like a wild ass's colt:" such an independence of understanding is a height for which we were not made. We may think of ourselves as we please; but from the beginning to this time, even from the time when Adam was brought into the world, until now, he that has thus absolutely trusted in his own heart has been a fool. How peculiar then is it to the nature of man, that God, as soon as he was created, made to him, as Moses relates, an especial revelation? If the perfection of man could have arisen merely from his reason, without doubt no such revelation would have been given him; for the all-wise God does nothing superfluous or in vain.P Therefore since a revelation was in fact made to man in the beginning; hence we know, that it was necessary, and that his original reason was not alone sufficient for him. As to those who say that the narration of a revelation made to the first man is a mere allegory and fable; let them not pretend to argue, that if the original reason of man was not alone a sufficient guide, then it must follow, that God did not sufficiently provide for the creature made thus imperfect; for the answer hereto is, that the revelation given to Adam, and intended to have been continued over and above his n Job xi. 12. • Prov. xxviii. 26. The argument used by the apostle concerning the law, might, I think, be justly accommodated to the topic before us, in words as follow: for if there had been reason given unto Adam, such as, or so sufficient, that it might have given him life, verily his righteousness would have been by his reason, See Gal. iii. 21. natural reason, would have been sufficient for man's na tural weakness, and have thoroughly instructed him more and more unto every good work, if it had not been set aside and disregarded by him. CHAP. VII. Some further considerations concerning the original state of our first parents; the nature of the first command, or prohibition made to them; and wherein consisted the sin of their not observing it. THE point we considered in the foregoing chapter was, how far we may reasonably conjecture, from the rank and order of being in which man was formed, that he was made a creature not of absolute independent understanding; I would here observe, that a most excellent writer has hinted to us this very thing. The au thor of the book of Ecclesiasticus enumerates those endowments with which, and the direction under which God thought fit to bring our first parents into the world. The Lord, he says, created man of the earth-they received the use of the five operations of the Lord, and in the sixth place he imparted them understanding, and in the seventh speech, an interpreter of the cogitationis thereof: counsel and a tongue, eyes, and ears, and a his own, but heart, gave he them to understand. In these and the three following verses, he remarks, how God gave unto man his five senses, his ability of speech and understanding. But he had before observed, that when God made man in the beginning, he left him in the hand of his counsel. The question is, in whose counsel was man now left? The Latin version says sui consilii, his own counsel; but very absurdly the Greek text is, ἀφηκεν αυτόν εν χειρί Διαβολίς αυτε" not εαυτε avre his, i. e. God's counsel. Now this truly agrees with what follows in the next verse, if man would have conformed to it; his duty was to have kept the commandments, καὶ πίςιν ποιησαι ευδοκίας. He was to have paid unto God υπακοήν της πίσεως, the obedience of faith; which intimation is no other than what is the substance of all revealed religion; that without faith it was impossible man should please God; for, not to follow absolutely the counsels of man's own heart; but to fear God, and to keep his commandments, was to have been the whole of man. This is what Moses sets before us, who tells us, that God made man; but over and besides making him a living soul, and creating him, as Solomon speaks, yashar, aright, having nothing in him un d a Ecclus. xvii. 1-9. b Ibid. xv. 14. * The following our own counsels, is, in scripture-meaning, the deserting or departing from what God has revealed, to do what seemeth right in our own eyes. See Psal. lxxi. 11, &c. and many other places, which might be cited. f Eccles. xii. 13. meet for an intelligence of his order and rank in being; having given him senses and understanding in such measure as his Maker thought fit to bestow : over and above all, he gave him a commandment, which, if he would have faithfully kept to and observed, would have led him unto every thing sufficient for him. But, The difficulty, which objectors raise against interpret ing literally what Moses relates of the command here said to be given; lies in their conceiving the command itself as in no wise rationally conducing to man's per & Eccles. vii. 20. His imperfect reason would have been the occasion of no evil, if he had not departed from observing the commandments of God. Adam's ability of reason was such as it ought to be in one of his rank in being, and the important thing to him was, to Know thy own point, this kind, this due degree Of blindness, weakness, heav'n bestows on thee. POPE, ubi sup. He ought not to have aimed to be knowing as God, but obeying what God commanded; thereby to have learned and done the duties of his life, but, In reas'ning pride our error lies, All quit their sphere, and rush into the skies: And who but wishes to invert the laws Of order, sin against the Eternal Cause. POPE, ubi sup. h fection. It is impossible, they think, that such a being as God is, should appoint so great a weight, of the happiness or misery of mankind, to depend upon a matter in itself of such little real importance, as the eating or not eating of the fruit of a particular tree. Here I confess they start, what ought to be examined very considerately, and is not to be so hastily determined as some imagine; who, I think, add to, instead of removing the stumbling block by their unaccountable ratiocination. They say, "God had laid the whole stress and weight of his authority upon this one command: if, say they, you suppose a case so circumstanced, that if a son's disobedience to a father, in some one particular, in itself of no moment, will infer not merely a neglect, but even a contempt of his parent's authority; be the matter of the offence what it will, will it not deserve the severest resentment? What the son thinks a trivial thing, and in common estimation may pass as such, he will presume his father will think so too: but had his father expressly laid the whole weight of his authority upon this one thing; had he expressly said before-hand, Son, whatever else you may think to do to please or shew regard to me, shall have no acceptance, unless in this one easy thing, which I make and appoint to be the test of your duty, you carefully obey me; for, upon your failure herein, I will most absolutely treat you as a rebel. Should the son, after all this, presume to offend in Id utique videtur gravissimum et asperrimum quòd gentem humanam plexisse, imò perdidisse, dicatur Deus ob rem exiguam. Burnet Archæol. p. 296. |