In the Common Defense: National Security Law for Perilous Times

Framsida
Cambridge University Press, 21 maj 2007 - 418 sidor
The United States faces the realistic and indefinite threat of terrorist attack with nuclear weapons. Whether the United States is successful in preventing such an attack will depend on whether we effectively wield the instruments of security. It will also depend on whether we effectively manage national security processes and apply the law in a manner that both enhances security and upholds our core values. As a result, lawyers, not just presidents, generals, and spies, will decide the outcome of this conflict. This book, first published in 2007, is essential for anyone wanting an understanding of national security law and process. The book includes chapters on constitutional law, the use of force, and homeland security, presented in the context of today's threats and as applied to issues like rendition and electronic surveillance.

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Sida 201 - Article 4 1 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. Article 43 1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security...
Sida 32 - It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations...
Sida 35 - This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.
Sida 98 - Council is to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security...
Sida 33 - It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.
Sida 39 - When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
Sida 201 - The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. Those may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Sida 47 - In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on "executive Power" vested in the President by § 1 of Art.

Om författaren (2007)

Judge James Baker was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in 2000. The Court is composed of five civilian judges and appointed for 15 year terms by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Court has appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Decisions of the Court are subject to review by the United States Supreme Court. Judge Baker previously served as Special Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, where he advised the President, the National Security Adviser, and the NSC staff on US and international law involving national security, including the use of force, terrorism, arms control, and human rights. Judge Baker also served as Deputy Legal Adviser to the National Security Council and as Counsel to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board. As an attorney adviser in the Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of State, he provided advice on law enforcement, intelligence, and counter-terrorism ad served as legal adviser to US delegations to various environmental negotiations. Judge Baker served as a legislative aide and acting Chief of Staff to Senator Daniel Moynihan. Judge Baker is the co-author of Regulating Covert Action, as well as numerous articles on national security and criminal law. After graduating from college, Judge Baker received a Reserve commission as a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps. He then earned a regular commission at The Basic School before joining the Fleet Marine Corps. Judge Baker is the recipient of the 1999 Colonel Nelson Drew Memorial Award, the NSC's highest honor. He is also the recipient of the Director of Central Intelligence's 'Director's Award'. Judge Baker graduated cum laude from Yale and then from Yale Law School. He teaches national security law at the University of Iowa College of Law and Georgetown University Law Center.

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