Insurance Co. v. Carson. 659, 83 S. W. 1010; and House v. Marshal, 18 Mo. 368.] Attention is called to the distinction in State ex rel. Jiner v. Foard, 251 Mo. 1. c. 56, 157 S. W. 619. The land in this case was the subject of plaintiff's action. The counterclaim of defendant was connected with that subject-matter, and hence, under section 1807, Revised Statutes 1909, a proper item for counterclaim. Bliss on Code Pleading (3 Ed.), section 126, page 215, defines "subject of the action" as follows: "Thus, in an action to recover the possession of land, the 'right' is the right of possession; the 'wrong' is the dispossession; the 'object' is to obtain possession; and the 'subject,' or that in regard to which the action is brought, is the land, and usually its title." It is held in the case of Lane v. Dowd, 172 Mo. 1. c. 173, 174, 72 S. W. 632, that the subject-matter of the action in an ejectment suit is the land, and that different transactions, if connected with the subject-matter of the action, can be joined in a petition or set up as a counterclaim. [See, also, Grimes v. Miller, 221 Mo. 1. c. 639, 640, 121 S. W. 21.] In an action to replevin a piano, a possessory action for personal property similar to ejectment for land, it is held that the piano is the subject-matter of the action. [Small v. Speece, 131 Mo. App. 513, 110 S. W. 7.] Appellant contends that defendant did not act promptly enough after discovering that the alleged fraudulent representations had been made by McKnight, and calls attention to a number of letters introduced in evidence written by defendant to McKnight and Collins with reference to the improvements being made, the roads, the slough, and the sale of the "back" forty acre tract. Defendant testified that when he bought the eighty acres McKnight agreed to relieve him of the "back" forty, and some of his correspondence relates to that. In one letter written as late as December, 1911, he said he liked the country and wanted to stay there. On May 7, 1912, a year and four months Insurance Co. v. Carson. after his purchase, he writes to McKnight and Collins informing them that he had a matter to settle with them and the plaintiff. He testified that they sent one Steele, the agent of plaintiff residing at Dexter, Mo., to him, and that he then notified Steele of the false representations made by McKnight. The evidence discloses that some time after this he brought a damage suit against plaintiff herein which was dismissed, the reason not appearing. Appellant cites cases holding that-"Unreasonable delay, especially if accompanied with acts which recognize the contract as in existence, will be construed as condoning the fraud and acquiescing in the validity of the contract. [Harms v. Wolf, 114 Mo. App. 387, 395, 89 S. W. 1037; Lierheimer v. Insurance Co., 122 Mo. App. 374, 381, 99 S. W. 525.]" There is, however, nothing in the record which shows that plaintiff in any way suffered or changed its position by the delay on defendant's part to assert his rights growing out of the fraud. Such being the case— the delay not having caused an altered position of the parties-this would not be a bar on the principle of laches. [Newman v. Newman, 152 Mo. 398, 54 S. W. 19; Bradshaw v. Yates, 67 Mo. 221.] In the case of Short v. Thomas, 178 Mo. App. 1. c. 419, 420, 163 S. W. 252, we said: "It has been often held that lapse of time short of the period fixed by the Statute of Limitations will not bar equitable relief where the right is clear and there are no countervailing circumstances' citing Cantwell v. Crawley, 188 Mo. 44, 86 S. W. 251; Summers v. Abernathy, 234 Mo. 1. c. 167, 136 S. W. 289; Lindell Real Estate Co. v. Lindell, 142 Mo. 1. c. 79, 43 S. W. 369; and Spurlock v. Sproule, 72 Mo. 1. c. 511. See, also, 6 Cyc. 301. We therefore hold that since defendant was unacquainted with the country to which he had moved as well as the very business he had engaged in, the delay of one year and four months did not make him guilty of laches. The most that can Insurance Co. v. Guseman. be said of his letters is that they tend to contradict his statement that the representations were made and that they were untrue in that they are silent on the subject of misrepresentations. But taking into consideration his situation and the circumstances under which the letters were written, we do not believe they contradict his positive testimony concerning the fraudulent representations. