but the grossest materialist—and by implication, utter scorner of metaphysics-has ever, with eyes open, refused to allow.

But the mention of mind, and of the objects on which mind feeds, leads in due course to an inquiry into the nature of the relation between the World of Mind and the World of Matter. And here I will summarize the philosophy of the author whom I am opposing, based as that philosophy is upon the Law of Relativity above stated.

"The worlds of Mind and Matter are better designated the "Internal and the External; the External taking in not only "Matter but Space. It will be found that the External is "embraced, without deficit or surplus, by the category of the "Extended; while the Internal, in its negative aspect, is "neither more nor less than the Inextended. Everything "which is an object at all, and yet has no extension, is Mind; "while wherever you find that which you can measure in three "dimensions, in two, or in one, there you may safely place "the abiding either of Matter or of Space. We yet need to "catch a glimpse of the positive aspect of the Internal "World. We find it threefold. Mind, the Internal, is "Feeling; it is Volition; it is Thought; it is all three "together. It is Feeling every one knows what feeling "means. It is also Volition, that is, feeling-prompted mus"cular action. For we have no knowledge of Mind except "in connection with a muscular framework. Lastly, Mind is "Thought: that is, it discriminates, it identifies, it retains its impressions. Discrimination, Identification, Retentiveness "make up Thinking. Having spoken of the Inextended and "Extended, or, as they are frequently called, Subject and "Object, separately, it must be inquired whether they can be "thought of separately. Am I competent to discuss myself by "myself? am I competent to discuss a Not Me wholly in"dependent of myself? It is necessary to give a wide exten"sion to the pronoun I in order to meet these inquiries. "I may be totally engrossed in the Extended, or, more readily, "in the Inextended; I may be in a Subject state or in an Object "state; but there can be no Object state, nothing extended, for "me, outside of and away from myself. As all my enunciations are measured by the standard of my own faculties, I am "justified in saying, that neither matter nor space exists except "in relation to me. The prefix for me is to be always under"stood before all my assertions. I am my own measure of "truth. What I think true, that I do think true; that is the "whole meaning of truth. There is no truth outside of my "thinking; no truth, I mean, for me; nor can I ever signify r anything except for me. In that signification-and a grand

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psychological impossibility debars me from putting any other "signification upon the words-I am the measure of all things. "But, as I said before, I might possibly be in a purely object "condition; in that case there would be an extended Object, independent of the inextended Subject, independent there"fore of the Ego, in the narrower denotation of that pro"noun, whereby it is co-extensive with Subject only, and not "with Subject and Object both.

"Before advancing to the grand and crowning examination "of the widest meaning of the Ego, wherein the Extended and "the Inextended together are merged, it is requisite to advert "to the mode of formation of the duality which composes this "universal Me. I consisted originally of states of active move"ment, nervous currents outwards, and states of passive sensa❝tion, nervous currents inwards. I went into conscious move"ment spontaneously, that is, without any stimulus of sensation, "when my nervo-muscular apparatus was fresh from food and "repose. I also had sensations without movement. These two "diverse kinds of consciousness, contrasting together, formed "the duality of the Active and the Passive. This duality of my "nature was primitive. From it sprang a second duality under "the nurture of experience. I thereby learned to distinguish "in me the Ideal from the Actual; the Actual, which varied "with my movements, from the Ideal, which was constant in "movement as in repose. The sight of a dog chasing a hare is "an example of an actual state of consciousness. The idea of "that chase is an ideal state. So precarious is the actual, that "it may be destroyed by the single movement of the closing "eyelids. So strong at home is the ideal, that, carried into "darkness or into the bustle of a city, it will yet subsist, where "no live hare is visible or durst even appear.

"Rehearsing the series anew and further completing it, I "continue :-I was originally a dualism of Muscular Feeling "and Passive Sensation. Thence, by experience and associa"tion, the custodier of my experiences, I passed into an ulterior "dualism of Ideality and Actuality. Out of this dualism was "born my third generation, Subject and Object. When I "emerge from a consciousness which abides under my move"ments to a consciousness which changes under them, I be"come Object, Extended, Not Self: thence repassing to a state "of consciousness which endures, notwithstanding my move"ment, I become Self once more, an Inextended Subject. But "Self and Not Self, equally with Ideal and Actual, with Sen"sation and Movement, are a pair of inseparables. I could "not know Sensation, as such, without Movement, nor an "Ideal without an Actual, nor could I know myself without "the foil that is not me."

And now, reader, I ween you wonder who I am that am thus marvellously constituted. Mine is a created, human person like your own; and I am not constituted as I have described myself; only Dr. Bain of Aberdeen, writing books on The Senses and The Intellect and The Emotions and The Will, says that I am. It is with him that I quarrel, in the name of the God that made us all three, made you, and Alexander Bain, and myself. I complain that the man from Aberdeen has set us up each in the place of God; now I will not be so set up, nor will you, nor shall Alexander Bain set up either himself or us, or any created self whatsoever, to enjoy divine supremacy. The following are the arguments with which I go about to pull him down.

