step which would have involved the two countries in war. Indeed, I feel a strong conviction, that if the Senate had been left free to decide on the question, not one-third of the body would have been found in favor of war. As it was, a large majority felt themselves compelled, as they believed, to vote for the bill recognizing the existence of war, in order to raise the supplies of men and money necessary to rescue the army under General Taylor, on the Del Norte, from the dangers to which it was exposed.

But to bring the matter home, the Senator himself is in no small degree responsible for the war. I intend no attack on him. I have made none, and will make none. The relations between him and myself, personal and political, have long been such, that self-respect and a sense of propriety forbid my alluding to him, except when unavoidable, and then in a courteous manner; and I now allude to his course only because it is necessary to explain mine, and the motives which governed me on the occasion.

The Senate will remember, that when the President's message was received, recommending Congress to recognize that war existed between us and Mexico, and to raise the necessary means for its prosecution, the Senator from Mississippi, whose seat is immediately on my right, but who is now absent, moved to print twenty thousand copies of the message and documents. The scene was a solemn one, and what occurred will long be remembered by the members of the body. I rose and objected; and said that we were on the eve of great events, and expressed my hope that we would proceed calmly and deliberately. I suggested that the printing of so large a number of copies would be construed into an endorsement of the message; adding that I was unwilling either to endorse or condemn, until the message and documents were printed, and carefully perused by me. A debate ensued, and the Journals of the Senate will show what took place. The Senator from Missouri was the individual

who made the discreet and appropriate motion to separate the recommendations of the message into two parts--and refer that which related to recognizing the existence of war to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and that which related to the raising of men and supplies, to the Committee on Military Affairs, of which he was chairman. The latter, it was expected, would report immediate measures for the support of General Taylor. I seconded the motion, and it was carried by a large majority. I saw in it that which gave me hope that I should be able to effect the object I had in view, and which I will hereafter explain.

The House of Representatives acted with much more precipitancy; it passed a bill the very day the message was received, recognizing the existence of the war, and providing means for its prosecution. It was late in the evening when it passed the House, and I am of the impression that the Senate had adjourned; and it was not reported to it that day; but be this as it may, the next day the Senator, as Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, reported the bill to the Senate as it came from the House, with both provisions in it; directly contrary to the order of the Senate, made on his own motion, to refer the part of the message relating to the recognition of war to the Committee on Foreign Relations. To this, and the fact that a caucus had been held of the party which agreed to sustain the report, may be traced the precipitate (to use no stronger word) action of the Senate, and the recognition of the war. It emphatically made the war. Had the order of the Senate been respected-had the Senator from Missouri, in conformity with it, and as he was in duty bound to do, moved to strike out all that related to the recognition of the war, and referred it to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and confined his report to raising the necessary means of rescuing General Taylor and his army from the pressing dangers which surrounded them, the possibility is, that the war might have been averted, and the two countries

at this day have been at peace. Sir, I say possibility-because, even then, after the skirmishes between our forces had occurred, I did not despair of escaping war, if sufficient firmness and prudence were used on the part of this body. I had deeply reflected on the subject in advance, and great as were the difficulties, I still saw a gleam of hope.

The intelligence of the skirmishes on the Rio Grande was received here on Saturday. I at once saw the danger, and turned my mind to the subject. I anticipated that a message would be received on Monday from the Executive, and formed not an incorrect opinion as to what would be its character. Casting my eyes over the whole, with a view to avoiding war, I came to the conclusion in my own mind, what course was best to effect that object. Next morning I communicated the conclusions to which I had come to two of my colleagues, who were boarding with me--I said to them, There is but one way of escaping war, but I am not certain it will be successful. It will, however, place us in the chapter of accidents, and thereby afford a possibility of escape. I was asked what it was--and replied that it depended on separating the question of war from that which relates to the rescuing of General Taylor and his forces. Let the means necessary for the latter be immediately granted--but let time be taken for due and deliberate consideration of the former. Had this been done, it was my intention to throw my whole weight against the immediate declaration or recognition of war; treating what had occurred as mere hostilities between the two armies, without authority of the Congress-the warmaking power of either Government.

We had not a particle of evidence then, or even now, that the republic of Mexico had made war against the United States. Indeed, we are in the anomalous condition of two countries being at war, during and almost an entire year, without either having declared it,-although the constitutions of both expressly provide that Congress shall declare war.

Instead, then, of recognizing war, I would have taken the very opposite ground-that what had occurred was mere hostilities, and not war, as the Congress of Mexico had not authorized it.

To provide for the contingency of the Congress of Mexico approving what had occurred, and refusing to treat for the settlement of our difficulties, I would have advised the raising of ample provisional force, to be collected at some convenient and healthy point, where they could be trained during the interval, and be fully prepared to meet such decision; but even in case such decision should be made, instead of advising a formal declaration of war, I would have advised as General Jackson recommended-giving authority to the Executive to make reprisals for seizing and holding such portion of the Mexican territory as would afford ample indemnity, to be retained until the differences between the two countries were settled; but, in the mean time, would have taken measures to repel the attacks made upon our army by the Mexican forces, and to drive them far beyond the limits of our borders.

Had this course been pursued, we should have had all the glory and reputation of the two brilliant victories at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, without being involved in the present indefinite and expensive war waged against Mexico. We would also have had the advantage of the chapter of accidents-of Mexico disavowing hostilities, and indemnifying our citizens-either from a sense of weakness or of returning justice on her part,-or from the influence of other powers, which have an interest in preserving peace, from their commercial or other relations with her, and thereby have saved a resort to arms on our part. But, at all events, failing in that, we would have avoided, by resorting to reprisals, the enormous expenses, the sacrifice of men and money, and the disasters to which the war has exposed us.

I have now met, and, I trust, successfully repelled, all the charges made by the Senator from Missouri, except those relating to the Missouri compromise, and the abolition question of that period, for which I am in no ways responsible. I was not then in Congress. I filled the office of Secretary of War at that time, and had no agency or control over it. His charges are as light as air-old and stale, without even plausibility, and I have not the slightest fear of their having any weight, either here or in the community.

REMARKS

Made at the Meeting of the Citizens of Charleston, Tuesday evening, March 9th, 1847.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: In complying with the request of your committee to address you on the general state of our affairs, in connection with the Federal Government, I shall restrict my remarks to the subject of our peculiar domestic institution, not only because it is by far the most important to us, but also because I have fully expressed my views, in my place in the Senate, on the only other important subject -the Mexican war.

I fully concur in the address of your committee, and the resolutions accompanying it. The facts stated are unquestionable, and the conclusions irresistible.

Indeed, after all that has occurred during the last twelve months, it would be almost idiotic to doubt that a large majority of both parties in the non-slaveholding States have come to a fixed determination to appropriate all the territories of the United States now possessed, or hereafter to be acquired, to themselves, to the entire exclusion of the slaveholding States. Assuming, then, that to be beyond