take place, from the struggle on the part of those who are benefited by the operation of an unequal system of legislation to retain their advantage, and on the part of the oppressed to resist it. When this state of things occurs, it is neither more nor less than a state of hostility between the oppressor and oppressed-war waged not by armies, but by laws; acts and sections of acts are sent by the stronger party on a plundering expedition, instead of divisions and brigades, which often return more richly laden with spoils than a plundering expedition after the most successful foray.

That such must be the effect of the system of measures now attempted to be forced on the Government by the perversion of its interior powers, I appeal to the voice of experience in aid of the dictates of reason. I go back to the beginning of the Government, and ask what, at its outset, but this very system of measures, caused the great struggle which continued down to 1828, when the system reached its full growth in the tariff of that year? And what, from that period to the termination of the late election which brought the present party into power, has disturbed the harmony and tranquillity of the country, deranged its currency, interrupted its business, endangered its liberty and institutions, but a struggle on one side to overthrow, and on the other to uphold the system? In that struggle it fell prostrate and what now agitates the country?-what causes this extraordinary session, with all its excitement, but the struggle on the part of those in power to restore the system; to incorporate a bank; to re-enact a protective tariff; to distribute the revenue from the lands; to originate another debt, and renew the system of wasteful expenditures; and the resistance on the part of the opposition to prevent it? Gentlemen talk of settling these questions; they deceive themselves. They cry Peace! peace! when there is no peace. There never can be peace till they are abandoned,

or till our free and popular institutions are succeeded by the calm of despotism; and that not till the spirit of our patriotic and immortal ancestors, who achieved our independence and established our glorious political system, shall become extinct, and their descendants a base and sordid rabble. Till then, or till our opponents shall be expelled from power, and their hope of restoring and maintaining their system of measures is blasted, the struggle will be continued,—the tranquillity and harmony of the country be disturbed, and the strength and resources of the Government be wasted within, and its duties neglected without.

But, of all the measures which constitute this pernicious system, there is not one more subversive of the objects for which the Government was instituted,-none more destructive of harmony within, and security without, than that now under consideration. Its direct tendency is to universal discord and distraction; to array the new States against the old, the non-indebted against the indebted, the staple against the manufacturing; one class against another; and, finally, the people against the Government. But I pass these. My object is not to trace political consequences; but to discuss the financial bearings of this measure, regarded in reference to what ought to be the policy of the Government; which I trust I have satisfactorily shown ought to be, to turn its attention, energy, and resources, from within to without,to its appropriate and exclusive sphere, that of guarding against danger from abroad; giving free scope and protection to our commerce and navigation, and that elevated standing to the country, to which it is so fairly entitled in the family of nations. It becomes necessary to repeat, preparatory to what I propose, that the object of this measure is to withdraw the revenue from the public lands from the treasury of the Union, to be divided among the States; that the probable annual amount that would be so withdrawn, would average, during the next ten years, not less

than $5,000,000; and that, to make up the deficit, an equal sum must be laid on the imports. Such is the measure, regarded as one of finance; and the question is, Would it be just, wise, or expedient, considered in its bearings on what ought to be the policy of the Government?

The measure, on its face, is but a surrender of one of the two sources of revenue to the States,-to be divided among them in proportion to their joint delegation in the two Houses of Congress, and to impose a burden to an equal amount on the imports; that is, on the foreign commerce of the country. In every view I can take, it is preposterous, unequal, and unjust. Regarded in its most favorable aspectthat is, on the supposition that the people of each State would pay back to the treasury of the Union, through the tax on the imports, in order to make up the deficit, a sum equal to that received by the State as its distributive share; and that each individual would receive, of that sum, an amount equal to what he paid of the taxes; what would that be, but the folly of giving with one hand and taking back with the other? It would, in fact, be worse. The labour of giving and taking back must be paid for, which, in this case, would be one not a little expensive and troubleThe expense of collecting the duties on imports is known to be about 10 per cent.; to which must be added the expense and trouble of distribution, with the loss of the use of the money while the process is going on, which may be fairly estimated at 2 per cent. additional; making in all, 12 per cent. for the cost of the process. It follows that the people of the State, in order to return back to the treasury of the Union an amount equal to the sum received. by distribution, would have each to pay, by the supposition, 12 per cent. more of taxes than their share of the sum distributed. This sum (equal to $600,000 on $5,000,000) would go to the collectors of the taxes-the custom-house officers-for their share of the public spoils.

some.

But it is still worse.

as foolish and absurd.

It is unequal and unjust, as well The case supposed would not be the real state of the facts. It would be scarcely possible so to arrange a system of taxes, under which the people of each State would pay back a sum just equal to that received; much less that the taxes should fall on each individual in the State in the same proportion that he would receive of the sum distributed to the State. But, if this were possible, it is certain that no system of taxes on importsespecially the bill sent from the other House-can make such equalization. So far otherwise, I hazard nothing in asserting that the staple States would pay into the treasury, under its operation, three times as much as they would receive, on an average, by the distribution,-and some of them. far more while to the manufacturing States, if we are to judge from their zeal in favor of the bill, the duties it proposes to impose would be bounties, not taxes. If judged by their acts, both measures-the distribution and the duties -would favor their pockets. They would be gainers, let who might be losers, in this financial game.

But be the inequality greater or less than my estimate, what could be more unjust than to distribute a common fund, in a certain proportion, among the States, and to compel the people of the States to make up the deficit in a different proportion; so that some shall pay more, and others less, than what they respectively received? What is it but a cunningly devised scheme to take from one State, and to give to another-to replenish the treasury of some of the States from the pockets of the people of the others; in reality, to make them support the Governments, and pay the debts of other States as well as their own? Such must be the necessary result, as between the States which may pay more than they receive, and those which may receive more than they pay. The injustice and inequality will increase or decrease, just in proportion to the respective ex

cess or deficit between receipts and payments, under this flagitious contrivance for plunder.

But I have not yet reached the extent of this profligate and wicked scheme. As unequal and unjust as it would be between State and State, it is still more so regarded in its operation between individuals. It is between them its true character and hideous features fully disclose themselves. The money to be distributed would not go to the people, but to the legislatures of the States; while that to be paid in taxes to make up the deficiency, would be taken from them individually. A small portion only of that which would go to the legislatures would ever reach the pockets of the people. It would be under the control and management of the dominant party in the legislature, and they under the control and management of the leaders of the party. That it would be administered to the advantage of themselves, and their friends and partisans, and that they would profit more by their use and management of an irresponsible fund, taken from nobody knows who, than they would lose as payers of the taxes to supply its place, will not be doubted by any one who knows how such things are managed. What would be the result? The whole of the revenue from the immense public domain would, if this wicked measure should become the settled policy, go to the profit and aggrandizement of the leaders, for the time, of the dominant party in the twenty-six State Legislatures, and their partisans and supporters; that is, to the most influential, if not the most wealthy, clique for the time in the respective States; while the deficiency would be supplied from the pockets of the great mass of the community, by taxes on tea, coffee, salt, iron, coarse woollens, and, for the most part, other necessaries of life. And what is this but taking from the many and giving to the few,-taking from those who look to their own means and industry for the support of themselves and families, and giving to those who look to