But since he expressly says, (and I think for the most part truly,)" that the three persons or subsistences, in the ever blessed trinity, are three real, substantial subsistences, each of which hath entirely, all the perfections of the Divine nature, divine wisdom, power, and goodness; and therefore each of them is eternal, infinite mind, as distinct from each other as any other three persons; and this he believes the Dean will no more recant, than he will renounce a trinity; for all the wit of man cannot find a medium between a substantial trinity and a trinity of names, or a trinity of mere modes, respects, and relations in the same single essence, which is no trinity at all." As also he had said much to the same purpose before, "that to talk of three subsistences in the abstract, without three that subsist, or of one single nature which hath three subsistences, when it's impossible that in singularity there can be more than one subsistence," &c. I believe he will find no small difficulty to name what it is, that with the peculiar distinct manner of subsistence makes a person; not the very same common nature, for the persons cannot be distinguished from each other by that which is common to them all. Therefore the divine nature which is common to the three, must according to him comprehend three single natures, and not be absolutely simple. Hither must be his resort at last, after all his earnest disputation against it. And these he will have to be parts, which because they are undivided, impartible, inseparable, everlastingly and necessarily united, I do reckon the inquirer did with very sufficient reason, and with just decency, and doth still continue very peremptorily to deny.

And whereas he contends that the whole divine nature is entirely in each subsistence, (as he does again and again,) I think the term whole improper, where there are no proper parts. And I doubt not, when he gives place to cooler thoughts, he will see cause to qualify that assertion For if he strictly mean that every thing that belongs to the Godhead is in each person; I see not how he will fetch himself from the Socinian consequence, that then each person must have a trinity subsisting in it, and be Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. For I doubt not he will acknowledge that the entire divinity includes in it the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. And therefore he must be beholden to an inadequate notion in this very case, when all is done, how much soever he hath contended against it. I do however think it safe and free from any other difficulty, that we unavoidably have in conceiving intinites, to say, That all perfection is in each subsistent (which I like better than subsistence, as more expressive of the concrete) as far as their natural, necessary, eternal order, towards one another, as the first is the fountain or radix, the second from that, and the third from both, can possibly admit. All must be originally in the Father, with whom the other two have that intimate, vital, eternal union, that what is in him the other communicate therein, in as full perfection as is inconceivable, and more than it is possible for us or for any finite mind to conceive. Therefore since that difference which only proceeds from that natural, eternal order, is conjecturable only, but is really unknown, unrevealed, and inscrutable; it is better herein to confess the imperfection of that knowledge which we have, than to boast that which we have not, or aspire to that which we cannot have.

A VIEW

OF THAT PART OF

THE LATE CONSIDERATIONS ADDRESSED TO H. H. ABOUT THE TRINITY. WHICH CONCERNS

THE SOBER INQUIRY ON THAT SUBJECT.
IN A LETTER TO THE FORMER FRIEND.

You see, Sir, I make no haste to tell you my thoughts of what hath been published since my last to you, against my sentiments touching the Holy Trinity. I saw the matter

w Defence, p. 90.

less required my time and thoughts, than my other affairs; and so little, that I was almost indifferent whether I took any notice thereof or no. There is really nothing of argument in what I have seen, but what I had suggested before, and objected to myself, in those very discourses of mine, now animadverted on; which not having prevented, with me, the opinion I am of, can as little alter it, and should as little any man's else. But a little leisure, as it can, without extortion, be gained from other occasions, I do not much grudge to bestow on this.

I find myself concerned in the late considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity-in a letter to H. H. The author is pleased to give me the honour of a name, a lank, unvocal one. It is so contrived, that one may easily guess whom he means; but the reason of his doing so I cannot guess; it is because he knew himself, what he would have others believe.

But I suppose he as well knew his own name. If he knew not the former, he ran the hazard of injuring either the supposed author, or the true, or both. I could, I believe, make as shrewd a guess at his name, and express it as plainly. But I think it not civil to do so; because I apprehend he hath some reason to conceal it, whereof I think he hath a right to be the judge. But I will not prescribe to him rules of civility, of which that he is a great judge, I will not allow myself to doubt.

