C. and L. J.) MERCANTILE LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. SALE OF GOODS CRIMINALLY OBTAINEDCONVICTION OF FELON.-Goods were obtained from the defendants by A. by false pretences, from whose possession they were subsequently and were afterwards sold by him to the plaintiff trover against the defendants, for such seizure retaken and removed by the defendants; and in and conversion, the plaintiff recovered a verdict for 1457., the value of the goods. At the time the action was brought and tried, the plaintiff was aware that A. was in custody awaiting his trial for the above offence, and A. was, in fact, plaintiff had recovered the aforesaid verdict. tried and convicted thereof on the day after the Upon a rule for a new trial, on the ground that the jury should have been directed to take into consideration the probability of A.'s conviction for false pretences, and that the damages were excessive, it was held by the Court of Exchequer (Kelly, C. B. and Martin, B.), that, by the effect and operation of sect. 57 of the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, upon the conviction of A. there was relation back to the time of the fraud committed by |