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with precision how much our susceptibility of suffering has been augmented as a punitive result of sin. That such a consequence would result, to some extent, from the introduction of moral evil, is as reasonable to suppose as it is to suppose that Jehovah governs the world in righteousness, and that intelligent beings are accountable for their conduct. But whatever extent of physical suffering may be attributable to punitive justice, the prevalence of clemency and love in tempering those sufferings, and giving them a salutary tendency, is very conspicuous; for pains and sufferings are seldom experienced, except when some physical or moral law is either trangressed or neglected; and even then, the suffering is directed to a wise and beneficent end. A few examples will illustrate this truth.

Excess in eating, in drinking, or in any other indulgence, is a transgression of the law of temperance and self-government, and a variety of physical evil results therefrom. Gluttony produces plethora and gout; drunkenness generates dropsy, delirium tremens, and a host of miseries; luxury produces effeminacy, and often brings on destitution and want.

Injustice, fraud, and oppression are transgressions of the law of love to our neighbour; and all the cruelties, wars, and murders which afflict mankind spring from the indulgence of these depraved principles.

Lasciviousness is a violation of the law of continence and chastity. Debility, consumption, loathsome diseases, premature death, and hereditary infirmities and pollutions stream forth from this degrading vice.

Indolence. The law of activity and industry is legibly inscribed upon man's nature, and enforced by his own interests, and by the instinctive habits of the animal creation. Idleness is a neglect of this law, and its consequences are squalid wretchedness and want, which, in their turn, produce other vices, and these vices, again, give birth to other miseries. -Wm. Cooke, D.D.

[10865] The connection of pains with the violation of moral and physical law is as distinguished by clemency as by justice, for they are intended to subserve a benevolent end. . . Thus the nausea, the headache, and sickness which follow the first drunken surfeit are gentle warnings to avoid that course in the future; and the debility, the delirium tremens, and the dropsy, which attend a more advanced stage of intemperance, are still louder tones of admonition to escape from the disgusting vice. Thus the squalid wretchedness, disease, and woe resulting from idleness, filthiness, and prodigality, are rebukes and admonitions to their miserable victims. The sufferings of the obscene libertine utter a loud and intelligible warning, calling upon him to abandon his depraved course. Indeed, all the physical evils springing from sin are so many merciful admonitions to repentance and reformation. They are so many appeals to man's self-love, even when he is lost

[INTRODUCTORY.

to every higher principle, declaiming against his vicious habits, and summoning him to the path of virtue and obedience, lest iniquity be his utter ruin. And generally, this appeal of Nature, though gentle at first, becomes louder and louder as the danger becomes more imminent-the tones of admonition, uttered by suffering and woe consequent on vice, assume a more startling and terrific cry as the rebel steps nearer the precipice of irrecoverable ruin. We ask, What principle could dictate this economy? The sinner's recovery to virtue and happiness is obviously the object, and that surely is the object of clemency and love. Punitive justice may, indeed, be manifested, but evidently in harmonious connection with tender compassion with unbounded goodness and love.-Ibid.

(4) Physical evils not arising from vicious habits.

[10866] It is alleged that there are sufferings not immediately arising from sin or moral evil, so far as their causes can be traced. We very much question, however, whether such pains and sufferings ought to be placed in the category of evils. Thus, if by accident a man or any other animal receive a bruise, a burn, or a cut, pain is instantly felt. But though in such cases pain is indeed experienced, and is unavoidable with our present constitution, the pain we regard as no evil, but a benefit, and an indication of a benevolent purpose. It is obvious the suffering, in such cases, is not punitive in its object, nor permitted for any object but a beneficial one-namely, the preservation of the creature. If no pain were felt from a bruise, we should have no warning to escape from danger; if no smart were felt from fire, we might be fatally burned before we were conscious of having received injury; if no pain were experienced from a wound, a limb might be amputated or a vital part be pierced before we were aware of any harm being done. The connection, therefore, of pain with any injury done to the body is a benevolent provision made for our preservation. The goodness of God is further manifested in having given the greatest sensibility to the outer surface of the body by his having distributed an immense number of nerves, like network, immediately under the skin, which, as so many watchful sentinels, in a moment give the alarm when danger is near, and our instinctive aversion to pain prompts us at the same moment to escape.—Ibid.

(5) The inequalities of man's condition.

