that body. The board of highway commissioners could not certify any amount without first determining such amount, and when a specific amount in dollars and cents is certified to the county board, such certificate must be taken as conclusive that there has been some action equivalent to determining that such amount is necessary. This and what has been said heretofore disposes of these objections, and for the reasons given they were properly overruled.

Objections to the tax of the town of Winslow are, that the record of the meeting of the board of highway commissioners held August 24, 1915, shows that said board met for the purpose of fixing the road and bridge tax for the ensuing year and it was resolved that the tax rate for the ensuing year be fixed at sixty-one cents on the $100, and it is contended that the record does not show the purpose for which the tax was to be levied. A further objection is that the record of the meeting held on the first Tuesday in September shows that the commissioners levied a road and bridge tax of $3100 for the ensuing year and that the use of the term "road and bridge tax" is too indefinite. What we have said heretofore disposes of these objections, and for the reasons above stated they were properly overruled.

One objection to the tax of the town of Oneco is that the record of the meeting held August 22, at which it was determined to levy sixty-one cents on the $100 for road and bridge purposes, is defective in that it does not follow the language of the statute. What we have said heretofore disposes of this objection. Another objection is that the record of the meeting held on September 1, which recites that the amount of $3450 was determined upon as the amount of tax to be levied and certified to the board of supervisors, is defective in that it does not also state that such certificate was made out and filed with the board of supervisors. The statute makes it the duty of the commissioners to take such action at this meeting, that is, to certify the amount of the tax levy to the board of supervisors,—but it is not nec

essary that they preserve a record of such procedure in the minutes of the meeting, if they did, in fact, make out the proper certificate and file it with the county board. For this reason and the reasons hereinbefore stated we think this objection was properly overruled.

The same objection is urged to the portion of the county tax levied for salary of the State's attorney that was made in People v. Chicago Great Western Railroad Co. supra, and what is there said disposes of this objection. It should have been sustained. The tax was excessive to an amount equal to the amount of fines and forfeitures turned in by the State's attorney, and plaintiff in error's tax should have been reduced proportionally.

The judgment of the county court will be reversed in part and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.

Reversed in part and remanded.

(No. 11390.-Decree modified and affirmed.)

JOHN F. ADAMS, Appellee, vs. Annie Larson, Appellant.

Opinion filed June 21, 1917.

I. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-whether specific performance will be granted depends largely on the facts of each case. Even where the terms of a contract are clear, certain and unambiguous, specific performance is not a matter of right but rests in the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised largely according to the facts and circumstances of each case.

2. SAME―mere change in value of property will not prevent enforcement of contract. The fact that there may have been a rise in the value of property or that one person may have gotten the better of a trade, if there are no inequitable circumstances, will not prevent the enforcement of a contract.

3. SAME when fact that agent acts for both parties will not defeat specific performance. Where an agent of the vendor is in the secret employment of the purchaser a contract made between the principal and purchaser through the agent's efforts is not binding

upon the principal, and that fact is a good defense to a bill for specific performance; but such is not the case where it is known that the agent is acting for both parties and there is no proof tending to show falsehood or misrepresentation.

4. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—when an agent may act for two parties. Where a dual agency is disclosed to a known principal the agent may act for both parties and the agency cannot be questioned; and the same is true where the interests of the two parties do not conflict and where loyalty to one is not a breach of duty to the other.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. DENIS E. SULLIVAN, Judge, presiding.

ANDERSON, ANDERSON & ANDERSON, for appellant.

WILLIAM M. & WILLIAM S. JOHNSTON, (JOHN J., ROONEY, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellee, John F. Adams, filed a bill in the superior court of Cook county March 17, 1915, for the specific performance of a contract for the conveyance to him by appellant, Annie Larson, of two lots and improvements thereon located on the north side in the city of Chicago, at the corner of Glenwood avenue and Arthur street. The matter was referred to a master in chancery, who heard the testimony and recommended a decree for specific performance. The trial court thereafter entered a decree approving the report of the master and ordering appellant within ten days to perform her contract and deliver to appellee a complete merchantable abstract of title or merchantable title guaranty policy and outlining certain other requirements as to perfecting title, etc., and including a general decree for specific performance. The case has been brought to this court on appeal.

The property in question consists of two fifty-foot lots improved with an eight-room residence, built by appellant's

husband about eleven years before the contract was executed. The appellant, who was a widow, resided on the premises with three children and a grandchild. The contract provided for the sale of the real estate to appellee for $10,000, on terms therein stated. The chief question in dispute is as to the circumstances connected with the execution of the contract. Paul A. Finley, of the real estate firm of Finley & McGuire, negotiated the sale. He testified that he first met Mrs. Larson about a year and a half before, when he asked her whether her house was for sale, and she stated it was not but might be later; that about nine days before this contract was executed, appellee, John F. Adams, who was a department manager in a wholesale grocery firm, came to Finley's office and stated that he was interested in buying in the vicinity of this property and inquired if he had any property for sale. Finley testified that he told him that perhaps Mrs. Larson would want to sell her place and suggested that he look at it; that Adams returned in a short time and stated that he would like to buy it and asked Finley to get a price on it, and the latter went to appellant and she said she might sell but would not take less than $10,000; that Finley told her he had a party but did not know whether he would consider it at that price; that Finley communicated that price to Adams, who said that he would not give it but would give $9000. Finley testified that he then asked Mrs. Larson if she wanted to sell for that amount and she said she did not; that within a day or two he came back to see her with an offer from Adams of $9500, which she refused, stating that her price was $10,000; that during some of these interviews there was talk with her about moving the house off, but she stated it would not pay; that after a second interview with Mrs. Larson Finley reported to Adams that she would not take less than $10,000 and wanted to remain on the premises until April 30, rent free; that Adams finally consented to having a contract drawn for $10,000, which was prepared

in Finley's office and signed by Adams, who also gave at the same time a check for $250 as first payment, payable to Mrs. Larson. Finley further testified that he then went to Mrs. Larson and told her that he had finally gotten appellee to execute the contract at her price of $10,000; that he told her he wanted her to understand everything in the contract, and she sat down and read the contract over with him, and they discussed the amount of cash ($4000) to be paid down, a mortgage to be given back to her on the premises for the balance, and the question of commissions and the unpaid installments of special assessments on the property, which, according to Finley's testimony, were to be paid by Mrs. Larson; that she sent her daughter for pen and ink, and Finley inserted, at her request, the provision for free rent until April 30, which he had overlooked when the contract was drafted; that she read it over again and he asked her if she was satisfied, and she said she was; that she signed the contract and indorsed the check, which it was understood he was to hold, and that he took the check with him and deposited it. He also testified to certain of their conversations during these negotiations with reference to her buying or renting an apartment; that she said she preferred to rent for a time; that after she had signed the contract she said nothing further to him about the transaction, except that she came to his office the next day and asked for a copy of the contract, and he had one written out by his stenographer and gave it to her; that shortly thereafter William R. Anderson, one of the firm of attorneys representing appellant in this case, called up Finley's office and later talked with him personally in regard to the matter. The substance of their conversation, which was admitted in evidence subject to objection, was that Anderson explained that for sentimental reasons Mrs. Larson did not care to go ahead with the contract; that she had lived there quite a while and had formed an attachment for the place; that he (Finley) told Anderson he had shown