creates by the first section an executive department of the city to be known as the department of public welfare and by the second section the office of commissioner of public welfare, and that no other office is created. Section 3 creates a bureau of employment and declares that the chief officer of that bureau shall be known as the superintendent of the bureau of employment. Section 4 creates a bureau of the department of public welfare to be known as the bureau of social surveys, and declares that the chief officer of that bureau shall be known as the superintendent of the bureau of social surveys. The argument is made that this section fails to create the office of superintendent of the bureau of social surveys, but only declares that the chief officer of that bureau, when the office shall be created, shall be known as the superintendent of the bureau of social surveys, and reference is made to the case of Moon v. Mayor, 214 Ill. 40, and similar cases, in which the ordinance provided that the police department should consist, in part, of "as many policemen as the city council may from time to time provide for." In such cases the ordinance did not purport to create the office of policeman but simply to create a police department, expressly leaving the office of policeman to be provided for by the city council in the future. In People v. McCann, 247 Ill. 130, an ordinance establishing an executive department of the city to be known as the department of police, and to embrace, among other officers, one inspector of police from each police division, was passed, and it was held that the ordinance created the office of inspector of police. The ordinance now under consideration creates an executive department to be known as the department of public welfare, in which are created two bureaus, to be known as the bureau of employment and the bureau of social surveys, the chief officers of which are. named as the superintendent of the bureau of employment and the superintendent of the bureau of social surveys. The duties of the respective bureaus were prescribed, and the

ordinance sufficiently indicates the intention of the council to start this executive department into operation at once with two bureaus, under the direction of a superintendent of each. These offices were not left to be provided for or prescribed in the future by the council but were then created by the ordinance itself.

The objection is made to various other allegations in the petition that they state conclusions of law and not matters of fact, but while the petition contains a number of immaterial allegations and may contain some legal conclusions of the pleader, it contains direct statements of fact sufficient to show the appointment of the petitioner, his service for six months and his removal the day after the expiration of that time.

Under the rule which has been quoted, original appointments are on probation for a period of six months. Section 10 of the act to regulate the civil service of cities provides, in part, that "at or before the expiration of the period of probation the head of the department or office in which a candidate is employed may, by and with the consent of said commission, discharge him upon assigning in writing. his reason therefor to said commission. If he is not then discharged his appointment shall be deemed complete." The plaintiffs in error insist that the discharge of the petitioner was in accordance with this rule, and that the phrase "at or before the expiration of the period of probation" includes all of the day following the expiration of the period of probation. The statute (Hurd's Stat. 1916, chap. 131, sec. 1,) prescribes that the time within which any act provided by law is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last, and we have frequently decided that the correct mode of computing time where an act is to be done within a particular time after a specified day is to exclude the specified day and include that upon which the act is to be performed. (Ewing v. Bailey, 4 Scam. 420;

Waterman v. Jones, 28 Ill. 54; Roan v. Rohrer, 72 id. 582; Gordon v. People, 154 id. 664.) But the present is not such a case. The act is not to be done within a particular time after a specified day but is to be done within a particular period of time beginning with a specified day. “At or before the expiration of the period of probation" refers to the duration of such period, and the discharge was authorized only during that time. The plaintiffs in error assume that the six months' period of probation is a period of time excluding the day of appointment. No reason is suggested for such construction. The appointment was complete on November 13, 1914. The petitioner became superintendent of the bureau of social surveys on that day. The petition alleged that he began the performance of his duties on that day, and the rule provides that the time served on probation, whether continuous or not, shall be credited upon the period of probation. The same statute already referred to, prescribes the meaning of the word "month" to be a calendar month, and the calendar month ends on the corresponding day in the month succeeding its beginning, less one day. The time within which a probationer may be discharged is not within six months from and after his appointment, but at or before the expiration of the period of six months beginning with the day of his appointment. That period ends six months after his appointment on the corresponding day of the month, less one. The statute provides that if he is not then discharged his appointment shall be deemed complete. "Then" refers to the expiration of the period of probation. On May 12, 1915, the petitioner's period of probation expired and the attempted discharge on the next day was ineffectual.

It is insisted that the demurrer should have been sustained for the reason that the petition sought both the reinstatement of the petitioner and the payment of salary; that the latter relief was conditional upon the former, and the petitioner could have no clear right to it until after his

re-instatement, and that the petition shows he was not entitled to the relief in regard to the salary. If a person has been wrongfully prevented from performing the duties of his office he may recover his salary by an action at law for the time during which he was so prevented where it has not been paid to anyone performing the duties of the office. (Bullis v. City of Chicago, 235 Ill. 472.) Whether in such case he may recover from the municipality the salary which has been paid to a de facto officer who has performed the duties of the office while the de jure officer has been prevented from their performance is a question about which there is a conflict of authority. In Dolan v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 278, and Waggoner v. City of Louisville, 117 S. W. Rep. 283, a recovery was denied, while in Andrews v. Portland, 79 Me. 484, State v. Carr, 129 Ind. 44, and Rasmussen v. Commissioners of Carbon County, 8 Wyo. 277, it was allowed. In People v. Brady, 262 Ill. 578, and People v. Stevenson, 270 id. 569, writs of mandamus were awarded requiring the re-instatement of the relators in the service of the State, from which they had been illegally discharged, and the payment of their salaries for the time during which they had been illegally prevented from performing their duties. This was done without regard to the question whether the State had paid their salaries to other persons illegally appointed in their places or not. The legal right to an office carries with it the right to the salary which is incident to the title to the office and not to its occupation and exercise. (Bullis v. City of Chicago, supra.) No obstacle exists to the granting of complete relief in one proceeding. The right of the defendant in error to his salary is as clear as his title to the office. Judgment affirmed.

(No. 10839.-Judgment affirmed.)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. DANIEL DONAHOE, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed June 21, 1917-Rehearing denied October 3, 1917.

I. CRIMINAL LAW-Supreme Court may, in its discretion, consider errors not argued in Appellate Court. The rule that alleged errors of the trial court not argued or brought to the attention of the Appellate Court will be held to have been waived and abandoned may be disregarded by the Supreme Court, in its discretion, where its application would result in great injustice.

2. SAME―all counts of indictment need not be good if some are sufficient. An indictment for conspiracy will be sufficient if some of its counts state the charge in sufficiently technical language so plainly that the nature of the offense charged can be readily understood by the defendant and by the jury.

3. SAME-good reputation may raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt. Evidence that a man has all his life maintained a good reputation for honesty and integrity is not proof of innocence when he is charged with crime, but it may be sufficient, under the circumstances, to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt.

4. SAME when proof of good reputation is not sufficient to justify an acquittal. If, considering the proof of good reputation together with all the testimony in the case, a reasonable doubt is entertained of the defendant's guilt he is entitled to an acquittal, but not where the evidence, outside of such proof, leaves no reasonable doubt of his guilt.

5. SAME when attorney is not exempted from prosecution for his actions in connection with a case he has conducted. The privilege of an attorney which exempts him from prosecution for anything he does or says in bringing and prosecuting a suit in a judicial tribunal does not exempt him from being prosecuted for a conspiracy, in which the bringing of his suit is one step or element.

6. SAME when character witnesses should not be asked if they had ever heard the defendant's reputation questioned. Character witnesses who have testified that the general reputation of the defendant was good prior to the date of the alleged crime should not be asked if they had ever heard his reputation questioned prior to that time.

7. SAME what argument by prosecuting attorney is not a reference to fact that defendant did not testify. An argument by the prosecuting attorney, in a prosecution for conspiracy, commenting on the fact that the source from which certain money came which