and having abundance of leisure-like all such people, we seek excitement; and there is no excitement more seductive to the young and ardent portion of our population than war. It is difficult to prevent such a people from rushing into war on any pretence; and if they should frequently recur, and this precedent be not reversed, nothing can prevent the Executive power from overshadowing the constitution and liberties of the country. We now have an opportunity to reverse it, if we think proper, by giving a strong and decided vote against a bill, the passage of which, as has been shown, is perfectly useless, and even worse than useless.

It is proper to remark, in conclusion, that I am aware that there are some doubtful questions as to the extent of the power of the President, in his character of commanderin-chief. Among these may be ranked that of levying contributions, in the strict sense of the term, and establishing temporary governments. I will not now enter on the investigation whether they belong to him or not, but my impression is, that in the portion of the enemy's country in which the authority of the United States is established for the time, he has not the right, without the sanction of law, to levy contributions, or to establish temporary governments. In coming to this conclusion, I readily concede to the President, as commander-in-chief, many and great powers, but they are such as arise out of exigencies immediately connected with the operations of the army, and its success or safety; among them I include the power of seizing supplies of every description, and of removing every obstacle necessary to be removed for security or victory. For that purpose, towns and cities may be battered down and destroyed; but when he undertakes to exercise power, on his own authority, over subdued territories, unconnected with the operations of the army, he exercises, in my opinion, a power not belonging to him. Congress may, by law, indeed, authorize him to levy contributions, or to establish temporary governments in such terri

tory; but it is one thing to exercise it on his own authority, and another to exercise it under the authority of law. The one places him under the control of law, while the other places him above its control.

I have now expressed my opinion. In all I have said I have put myself, I trust, above party feelings or personal considerations. I am actuated by the single motive, a desire to prevent an unconstitutonal and dangerous act from becoming a precedent, which there is great cause to fear it would, if not noticed or exposed.

[MARCH 17.-The same subject being again under consideration, Mr. Calhoun addressed the Senate as follows:-]

When I addressed

I rise to make a very few remarks. the Senate yesterday, in reply to the question, What shall we do if the treaty is not ratified? I answered-Take possession of the country which is ceded to us by that instrument, occupy it, and defend it. The worthy Senator from Michigan (Mr. Cass) says, he is at a loss to understand what I mean by that. Well, there is not much difference between us. I am at a loss to understand why he cannot understand it. It appears to me to be one of the plainest propositions in the world. He has hunted up a thousand imaginary difficulties that never did exist, and never can exist, in order to make good his case. Does he wish to know how my plan can be carried out? I point to the case of Texas. The whole of the eastern frontier, according to the line ceded to us by the treaty, was the boundary which Texas claimed as against Mexico. Now, does not every man know, that for seven long years Texas held possession of that frontier to the Nueces, without a single invasion on the part of Mexico, and that at a time when Texas had not more than three or four companies of regulars altogether? Now, Sir, if Texas could hold that line then, is there any difficulty with Texas in

doing it now, as far as the Rio Grande, when she has doubled her population, and is backed by the whole of the United States? And yet the worthy Senator from Michigan cannot understand it? It is impossible that he can understand it! Again, as to California, he is, if possible, more at a loss. His first great difficulty is as to our occupying the Gulf of California. If the Senator will remember, the line that I proposed passed through the whole extent of the Gulf of California, and if he will look at the map he will find it is a very broad expanse of water. He will find that it covers a very large portion of California-all the settled and inhabited portion of California. If he will look at the statistics of Mexico, he will find that she has not a single armed vessel. Now, what I asserted was, that a few armed vessels—one or two steamers among them-occupying that expanse of water, would be sufficient to secure us against all attacks of Mexico on that portion of the line; and yet the Senator could not understand it! It is, as I understand, with him a sort of metaphysical idea! Now, as to the residue of that line. The whole length of it is about four or five hundred miles, from the head of the Gulf to the Paso del Norte. That is all that remains to be defended. Well, the whole of the country covered by that line is inhabited by Indian tribes, so powerful that there is no fear of Mexico invading it. They invade Mexico! They are too powerful for her; and it will not require a single soldier to be stationed on its whole extent to protect us against Mexico. There may be some protection necessary against the Indians. Indeed, California is so remote from Mexico, and the difficulty of approach so great, that the mere handful of people in California have been enabled, in fact, to have almost an independent government there. I venture to say that not a single regiment will be needed there that the Americans now there, together with the natives, who are well affected towards us, and desirous of seeing our authority established, will be quite adequate to

defend it against Mexico for ever, with the aid of a few vessels in the Gulf of California.

Now, I venture to present what no doubt will appear to the Senator a very bold proposition: the cost would be vastly less to fall back and occupy the country without the treaty, than to occupy it under the treaty. I beg the especial attention of the Senator. Under the treaty-I may speak of what every one knows perfectly well-a large mass of Indians is thrown on our side of the line, and, from the necessity of the case, we shall be compelled to defend Mexico against these Indians; or, if we should not, and Mexico should have force enough, she will have the right to pass over and attack these Indians within our limits, to which we could not submit. For that purpose, then, we will be obliged to establish a line of military posts along the whole length of the Gila, from the Paso del Norte to the head of the Gulf of California. But it would require a larger and more expensive force to occupy this long line of posts, so as to defend Mexico against the Indians, than would be necessary to occupy and defend the country against the Mexicans themselves. The reason is obvious. The Gulf of California, as I have stated, will cover, with a few vessels, the whole of the settled part of California; and the intervening Indian tribes between the head of the Gulf of California and the Paso del Norte would effectually cover us from the possibility of an attack on that part of the line from the Mexicans. Nor would it be necessary to have any considerable force to protect us against the Indians, as their hostility to Mexico, and their love of plunder, would direct their warfare exclusively against Mexico. Thus the long line, of which the Senator spoke, of fifteen hundred miles, could, to its whole extent, from the Pacific Ocean to the Paso del Norte, be defended by a small force, and at an inconsiderable expenditure, if held without the treaty. The only remaining part is that from the Paso to the Gulf of Mexico, along the Rio del Norte; and we know

from the experience of Texas, how little that will probably cost. Now, if we add to this difference in the cost of defending the country without the treaty, and of defending under the treaty, the large sum of fifteen or twenty millions of dollars, which will be saved if Mexico refuses to ratify the treaty, there can be no doubt but we will be great gainers, in a pecuniary point of view, if she should refuse to ratify.

But I understand the drift of the Senator's remarks in this particular. He and I entertained directly opposite opinions as to what should be done, in case the treaty should not be ratified. He is, in that event, for a vigorous prosecution of the war, and hence his vigorous attack upon the policy of which, in that case, I am in favor, and exaggerated statement of the expense and difficulty of maintaining it. Indeed, there has been a standing conflict between the two lines of policy, almost from the commencement of the war, and hence the assaults of a similar character, which have been repeatedly made on that which I have maintained, and with the same view, by those who support the policy maintained by the Senator. But I have no fear-none in the world-that we shall ever return to a "vigorous prosecution of the war." That day is gone. You cannot vitalize the policy. It is buried. The country would consider it the greatest misfortune that could befall us, if we were to reopen and renew the Mexican war. The tide of public opinion is running with irresistible force against it. I have no apprehension of it. But I do desire that, in the mean time, the public mind shall not be occupied with an idea which will prevent it from falling readily into its natural position, if this treaty should be ratified; for if the treaty should not be ratified, it is plain that we must keep possession of the country, and defend it. Every Senator can speak of his course and his votes in the secret session. I voted for the treaty, and I supported it. But did I do that because I regarded it as preferable to the