upon the fide of virtue; and there would ftill be reafon to fear that vice and irregularity would end ill. This alone would be enough to keep wife and confiderate beings to their duty, as far as known. But our condition is very different; and our knowledge of all neceffary truth fufficiently clear, extenfive and certain.

SECT. I.

The Being and Attributes of God eftablished as the Foundation of Morality.

NOTHI

OTHING is more indifputable than that fomething now exifts. Every perfon may say to himfelf, "I certainly exift: for I feel that I exift. And "I could neither feel that I exift, nor be deceived in "imagining it, if I was nothing. If, therefore, I exist, "the next queftion is, How I came to be?" Whatever exifts, muft owe its being, and the particular circumftances of it, to fome caufe prior to itself, unless it exifts neceffarily. For a being to exift neceffarily, is to exist fo as that it was impoffible for that being not to have existed, and that the fuppofition of its not exifting should imply a direct contradiction in terms. Let any person try to conceive of space and duration as annihilated, or not exifting, and he will find it impoffible, and that they will ftill return upon his mind in fpite of all his efforts to the contrary. Such an existence therefore is neceffary, of which there is no other account to be given, than that it is the nature of the thing to exist; and this account is fully fatisfying to the mind.

Whatever difficulty we may find in conceiving of the particular modus of a neceffary exiftence; an exiftence which always was, and could not but be; always continuing, but which never had a beginning; as all the difficulty of fuch conceptions evidently arifes from the narrowness of our finite and limited minds, and as our reafon forces us upon granting the reality and neceffity of them, it would be contradicting the most irrefiftible convictions of our reafon to difpute them; it is indeed out of our power to difpute them.

and

To

To have recourfe to an infinite fucceffion of dependent caufes, produced by one another from eternity, and to give that as an account of the exiftence of the world, will give no fatisfaction to the mind, but will confound it with an infinite abfurdity. For if it be abfurd to attempt to conceive of one fingle dependent being, produced without a caufe, or exifting without being brought into existence by some pre-exifting caufe, it is infinitely more fo to try to conceive of an infinite feries of dependent beings exifting without being produced by any original and uncreated caufe; as it would be more fhocking to talk of a thousand links of a chain hanging upon nothing, than of one.

That the material world is not the firft caufe, is evident; because the firft caufe, exifting neceffarily, without which neceflity he could not poffibly exift as a first cause, must be abfolutely perfect, unchangeable, and every where the fame, of which afterwards. This we fee is by no means to be affirmed of the material world; its form, motion, and fubftance, being endlessly various, and fubject to perpetual change. That nothing material could have been the neceffarily exiftent first cause is evident, because we know, that all material fubftances confift of a number of unconnected and feparable particles; which would give, not one, but a number of first caufes, which is a palpable abfurdity. And that the first cause cannot be one fingle indivifible atom is plain, because the first caufe, being neceffarily exiftent, muit be equally neceffary throughout infinite space.

That chance, which is only a word, not a real being, fhould be the cause of the exiftence of the world, is the fame as faying, that nothing is the cause of its exiflence, or that it neither exifts neceffarily, nor was produced by that which exifts neceffarily, and therefore does not exist at all. Therefore, after fuppofing ever fo long a feries of beings producing one another, we muft at laft have recourse to fome First Cause of all, himfelf uncaused, exifting neceffarily, or fo, as that the fuppofition of his not exifting would imply a contradiction. This first cause we call God.

The firft caufe muft of neceffity be one, in the moft pure, fimple, and indivifible manner. For the first Q3.

cause

cause must exift neceffarily, that is, it is a direct abfurdity to say, that something now exifts, and yet there is no original firft caufe of exiftence. Now, when to avoid this abfurdity, we have admitted one independent, neceffarily exiftent firft caufe, if we afterwards proceed to admit another firft caufe, or number of first caufes, we fhall find, that all but one are fuperfluous. Because one is fuflicient to account for the existence of all things. And as it will evidently be no contradiction to fuppofe any one out of a plurality not to exist, fince one alone is fufficient; it follows, that there can' be but one fingle first caufe.

Befides, it will be made evident by and by, that the firft caufe must be abfolutely perfect in every poffible respect, and in every poffible degree. Now that which ingroffes and fwallows up into itself all poffible perfection, or rather is itself abfolute perfection, can be but one; because there can be but one abfolute Whole of perfection.