Yet I will not suppose him to have so very diminishing thoughts of our Saviour, as not to acknowledge and reverence the authority of that great rule of his, which he knows gained reverence with some who called not themselves Christians, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you-&c." Nor can divine what greater reason he should have to hide his own name, than to expose mine, or make the person he indigitates be thought the author of the discourse he intended to expose; since no man can imagine how, as the Christian world is constituted, any one can be more obnoxious for denying three persons, than for asserting three Gods: which latter his impotent attempt aims to make that author do.

For his censures of that author's style, and difficulty to be understood, they offend me not. But so I have known some pretend deafness, to what they were unwilling to hear. There is indeed one place, Sober Inquiry, in the end of sect. 8. where must should have been left out, upon the adding afterwards of can, that might give one some trouble. In which yet, the supposal of an (not unusual) asyndeton, would, without the help of magic, have relieved a considering reader. And for his compliments, as they do me no real good, so, I thank God, they hurt me not. I dwell at home, and better know my own furniture than another can. For himself, I discern and readily acknowledge in him, those excellent accomplishments, for which I most heartily wish him an advocate in a better cause, without despair he will yet prove so; when I take notice of some passages which look like indications of a serious temper of mind, as of choosing God, and the honour of his name, for our portion and design: and that he lives in vain, who knows not his Maker, and his God: with the like.

But on the other hand, I was as heartily sorry to meet with an expression of so different a strain, on so awful a subject, of "making a coat for the moon." That precept which Josephus inserts among those given the Jews, doth for the reason it hath in it, abstracting from its authority, deserve to be considered. It seems to import a decency to the rest of mankind, whose notions of a Deity did not argue them sunk into the lowest degrees of sottishness and stupidity. Good Sir, what needed (think you) so adventurous boldness, in so lubricous a case? It gains nothing to a man's cause either of strength or reputation with wise and good men. A sound argument will be as Sound without it. Nor should I much value having them on my side, whom I can hope to make laugh at so hazardous a jest. I can never indeed have any great veneration for a morose sourness, whatsoever affected appearance it may have with it, of a simulated sanctimony or religiousness; but I should think it no hardship upon me to repress that levity, as to attempt dancing upon the brink of so tremendous a precipice. And would always express • Βλασφημείτο δε μηδεις θεούς ους πολεις αλλαι νομίζουσι. Lib. 4. Jud.

Antiq.

1. First to give a view of the sober inquirer's hypothesis; 2. And then to argue against it.

As to the former. He doth it, I am loath to say, with less fairness than from a person of his (otherwise) appearing ingenuity, one would expect. For he really makes me | to have said more than I ever did, in divers instances; and much less than I have expressly said; and that he cannot have so little understanding as not to know was most material to the cause in hand.

He represents me, p. 40. col. 1. saying: The persons are distinct essences, numerical natures, beings, substances; and col. 2. That I hold them to be three spirits; when in the close of one of those paragraphs, I recite the words of W. J. "In the unity of the Godhead 'there must be no plurality or multiplicity of substances allowed; and do add, Nor do I say that there must.' And I do not positively say there are three distinct substances, minds, or spirits." I would ask this my learned antagonist, Have saying and not saying the same signification? And again, when my words are: I will not use the expressions, as signifying my formed judgment, that there are three things, substances, or spirits in the Godhead, how could he say, I hold the three persons to be three spirits? Is any man, according to the ordinary way of speaking, said to hold what is not his formed judgment? If he only propose things whereof he doubts, to be considered and discussed by others, in order to the forming of it, and by gentle ventilation to sift out truth, it the rather argues him not to hold this or that.

And I think much service might be done to the common interest of religion, by such a free mutual communication of even more doubtful thoughts, if such disquisitions were pursued with more candour, and with less confidence and prepossession of mind, or addictedness to the interest of any party whatsoever. If it were rather endeavoured, to reason one another into, or out of, this or that opinion, than either by sophistical collusions to cheat, or to hector by great words, one that is not of my mind. Or if the design were less to expose an adversary, than to clear the matter in controversy.

