of the World, can never alter them without altering the nature of things; cannot make that good which is hurtful, nor that hurtful which is good; which is all the Good and Evil which I know of: for whereas we diftinguish between Moral and Natural Good and Evil, the only dif ference between them is this, that Moral Good and Evil is in the Will and Choice, Natural' Good and Evil is in the Nature of Things; that which is good or hurtful to our felves or others,' is naturally good or evil; to love, to chufe, to do that which is good or hurtful to our felves or others, is morally good or evil, or is the good or evil of our Choice and Actions..

If you will but recollect your felves, you will all find, that you have no other Notion of Good or Evil but this. When you fay, fuch a Man has done a very good or a very evil action, what do you mean by it? Do you not mean, that he has done fomething very good or very hurtful to himfelf or others? When you hear that any man has done good or evil, is not the next question, What good, or what hurt has he done? And do you not by this mean Natural Good or Evil? Which is a plain evidence, that you judge of the Moral Good or Evil of Actions by the Natural Good or Evil which they do: And the effential difference between Moral good and evil, is founded on the effential difference between Natural good and evil and evil; and therefore is as unalterable as the nature of things.

This is evident from that univerfal Rule of Juftice and Goodness, Whatfoever ye would that men fhould do unto you, do you that also unto them, which is an Appealto cur own fense and feeling for the

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good and evil of our Actions; which must therefore fignify the natural good and evil of them : We feel what is for our good or hurt; and we defire men fhould do good to us, but that they fhould not hurt us; and therefore we must do good and no injury to them; and this is the fum of the Law and the Prophets: The univerfal Rule of moral Juftice and Goodness, which is to do that which is for the natural good of mankind, whatever our fenfe and experience tells us, is naturally good and beneficial to our felves: which would be a very imperfect Rule, if there were not an infeparable connexion between Moral and Natural Good.

The not obferving this, is the true reafon why fome men can form no Notion at all of moral Good or Evil, but think Virtue and Vice to be mere Arbitrary Notions, which have no Founda tion in the Nature of Things; as indeed they can have none but only this, That Virtue is to love, and chufe, and do that which has a natural good in it, which is good to our felves or others; that Vice is to love, and chufe, and do that which has fome natural Evil init, or which is hurtful to our felves or others: As for inftance; Charity which is one of the most excellent Virtues of the Chriftian Life, confifts in doing every thing which is for the good of men; in feeding the Hungry, cloathing the Naked, relieving the Injured and Oppreffed,the Fatherlefs and the Widow; in directing, advifing, affifting, comforting men in Difficulties and Diftrefs, in forgiving Injuries, concealing Faults, judging Charitably, and in all fuch other acts of Goodnefs as are greatly for the benefit of Mankind whereas the contrary

Vice does all the contrary Evils and Mischiefs, to the great hurt and injury of men; and whoever confiders this, muft confefs that moral Good and Evil is as real a thing as natural Good and Evil is; and I fuppofe no man who has his fenfes about him, will deny that there is fuch a thing as natural Good and Evil; as for inftance, Pain and Pleasure; and then his fame fenfes will in abundance of inftances tell him the effential difference between moral Good and Evil.

On the other hand, the true and only reafon why men fo vaftly differ in their Notions of moral Good and Evil, is because in many inftances they are not agreed what natural Good and Evil is: Some men call nothing Good or Evil, but what is Good or Evil to their Bodies, such as Pain and Pleasure, and the causes and inftruments of them,Health and Sickness,Riches and Poverty,and the like. Others think,and with much greater reafon, that we should take our Souls into the account too; that whatever is for the eafe and pleasure of our minds, whatever adorns and perfects a reafonable Nature, is a natural Good to men; as Wisdom and Knowledge, and regular and wellgovern'd Appetites and Paffions do; and therefore thefe are the foundation of moral Virtues too; but whatever debafes our Natures, and is a reproach to the Reason and Understanding of a man, whatever thrufts him down into the rank of brute Creatures, and either difturbs his ease, or changes the Pleafures of a Man for thofe of a Eeaft are great natural Evils too,if the perfection and happiness of Humane Nature be a natural Good; and therefore to chufe and to act fuch things, is morally Evil

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This is enough to fhew what moral Good and Evilis, that it has à neceffary relation to natural Good and Evil; and it were eafy here to prove, were it not too long a Digreffion, That all the Laws of the Gofpel do either command what is for the good and happiness of Mankind, of every private man, and of publick Communities; or forbid fuch things as are hurtful and prejudicial to them; but my prefent defign will not fuffer me to ftraggle fo far out of the way.

II. The fecond branch of this Argument is, That according to the general fenfe of mankind, what is good ought to be rewarded, and what is wicked ought to be punished.

"For the proof of this, I shall appeal in the first place to all civilized Nations who live under Laws and Government; for there is no fuch Nation but thinks fit to restrain Wickedness by a publick Vengeance on those who commit it: Indeed their Laws and Punishments are not always the fame, nor do they all punish the fame Crimes, nor with the fame Punishments; but all of them punish fuch Crimes as they think injurious to the Publick, which is the principal concernment of Civil Government; and inflict fuch penalties on them, as they judge proportioned to fuch Crimes, or fufficient to reftrain the commiffion of them; fome Capital, fome Pecuniary Mulets, Confifcation of Goods, loss of Honour, Corporal Punishments, Imprisonment, Banifhment, or fome publick Marks of perpetual Infamy; which is a certain Argument, that the Wifdom of all Nations thinks it fit that Wickedness fhould be punished; that "thöfe who do Evil fhould fuffer Evil; and indeed wall

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all Mankind is fo fenfible of this, that there is not a greater Reproach to any Government, than the Impunity of Vice; nor a greater Glory to it, than the ftrict and equal Adminiftration of Juftice.

Where publick Juftice fails, as it does in a great many inftances, we muft next appeal to private Revenge, to understand what the fenfe of mankind is about the defert of Sin; for there is not a more natural, nor more eager Paffion in Human Nature; all men naturally defire to return the Injury they fuffer, upon the Heads of those who do it; and account it no Injury, but a great act of Juftice to do fo. In many Nations fome private Injuries have been left to private Revenge; and the Jewish Law it felf permitted a Retaliation of Injuries, an Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth, tho it did not permit the injured Perfon to take this Revenge himself, but made the publick Magiftate the Judge of it.

It may be you will wonder I fhould appeal to the impatient thirft and appetite of Revenge, to prove the sense of mankind, that Sin ought to be punifhed; when private Revenge it self is a great Evil, and forbid by the Gofpel of our Saviour: but for all that, Revenge is a natural Paffion, and fpeaks the furious rage and language of Nature, that Sin ought to be punished. It is that paffion in -us which minifters to Punitive Juftice, as a natural tenderness and compaffion does to Charity and therefore the Paffion it felf is not finful, tho the irregular exercife cf it is: It is implanted in: all Mankind, as the love of Juftice is, but all men must not execute Revenge, no more than every .man can adminifter Juftice; where every man is a Minifter