I cannot resist the persuasion, that if there be a clear case in respect to the genuineness of any passage of the New Testament which has ever been controverted, the one before us is such a case. Most fully do I assent to the words of Griesbach, at the close of his critical examination of this subject (Comm. Crit. II. 55), who says: "Cum igitur parum roboris insit argumentis omnibus adversus duorum istorum capitum authentiam prolatis, genuina ea esse censemus; ipsaque inde ab initio, cum primum in publicam lucem emitteretur Matthaei Evangelium, buic adhaesisse, ac in autographo seu archetypo jam extitisse, nulli dubitamus."

ARTICLE V.

THE SCRIPTURAL IDEA OF ANGELS.

By Lewis Mayer, D. D. late Prof. in the Theol. Sem. of the Germ. Ref. Church, York, Pa.

THE existence of a world of spirit is as much a subject of observation and experience as the existence of a world of matter. The human soul is a spirit manifesting itself in the affections and operations of mind; there is a spirit in the brute which is the seat of sensation, of memory, of pleasure and of pain; the reproduction of animals, the vegetation of plants, the crystalization of minerals, and chemical agencies, are not the effects of inert matter, but must be referred ultimately to a cause which acts spontaneously and rationally. Ancient philosophy conceived that cause to be a soul of the world, and considered the world an animated, sentient, and rational being. The Bible makes it God, and the spirit of God, which pervades all things.

All spirit is not of the same order. There is an infinite difference, both of nature and of attributes, between the uncreated infinite Spirit, and all created finite spirit. There may also be an order of spirits among the creatures, perhaps embracing many genera and species, superior to man, and existing in a state of being which is not subject to the observation of our senses; nor, perhaps, even to be apprehended by the human mind, in its present connection with matter.

That intelligent creatures, superior to man, and still at an

infinite distance from God, may exist, is a position which reason cannot disprove. The fact, however, of their existence does not follow of course from the possibility of it. Neither do I know that it can be demonstrated by reasoning from any abstract principle. All that reason can do is to make out a high degree of probability by analogical argument from facts previously known or granted. It is of little weight to say, that inasmuch as the distance between man and the Deity is infinite, it is improbable that man is the highest of animated beings, and the only creature which is endowed with reason; for, whatever conception we may form of rational creatures, superior to man, to occupy the chasm between him and his Creator, the distance between those creatures and the Deity must still be infinite, and the same necessity of supposing others above them will return forever. It may then be urged, that, as no creation can be infinite, it must be admitted that the Creator has stopped somewhere; and no sufficient reason can be given, why he should not have stopped at man, as well as at any conceivable grade in the scale of existence above him.

The argument from analogy is of more value. It may be constructed as follows. It is probable that the other planets, in the system of which our globe is a part, are inhabited by living creatures; because in our world every part teems with life and activity; the earth, the air, and the water abound with animated beings; the microscope reveals to us a world of animalcules, in immense variety of form, of character, and of magnitude, beyond the limits which confine the unassisted sense, and extending in minuteness beyond the bounds even of microscopic vision; often so numerous that many thousands of them are contained in a single drop of water; and so minute that they find room enough in it to move and to sport without hindrance. Yea, such is the Creator's attention to the production and sustenance of living existence, that even the food of many of the larger animals is animated; and these again constitute so many worlds upon which smaller species live and feed. It is therefore probable that the other globes in the solar system, which are known to be subject, in other respects, to the same general laws as our own, are not left destitute of living creatures. If each of the fixed stars, which are known to resemble our sun, is the centre of another system of worlds, and the source of light and heat to globes that revolve around it, it is also probable that those worlds are the habitations of living and

sensitive beings. But if all the heavenly bodies, like the globe upon which we dwell, are furnished with living creatures, it is not probable that all their inhabitants are irrational animals, which can have no knowledge of their Creator, and can bring to him no offering of virtue and praise. In this world man is the lord of the lower creation; all the inferior creatures are adapted to his use, and subjected to his power; and there is a gradation in the scale of existence, through various forms of organization and character, from rude matter up to man, who is constituted an image of his Creator, and forms the link which connects this world with the invisible Deity. If other worlds are analogous to our own, there must be in them the same sort of gradation, terminating in a highest which represents God, and connects them with him.

If there be rational beings in other worlds, it is not likely that they are of the same order and species with man. The human race could not subsist in any other of the planets which are known to us. In Mercury, for example, they would be consumed with heat, and in Herschel destroyed by cold; and in none of the planets can there be vegetation or animals like those with which we are acquainted here. If those bodies are inhabited, it must be by natures that are adapted to them, and are therefore wholly different from any which are known to us: and if in each of them there be a class of beings upon which the image of God is impressed, it must be one that differs entirely from the human race.