For my part, I have little doubt but this ingenious writer is so well acquainted with the gust and relish of intellectual delight, that he chose to expose his adversary by using that odd expression of gross idea so causelessly, in accommodation only to the genius of some other men, whom he thought fit to humour, rather than his own. Nor can he be so little acquainted with the paganish theology, as not to apprehend a vast disagreement between this and that, and a much greater agreement between the paganish notion of the Deity, and his own.

For the questions which he supposes me to put, and makes me answer as he thinks fit, by misapplied passages of that discourse, I hope it will appear they were either prevented, or answered at another rate. At length he says, "The butt-end of this hypothesis," &c. I like not that phrase the worse for the author's sake, of whom it seems borrowed, whose memory greater things will make live, when we are forgot. But let him proceed-The butt-end of this hypothesis is the true strength of it. But that true strength he hath either had the hap not to observe, or taken the care not to represent, i. e. from what is so often inculcated in that discourse, the necessary existence of two hypostases of, and in the first, and of an omnimodous simplicity groundlessly supposed in the Divine Being, he hath kept himself at a wary cautious distance, when he might apprehend there was its strength. Therefore I cannot also but observe, that as he hath marked this hypothesis, with (most undue) ill characters; so he hath maimed it too, of what was most considerable belonging to it, that he might expose it by the former means, so as to make it need much defence; and that by the latter it might seem quite destitute of any defence at all.

And now when (not without some untoward disfigurations) it hath thus far escaped his hands, and is (in none of the best shapes) set up only to be beaten down; the argument he first attacks it with, is the inartificial one of authority. And yet his argument from this topic, is only negative, that the opinion he would confute wants authoand that no learned divine of any persuasion will subscribe to it:" q. d. 'Tis false, and impossible to be true. The inquirer only proposing what he offered, as possible for ought we know, is not otherwise opposed than by asserting it to be impossible. This therefore he must say, or he saith nothing to the purpose. And why now is it impossible? Because no body said it before. So, then, was every thing that any man first said; but afterwards, by being often spoken, it might, it seems, at length become true. For any learned divines subscribing to it, I suppose he intends that in the strict sense. And so the inquirer never said he would subscribe it himself, otherwise than that his judgment did more incline to it, as liable to less exception than other ways of defending the doctrine of the trinity, or than denying it, which he thought least defensible of all.

In the meantime, that there is a trinity in the Godhead is no matter of doubt with me; but only whether this be the best way of explaining and defending it. If this be not the best, or sufficient, some other will, I believe, or hath been found out by some other. Of which I have spoken my sense not only indefinitely, but particularly of the more common way; not that I did then, or have yet thought it the best, but not indefensible.

And I must now sincerely profess, that the perusal of these very considerations gives me more confidence about this hypothesis, than I allowed myself before; finding that the very sagacious author of them, of whose abilities and industry together, I really have that opinion, as to count him the most likely to confute it of all the modern antitrinitarians, hath no other way to deal with it, than first, both partially and invidiously to represent it, and then, rather to trifle than argue against it. He first paints it out in false and ugly colours, before he comes to reasoning; and then, when he should reason, he says nothing that hath so much as a colour. It seems to me an argument of a suspected ill cause on his side, that he thought it needful to prepossess the reader with the imagination of I know not

is necessary to found the distinct predications or attributes severally given them in the Holy Scriptures, and yet be eternally, necessarily, naturally, vitally so united, as notwithstanding that remaining distinction, to be one God." | And let us now see what he hath to say, first, to the inquirer's illustrations of it, as possible: secondly, what he brings to prove it impossible.

As to the former part, he first falls upon what the inquirer hath said concerning the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective natures in ourselves. And upon this he insists so operously, as if the whole weight of the cause had been laid upon it, and seems to think the inquirer had forgot the question, when he mentioned it; because he says, those are only distinct faculties, not persons, or substances, (though persons were not in his question,) without ever taking any notice of the inquirer's waiving it, with these words, "that he would content himself with what was more obvious." But this is all art: to raise a mighty posse, and labour to seem to those that he believed would read what he writ only, not what the other did, most effectually to expunge what he saw was neglected, though not altogether useless; as we shall see anon.

