Economic Analysis of Contract Law, Antitrust Law, and Safety RegulationsJenny Bourne Wahl Taylor & Francis, 1998 - 384 sidor First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company. |
Innehåll
Transaction Costs Risk Aversion and the Choice | 15 |
A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush | 35 |
Hadley v Baxendale | 90 |
Williams v WalkerThomas | 97 |
A Critical Reappraisal | 105 |
Rings and Promises | 129 |
The Economics of the Baby Shortage | 143 |
Evidence from Early Modern Japan | 169 |
Property Rights Risk Sharing and Player Disability | 219 |
The Nature of the Firm | 244 |
The Theory of Economic Regulation | 265 |
What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity | 285 |
The Influence of Recycling on Monopoly Power | 298 |
A Reconsideration of Taxi Regulation | 323 |
The Impact of ChildResistant Packaging | 336 |
Crisis in the Cockpit? The Role of Market Forces in Promoting | 355 |
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abscond accident risk adoption agencies air bags airline Alcoa allocation aluminum analysis automobile average number baby behavior breach buyer California cars coefficients compensation competitive consumer contract law court days lost demand diamonds disabled list discharge doctrine drivers dummy variable Econ economic effect employers enforcement equation estimate event example expected firm foster care gold hypothesis incentive income increase industry land lease liability loss major league marginal marginal cost monopoly negotiated number of days Ogyu Sorai organising output parents parties payment percent perfect competition performance players premium price discrimination price mechanism problem production property rights purchase recycling reduce regression regulation relative rent reserve clause result risk aversion rule safety sample scrap seller share contract statistically Steven N. S. Cheung stock market superior risk bearer supra note Table taxi tenant theory tion Tokugawa trading days transaction costs unconscionability vehicle wage workers