operations from the President, as apparently occurred during the Iran-Contra affair, "simply didn't occur to us. There was, if you will, a legalistic, an ethical mind-set which simply precluded that as a possibility.”

The importance of a sensitivity to law and propriety among Government officials can hardly be stressed enough. As always, the quality and integrity of office-holders, along with their attitudes toward Congress and the give-and-take that is the hallmark of democracy, will determine in large measure how well America's experiment in self-government works.

In light of this Nation's ongoing need for an effective intelligence service in a dangerous world, the objective must be not to ban foreign operations, but insofar as possible to bring them within a democratic framework.

The remedies are well-known, though difficult. At every level of the Government, accountability will continue to depend upon clear guidelines, timely reporting, honest officials, and dedicated overseers willing to invest the time required to review the conduct of foreign policy.

To this list, H.R. 3665 adds another vital ingredient: penalties for those who insist upon the adoption of their own will over the public's will. And overarching every prescription must be a spirit of cooperation between foreign policy leaders within the executive and legislative branches, the good faith extolled by the Inouye-Hamilton panel

With this mixture, Mr. Chairman, a challenging but reachable goal, the United States can enjoy both democracy and national security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Johnson follows:)

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be a member of this distinguished

panel assembled here to examine a proposed law entitled the "Official

Accountability Act" (H.R. 3665).

The purpose of this bill, introduced

by you on November 20, 1987, is "to provide for criminal penalties for

Government officials who commit national security offenses."

A

their seemingly inherent antithesis, can exist safely and effectively

within the same society--but only with the most careful precautions.

This tension between the concern of some, on the one hand, about the

proper supervision of the intelligence agencies and, on the other hand,

a willingness by others to let them operate in full secrecy, lies at the

heart of the dilemma addressed by H.R. 3665.

"While there is a strong

public interest in the public disclosure of the functions of

governmental agencies," a senior official in the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) once put it, "there is also a strong public interest in the

effective functioning of an intelligence service."

Democracy and intelligence, in a word, represent values that are in

conflict, pulling one against the other. Democracy rests on the

assumption that government should be conducted openly, that decision

should be preceded by wide public debate, that the rule of law is more

trustworthy than the rule of man, that officials ought to be held

accountable for their acts.

Ours is "a government of laws and not of

men," wrote John Adams into the Massachusetts state constitution in

1780.

In contrast, intelligence operations depend upon secrecy and

limited debate, and often involve the violation of ethics and laws in

those countries overseas where U.S. agents operate, as well as the use

of tactics or "dirty tricks" that seem far removed from the accepted

philosophical tenets of democratic theory--lying, sabotage, even

clandestine warfare and assassination in times of peace.

One possible response to the democracy-versus-intelligence dilemma

is to eliminate, or sharply curtail, U.S. intelligence operations. Yet,

to abolish or emasculate the intelligence agencies would be an act of

folly, for while they can--and have--posed a threat to democracy from

within, they also provide a vital protection for democracy against

serious threats from abroad.

Here is the paradox. And from this

paradox comes the central challenge:

to guard against intelligence

excesses anathema to an open society while, at the same time, holding

high the intelligence shield against dangers from beyond these shores.

In the renewed public debate stirred by the Iran-contra scandal of

1986-87, citizens of the United States and their elected representatives

must determine what kinds of intelligence operations they are unwilling

to allow and what operations the nation must tolerate in order to

protect itself in a world filled with enmity, terrorists, and doomsday

weapons. Responsible officials--elected and appointed--must guarantee

through vigorous program review (oversight) that the nation's spymasters

and agents are held accountable and operate firmly within the

established boundaries.

Under the provisions of H.R. 3665, those

individuals who transgress these boundaries would, quite properly, be

held criminally accountable for their disregard of the legal standards.

The historical records suggests that the deterrent of criminal sanctions

may be necessary to curb the excessive zeal of some foreign-policy

officials.

Intelligence and the Law:

A Stormy History

The modern American intelligence community was established by the

National Security Act of 1947, with amendments in 1949. Prior to the

Iran-contra affair, the history of these secret agencies reflected a

three-staged evolution toward greater democratic control.

The first

phase, the Era of Trust (1947-74), was a time when the intelligence

agencies were permitted almost complete discretion to chart their own

courses, free of meaningful scrutiny by overseers in the Congress or

even the White House.

This state of benign neglect changed dramatically

to the aftermath of a series of articles published in the New York Times

throughout December of 1974.

These articles charged the CIA with the

conduct of unsavory operations against a democratically elected regime

in Chile and, more startling, with "massive" spying at home.

The

American public itself had become the object of the CIA's dark trades,

as the Orwellian vision of Big Brother moved from the pages of 1984 to

the headlines of the nation's leading newspapers.

The second phase, the Era of Skepticism (1975-76), saw the

intelligence agencies reel under the impact of investigations led by

public officials on Capitol Hill and in the White House, now suddenly

skeptical about the trust they had long placed in America's secret

service. Among intelligence officers, this season of Inquiry is still

remembered painfully as the "Year of the Firestorm" and the time of the

"Intelligence Wars." The investigations released a torrent of

information on the previously invisible side of American government.

The extensive hearings and reports published by the investigators stood

several feet high and chronicled, in chilling detail, the dangers posed

by the intelligence agencies, when misused.

If anyone had forgotten the

perils of hidden and unfettered power--despite the still-fresh

revelations of the Watergate scandal--here were some unpleasant

reminders.

The third phase, the Era of Uneasy Partnership (1976-86), witnessed

a closer legislative monitoring of the intelligence community and a

heightened public awareness of its mission--a "democratization" of u.s.

Intelligence policy.

The Congress created formal intelligence oversight

committees; intelligence budgets underwent scrutiny by legislators and