ART. IV. A View of the State of the Nation, and of the Meafures of the last five Years; fuggefted by Earl Grey's Speech in the Houfe of Lords, 13th June, 1810. By Thomas Peregrine Courtenay, Efq. 8vo. 180 pp. 5s. 6d. J.J. Stockdale. 1811.

THE

HE fpeeches of party leaders and the difcuffions of party writers are always perufed by us with fome degree of diftruft, and praised with caution, even when the opinions contained in 'them coincide with our own. But though this pamphlet is a profeffed defence of the pre. fent adminiftration, and in that refpect to be claffed with the political writings alluded to, it refts fo ftrongly upon facts, deduces from them fuch forcible arguments, is fo candid in it's reprefentations, and so temperate in it's language, that we deem it worthy to be perufed by all whofe minds are not, on political fubjects, dead to found reafoning; and we are therefore defirous to contribute, fo far as lays in our power, to promote its circulation.

After a fuitable introduction, the author proceeds to analyze the speech of the noble earl, dividing it into fourteen different heads, in order to purfue more clearly and diftinctly the feveral details. Of thefe heads, however, only the feven. firft are the fubjects of his present difcuffion. The chief of these are,

"The great increase of our expenditure fince the laft war, and the infufficient provifion made for it by the present adminiftration;-The neceffity of what the noble earl terms repofe for the country, (although he intimates that our fyftem of policy has rendered peace unattainable); and the expediency of our adopting the provident fyftem of husbanding our refources,"

Under the laft head the noble speaker expatiates on the folly of our military operations against France, and our embarking in the war in Spain, without afcertaining whether there was an efficient government in that country;the attack on Denmark in 1807;-and the impolicy (in the noble earl's opinion) of our conduct with regard to Sicily. These attacks on adminiftration the prefent writer, after fome preli.minary remarks, repels, firft, by fhowing that the increase alledged in every branch of taxation, fo far from being a proof of our refources being exhausted,

"Affords the fureft pledge of their remaining competency; fince the revenue has continued to flourish under the weight of the new impofitions, fince the various modes adopted for increafing it have been generally fuccefsful, and large and repeated burthens

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have been imposed without diminishing the power by which they are fuftained."

The author does not, however, maintain that our resources of finance are inexhaustible, but that "they are as yet unexhaufted and copious." To the arguments founded on the financial arrangements of 1807, and the fubfequent departure from the plan of the late minifters, a very full, and we think fatisfactory, anfwer is given. But for thefe details we must refer to the work itfelf.

The infinuation that the conduct of the prefent ministers has tended to remove every hope of peace" (though the noble fpeaker had before argued that a fafe and honourable peace was unattainable) is next noticed by the author, and repelled by adverting to the negociation of 1806, and the noble earl's declaration on that occafion, that "peace was rendered unattainable by the unreasonable demands and expectations of Bonaparte ;" and it is alfo oppofed by a statement of the difcuffions on that fubject, which have fince taken place between the prefent minifters and thofe of the powers at war with us. The objections of the noble speaker to all offenfive measures in conducting the war, together with his much boafted fyftem of "hufbanding our refources," are next very amply difcuffed. The author of this tract denies (we think with great juftice) that a defenfive war is the natural policy of a nation wishing for peace and not able to attain it; especially when the obftacle to peace is the great and increafing power and inordinate ambition of the enemy. But, as in the speech there is a direct challenge to investigate and compare the two fyftems of the late and prefent administrations, the author proceeds to an examination of them, fhowing, firft, that it was not (as the fpeech would imply) the policy of the noble earl and his affociates "to abftain from all military operations, or to avoid hazarding a British army on a hoftile continent:" on the contrary, he alludes to four * diftinct proceedings of the cabinet in 1806 of a different nature, and infifts that in the expeditions to Conftantinople, Egypt, and Buenos Ayres, the minifters expofed themselves to failure, and did fail, not for want of the means of fuccefs, but because they ventured not to apply them."

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With thefe enterprifes of Earl Grey and his colleagues, the author compares thofe which were undertaken by the adminiftration of the Duke of Portland, and, admitting that

Or rather three; though perhaps the original deftination of General Crawford to Chili is the fourth expedition alluded to.

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amongst these there was one great failure, namely, the expedition to the Scheldt, he enquires why this failure has excited more indignation than the numerous reverses of the late war, or those which he has just been contemplating, against the minifters who planned it? This he attributes not to our having fuftained greater loffes, or the glory of our arms having been tarnished, but to the magnitude of the attempt, the extent of the preparations, and the unexampled exertions; which, added to the proximity of the fcene of action, and the nature of the lofs fuftained, attracted to the attempt a peculiar degree of attention, and confequently to the failure a peculiar degree of indignation. He allows, however, that the failure of the Scheldt expedition, though not complete, was "confiderable and .difaftrous," and only pleads that the utmoft was done to infure fuccefs, and that this fingle misfortune does not, in regard to military expeditions, eftablish a preference for the cabinet of 1806*. He adds,

that

"No failure could have lefs influence upon the general political fyftem, or conduct of the war; that it has affected in a very inconfiderable degree the state of the nation; and, at any rate, will never be made a ground for recalling the uniformly unfortunate minifters of 1806.".