In the meantime, it is observable how needlessly he slurs himself in this his first brisk onset. He says, No man ever pretended that the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective faculties (or powers) are so many distinct, individual persons, substances, or essences, we grant," &c. What, did no man ever pretend that these three distinct natures, the vegetative, sensitive, intellective, were in man, three distinct substances, or souls, concurring by a certain subordination in him? What necessity was there, that to heighten his triumph, in the opinion of his eredulous followers, he should, with so glorious a confidence, put on the vain and false show of having all the world on his side; and herein either dissemble his knowledge, or grossly bewray his ignorance in the mere history of philosophy; and most imprudently suppose all his readers as ignorant, as he would seem? What, did he never hear of an Averroes in the world? Doth he not know that physician and philosopher, and his followers, earnestly contended for what he says no man ever pretended to? Or that divers other commentators upon Aristotle, have some abetted, others as vehemently opposed, them in it? Not to insist also that some thought the Intellectus Agens, and Patiens, to be distinct substances, belonging to the nature of man, as others had also other conceits about the former? And if he look some hundreds of years back, as far as the time and extant work of Nemesius, bishop and philosopher, (as he writes himself,) of the nature of man, (who lived in the time of Gregory Nazianzen, as appears by an epistle of his writ to him, and prefixed to that little book of his,) he will find that author takes notice there were divers that took man to consist of mind, soul, and body, and that some did doubt whether the mind supervening to the soul as one to the other, did not make the latter intelligent. And in several other parts of that work, easy, if it were necessary, to be recited, he speaks it as the judgment of some,d that the unreason able nature in man did exist by itself, as being of itself an unreasonable soul, not a part of the reasonable; accounting it one of the greatest absurdities, that the unreasonable soul should be a part of that which is reasonable.

And he carries us yet much further back, referring us to f Plotinus, in whom any that will, may read much more to that purpose in many places. It matters not whether this opinion be true or false, but a great mistake (or misrepresentation) it was, to say no man ever pretended to it. And be that as it will; if all the readers will suspend their judgments, that a trinity in the Godhead is impossible, till the considerator shall have proved, by plain demonstration, the concurrence of three such spirits (a vegetative, sensitive, and intellective) vitally united in the constitution of man, is a thing simply impossible, I believe he will not, in haste, have many proselytes.

I, for my part, as his own eyes might have told him, laid no stress upon it; but only mentioned it in transitu, as I was going on to what is obvious, and in view to every man, the union between our soul and body. Nor was I solicitous to find this an exact parallel, as he fancies I

• Πότερον προσελθων, ο νους τη ψυχη ως άλλος αλλη νοεραν αυτην εποίησεν, &c. cap. 1.

was obliged to do. What if there be no exact parallel? Will any man of a sober mind, or that is master of his own thoughts, conclude every thing impossible in the uncreated Being, whereof there is not an exact parallel in the creation? If any man will stand upon this, come make an argument of it, let us see it in form, and try its strength.-Whatsoever hath not its exact parallel in the creation, is impossible in God, &c.-He will sooner prove himself ridiculous, than prove his point by such a medium. 'Tis enough for a sober man's purpose, in such a case as we are now considering, if we find such things actually are (or might as easily be, as what we see actually is) among the creatures, that are of as difficult conception, and explication, as what appears represented in the inquirer's hypothesis concerning a trinity. "Tis trifling to attempt to give, or to ask, a parallel exact per omnia. It abundantly serves any reasonable purpose, if there be a parallel quoad hoc, viz. in respect of the facility or difficulty of conception. And though the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective natures be not so many distinct substances, a trinity is not less conceivable in the Divine Being, than three such natures, or natural powers, in the one human nature.

And whoever they be that will not simplify the Divine Being into nothing, (as the excellent author of the 28 propositions speaks,) must also acknowledge the most real perfections in the Divine Being, though not univocal, but infinitely transcendent to any thing in us. And are they no way distinct? Let any sober understanding judge, will the same nothing agree to them all? Is his knowledge, throughout, the same with his effective power? Then he must make himself. For who can doubt he knows himself? And is his will the self-same undistinguishable perfection, in him, with his knowledge? Then the purposes of his will must be to effect all that he can. For doth he not know all that he can do? And the complacencies of his will must be as much in what is evil, as good, even in the most odious turpitude of the vilest, and most immoral evils! For he knows both alike. I know what is commonly said of extrinsical denominations: but are such denominations true, or false? Have they any thing in re correspondent to them, or have they not? Then some distinction there must be of these perfections themselves. If so, how are they distinguished?

