ferred to every puny arm of finite creature, and becomes in every guilty hand a sceptre of dominion, demanding an eternity of vindictive concern in answer to an idle word of profane lips. The argument utterly perverts the sublime sentiment of Scripture: "If thou sinnest, what doest thou against Him? or if thy transgressions be multiplied, what doest thou unto Him?" "Will He reprove thee for fear of thee? Will He enter with thee into judgment? Is not thy wickedness great, and thine iniquities numberless?" (Job xxxv. 6; xxii. 4, 5.) Where the sense seems to be: Your sins must have been exceedingly grievous or long continued, thus to provoke the notice of high Heaven.1

§ 3.

SIN AGAINST GOD AS INFINITE LOVE?

But the language of Eliphaz to Job, just cited, is only half of the truth. God is not the impassible being of the Epicurean and the IIindoo philosophy, wrapt up in a dignified, heartless indifference respecting the world. As a God of love He must delight in those who obey Him, and He is equally grieved with those who sin against Ilim. "Behold," says one, "sin is so hateful to God, and grieveth Him so sore, that He would willingly suffer agony and death, if one man's sins thereby might be washed out. And if He were asked whether He would rather live and that sin should remain, or die and destroy sin by his death, He would answer that He would a thousand times rather die. For to God one man's sin is more hateful, and grieveth Him worse than His own agony and death. Now if one man's sin grieveth God so sore, what must the sins of all men do? Hereby ye may consider, how greatly man grieveth God with his sins." 2

"2

1 The theodicy is rejected as Manichæan by Duns Scotus, Opp. VII. 412, 418, 422, ed. Lugd. 1639, cited by Strauss, Glaubenslehre, § 69. It is censured by Warburton, Divine Legation, b. 9, c. 1:- Kant, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, b. 2, § c;- Doederlein, Inst. Theol. Chr., § 223, obs. 3;— Magee, On the Atonement, Diss. XI;-John Foster, Life and Corresp., Let. 226;- Henry Rogers, Essay on the Genius and Writings of Edwards, p. 1: “In reasoning on the infinite nature of all sin, Edwards appears to fall into his besetting vice, verbal reasoning, which he is very apt to do when treating of infinitude;"- R. W. Hamilton, Rewards and Punishments, pp. 406, 407. 2 Theologia Germanica, c. 37.

This attribute of God as a being of feelings and emotions, is wrought into a theodicy by the author of the "Conflict of Ages." "If any thing," says he, "is prominent and uncontradicted in the Bible, it is the great doctrine that the entrance of evil has involved a period of long-continued suffering to God. Indeed it is the grand characteristic of the present system, that all the glorious results to which God is conducting the universal system have been purchased at the expense of his own longcontinued and patiently-endured sufferings. In this He gives to the universe the highest possible proof of pure, disinterested, self-sacrificing love." And afterwards, summing up the results of his theory, he says: "It alone leads to such an understanding of the doctrine of future eternal punishments as, connected with the previous suffering of God, shall properly throw the moral sympathies of all holy minds on the side of God, and put an end to that reäction which tends so fatally to destroy the true and indispensable power of that doctrine.” 1

It is not sufficient to reply to this, that the language is anthropopathic; for this is a scriptural mode of representation, as it is a necessity of all human thought and speech respecting God. Man can conceive of the infinite and the eternal only under limitations. He can not apprehend God as a personal Being, except as also finite. All human theology is of necessity anthropomorphic. "I speak as a man," said Paul, describing the feelings of God respecting the conduct of men. And such words as "repentance," "grief," "anger," and "jealousy," though they tell the wrong feelings as well as the right feelings of men, may, nevertheless, indicate divine truth that could not otherwise be told. And Dr. B. properly asks: "Does it exalt our ideas of God, and show the infinite difference between Him and a creature, to assert that He can put himself and all

1 Pp. 487, 490, 491. For statements which we hope to show are equivalent, see Charnock, Discourse on Practical Atheism: "The soul of man deserves an infinite punishment for despising an infinite good; "-- Lacoudre, Theodicea, Instt. Phil., II. 316: "Quid mirum igitur si portea implacabili odio Deus vice suâ contemptum amorem ulciscitur?"- Crousaz, Examen du Pyrrhonisme, Part III. c. 13, § 52.

2 See Gen. vi. 6; Hos. xi. 8; Nahum i. 2.

his plans fully into the mind of that creature? Or does it, on the other hand, most exalt God to say that He is so vast that no created mind can fully comprehend Him or his plans, and that it is beyond his power to destroy the infinite chasm that separates Creator and creature?" (p. 476.)

But is God indeed made infinitely unhappy by the sins of men? No one believes this, and for various reasons.

