In the ranks of the bitter and determined opponents of all they ever professed and contended for-doomed, unless they speedily separate from faithless allies, to loss of caste and endless disgrace.

And what is to become of that mighty mass who were governed without reason and reflection, by the mere force of pecuniary pressure, to seek change-in whose ears, change, change, change, was incessantly rung? Have prices improved? Have times become better? or will they, in consequence of these measures? Far otherwise. The agitation, which they have already caused,-which they must continue to cause, and the powerful disturbing influence which they must have, if adopted, on the currency and the money market, are the most deadly foes to the revival of business. They have already done much to depress trade, and destroy confidence; and should they unfortunately succeed, will do more to prevent the return of prosperous times, than any other step that could be taken. The end will be, that these, like every other corps of recruits that swell the ranks of the victors,-except the two exclusive favorites here, office seekers and money-mongers,-are doomed to sad disappointment.

SPEECH

On the Distribution Bill, delivered in the Senate, August 24, 1841.

MR. CALHOUN said, if this bill should become a law, it would make a wider breach in the constitution, and be followed by changes more disastrous, than any one measure which has ever been adopted. It would, in its violation of the consti

tution, go far beyond the general welfare doctrine of former days, which stretched the power of the Government as far as it was then supposed was possible by construction, however bold. But, as wide as were the limits which this doctrine assigned to the powers of the Government, it admitted, by implication, that there were limits: while this bill, as I shall show, rests on principles which, if admitted, would supersede all limits.

According to the general welfare doctrine, Congress had power to raise money, and appropriate it to all objects which it might deem calculated to promote the general welfare,— that is, the prosperity of the States, regarded in their aggregate character as members of the Union; or, to express it more briefly, and in language once so common,-to national objects; thus excluding, by necessary implication, all that were not national, as falling within the spheres of the separate States. As wide as are these limits, they are too narrow for this bill. It takes in what is excluded under the general welfare doctrine, and assumes for Congress the right to raise money, to give by distribution to the States; that is, to be applied by them to those very local State objects to which that doctrine, by necessary implication, denied that Congress had a right to appropriate money; thus superseding all the limits of the constitution,-as far, at least, as the money-power is concerned. The advocates of this extraor dinary doctrine have, indeed, attempted to restrict it, in their argument, to revenue derived from the public lands; but facts speak louder than words. To test the sincerity of their argument, amendments after amendments have been offered to limit the operation of the bill exclusively to the revenue derived from this source, but which, as often as offered, have been steadily voted down by their united voices. But I take higher ground. The aid of these test votes, strong as they are, is not needed to make good the assumption that Congress has the right to lay and collect

taxes for the separate use of the States. The circumstances under which it is attempted to force this bill through, speak of themselves a language too distinct to be misunderstood.

The treasury is exhausted; the revenues from the public lands cannot be spared; they are needed for the pressing and necessary wants of the Government. For every dollar withdrawn from the treasury, and given to the States, a dollar must be raised from the customs to supply its place this is admitted. Now, I put it to the advocates of this bill,Is there, can there be, any real difference, either in principle or effect, between raising money from customs, to be divided among the States, and raising the same amount from them to supply the place of an equal sum withdrawn from the treasury to be divided among the States ? If there be a difference, my faculties are not acute enough to perceive it ; and I would thank any one who can point it out. But, if this difficulty could be surmounted, it would avail nothing, unless another, not inferior, can also be got over. The land from which the revenue, proposed to be divided, is derived, was purchased (with the exception of a small portion, comparatively, lying between the Ohio and Mississippi rivers) out of the common funds of the Union, and with money derived, for the most part, from customs. I do not exempt the portion acquired from Georgia, which was purchased at its full value, and cost as much, in proportion, as Florida purchased from Spain, or Louisiana from France.

If money cannot be raised from customs or other sources for distribution, I ask, how can money derived from the sales of land purchased with money raised from the customs or other sources, be distributed among the States? If the money could not be distributed before it was vested in land, on what principle can it be when it is converted back again into money by the sales of the land? If, prior to the purchase, it was subject, in making appropriations, to the limits prescribed by the constitution, how can it, after having been

converted back again into money by the sale of the land, be freed from those limits? By what art, what political alchemy, could the mere passage of the money through the lands free it from the constitutional shackles to which it was previously subject ?

But if this difficulty also could be surmounted, there is another, not less formidable and more comprehensive, still to be overcome. If the lands belong to the States at all, they must belong to them in one of two capacities,-either in their federative character, as members of a common union; or in their separate character, as distinct and independent communities. If the former, this Government, which was created as a common agent to carry into effect the objects for which the Union was formed, holds its authority over the lands, as it does all its other delegated powers, as a trustee for the States in their federal character, for those objects only, and for no other purpose whatever; and can, of course, under the grant of the constitution "to dispose of the territory or other property belonging to the United States," dispose of the lands only under its trust powers, and in execution of the objects for which they were granted by the constitution. When, then, the lands, or other property of the United States, are disposed of by sale—that is, converted into money—the trust, with all its limitations, attaches as fully to the money, as it did to the lands or property of which it is the proceeds. Nor would the Government have any more right to divide the land or the money among the States, that is, to surrender it to them,-than it would have to surrender any other subject of its delegated powers. If it may surrender either to the States, it may also surrender the power of declaring war, laying duties, or coining money. They are all delegated by the same parties, held by the same instrument, and in trust, for the execution of the same objects. The assumption of such a right is neither more nor less than the assumption of a right paramount to the consti

tution itself the right on the part of the Government to destroy the instrument, and dissolve the Union from which it derives its existence. To such monstrous results must the principle on which this bill rests lead, on the supposition that the lands (that is, the territory) belong to the United States, as is expressly declared by the constitution.

But the difficulty would not be less if they should be considered as belonging to the States, in their individual and separate character. So considered, what right can this Government possibly have over them? It is the agent, or trustee of the United States,-the States as members of a common union, and not of the States individually, each of which has a separate government of its own to represent it in that capacity. For this Government to assume to represent them in both capacities, would be to assume all power-to centralize the whole system in itself. But, admitting this bold assumption; on what principle of right or justice, if the lands really belong to the States-or, which is the same thing, if the revenue from the lands belong to them-can this Government impose the various limitations prescribed in the bill? What right has it, on this supposition, to appropriate funds belonging to the States separately, to the use of the Union, in the event of war, or in case the price of the lands should be increased above a dollar and a quarter an acre; or any article of the tariff be raised above 20 per centum ad valorem ?

He

Such, and so overwhelming are the constitutional difficulties which beset this measure. No one who can overcome them-who can bring himself to vote for this bill-need trouble himself about constitutional scruples hereafter. may swallow, without hesitation, bank, tariff, and every other unconstitutional measure which has been adopted or proposed. Yes; it would be easier to make a plausible argument for the constitutionality of the most monstrous of the measures proposed by the abolitionists-for abolition itself-than

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