[10867] It is not obligatory upon benevolence to render all men equal-to place all men on the same perfect level. If a certain rich man should provide for the necessities of a hundred poor families, we should justly deem him benevolent; and if the same rich man should also elevate another family above poverty to a degree of affluence, we should not regard him the less benevolent on that account. The second act of goodness to one family does not negative the

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first act of charity to a hundred. Thus it is with God's gifts, and the disposition from which they flow. He gives nothing but what is absolutely His own, and the fact that He may bestow more on some does not neutralize the goodness that every day provides for millions.

It is manifestly the design of a gracious God that all men should have food to eat and raiment to wear, and He amply provides for these; and if they be not realized by some, the cause is to be ascribed, not to God, but to man -either to the conduct of the sufferer himself, or to injustice or oppression, or to a want of charity in others. If there be any cases of want not referable to these causes, they are few indeed, and if the true causes were known, they would be found to involve no impeachment of the Divine goodness. The unceasing bounty of God's providence for man meets every charge against His kindness and love.

Perfect equality among men is a Utopian idea, which can never be realized. If all men were now placed in equal circumstances, their diversity of talent, habit, and character would soon produce an inequality as wide as that which exists in society. Men are to a great extent the architects of their own condition. Moreover, the mutual dependence of man upon man, of talent upon capital, and of labour upon both, and of both upon labour, renders it necessary to the well-being of every part of the social structure that there should be variety in the condition of mankind; just as the various members of the human body are mutually dependent one upon another, and their various positions and offices subserve the good of the whole, so that the eye cannot say to the hand, 66 I have no need of thee," nor the hand to the eye, "I have no need of thee." It is even so in the social fabric-the rich subserve the welfare of the poor, and the poor promote the interests of the rich, and all in their appropriate sphere minister to the good of the body politic. Talent, capital, and labour are mutually dependent and subservient; one cannot do without the other, and it is the design of Providence that every man should be honourable, useful, and happy in his own sphere.

Riches are among the least gifts that Providence has to bestow, and all the higher endowments and blessings of human nature are imparted to the poor as well as the rich, and often with more abundant bounty.-Ibid.

(6) Death of the human race.

[10868] The fact that all visible creatures are doomed to die has often been adduced as an argument against the benevolent character of God. It is confessedly a fact invested with a sombre aspect, and well fitted to engender grave reflections. Indeed, viewed personally, it is repugnant to our selfish instincts and desires; but that it is repugnant to the Divine benevolence, we are not prepared to admit. Seeing that death is the effect of sin, it impugns neither the justice nor the benevolence of God. In the economy of human governments it is not deemed

[INTRODUCTORY.

unjust to inflict the penalty of death for the violation of human laws. Nor does the infliction of death argue a want of benevolence in the sovereign who administers our laws. It is rather the dictate of benevolence toward the living and the obedient that the murderer is removed by the extreme penalty of the law. Moreover, as God gave life, he had a right to take it away if he pleased, even if man had never sinned. The mere cessation of life does not neutralize the goodness displayed in giving life for a time, and in providing for its enjoyments while it is permitted to continue. But when, in taking away that life from one, it is under an economy which affords scope for imparting life to thousands and millions of others through successive generations, there is plainly a manifestation of unbounded goodness, even in connection with the infliction of a dreadful penalty. To each sinner death is a punishment, because it removes him from earth under circumstances of pain and degradation; but, after all, Divine goodness is not defeated in its purpose, for death itself creates room and scope for multiplying existence to countless millions. Thus death merely shortens the period of God's goodness in relation to the physical existence of each generation, but at the same time it affords scope for extending the blessing of life to others, who, in their turn, share the same tokens of Divine clemency and regard. Without death man must have been either removed from this sphere while alive, or his species must have ceased to be multiplied. Sin has deprived him of the privilege of being removed by translation. He is taken away by death; this is punitive; but seeing this punitive removal affords room for multiplying existence to countless myriads, and seeing Divine goodness immediately replenishes the vacancy by new generations of the same race, on whom God continues successively to heap the proofs of his regard, we see in this economy multiplying evidences that God is good.-Ibid.

(7) The existence of moral evil.

...

