I anfwer, I'll endeavour-if you will,

I'm fure you can, he cries, and urges ftill.""

P. 107. From the appendix to this book it appears, that the author has been recommended by a literary friend to give an entire tranflation of Horace. Without attempting to difpute his qualifications for the task, which may be confidered as proved by this volume, we cannot forbear to advise him not to be led into fuch an undertaking. No man, at all inferior to Horace himself in genius and talent, will ever produce a perfect tranflation of the very varied compofitions of that elegant writer; and even the higheft fuccefs, in a few specimens, cannot be confidered as a pledge of fuccefs in the whole. Taken altogether, we have little expectation of feeing a better tranflation of Horace entire, than that produced fince the commencement of our labours by Mr. William Boscawen * ; and we are much more anxious to fee that retouched and completed, than any attempt made to produce one which might fuperfede it. Though Mr. Bradftreet's principles of English and Roman metre appear to us correct, we do not think that so close a mode of imitating the original metres as he has undertaken, will ever be appreciated by readers of a tranflation. It would therefore, in that refpect, be labour loft. If ever an unexceptionable tranflation of Horace fhould be produced it must be by compilation, as the Duncombes attempted, rather too foon, to produce one; and in fuch a work many flowers from Mr. Bradstreet's garden would beyond all doubt be intervowen.

*Since we wrote this juft commendation of MR. BOSCAWEN'S Horace, the ingenious and truly excellent author has been removed beyond the reach of our praife. A long continued feries of ill health had rendered that event but too probable, which yet, by the fuddennefs of its actual approach, came upon his relatives and friends with the effect of fomething unexpected. Within a very few days of his death he wrote thofe verfes, which at the late anniverfary of the LITERARY FUND were received with fuch deferved applaufe. By that fociety, which his benevolence had foftered from its beginnings, his lofs will be deeply regretted. To us, it is like the amputation of a limb, from which the first pain, though acute, is nothing to the perpetual privation.

A new edition of his Horace, much improved by his long-continued attention, is intended foon to be brought forward. It will be accompanied by the original, and by many additional notes and will doubtlefs receive encouragement from that public, which has always approved the work,

ART.

ART. IV. A View of the State of the Nation, and of the Meafures of the last five Years; fuggefted by Earl Grey's Speech in the House of Lords, 13th June, 1810. By Thomas Peregrine Courtenay, Efq. 8vo. 180 pp. . 5s. 6d. J. J. Stockdale. 1811.

THE

HE fpeeches of party leaders and the difcuffions of party writers are always perufed by us with fome degree of diftruft, and praifed with caution, even when the opinions contained in them coincide with our own. But though this pamphlet is a profeffed defence of the prefent adminiflration, and in that refpect to be claffed with the political writings alluded to, it refis fo firongly upon facts, deduces from them fuch forcible arguments, is fo candid in it's reprefentations, and fo temperate in it's language, that we deem it worthy to be perufed by all whofe minds are not, on political fubjects, dead to found reafoning; and we are therefore defirous to contribute, fo far as lays in our power, to promote its circulation.

After a fuitable introduction, the author proceeds to analyze the fpeech of the noble earl, dividing it into fourteen different heads, in order to purfue more clearly and diftinctly the feveral details. Of thefe heads, however, only the seven firft are the fubjects of his present difcuffion. The chief of these are,

"The great increase of our expenditure fince the laft war, and the infufficient provifion made for it by the prefent administra tion;-The neceffity of what the noble earl terms repofe for the country, (although he intimates that our fyftem of policy has rendered peace unattainable); and the expediency of our adopting the provident system of husbanding our resources."

Under the laft head the noble speaker expatiates on the folly of our military operations against France, and our embarking in the war in Spain, without afcertaining whether there was an efficient government in that country;-the attack on Denmark in 1807;-and the impolicy (in the noble earl's opinion) of our conduct with regard to Sicily. These attacks on adminiftration the prefent writer, after fome preli minary remarks, repels, firit, by fhowing that the increase alledged in every branch of taxation, fo far from being a proof of our refources being exhaufted,

"Affords the fureft pledge of their remaining competency; fince the revenue has continued to flourish under the weight of the new impofitions, fince the various modes adopted for increasing it have been generally fuccefsful, and large and repeated burthens have

Hh3

have been impofed without diminishing the power by which they are fuftained."

The author does not, however, maintain that our resources of finance are inexhauflible, but that "they are as yet unexhausted and copious." To the arguments founded on the financial arrangements of 1807, and the fubfequent departure from the plan of the late minifters, a very full, and we think fatisfactory, anfwer is given. But for thefe details we must refer to the work itself.