And there appears great reason, from God's own word, to conceive greater distinction of the three hypostases in his being, than of the attributes which are common to them, as is said, Sober Inquiry, page 151. In reference whereto, it is not improper or impertinent to mention such differences, as we find in our own being, though they be not distinct substances. Less distinction in ourselves may lead us to conceive the possibility of greater in him in whom we are wont to apprehend nothing but substarce. What he adds concerning the union of soul and body in ourselves, (which he cannot deny to be distinct substances,) is, from a man of so good sense, so surprisingly strange, and remote from the purpose, that one would scarce think it from the same man; but that he left this part to some other of the club, and afterwards wrote on, himself, without reading it over; or this was with him (what we are all liable to) some drowsy interval.

For when he had himself recited as the inquirer's words, or sense, "If there be this union between two so contrary natures and substances, as the soul and body, why may there not be a like union between two or three created spirits?" he, without shadow of a pretence, feigns the inquirer again to have forgot the question, because soul and body are not both intelligent substances. And why, Sir, doth this argue him to have forgot the question? 'Tis as if he expected a man to be at the top of the stairs, as soon as he touched the first step. In a series of discourse, must the beginning touch the end, leaving out what is to come between, and connect both parts? What then serve mediums for? And so farewell to all reasonings, since nothing can be proved by itself. He expected, it seems, I should have proved "three intelligent natures might be united, because three intelligent natures might be united."

But say I (and so he repeats) if there be so near union Η Καθ' εαυτήν είναι ως λογον ψυχην. • Των αποποτατων, cap. 16. f Eun. 6. lib. 7. cap. 5, 6, 7, &c.

between things of so contrary natures as soul and body, why not between two or three created spirits? The question is, as he now states it himself, why may not three intelligent substances be united? And hither he (with palpable violence) immediately refers, the mention of the union of soul and body; and, says he, Why, Sir, are body and soul intelligent substances!" And, say I, But why, Sir, are not the three (supposed) created spirits intelligent substances? And now, thinks he, will my easy admiring readers, that read me only, and not him, say, What a baffle hath he given the inquirer! What an ignorant man is this Mr. ——, to talk of soul and body, as both intelligent substances! But if any of them happen upon the inquirer's book too, then must they say, How scurvily doth this matter turn upon himself! how inconsiderate a prevaricator was he that took upon him the present part of a considerer, so to represent him! And I myself would say, had I the opportunity of free discourse with him in a corner, (which because I have not, I say it here,) Sir, is this sincere writing? Is this the way to sift out truth? And I must further say, this looks like a man stung by the pungency of the present question. "If soul and body, things of so contrary natures, that is, of an intelligent and unintelligent nature, can be united into one (human) nature, why may not three created spirits, all intelligent natures, be as well united into some one thing? It appears you knew not what to say to it; and would fain seem to say something, when you really had nothing to say, and therefore so egregiously tergiversate, and feign yourself not to understand it, or that your antagonist did not understand himself. The inquirer's scope was manifest. Nothing was to be got by so grossly perverting it. Is there no argument but à pari? Might you not plainly see, he here argued à fortiori? If contrary natures might be so united, why not much rather like natures?

When you ask me this question, "Do not body and soul remain two substances, a bodily and a spiritual, notwithstanding their concurrence to the constitution of a man?" I answer, Yes. And I thank you, Sir, for this kind look towards my hypothesis. If they were not so, the mention of this union had no way served it. You know 'tis only union, with continuing distinction, that is for my purpose. I doubt you nodded a little, when you asked me that question; and I do annuere.

possible, which by mere oversight and incogitance (as I hope now appears) was too hastily pronounced an oversight, or incogitancy.