[10869] Moral evil is sin, and sin is a voluntary transgression. Therefore moral evil is not the act of God. . . . . To have prevented the existence of sin by an absolute determination would have prevented the freedom of all intelligent beings. As a consequence this would have prevented the existence of moral excellence, and converted intelligent beings into mere machines. . . . In such a state of things God could have had no moral empire, no mental obedience, no intellectual servants and subjects, nor could the creature have realized any moral development or excellency: the mind would have been as passive as matter, and God the only agent and operator in the universe of being. The exclusion of free agency would thus exclude from Jehovah's empire all moral government, and the development of all those moral excellences which reflect so much real dignity, worth, and happiness on the creature. If, therefore, God must have a moral empire at all, if moral

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obedience must be rendered to him, and moral excellence with its attendant glories and enjoyments must be developed, intelligent beings must be free; and if free, they must be liable to sin. It is true they need not sin; their freedom excludes all necessity of departing from the right way; but the possibility of their doing so is certainly involved in a capacity for obedience and moral excellence. Such a constitution, therefore, as renders the intelligent being free, with all its attendant possibilities, is undoubtedly wise and good, and is every way worthy of God.-Ibid.

(8) Human susceptibility to mental anguish. [10870] Our susceptibility of remorse and mental anguish does not impugn the benevolence of the Divine Being. The very existence of remorse and mental anguish implies the existence of sin, and flows from it as its punishment. Unless, therefore, this impugns the Divine justice, it is in perfect harmony with benevolence. That it is not unjust for the sinner to suffer these emotions, will be admitted; and if so, the capacity for such emotions involves no injustice. If intelligent beings were without such a capacity, they would have no moral sense, no conscience, and be incompetent for moral obedience.

So far from our moral sense, or, in other words, our susceptibility of remorse, impugning the Divine goodness, we are prepared to say that such a constitution affords an additional proof of that goodness. In considering this subject, however, it must be carefully observed that a constitutional susceptibility is widely different from a constitutional propensity. A propensity is a disposition actively operating and stimulating the creature to a certain course. Such are all instinctive propensities and passions; but a susceptibility implies a passive. state-a mere liability to be subject to certain influences. Now, it is remarkable that such is the constitution of our nature, that, while we are stimulated to enjoyments, we are merely susceptible of pains, whether of body or mind. We have instincts and propensities actively prompting to what yields gratification and delight, but are merely liable to sufferings; we are never instinctively prompted to them. Thus we are merely susceptible of remorse and mental anguish. These emotions do not intrinsically or instinctively arise in our minds, like the salient and spontaneous springs of joyous emotions. They are never experienced but when excited by some course of moral action. In a well-ordered mind they are never excited by good actions, nor are they excited by actions that are indifferent in their character. They are never excited by seeking happiness in any lawful object, or within a lawful extent. In fact, they are never excited except by the exercise of bad affections and the practice of bad actions. Thus, remorse and mental anguish are only the associates of vicious conduct —the attendants and the scourge of moral evil.

[INTRODUCTORY.

Such a constitution, therefore, instead of impugning the Divine goodness, affords an additional demonstration of it. For why are remorse and mental anguish merely susceptibilities and not active instincts? Because God is good, and is averse to our suffering unnecessarily. Why are these painful emotions not excited by actions good in their nature or indifferent in their quality? Because God is good, and delights in our virtue and happiness.-Ibid.

(9) Hereditary depravity and future punish

ment.

[10871] It is true that mankind are involuntarily the subjects of inherent depravity; but it is equally true that mankind are involuntarily placed in a state of grace and salvation (Rom. v. 15). The remedy is co-extensive with the disease. As to the final destiny of those who die in infancy, we are assured of their salvation through Him who in the days of his earthly sojourn said, "Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of God." And as to the final condition of those who have never heard the gospel, we must leave it to the righteous Governor of all, assured that their final state will harmonize with both the justice and the mercy of God. The Judge of all the earth will do right, and his decision, when made known, will command the assent of all holy intelligences. It is, indeed, a solemn truth that many human beings will perish eternally; but it will be the result of their wilful rebellion, their obstinate resistance of Divine mercy and goodness. The future punishment of the wicked may be regarded as a necessary result of a sinful existence. Sin carries with it its own punishment to a certain extent, while men exist on earth; and if their existence be perpetuated in the world to come, that existence must be miserable. For the society and employments of heaven there is neither relish nor sympathy in their moral nature; and severed from God and heaven they must be, even if they had their choice. Heaven itself would be a hell to the wicked. The elements of misery are essentially and inseparably connected with sin. Divine mercy has provided a remedy, and if men reject that remedy, their doom is the result of their own conduct, and impugns not either the benevolence or the justice of God.—Ibid.