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court should not be disturbed and it is accordingly affirmed. Sturgis, J., concurs herein on the ground that there is sufficient misrepresentation shown to warrant a rescission of the contract. Robertson, P. J., dissents. INSUR THE CONNECTICUT MUTUAL LIFE Springfield Court of Appeals, December 14, 1914. VENDOR AND VENDEE: Real Estate: Contract of Sale: Fraud of Vendor's Agent: Rescission by Purchaser. Action in ejectment. Defendant asked to have his contract of purchase of certain real estate canceled because of alleged fraud on the part of the plaintiff's agent and prayed for damages. A judgment awarding damages to defendant is reversed with directions to enter judg ment for plaintiff. (FARRINGTON, J. Dissenting.) Appeal from Stoddard County Circuit Court.-Hon. W. S. C. Walker, Judge. REVERSED AND REMANDED (with directions). Wammack & Welborn for appellant. (1) The respondent visited and inspected the land and there is no testimony that he was in any way Insurance Co. v. Guseman. hindered from making as extensive an investigation of it as he desired. Under the circumstances he cannot allege that he was defrauded. Morse v. Rathburn, 49 Mo. 91; Judd v. Walker, 215 Mo. 337; McFarland v. Carver, 34 Mo. 195; Dunn v. White, 63 Mo. 181; Wade v. Ringo, 122 Mo. 322; Bradford et al. v. Wright, 145 Mo. App. 623; Holland v. Anderson, 38 Mo. 55; Ordway v. Ins. Co., 35 Mo. App. 434; Slaughter, Adm. v. Gerson, 13 Wallace, 379. (2) Mere expressions of opinion of trade talk do not constitute fraud. Nor do mere loose talk and brag about the value of property. Franklin v. Holle, 7 Mo. App. 245; Anderson v. McPike, 86 Mo. 300; Chase v. Rusk, 90 Mo. App. 29. (3) A broker who takes an option to purchase real estate at a stated price is not the agent of the owner for making the sale. Benedict v. Pell, 70 N. Y. App. Div. 74, N. Y. Supp. 1085; Dilworth v. Bostwick, 1 Sweeny 581; Southack v. Land, 23 Misc. 515, 52 N. Y. Supp. 687. Mozley & Woody, Fort & Green, and K. C. Spence for respondent. (1) Respondent, not being acquainted with the soil, and the character thereof, of the locality of the land sold to him, is not precluded from recovery by the mere fact that he made a casual examination of this particular land. Williamson v. Harris, 167 Mo. App. 347, 151 S. W. 500; Hindes v. Royce, 127 Mo. App. 718, 106 S. W. 1091; Adams v. Barber, 157 Mo. App. 370, 139 S. W. 497; Brownlee v. Hewitt, 1 Mo. App. 360; Stonemets v. Head, 248 Mo. 243, 154 S. W. 108; Judd v. Walker, 215 Mo. 312, 114 S. W. 979. (2) The representations contained in the circulars given by respondent by the Illinois & Texas Land Company, and the representations made to him by E. R. Bartlett, agent of appellant, were representations of facts, and not mere expressions of opinion. Stonemets v. Head, supra; Chase v. Rusk, 90 Mo. App. 25; Cahn v. Reid, Insurance Co. v. Guseman. 18 Mo. App. 115; Stones v. Richmond, 21 Mo. App. 17; Adams v. Barber, supra; Williamson v. Harris, supra. (3) The Illinois & Texas Land Company, which, so far as this record discloses, was E. R. Bartlett, is clearly shown to have been the agent of appellant in the sale of this land to respondent. The sale was reported to Wm. Collins, appellant's agent for all its lands in Missouri, he received the purchase money paid, and all negotiations concerning this transaction were had with him acting for appellant. Appellant is chargeable with the fraud of said land company, or Bartlett, even though it did not know of the fraud, and did not participate in it. Appellant ratified the contract made, and, by such ratification, made the land company, or E. R. Bartlett, its agent, from the inception of the transaction. Clydesdale Horse Co. v. Bennett, 52 Mo. App. 333; Porter v. Woods, 138 Mo. 552, 39 S. W. 797; Case v. Company, 138 Pac. 167; Wilson v. McCarthy, 134 Pac. 1189; Green v. Waddington, 103 N. E. 964; Taylor v. Bank, 174 N. Y. 181; Porter v. O'Donnell, 130 Pac. 393; Mundorff v. Wilkershaw, 53 Pa. 89, 3 Am. 531; Kirkpatrick v. Pease, 202 Mo. 471, 101 S. W. 651; Wann v. Scullin, 235 Mo. 629, 139 S. W. 425; Judd v. Walker, 215 Mo. 312, 114 S. W. 979. ROBERTSON, P. J.-This is an action in ejectment. Defendant answered with a general denial and a plea of fraud and deceit in the sale of the land involved, forty acres in Stoddard county, and asks judgment for damages in the sum of five hundred fifty-one dollars and fifty cents which he sought to have declared a lien on the land with an injunction against plaintiff interfering with his possession until said sum was paid. The court and defendant, over plaintiff's objection, treated the defense in the nature of an action in equity, but as defendant is entitled to no relief either in law or equity, plaintiff is not prejudiced on |