2. We are next to consider what he says to prove it impossible. And so far as I can apprehend the drift of the discourse, what he alleges will be reduced to these two heads of argument, viz.-that three such hypostases (or subsistents, as I have chosen to call them) can have no possible nexus, by which to be one God? (1.) Because they are all supposed intelligent: (2.) Because they can neither be said to be finite, nor infinite. He should not therefore have said the hypothesis was mere incogitance and oversight; for he knows I saw, and considered them both; (in the Sober Inquiry itself: the former, page 138, the latter, page 143, with page 149,) and thought them unconcluding then, as I still think. Nor do I find the considerer hath now added any strength to either of them. But I shall, since he is importune, go to the reconsideration of them with him. And,

(1.) As to the former, I cannot so much as imagine what should make him, confessing (which he could not help) the actual union of an intelligent and unintelligent being, deny the possible union of intelligent beings. He seems to apprehend many dangerous things in it, that if he caunot reason he may fright, a man out of it, and out of his wits too. It will infer associating, discoursing, solacing. But where lies the danger of all this? or to whom is it dangerous? He says it introduces three omniscient, almighty Beings, as I expressly call them, associating, &c. But he cites no place where, and I challenge him to name any persons among whom, I so expressly called them. He may indeed tell where I blamed him for representing some of his adversaries, as affirming three Almighties, and denying more than one; but that is not expressly calling them so myself. And he may know in time 'tis one thing expressly to call them so, and another to put him (as he is concerned) to disprove it.

Aye, but it will further infer tritheism. It will make three Gods. And if this be not to make three Gods, it can never be made appear that the pagans held more gods. Yes, if there be no natural, vital nerus, if they be united in one, of which the pagans never talked: or, if they be coordinate, not subordinate, as Dr. Cudworth speaks. And I add, if that subordination be, not arbitrary, but by necessary, natural, continual emanation of the second from the first, and of the third from both the other; so as that their goings forth may be truly from everlasting, as is said of the one, and may as well be conceived of another of them.

But upon the whole matter, when you let your mind so unwarily be in patinis, your cookery quite spoiled your philosophy. Otherwise, when you had newly read those words in the Sober Inquiry, as I find you had, page 138. "Waiving the many artificial unions of distinct things, that united, and continuing distinct, make one thing under one name, I shall only consider what is natural," you would never let it (your mind, I mean so fine a thing) be huddled up, and sopped, with meat, plums, sugar, wine, in a Christmas-pie; or have thought that the union of a human soul with a human body was like such a jumble as this. I believe when some among the ancients made use of this union of soul and body, (as I find they have,) to represent a very sacred, viz. the hypostatical one, they little thought it would be so debased; or that any thing would be said of it so extravagant as this. And, if we design doing any body good by writing, let us give over this way of talk, lest people think, what I remember Cicero once said of the Epicureans arguing, that they do not so much consider, as sortiri, cast lots what to say. But now 'tis like we may come to some closer discourse. We see what is said to the inquirer's elucidation of his hypothesis to represent it

I would have the trinitarians be content with the reproach of falling in, quoad hoc, with Plato; and not envy their antagonists the honour of more closely following Mahomet. And, Sir, there is more paganism in denying this, and the divine revelation upon which it is grounded, than in supposing it.

cannot be conceived, but between beings so distinct and diverse, that they can be one in no natural respect, but only in a civil, or economical. This is loud, and earnest. But why can there not? Setting aside noise and clamour, I want to know a reason, why intelligent beings may not be as intimately and naturally united with one another, as unintelligent and intelligent? and if so, why such union should spoil mutual conversation and delight? Perhaps his mind and mine might not do well together; for he cannot conceive, and I, for my part, cannot but conceive, that most perfect intelligent natures, vitally united, must have the most delightful conversation, harmony, and agreement together; and so much the more, by how much the more perfect they are, and by how much more perfect their union is.

Whereas then I expect a reason, why intelligent beings cannot be capable of natural union, and no other is given me, but because they are intelligent. And again, why such beings naturally united cannot converse, and no other is given me, but because they are naturally united, i. e. such things cannot be, because they cannot be. By how much the less such reasons have to convince, they have the more to confirm me, that the hypothesis I have proposed is not