XI. IMPORT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KNOWLEDGE of God.

[10872] It is so vast that it will take nothing short of eternity to comprehend it-to know God. Let us occupy ourselves not so much with the knowledge as with the God. It is not the process of knowing, but the glorious One whom we seek to know, and whom it is His gracious purpose that we should know. In one sense it is impossible to know God here fully. In that sense we may say that we are agnostics, for we cannot know Him fully. But, blessed be His

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name, He is able to reveal to us, as we are able to bear it, just those glorious features of His person and character that we, each one of us, stand in need of. But where must we be to know Him? I remember many years ago a learned Jewish rabbi, still in London, with whom I then had a good deal to do, telling me one morning, as he came to the class, that he had been present the night before at a very solemn scene it was the deathbed of a very aged Israelite, a man of wealth, and a man with a large family of sons, all of them old men almost themselves, standing around his bed. The rabbi said he could picture to himself the departing Jacob with his sons around him. He told these sons of a strange dream he had had the night before, which had filled him with anxiety and made him very sad. He dreamt that he was about to enter upon the unknown world, and that one of the heavenly ones came to him, holding out a garment, with which he must invest himself ere he could enter; but he tried in vain to put it on. He could not undo the fas

tenings with which it was fastened; and he saw that on each successive fastening there was an inscription. On the first was written, "Know God;" on the next was written, “Who can know God?" on the third was written, "None but God can know God." But he could not unfasten it. No, poor Hebrew, he had not the key of David. He did not know God in the face of Jesus Christ. His sons were unable to help him; and thus he passed away. The rabbi said truly, for he was unable himself to unlock the fastening, "It was a sad scene." "None but God can know God." You must be in God before you can know Him. Therefore, He makes us partakers of the Divine nature; gives us His holy Spirit that we may know Him.— S. A. Blackwood.

XII. NATURE AND CONDITIONS OF ITS ATTAINMENT.

[10873] It is, of course, understood and admitted that there can be no absolute knowledge of God. So far our agnostic friends are right; but though this is true it is not new. In one of the oldest books of the Bible we have it quite fairly expressed in the passage, " Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?" But is not the same thing true on a small scale in regard to our fellow-men? This is true, even though your friend may be below you in spiritual attainments, and it is still more so if he be above you. Our knowledge of one another is in every case limited by two things-capability of expression on the one hand, power of comprehension on the other. There may be much in the soul of my friend that is never expressed-in look or in attitude, or in word or in deed. There may be much in him that cannot be expressed; there may be much that he would not express, though he could, or could not though he would. On the other hand, there may be very much of what is expressed that I cannot understand or catch.

[INTRODUCTORY.

To illustrate this further, for it seems to me of great importance in reference to the subject of the knowledge of God, let us consider what means we have of gaining some knowledge of such a one as Michael Angelo. There are fragments of revelation of the spirit of Michael Angelo scattered far and wide in our art galleries and elsewhere in casts and copies, so that almost everybody has an opportunity of knowing something about him. Then there are poems of his which give a further revelation of the man to those who have an opportunity of reading them. These are all expressions of his spirit, utterances of the man, and we might, without abuse of language, put them all together, and call them the word of Michael Angelo. But it is quite evident that the extent of my knowledge of him will depend not only on my opportunities of seeing these works of his, and studying them, but also, and even more, upon the degree with which my spirit is kindred with his; the degree in which I can understand that which is expressed in his works.

Then suppose that from the study of his works we have learned something of the reality which lurks behind the great name of Michael Angelo, and we wish to know still more about him, what do we do? We take up his life and read it. How much more knowledge have we of the great artist now? This, again, will depend first upon what his biographer has been able to catch and set down of that which he has uttered and expressed; and, secondly, what I am able to take in of that which is set down. Or, again, if I look at his portrait, the additional knowledge that I have from looking on his portrait will depend in the first place upon what the painter has been able to set down on the canvas, and secondly, what I am able to see of that which is set down. Still further, the case would not be altered in principle even if we could have lived in his time, and lived with him, so as to see him every day, and be in his company almost constantly. We should in that case have a far better opportunity of knowing him, but even then our knowledge of him would be subject to the same twofold limitation; first it would depend upon how much of the spirit within him ever uttered itself in his face, or gesture, or word, or deed, and second upon our ability to comprehend and catch that which was thus uttered.

The point of view we have now reached is a favourable one for seeing of what immeasurable importance this second condition is; for is it not manifest that it would be quite possible for the artist's valet de chambre, for his own personal attendant, to know less of him, less of the true Michael Angelo, than a man of kindred soul, who had never seen him, and had not even read his life, and had paid just one visit to the Sistine Chapel?—Dr. Munro Gibson.

[10874] Our knowledge of our fellow-men, even under the most favourable circumstances, must be partial and inadequate. Why, then, should we expect to have full and adequate