Aristotle says that, of two contradictories, one is enough to distinguish both itself and its opposite; ἱκανὸν θάτερον μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ἑαυτό τε κρίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον.* Το bring out the sense of this dictum, let me see how Dr. Bain understands a man to know yellow. To know it, he says, in its difference from other juxtaposed colours, as blue, purple, green; and again to know it in its agreement with the same colours in the fact of being a colour. Take the contrast, yellow-blue. Am I obliged to know blue in order to know yellow? Not at all. I may know pink, or violet, or lavender; any shade will do, to set off yellow in my cognition. All that Dr. Bain contends for is that, to know yellow as a distinct colour, I must know also some other colour from which it is distinguished. Let us call that other colour for not yellow we will write -∞. y. Yellow we will call; and data, that y=-, or x+y=0; in concrete language, that were It does not follow from these a thing yellow to start with, and we painted it say blue, the thing would by that painting lapse into non-entity. In other words, yellow and blue are not pure logical contradictories. One does not merely exclude the other; it supplants it with something positive. Now I ask Dr. Bain whether it is the exclusive or the supplantative element of his much insisted upon "contrasting notion," that supplies the foil which he desiderates for cognition? When I know a white mare by contrasting her with a chestnut, is it the second mare's being chestnut or her being not white that forms my differentiating circumstance? I opine that it is her being not white. She does not differ in having colour, but in not having that colour which the other has. So through any number of "polar pairs," white-red, white-transparent, white-divine, &c., there is one only contradiction diffused, that of white not-white. So long

* "De Anima," i. 5.

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as a thing is not white, it does not become either more or less opposed to white by being anything or nothing else besides. This being the case, I go on to affirm with Aristotle, that the negative or non-existent element is known by the positive or existent, and not vice versa. Not-white is known through white; this order of cognition cannot be reversed. White is prior to not-white in the mind, not by a priority of time, for the notions are gathered simultaneously, but by a priority of order, in as much as it is through the positive notion that the negative is apprehended. To prove what I say. experience a contrast of colours, black and white. Wherein does the contrast lie? Not in the white being white, nor in the black being black, but in the black being not white, and the white not black. Beyond this there is no contrast between colour and colour. How then do I perceive a contrast between them? Clearly by knowing white, and through that, not white, and so knowing black in so far as it is not white; and again by knowing black, and through it, not black, and so knowing white in so far as it is not black. So the knowledge of good and evil may be had from contemplating good alone; for pure evil is pure not-good, i.e. nothing; an evil thing is an admixture of evil and good. So not-self may be learnt from the mere study of self; it can be learnt by this study only. If we actually had experience of a not-self, and had not studied self previously, we should not appreciate what we experienced. If these conclusions, suggested by Aristotle, are correct, Dr. Bain's Law of Relativity must be erased from the statutebook of philosophy. It is then possible to know an object by itself alone; or if you still postulate a dualism in cognition, you may find it in the object known along with its logical contradictory. You may know a by itself; or, if you will to say so, you know and -x. That is enough; you have no need of knowing y. Granting to the full that there is an obverse and reverse side to every cognition, no less than to every medal; I still find no obverse for a except-x. You tell me that y is an obverse. Now if y is not an identity with-a, call it equal to y'-x. Then, I repeat, it is not the y' but the -a, which is the obverse of a. But here is the place for my adversary to put in a grave objection, which I must notice. You admit," he says, "that it is impossible to know a without also knowing-x. But cannot be learnt except from y, z, &c., i.e. y'-x, zx, &c. Therefore, to know a, we must know some other positive reality besides, as y' or '." To this objection, my answer stands as might be expected, admitting my own major, and denying the minor which the objicient has appended to it. I deny that-x cannot be apprehended without some second positive term be

sides a, as y' or ', being apprehended with it. But my opponent meets my denial with a proof. "Take a man," he says, " and keep him in a medium at 70° without change of temperature, apparel, or health; that man, living in a permanent summer heat,' will have no notion of heat, because he has never experienced cold. There then is the heat, the a by itself, which cannot be realized to the mind for want of the y, the cold." There is some truth in my opponent's statement, but he has exaggerated it, and in the exaggeration lies all that serves his purpose of proof. I reply, therefore, that the man so circumstanced has it in his power to form a notion of heat. At the same time I admit that the notion formed will be faint, and would be vastly clarified by an experience of cold. My reason for saying that he might form some notion is this, that if experience of heat (a) taught him nothing of heat, experience of cold (y,=y-x) would teach him nothing of not-heat (-x); and so he would remain under any circumstances hopelessly unconscious of heat. But I admit that his notion of heat would be very faint, and that, both on physiological and on psychological grounds. Psychologists, all in their several phraseologies, distinguish between those conscious states which are attended to, and those which are not. All day long, for example, the beating of my heart is an item in the general aggregate of my consciousness. If I will, I can pick that item out and mark it by itself. But what tempts me to single out any given item for special attention? I am tempted either by the pleasurableness or the painfulness, or the utility of that particular item. Now revert to our typical man, in his room at 70° F. constant. The animal frame has a tendency to adapt itself to circumstances. Bodily pleasure long felt ceases to please, and bodily pain in like manner abates, owing to the internal adaptation which occasions the pleasure-giving or pain-giving agent outside to produce less impression on the body. This is a physiological principle, holding in other processes besides sensation; it does not touch the cognitive process as such, but only the organic details on which the cognitions of a flesh-imbedded spirit are conditioned. Our man will hardly be delighted or pained with the abiding temperature at which he lives. He will feel no call of attention to it on an emotional score. May he not will to notice it, as a means to some useful purpose? He may, but probably he will not, for an unchanging means, like an inflexible rope, can offer little apparent utility. Consequently the habitual summer heat will rank in the mind with the unchanging weight of the bones, and the regular pulsation of the circulatory organs; it will lie always within the call of attention, but will hardly ever be