David v. Cider Co. untenable, for the reason that liability cannot be predicated upon the vibration of the premises under the evidence relating to this matter, which we have set out above. And conceding, for the sake of argument only, that liability may arise from the supposed negligence of plaintiff's colaborers in piling the barrels, upon the theory that a dangerous condition of the premises was thereby created, which defendant by the exercise of ordinary care could have discovered, surely such negligence in the erection of the stack of barrels or the existence of such dangerous condition, must be in some manner established. It is not suggested that the maxim res ipsa loquitur here applies; nor does it. It is said not to be inapplicable merely because of the existence of the relation of master and servant (Klebe v. Distilling Co., 207 Mo. 480, 105 S. W. 1057); but for the reasons mentioned in the case just cited, if none other, the doctrine would not here apply. And it is clear that, in the absence of any evidence touching the matter, we are. asked to infer a negligent erection or dangerous condition of the stack of barrels from the fact alone that a barrel fell therefrom. The case is not like that of Rigsby v. Oil Well Co., 115 Mo. App. 297, 91 S. W. 460; 130 Mo. App. 128, 108 S. W. 1128; where the defendant's foreman created a dangerous place, through the negligent erection of a pile of lumber, and, knowing such place to be unsafe, ordered the plaintiff to go into it. Neither are the facts quite such as were presented in Bradley v. Forbes Tea & Coffee Co., 213 Mo. 320, 111 S. W. 919, where a recovery was denied the servant; for there a stack of bags of coffee bulged and fell because of the taking away of another such stack which gave it lateral support, and in which work the plaintiff was engaged. The case is much like that of Bowman v. Car & Foundry Co., 226 Mo. 53, 125 S. W. 1120, where plaintiff was engaged in helping to pile pig iron near an David v. Cider Co. old pile thereof which fell and injured him. In an opinion by VALLIANT, J., it is said: "There was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants to justify the submission of the case to the jury. There was no evidence that the pile that fell was negligently constructed or that it contained a defect, that was known or could have been known by the exercise of ordinary care. The petition charges that it 'had been so piled and placed as that it was liable to fall over at any time,' but it does not specify in what particular it was defective. Under that averment (assuming without conceding that it was sufficient to state an act of negligence) the plaintiff could have introduced evidence to prove any defect in the construction or location of the pile that would indicate its dangerous condition, as that it was leaning to one side, or was not compact or otherwise, but the only thing he attempted to prove was that it was higher than usual. He offered no evidence to show that the height rendered it dangerous. Men of experience in that business could have been found to testify that the height of seven or eight feet rendered the pile dangerous if such was the fact, but neither the court nor the jury could take judicial cognizance that such was the fact. Yet with no evidence except that the pile was seven or eight feet high the jury was left to conjecture that from that fact alone it was dangerous. The burden was on the plaintiff to show that the pile fell because of its own inherent defect, and that it was a defect which the defendants knew or would have known if they had exercised reasonable care." In the case before us no evidence whatsoever was adduced touching the condition of this stack of barrels. It does appear that it consisted of three barrels, one upon another; but there is nothing to suggest that this rendered it dangerous. Regardless of other questions involved, had the demurrer been overruled, the jury David v. Cider Co. would have been left to grope in the dark, and authorized to base a verdict, if they so saw fit, upon a mere conjecture that the stack of barrels was in a dangerous condition, through negligent piling or otherwise, and that such dangerous condition had existed for such length of time and was of such character as to enable the defendant to discover the same by the exercise of ordinary care. We do not mean to say that liability could attach to the master for a dangerous condition created by the negligence of plaintiff's fellow-servants in piling these barrels, had such been shown. As to this it is sufficient to say that nothing whatsoever appeared