We may poffibly, through inattention, commit miftakes with refpects to what are, or are not, perfections fit to be afcribed to the firft caufe, as fome of the Heathens were abfurd enough to afcribe even to their fupreme deity, attributes which ought rather to be termed vices than virtues. But we can never mistake in afcribing to the Supreme Being all poffible, real, and confiftent perfections. For a Being, who exifts naturally and neceffarily, muft of neceffity exift in an infinite and unbounded manner, the ground of his existence being alike in all moments of duration, and all points of space. Whatever exifts naturally and neceffarily in the East, muft of courfe exift naturally and neceffarily in the Weft, in the South, and in the North, above and below, in former, prefent, and in future times. Whatever exifts in this manner, exifts in a perfect manner. Whatever exias in a perfect manner, in respect of extent and duration, muft evidently be perfect in every other refpect, of which its nature is capable. For the whole idea of fuch a Being is by the fuppofition natural and neceffary; a partial neceflity being an evident abfurdity. That the firft caufe therefore fhould be deficient in any one perfection confiftent with the nature of fuch a Being

a Being as we muft conclude the firft caufe to be, is as evident a contradiction as to fay, that the first cause may naturally and neceffarily exift in the Eaft, and not in the Weft, at prefent, but not in time paft or to come. For fuppofe it were argued, that the firft caufe may not be infinite, for example, in wifdom; I ask first, Whether wisdom can be faid to be a property unfuitable to the idea of the firft caufe? This will hardly be ; pretended. No one can imagine it would be a more proper idea of the firft caufe, to think of him as of a Being utterly void of intelligence, than as infinite in knowledge. It is evident, that of two beings, otherwife alike, but one of which was wholly void of intelligence, and the other poffeffed of it; the latter would be more perfect than the former, by the difference of the whole amount of the intelligence he poffeffed. On the other hand, of two beings otherwife alike, but one of which laboured under a vicious inclination, which occafioned a deviation from, or deficiency of moral perfection, and the other was wholly clear of fuch imperfection, the latter would be a more perfect nature than the former, by the difference of the whole amount of fuch negative quantity, or deficiency. Which fhews the neceffity of afcribing to the Supreme Being every poffible real perfection, and the abfurdity of fuppofing the smallest imperfection or deficiency to be in his na

ture.

If it be evident then that wifdom, in any the lowest degree, is an attribute fit to be afcribed to the firit cause, and if whatever is in the first caufe, is in him naturally and neceffarily, that is, could not but have been in him, it is obvious, that fuch an attribute cannot be in him in any limited degree, any more than he can naturally and neceffarily exift in one point of fpace, and not through all. It is an evident contradiction to fuppofe the first cause exifting naturally and neceffarily, and yet limited, either as to his exilence or perfections; because it is plain, there can be nothing to limit them, which is the fame as faying, that they must be unlimited. Farther, whatever is in the nature or ef fence of the firft caufe, must be in him naturally and neceffarily

neceffarily; that is, is an effential attribute of his nature, or could not but have been in his nature; for if it had been poffible that his nature could have been without any particular attribute, it certainly would, by the very fuppofition. Now, whatever is neceflarily an attribute of Deity, is Deity. And limited Deity is a contradiction as much as limited infinity. For infinity is unbounded, knowledge is unbounded, power is unbounded, goodnefs is unbounded. Thefe and the reft are the neceffary attributes of Deity. And as they are in him, they together form the idea of fupreme Deity. The Deity, or firft caufe, muft therefore be poffeffed of every poflible perfection in an infinite degree, all thote perfections being naturally infinite, and there being nothing to limit the Deity, or his perfections.

We cannot therefore avoid concluding, that the first caufe is poffeffed of infinite intelligence, or knowledge, that his infinite mind is a treafure of an infinity of of truths, that he has ever had at all moments from all eternity, and ever will to all eternity have in his view, and in actual contemplation, all things that ever have exifted, that do now, or ever thall exift, throughout infinite fpace and duration, with all their connections, relations, dependences, gradations, proportions, differences, contrafts, caufes, effects, and all circumstances of all kinds, with the ideas of all things which are merely poflible, or whofe exiftence does not imply a contradiction, though they have never actually exifted, with all their poffible relations, connections, and circumftances, whofe idea is conceivable. In one word, the Divine mind muft comprehend all things that by their nature are capable of being know or conceived.

From the fame peceffary connection between the infinity of the firft caufe in one particular, and in all, we cannot avoid concluding, that he must be infinite in goodness; it being felf-evident, that goodnefs or benevolence muft in any ftate of things be a perfection, and the want of any degree of it a deficiency. To be infinite in goodneis, is to poffefs fuch benevolence of nature, as no conceivable or poffible meafure of goodnefs can exceed, or which can never be fatisfied with

exerting