If man is not the only intelligent creature in the universe, and if every other world contains a distinct order of the same class, it is very improbable that they are all equal with respect to their physical and intellectual powers. As far as our observation extends in the works of God, we discover diversity united with regularity. All organized being is reducible to classes, orders, genera, species, and varieties; no two individuals of a species are in all respects alike; there is everywhere a continual variation, and a rising from the less in perfection to the greater, or a descending from the greater to the less; there is an oak and a moss, a lion and a worm, an eagle and a mite; there is a sun to illuminate a system of worlds, and a meteor to shine momentarily in the dark. The human species is diversified by every variety of beauty and deformity, and by every grade of rank from the king to the beggar, and from the sage to the idiot. If the same law prevails throughout the universe,

no two worlds can be alike, and there are, doubtless, as many different grades of intelligent beings as there are worlds which they inhabit.

Neither is it probable that man is the highest in this class of creatures. On the contrary it is more likely that he is the lowest in the scale. A compound of spirit and matter, and of matter in its gross sluggish form, he is allied to the earth on which he treads, and the connecting links between him and its rude matter are the brute, the plant, and the crystalization. While some of the individuals of the species exhibit intellectual powers of a high order, others are so little removed from the more sagacious of the irrational animals, that the transition from the one to the other is made by a single step. We may therefore conclude, that, if there be among the creatures of God other grades of intelligent beings, they are higher than

man.

All this reasoning is hypothetical; we assume in it, on probable grounds, what we cannot strictly demonstrate. From such premises the conclusion can be nothing more than probability. It is however a high degree of probability that is obtained in this case; and there being no argument of equal weight, nor, so far as I can see, of any considerable weight, on the opposite side, we approach so near to certainty, that we may take the fact as sufficiently proved.

The religious philosophy of every age, in the Gentile world, has taught the existence of a class of beings between the supreme Deity and man. In the theology of all idolatrous nations, as there was a plurality of divinities to whom their worship was addressed, so there was a subordination of rank among the objects of worship, and one supreme deity that presided over the rest; and among the inferior gods there were such as approached very near to man, while others scarcely differed from the one who was acknowledged as supreme. But besides these inferior beings, to whom the title gods was given, the Gentiles held the existence of a class of beings between the gods and men, consisting of different orders, who were the ministers of the gods, and mediators between them and men; bearing to the gods the prayers and offerings of men; and to men the answers and the commands of the gods. The Hindoos have their Dejotas, the Persians, and others of the Magian sect, their Amschashpands, Izeds, Fervers, and Dews; the Greeks had their Daemons, and the Romans their Genii.

Hesiod, who lived about the time of Homer, divides intelligent natures into four classes, namely, gods, daemons, heroes, and For so doing he is commended by Plutarch. Plato taught that the whole space between the gods and men was occupied by daemons, which were, however, of different kinds. The Pythagoreans, the Stoics, the Peripatetics, and, indeed, every sect of philosophy among the Gentiles, except the Epicurean, held a similar doctrine.

In the Holy Scriptures we have frequent notice of spiritual intelligences, existing in another state of being, and constituting a celestial family, a hierarchy, over which Jehovah presides. The Scripture, however, does not treat this subject professedly, and as a doctrine of religion, but adverts to it incidentally as a fact, as it does to other facts, in its religious history and the course of its instructions. It speaks of no obligations to these spirits, and inculcates no duties toward them. A belief in the existence of such beings is therefore not an essential article of religion, any more than a belief that there are other worlds besides our own; it belongs not so much to religion as to philosophy; but such a belief serves to enlarge our idea of the works of God, and to illustrate the greatness of his power and wisdom; and in this way it exerts an important and salutary influence upon the heart.

The names or titles, by which the Scripture designates these celestial beings, are spirits, Greek пveúμara pneumata; angels, Greek ayyelo, angelloi; Hebrew mlakhim; and in the Old Testament and elohim, and bne elohim. The first of these terms has respect to their essence, and the second to their office. The last two denote their rank in the scale of being. Gesenius denies that elohim ever means angels; and he refers in this denial particularly to Ps. 8: 5, and Ps. 97: 7; but he observes, that the term is so translated in the ancient versions. In the epistle to the Hebrews, where these texts are referred to, the same translation is given, Heb. 1: 6. 2: 7.

Elohim is the plural of Eloah. According to Gesenius Eloak is a primitive, and the verb Alah is a derivative from it. The verb does not occur in the Hebrew Scriptures, but is used in the Arabic, in the sense of to reverence, to dread. Eloah is therefore that which inspires reverence, fear, dread; or which creates astonishment, alarm and awe; and Elohim, in its ordinary sense, denotes a plurality of such objects. When the plural is joined with a verb, or with other dependent words, in the