as to the erection of the stack which fell or its condition prior to the accident. But see: Sutherland v. Lumber Co., 149 Mo. App. 338, 130 S. W. 40; Dickerson v. Jenkins, 144 Mo. App. 132, 128 S. W. 280. Neither is it necessary to decide whether plaintiff himself should be regarded as negligent, as a matter of law. In his testimony he reiterated time and again that he did not look to see how the barrels were piled, did not notice them, or pay any attention whatsoever to the condition of the stacks. Under the circumstances shown in evidence the question of plaintiff's negligence in failing to observe his surroundings, or to take any heed for his own safety, would be an important factor to be reckoned with, were the case not disposed of on other grounds. [See Bradley v. Forbes Tea & Coffee Co. supra.] The judgment must be affirmed, and it is so ordered. Reynolds, P. J., and Nortoni, J., concur. Wiest v. Insurance Co. JOHN H. WIEST, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES HEALTH & ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF SAGINAW, MICHIGAN, Respondent. St. Louis Court of Appeals, December 8, 1914. 1. ACCIDENT INSURANCE: Loss of Hand or Foot: Construction of Policies. Where an accident insurance policy provides for indemnification against "loss" of a hand or foot, actual physical severance of such member is not necessary to warrant a recovery, but it is sufficient if insured is wholly and permanently deprived of the use thereof; and even where the policy provides that "loss" means "actual amputation," it is not essential to a recovery that the entire member be severed, but is sufficient if so much thereof is severed as to leave the remainder useless for all practical purposes. 2. INSURANCE: Construction of Policy. Any ambiguity or uncertainty of meaning in an insurance policy should be resolved in favor of insured and against insurer. 3. ACCIDENT INSURANCE: Loss of Hand: Severance: Policy Construed. An accident insurance policy indemnifying against loss of a hand, but which provides that such loss shall mean "loss by severance at or above the wrist joints," does not cover a loss of the entire hand with the exception of the little finger and a portion of the palm supporting it, although such finger and portion of the palm are permanently paralyzed and of no use or service to insured. Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court.-Hon. J. Hugo Grimm, Judge. AFFIRMED. Henry B. Davis, Charles Erd and Carlisle Durfee for appellant. (1) Where the policy provides for the payment of an indemnity for the loss of one entire hand or foot, or the loss of two entire hands or feet, it is not necessary, in order to recover thereunder, that . Wiest v. Insurance Co. there should be an actual physical severance of the member from the body. Any loss which renders it practically useless is sufficient. 1 Cyc. p. 272, and cases cited; 5 Words & Phrases, p. 4236; Sisson v. Sup. Ct. of Honor, 104 Mo. App. 60; Sheanon v. Pac. Mut. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 618; Lord v. Am. Mut. Acc. Assn., 89 Wis. 19; Sneck v. Trav. Ins. Co., 88 Hun 94; Gahagan v. Morrisey, 3 Lack. Leg. N. 168; Garcelon v. Com. Trav. Assn., 184 Mass. 8; Fuller v. Locomotive Eng. Mut. Life & Acc. Ins. Assn., 122 Mich. 548. (2) The rule is well settled by an unbroken line of decisions in Missouri, that where the provisions of a policy are capable of two interpretations, that meaning must be applied which is the most favorable to the assured, even though it was intended otherwise by the insurer. Mathews v. Modern Woodman, 236 Mo. 326; Stix v. Indemnity Co., 175 Mo. App. 171; Dezell v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 176 Mo. 253, 265; Head v. Ins. Co., 241 Mo. 403; Renshaw v. Ins. Co., 103 Mo. 597; Brown V. Assurance Co., 45 Mo. 221; Mining Co. v. Casualty Co., 162 Mo. App. 191; Renn v. Supreme Lodge, 83 Mo. App. 442, 447; Cunningham .v. Union C. &. S. Co., 82 Mo. App. 614; Norman v. Ins. Co., 74 Mo. App. 456; Burnett v. Ins. Co., 68 Mo. App. 343; Hoffman v. Ins. Co., 56 Mo. App. 301; Ethington v. Ins. Co., 55 Mo. App. 129; Hale v. Ins. Co., 46 Mo. App. 508; La Force v. Ins. Co., 43 Mo. App. 530. Collins, Barker & Britton and C. K. Rowland for respondent. It is the duty of courts to construe contracts and to ascertain their meaning from all of the provisions thereof and not from single words or phrases or sentences, but, when there is no ambiguity or uncertainty in the terms used, there is no room for the application of the technical rules of construction. Matthews v. Modern Woodmen, 236 Mo. 342; Meyer v. Christopher, |