The other military operations of Lord Grey's fucceffors are brought forward by this writer with a confiderable degree of exultation. The expedition against Denmark (the political expediency and juftice of which he referves for fubfequent confideration), was marked, he obferves, with ftrong features of ability, both in the plan and execution; and a more than ufual majority in parliament, together with a majority in the country, at least, correfponding to the reprefentation, approved it, as a wife measure, fkilfully conducted, and fuccefsful.

Having adverted to our fubfequent conquefts of the French Weft India islands, and explained the policy of the prefent adminiftration in their tranfactions with Sweden, the author difcuffes at large the war in Spain and Portugal, giving an account of its rife and progrefs, and particularly flating the refolutions and meafures of the late administration with regard to the latter of thefe kingdoms; which fhowed the importance which even they attached to the prefervation of that country

* In a note he cites the refolutions of the House of Commons, juftifying the minifters, as well as the naval and military com. manders, after (as he obferves) a very ftrict and fevere enquiry.

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from the dominion of France. The fubfequent abandon◄ ment of thofe meafures, by both adminiftrations, is accounted for by the reported impracticability, at that period, of defending Portugal, and alfo by the change produced by the treaties of Tilfit in the fituation of Europe.

The great and unexpected revolution in the affairs of the Spanish peninfula, gave, the author remarks, an entirely new face to the politics of Great Britain and France, more particularly as to our relation towards Spain: but, as to Por. tugal, he infifts, it more firmly established the wisdom, and called for a more direct application of the policy which Earl Grey and his colleagues had adopted, and which his fucceffors have imitated, and (in the opinion of this writer) ́ improved.

He admits that, at firft, in a military view, the interefts of Portugal were merged in thofe of Spain, and, confequently, that our intereft did not, at that moment, dictate any other measures with refpect to Portugal than fuch as were most advisable for the peninfula in general. He does not, however, as fome have done, conclude from thence that operations on the fide of Portugal were altogether unadvisable, and that we ought at once to have poured our utmost poffible force into Spain; nor does he agree with those who infift that, without a rational hope of the ultimate and complete expulfion of the French, thofe operations ought never to have commenced. To explain the policy of the measures then adopted, he adverts to the fituation of affairs in June, 1808; which determined government to direct to the fcene of action the largest force that could promptly be affembled and tranfported. The expulfion of the French from Portugal, he flates to have been, in the opinion not only of the government at home, but of the officers employed, and of fuch Spanish authorities as could be confulted, the most advisable opera tion. This, he obferves, was accomplished in lefs than two months from the departure of Sir A. Wellesley from Cork.

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The next important measure difcuffed is, the determina. tion formed, after the conqueft of Portugal, that a confider able part of the army there employed, reinforced from England, fhould enter Spain, and co-operate with the armies of that kingdom. In fupport of this refolution the author contends that, by confining ourselves to the mere defence of Portugal, we fhould, in effect, have given up the ca fe of

* There is a very candid and judicious note on the Conven, tion of Cintra,

Spain, whofe rulers were then become very defirous of Britifh affiftance; and he controverts the pofition of Earl Grey,

that

"We should previously have afcertained that there was fuch an efficient government and fuch ample refources, in that country, as were likely to bring the war to a fuccefsful termi nation."

Meaning by "a fuccefsful termination" the accomplishment of its great object, or that a general plan fhould have been previously arranged. In every state of fuch a war, it was, Mr. Courtenay contends,

"Impoffible to foresee the points upon which our force might most advantageously be brought to bear, or to form a correct judgment either of the force which would be oppofed to us, or of that with which we were to act.”

In his opinion, therefore,

"All we could do was to affemble, in the most convenient pofition, the largest British force that could be maintained-to place it under an able general-to give him the fulleft informa tion that could be collected, and communicate to him the views of government; but to intruft him with a large difcretion, both as to his offenfive movements, and as to the point and period of his retreat, in cafe it fhould be neceffary."

Mr. C. reafons further on the difficulty of obtaining complete proof of that efficiency, which Lord Grey requires in the Spanish armies and government, and ftates very fully all the circumftances under which the determination of minifters on the plan of operations in Spain was adopted; which certainly, if they do not prove its fuperior expediency to any other fyftem, fhow that the choice was made on due delibera. tion, and with very probable grounds of fuccefs.

In detailing the events of Sir J. Moore's campaign, the author endeavours (we think fuccefsfully) to fhow, that neither the determination of that officer to advance upon Valladolid, nor his fubfequent advance to Sahagun, were chiefly grounded on the opinion, or prompted by the infligation, of Mr. Frere; ftill lefs that they were influenced, directly or indirectly, by Sir J. Moore's inftructions from home, which left him to the free exercife of his own judgment and difcretion. It is however admitted that Mr. Frere's opinion refpecting the popular feeling at Madrid, and the actual refiftance which it produced, operated on the mind of the General as one of the motives by which his conduct on that occafion was determined,

As