dæmoniacs fpoken of in the gofpels were not perfons labouring under a bodily complaint befides the poffeffion by evil spirits; but, Whether the people faid to be poffeffed, were at all poffeffed, or not. If a perfon, whofe brain was diftempered, was likewife poffeffed with an evil spirit, he might with fufficient propriety be spoke of in one place as a lunatic, and in another as a dæmoniac.

I should humbly judge it a much more easy and natural way of getting over this difficulty, to proceed upon our Saviour's anfwer to his difciples concerning the man born blind." Neither did this man fin," fays he, (in any extraordinary manner)" nor his parents; but that "the works of God might be made manifest in him.” If the whole human fpecies are offenders, and at all times deferving of punishment, where is the difficulty of conceiving, that it might be fuitable to the Divine fcheme of government, that at the time of our Saviour's appearance, or any other period, a greater variety of punishments might be fuffered to fall upon a guilty race of beings, and afterwards, through the Divine mercy, their fufferings might be abated. Particularly, is there not even a propriety in God's giving to Satan, and his angels, the ancient and inveterate oppofers of the Meffiah, and his kingdom, a fhort triumph over mankind, in order to render the Meffiab's victory over him more confpicuous and more glorious. This I fay on the suppofition, that poffeffion by evil fpirits was altogether peculiar to thofe ancient times; and that there is at prefent abfolutely no fuch thing in any country in the world. But, before any perfon can pofitively affirm, that there is no fuch thing in our times as poffeffion by fpirits, he must be fure of his knowing perfectly the natures and powers of fpirits, and be able to fhew the abfolute impoffibility of a fpirit's having communication with embodied minds; and must be capable of fhewing, that all the fymptoms and appearances in diseases, in madness, and in dreams, are utterly inconfiftent with the notion of spirits having any concern with our fpecies. Now to establish this negative will be fo far from being eafy to do, that, on the contrary, univerfal opi

nion, as well as probability, and the whole current of revelation, are on the oppofite fide. Who can say that it is abfurd to imagine fuch a state of the human frame, efpecially of the brain, as may give fpiritual agents an opportunity of making impreffions upon the mind? Who can fay, that fleep may not lay the mind open to the impreffions of foreign beings; and that waking again may not, by fome laws of Nature unknown to us, exclude their communications? Who can fay, that part (I do not fay all) of the fymptoms in phrenetic, epileptic, lunatic, and melancholic cafes, especially in the more violent paroxyfms, may not be owing to the agency of fpirits? Were this to be allowed, it would not at all vacate the use of medicines or dieting. For if the accefs of fpirits to our minds depends upon the ftate of our bodies, which it is no way abfurd to fuppofe, it is evident, an alteration in the state of the body may prevent their access to our minds, and deprive them of all power over us; and in that light medicines and regimen may be effectual even against spirits, fo far as they may be concerned, by being fo against the natural diforder of the frame occafioned merely by the disease. So that there may, for any thing we know to the contrary, be dreams, in which foreign agents may be concerned, and there may be others occafioned by mere fumes of indigeftion, as the poet speaks. There may be epileptics, and maniacs, who are fo from mere obftructions and diforders in the brain and nerves; and there may at this day be others attacked by thofe maladies, whofe distress may be heightened by wicked fpirits. The amazing ftrength of even women and youths, in fome of their violent fits, feems to countenance a fufpicion, that fomething acts in them, feparate from their own natural force, and which is hardly to be accounted for from any extraordinary flow of animal fpirits. And why in Scripture we should have fo many accounts of revelations communicated in dreams; from whence probably the Heathens, ever fince Homer, have had the fame notion; feems unaccountable upon any other footing, than that of fuppofing fome natural mechanical connection between a particular ftate of the bodily frame, and communication

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munication from feparate fpirits. The behaviour of the prophet in the Old Teftament, who calls for an inftrument of mufic, when he waits for an infpiration, does likewife countenance the fame notion; as if the natural effect of melody was to open the way to the mind in a mechanical manner, in order to the more full admiffion of the fupernatural communications. To conclude what I would fay on the difficulty of the dæmoniacs in the gofpel-history, I do not pretend to decide which is the true folution. All I contend for is, That to explain away the reality of the presence of spirits, is, in my opinion, unwarrantable and dangerous, and removing a lefs difficulty to put a greater in its place.