The infinuation that the conduct of the prefent minifters has tended to remove every hope of peace" (though the noble speaker had before argued that a fafe and honourable peace was unattainable) is next noticed by the author, and repelled by adverting to the negociation of 1806, and the noble earl's declaration on that occafion, that " peace was rendered unattainable by the unreasonable demands and expectations of Bonaparte;" and it is alfo oppofed by a statement of the difcuffions on that fubject, which have fince taken place between the prefent minifters and thofe of the powers at war with us. The objections of the noble fpeaker to all offenfive measures in conducting the war, together with his much-boafted fyftem of "hufbanding our refources," are next very amply difcuffed. The author of this tract denies (we think with great juftice) that "a defenfive war is the natural policy of a nation wishing for peace and not able to attain it ;" more efpecially when the obftacle to peace is the great and increafing power and inordinate ambition of the enemy. But, as in the fpeech there is a direct challenge to inveftigate and com, pare the two fyftems of the late and prefent administrations, the author proceeds to an examination of them, fhowing, first, that it was not (as the fpeech would imply) the policy of the noble earl and his affociates "to abftain from all military operations, or to avoid hazarding a British army on a hoftile continent:" on the contrary, he alludes to four* diftinct proceedings of the cabinet in 1806 of a different nature, and infifts that in the expeditions to Conftantinople, Egypt, and Buenos Ayres, the minifters expofed themselves to failure, and did fail, "not for want of the means of fuccefs, but because they ventured not to apply them."

With thefe enterprifes of Earl Grey and his colleagues, the author compares thofe which were undertaken by the adminiftration of the Duke of Portland, and, admitting that

*Or rather three; though perhaps the original deftination of General Crawford to Chili is the fourth expedition, alluded to.

among

amongst these there was one great failure, namely, the expedition to the Scheldt, he enquires why this failure has excited more indignation than the numerous reverses of the late war, or those which he has just been contemplating, against the minifters who planned it? This he attributes not to our having fuftained greater loffes, or the glory of our arms having been tarnished, but to the magnitude of the attempt, the extent of the preparations, and the unexampled exertions; which, added to the proximity of the scene of action, and the nature of the lols fuftained, attracted to the attempt a peculiar degree of attention, and confequently to the failure a peculiar degree of indignation. He allows, however, that the failure of the Scheldt expedition, though not complete, was "confiderable and difaftrous," and only pleads that " the utmost was done to infure fuccefs, and that this fingle misfortune does not, in regard to military expeditions, eftablish a preference for the cabinet of 1806*. He adds, that

"No failure could have lefs influence upon the general political fyftem, or conduct of the war;-that it has affected in a very inconfiderable degree the ftate of the nation; and, at any rate, will never be made a ground for recalling the uniformly unfortunate minifters of 1806."

The other military operations of Lord Grey's fucceffors are brought forward by this writer with a confiderable degree of exultation. The expedition against Denmark (the poli-. tical expediency and juftice of which he referves for fubfequent confideration), was marked, he obferves, with strong features of ability, both in the plan and execution; and a more than ufual majority in parliament, together with a majority in the country, at leaft, correfponding to the reprefentation, approved it, as a wife measure, skilfully conducted, and fuccefsful.

Having adverted to our fubfequent conquefts of the French Weft India islands, and explained the policy of the prefent administration in their tranfactions with Sweden, the author difcuffes at large the war in Spain and Portugal, giving an account of its rife and progrefs, and particularly flating the refolutions and meafures of the late adminiftration with regard to the latter of these kingdoms; which fhowed the importance which even they attached to the prefervation of that country

* In a note he cites the refolutions of the House of Commons, juftifying the minifters, as well as the naval and military com. manders, after (as he obferves) a very ftrict and fevere enquiry,

Hh 4

from

from the dominion of France. The fubfequent abandonment of thofe measures, by both administrations, is accounted for by the reported impracticability, at that period, of defending Portugal, and alfo by the change produced by the treaties of Tilfit in the fitiation of Europe.

The great and unexpected revolution in the affairs of the Spanish peninfula, gave, the author remarks, an entirely new face to the politics of Great Britain and France, more particularly as to our relation towards Spain: but, as to Portugal, he infifts, it more firmly established the wifdom, and called for a more direct application of the policy which Earl Grey and his colleagues had adopted, and which his fucceffors have imitated, and (in the opinion of this writer) improved.

He admits that, at firft, in a military view, the interefts of Portugal were merged in thofe of Spain, and, confequently, that our interest did not, at that moment, dictate any other me fures with refpect to Portugal than fuch as were molt advisable for the peninfula in general. He does not, however, as fome have done, conclude from thence that operations on the fide of Portugal were altogether unadvifable, and that we ought at once to have poured our utmost poffible force into Spain; nor does he agree with those who infift that, with ut a rational hope of the ultimate and complete expulfion of the French, tho e operations ought never to have commenced. To explain the policy of the measures then adopted, he adverts to the fituation of affairs in June, 1808;' which determined government to direct to the scene of action the largest force that could promptly be affembled and tranf ported. The expulfion of the French from Portugal, he ftates to have been, in the opinion not only of the government at home, but of the officers employed, and of fuch Spanish authorities as could be confulted, the moft advisable operation. This, he obferves, was accomplished in less than two months from the departure of Sir A. Wellesley from Cork.

*

The next important meafure difcuffed is, the determina tion formed, after the conqueft of Portugal, that a confiderable part of the army there employed, reinforced from England, fhould enter Spain, and co-operate with the armies of that kingdom. In fupport of this refolution the author contends trat, by confining our felves to the mere defence of Portugal, we fhould, in effect, have given up the cause of

There is a very candid and judicious note on the Conven. tion of Cintra.