It is manifest also, that by producing these texts as the substance of the law, which are in truth the substance only of a part of it; viz. its moral or religious part; he virtually set aside the merely ritual, as comparatively of small importance, or rather of none whatever: and therefore did more than dispose of the further question, What commandment was greatest in the law, by affirming that there was no room for comparison of force and obligation, of dignity and excellence, between its several parts at all; that there was but one class of commandments, or but two commandments belonging to that class, which were of any account in point of moral estimation; which could be called and considered the law, in the proper sense of the word.

It is worthy of remark, that our Saviour, though addressed by a question, instead of returning a direct answer to it, replied by a question himself; and by a question apparently not connected with the original inquiry. On the other two occasions, which we have referred to, he did no such thing; but answered each of the questions directly and to the point. May we not infer that if he did otherwise in the present instance, it was not without design? and may we not consider it a proof both of his own condescension, and also of the ability, yet withal the modesty and diffidence of the inquirer? If he answered him through his own mouth, it might be because he knew him to be capable already of satisfying his own doubts for himself, to a certain extent; and where he was likely to stop short, he intended to interpose his own authority, and assist him forward. He might have preferred to conduct him to the desired conclusion upon the strength and assur

ance of premises, into which he previously possessed a clear insight; though he wanted confidence to draw from them for himself, an inference equally clear and legitimate. For it appears from the sequel, that the interrogator was even then aware to what conditions the promise of eternal life was virtually attached; though he required more certainty as to the fact of its being actually so attached.

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The true answer to the question "What shall I do, and inherit everlasting life?" is contained in the words, "This do, and thou shalt live:" as their very form implies: "This do," being critically accommodated to "What shall I do," and "Thou shalt live," to "And shall inherit everlasting life." Now this is an answer, manifestly interposed authoritatively, in our Lord's sense of his own competency so to interpose it; and it was to be received implicitly, in deference to the ipse dixit and assurance of its author. And interposed authoritatively as it is, it is still in the shape of a promise annexed to a condition; the promise of life as the consequence of doing; that doing being the observance of the two commandments, the sum and substance of the law, the statement of which furnished the answer to the intermediate question. It seems reasonable, therefore, to presume that the object of the question was to elicit the statement, by way of preliminary; and this being done, to found upon that statement the desired assurance, which served as the answer to the original inquiry.

Now the question of our Saviour includes two propositions, "What is written ?" and "How dost "thou read?" which are far from being identical. The first concerns a matter of fact, equally notorious

to all who were conversant in the law-what was actually contained therein, or enjoined by it? the second a matter of private opinion or private judgment, which could be known only to the respondent; how he himself read, that is, apprehended, understood, and construed the many and various injunctions and precepts, on record in the word of God? His answer is adapted to both these propositions: to the first, as stating what was actually part of the law; to the second, as stating it virtually with his own constructive sense of it as the epitome, the multum in parvo of the whole. His answer too was satisfactory to our Saviour, with respect to both; for his approbation pronounced upon that answer, implies that it was such, as by his own question he had wished or expected to obtain. He had answered rightly; that is, he had cited the law correctly; and he had reasoned upon the citation justly; such was indeed the substance of the law.

It would be no objection to the supposed rectitude of the inquirer's motive in the present instance; could it be proved that besides being a lawyer or Scribe, he was also a Pharisee. The majority of that sect were certainly the personal enemies of our Saviour, and his most virulent opponents with the people; yet some even among them dissented from the rest, and either openly, or secretly in their own minds, were favourably disposed towards our Lord. It is but necessary to assume that this man was one of those, who whether many or few, thought honourably of the authority of our Saviour; and we assign a sufficient reason why he should have addressed him, in a question of so much practical importance as this was, with the

most honest and upright intent. Nor is it impossible that, even as Pharisees, both this Scribe and the other, who held the conversation with our Lord, recorded Mark xii. 28-34. were Pharisees who belonged to the party of the Karaites, or men of the letter; so called as acknowledging no rule of faith or practice, but the written word of God; and therefore, discarding altogether the whole system of traditionary interpretation, as the mere invention of This sect was certainly small in numbers, and totally inconsiderable in popular influence; but they were weighty in judgment and in real knowledge; and from the peculiar nature of their principles themselves, they would be the most candid and liberal, and open to conviction, of their contemporaries; the most likely to ponder well the evidences of our Saviour's character; and on many accounts, to be predisposed in his favour.

men.

The motives, which actuated the inquirer, are specified, indeed, by the evangelist, in the words, ékteιpáswv autòv, prefixed to his first question, and those of, féλav dikaιouν Eavтov, premised to his second : the former of which is rendered in the English version, by," And tempted him;" the latter by, "Will'ing to justify himself." But the words of the original in each instance, are capable of another meaning, which is much more consistent with the supposed honesty and simplicity of the interrogator's motive, than either of these versions would be.

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The word which is rendered "to tempt," denotes properly no more than to try, to prove, to ascertain by experiment, and the like; but for what particular purpose in the trial, and whether with a good or a bad intent, is not necessarily implied by the

word itself. The English word " to tempt," might originally denote no more; being derived from a word in the Latin, exactly the same in meaning as the verb which it expresses in the Greek. And in this sense must it have been intended by our translators, Gen. xxii. 1, to express the act of the Deity in tempting, that is, making trial of Abraham, when he commanded him to sacrifice his son; an act which the Septuagint also expresses by the corresponding verb in Greek.

Now the mere act of trying or proving, necessarily involves nothing of the final end of the proof or trial. That end may be innocent, and it may be otherwise; yet the same word may still be employed to denote the act itself. It is not to be denied that the word nepal in Greek, tento in Latin, and tempt in English, may be so used, (and often are,) as to imply the act of trying or proving, with a malicious, a sinister, a criminal intent; more especially for the act of trying or proving the strength of principle, religious or moral, with a view to allure unto sin. And for this reason, as being the principal agent in all such trials of principle for such purposes, the Devil himself is designated in scripture as regularly by the name of ¦ περáv “the tryer” or “tempter;" as by that of ovpòs, "the evil one;" i expòs, "the enemy;"Σaravas, "Satan ;" or i Aaßóλos, "the "Devil" the first of which only properly expresses him as what he is, especially when contradistinguished to God, as i άyalòs," the good one."

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But this is a secondary and improper sense of the word; and whether it is to be understood in a given instance, with that further enlargement or qualification of its meaning, or not, must be deter