To return to the general objection I was upon before this digreffion, which was, That we have no reason to believe there ever were any miracles, because we have no experience of any in our times; I have to fay farther, that the objection is not founded upon truth; at least not upon an unquestionable truth. For many perfons of good judgment have declared it to be their opinion, that among the innumerable fictitious accounts of fupernatural appearances and prodigies, fome, even in these later ages, are in fuch a manner authenticated, that to deny them a man muft deny every information he can receive by any means whatever, befides his own immediate fenfes, which does not feem highly rational. Besides, are not the completions of a multitude of prophecies, which we have at this day extant before our eyes, as the predicted lafting ruinous state of Babylon and Tyre, the total fubjection to the latest ages, of the once illuftrious kingdom of Egypt, the remaining marks of the general deluge; the unequalled and unaccountable condition of the Jews for fo long a period of time; the establishment and continuance to the end of the world of the Chriftian religion,-are not these standing miracles confpicuous in our time? Butof this more elsewhere. Upon the whole, it is evident, that if the objection was founded on truth, it could not be valid, because different periods may require different measures of government; and to fay that there could

never have been any miracles, because there are none now (were it true that there are no effects of miraculous interpofition remaining in our times) would be as abfurd as to fay, that the axis of the earth muft point exactly the fame way it did two thousand years ago; whereas the obfervations of ancient aftronomers have put the doctrine of its continual change of direction, and the proceffion of the equinoxes, out of all poffible doubt. But if the objection is not founded upon truth, it muft of courfe fall to the ground.

Prophecy is a miraculous hiftory, or account of events before they happen. This being unquestionably above the reach of human capacity, it is a proper and convincing evidence, that the revelation in which it is given is not a human production. To pretend to determine the foundation, or the modus, of the prefcience of the actions of free agents, may be wholly out of our reach in the prefent ftate. But we can form fome conception of its being poffible, in fome fuch manner as the following, though it may not perhaps be fafe to affirm, that the following is a true account of it.

Do we not commonly fee inftances of very found judgments paffed by wife men on the future conduct of others? May we not fuppofe, that angels, or other beings of fuperior reach, may be capable, from their more exact knowledge of Human Nature, to pafs a much more certain judgment of the future behaviour of our fpecies? And is there any thing lefs to be expected, than that He who made us, who perfectly knows our frame, who immediately perceives the moft fecret motions of our minds, and likewife forefees with the utmost exactnefs, and without a poffibility of being deceived, the whole proceeding and concurrent circumstances in which any of his creatures can at any future time be engaged (as it is evident, that all things are the effect of his directing providence, except the actions of free creatures, to whom he has given liberty and power of action within a certain fphere) is any thing lefs to be expected, I fay, than that our infinitely wife Creator fhould form a judgment, fuitable to his wifdom, of the future conduct of his creatures? And to imagine that

this judgment should at all effect the future behaviour of the creature, feems as groundiefs as to conclude that one created being's judging of the future conduct of another should actually influence and over-rule his conduct. The judgment is, by the fuppofition, formed upon the character of the perfon judged of, not the character influenced by the judgment. There are fome paffages of Scripture, which feem to lead us to this manner of conception of this difficult point.

When David (1 Sam xxii. 12.) purfued by the inveterate hatred of king Saul, confulted the oracle, whether, if he staid in the city of Keilah, the people of that city would give him up to his enemy; the answer he received was, That they would. It is plain in this cafe, that the Divine prefcience of the conduct of that people, in the event of David's trufting himself into their hands, did not arife from God's having decreed that they should give up David: for if it had been decreed, it must have co.ne to pafs. Nor was their treachery foreknown because it was future: For it was not future, having been difappointed, and never coming to be executed. Nor could it be eventually predetermined, that in cafe of David's staying in the city, the people fhould give him up into the hands of his enemy. For the event fhews, that it was not the Divine fcheme that he fhould fall into the fnare, but that he fhould efcape it. There feems nothing therefore left to conclude, but that the Divine prefcience of the conduct of the people of Keilah was founded in a thorough and perfect infight into the treacherous character of that people, and perhaps the knowledge of actual defigns formed by them to betray David into the hands of the king.

Again, when God foretells (Gen. xviii. 19.) that Abraham would "command his household after him, and they would keep the way of the Lord;" he plainly fhews upon what that prefcience was grounded, in faying, "I know him, that he will command, &c." That is, I fo fully know his zeal and affection for the true God, that I forefee he will fet up and fupport my worship in his family, and enjoin it his pofterity, in oppofition

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