1. The moral perfection of God is not impaired by the exist ence of sin in the world. He is no party to its introduction; behind His abhorrence of it there was no secret purpose that it should exist; His relations to wrong are all right. If they were not, then might He suffer unmeasured sorrow. But His integrity is unsullied; the divine conscience is not concerned with human guilt; and thus far, at least, His blessedness is undisturbed.1

2

2. The limitations of human capacity are no cause of grief to God. We are told indeed of "the necessary liability of finite minds to unbelief and distrust of God, when exposed to the inevitable trials which pertain to an infinite system, such as befits God;" and of "finite capacities, and a consequent liability in the first generations of creatures to unbelief, distrust, and sin, involving a season of suffering in God." But in itself, this finite nature is God's work, with which IIe was well pleased, pronouncing it "very good." It is not the cause of evil, but only renders sin possible. It gives one of the proximate solutions of the old problem. In one view, it makes the mystery of sin more profound. For the conscious weakness of the creature is the weightiest reason for trust and confidence in the Creator. The theodicy last considered sometimes takes just this form, that the sin of creatures is infinitely heinous, because they, without having comprehended God, or weighed the Infinite in balances, have rejected and condemned Him as unworthy of their confidence. In fact, men are guilty, not because they understand so little of God, but because they know so much of Him. "If ye were blind, ye should have no sin; but now ye say, We

1 M. P. Squier, The Problem Solved, or Sin not of God, p. 55. 2 Conflict of Ages, p. 475.

see; therefore your sin remaineth." There is indeed the sin of ignorance or of passion, and of presumption, the pardonable and the unpardonable, whence the problem of the origin of evil is two-fold; to explain the transition from faith to distrust, and from distrust to malignity. But in either form, man's guilt cannot injure God; it is simply a rejection of his love. In so far as sin comes of weakness, God cannot be grieved, as the sage is not grieved with unlettered simplicity, though he may pity it. In so far as sin matures in hatred of God, it may, in the dramatic language of the Bible, provoke His indignation, or the smile that says He is infinitely beyond the reach of malice. His plans are not disconcerted, or his peace disturbed by the rebellion of mighty ones. "He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; the Lord shall have them in derision." If He deigns to notice them it is not his necessity but his choice.

3. God's love for all his creatures is free. It is a gift of His favor. The very pain and grief which it does occasion to God is disinterested; it is the earnestness, the fullness, the bounty of love. Disappointed, or unrequited, the divine love appears in the form of anger, like that of the parent toward the undutiful child. The very grief is an emotion of love, and cannot outlive it. The execution of divine justice is a painful thing to God, His "strange work," because "God is Love;" and in this Ile differs from heartless Nature and relentless Fate.

The divine grief, then, is a gift. But whatever is truly given, cannot afterwards be charged as a debt. And here is the radical and enormous error of this theodicy. It represents Infinite Goodness as not only ceasing to love the creature, but revoking the long-tried affection in the form of an account that can never through eternity be liquidated. What is generously given (and it must be generously or not at all) is GIVEN. But according to this theodicy, God's own love is only granted as a loan, at an infinite rate of interest, the payment of which will be demanded through endless ages if the original love be not reciprocated. This vindication of divine justice consists in a ruinous draft upon the divine grace. The proper character of

each is destroyed. The grace is no more grace, and the justice is no longer just.

The logical results of this theodicy are thus even fearful, as will further appear in subsequent discussions. We shall also meet with similar perversions of the idea of grace, and attempt, in the proper place, to give an explanation of them, as phenomena of man's fallen estate.

The Dualism of the theodicy is also manifest. While it offers to restore the gift of divine love, as a lost treasure to its owner, it nevertheless exposes the divine heart, as a tender nerve, an open wound, to the smiting of every careless hand. It puts infinite blessedness at the mercy of every trustless son of man, and makes infinite goodness the victim of millions of evil creatures. And the returned gift itself becomes a debt burdensome for collection by the eternal justice.

§ 4. SIN AS AGAINST THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

1

The theodicies already examined are based upon various attributes of the divine nature. But with respect to God as a Ruler it is said that "If temporal punishments are justified on the ground that they are necessary to meet the exigencies and uphold the interests of temporal governments, surely eternal punishments may be justified on the same ground in relation to an eternal government." And sin, "as tending to infinite anarchy and mischief, must be infinite. All that is meant by calling sin infinite evil is, that it is deserving of endless punishment; and this can never be fairly objected to as an absurdity. If there be no absurdity in the immortality of a sinner's existence, there is none in supposing him to deserve a punishment, be it in what degree it may, that shall run commensurate with it."2

1 Bledsoe, Theodicy, p. 207.

2 A. Fuller, Veneration for the Scriptures. Compare various representations of sin as Treason; - Dodwell, Letter on the Soul, Pref. § 5: "This perpetuating of human nature for punishment could not be justly inflicted till a publication of God's pleasure, that he judged the Devil a public enemy, and that all who did not join the body instituted by himself, should be taken for associates of the Devil; "- Lacoudre, Theodicea, p. 315: "Sapiens legislator sufficientem debet