Unfaithful and unskilful service, Disclosing secrets of master's trade, Disobeying orders, Damaging master's interests, or permitting others to do so, Lending them unlawfully, Gaming, Frequenting taverns or playhouses, Committing fornication, Contracting matrimony, Buying and selling to his own use, General insubordination or impropriety of language or For these offences the Court commits to Bridewell, a prison of detention and occupation, but not a place of confinement for crimi nals. This power is seldom resorted to until admonition and advice have failed, and practically it is found necessary only in cases of confirmed depravity and wilful determination to continue idle or vicious courses. From seven to twenty-one days are the usual terms of commitment, but the Court has power to extend imprison ment to three months. Before, however, lengthened imprisonment is resorted to, it is usual for the Court to recommend cancelment of the indentures, in cases in which imprisonment for shorter periods has been found ineffective. The jurisdiction of the Court then ceases. The Court also deals with breaches of covenant on the part of the master, and protects the rights of the apprentice. Complaints are constantly brought of unkind, unjust, or tyrannical treatment; of insufficient work, or maintenance; or of improper or unwholesome lodging provided for the apprentice. In all such cases the Court exercises a protective jurisdiction which extends to all that concerns the morals, health, and well-being of the apprentice, and enforces the due execution of the covenants entered into by the master. The administration of justice is prompt, for the Court sits daily, and is also inexpensive, as a complaint can be heard for a cost of one shilling, and no further expense is incurred unless commitment takes place. No form of agreement excepting the indenture can be produced in Court, which being invariable in its terms, certainty of decision based upon precedents is secured. This Court is also, to some extent, one of conciliation; it being the practice to reconcile differences, afford advice, or admonish by private hearing, which in the majority of instances is found to succeed with first offenders, and with those who have erred from misunderstanding the law. No solicitor practises in the Court, but the apprentice may be heard by his parents or friends. It is a peculiarity of this case, that the apprentice, being bound according to the custom, may plead in any court in his own person, and not by his parents, even though under age-this right has been frequently recognised in the Supreme Courts of Judicature. Appeal lies from the Chamberlain's Court to the Mayor's Court of the City of London. To afford an indication of the extent to which the jurisdiction is resorted to, the following figures are given, from the books of the Court now in use, which include a period of thirty-six years :— Complaints adjudicated on private hearing, the parties being in most cases reconciled, about Hearings on summons before the Chamberlain. Average hearings on summons before the Chamberlain annually Average commitments annually 14,000 3,501 1,044 97 29 58 About 3,000 apprentices are now subject to the jurisdiction, and the number is rather on the increase. The trades mostly binding under the custom are printers, scriveners, stationers, type founders, iron and copper smiths, machinists, bookbinders, cork cutters, carpenters, cabinet makers, and box and packing-case makers. Many citizens in these trades employ from ten to sixty apprentices each. Bills have been brought into Parliament by Government which contained provisions for shortening the term of service when desired; attempts have been made, also, by the Corporation to effect the same object, but hitherto without effect. Such an alteration, if legally effected, would be acceptable to many traders, and would accord well with the present conditions of trade and of society. The writer, who may be permitted to speak of the system apart from its administration, desires to express his own decided convic tion that in a social point of view it is admirably conceived in the spirit of the wisdom which of old declared, " It is good for a man that he bear the yoke in his youth." He is of opinion that it would be well for this metropolis, for its trade and traders, its youth and their parents, if the custom of the City were extended to all parts beyond the City's jurisdiction; and if good for London, then it follows that it will be beneficial to all towns and cities of the provinces. Such was the opinion of the late Lord Ellenborough, who said in open court, when the subject casually came before him, “I heartily wish that such a practice extended all over England." Should such an extension ever be contemplated, there are three things which should be carefully attended to: 1. The mode of binding must be left optional, as at present in London. 2. The jurisdiction should not be entrusted to magistrates acting in criminal cases, but to some civil functionary, such as the County Court judge. 3. The place of commitment must not be a prison to which criminals are consigned. These precautions are necessary in order that freedom of trade may be respected, and that the self-respect of youths may not be destroyed by contact with criminals and criminal associations. On the Liability of Master to Servant in Cases of Accident. By VERNON LUSHINGTON, Barrister-at-Law. THE Bill on this subject which was introduced this session by Mr. Ayrton and rejected by the House of Commons, purported to extend the liability of the master certainly to two cases where at present he is not liable, namely, (1) where the accident is caused to the servant by default of tackle or machinery, though the master is not proved to have been guilty of any personal negligence; (2) where the accident is caused by the default of a fellow-servant; and perhaps to a third case, (3) where the accident is caused to the servant by the negligence of the master in not furnishing proper machinery, the servant having undertaken or continued the work with knowledge thereof. These three cases were dealt with by the first section of the Bill in these terms: "Whenever any workman or servant shall be injured in consequence of his master, or any other person employed by his master, not doing any act or providing any thing which may be requisite or proper, or doing any act or providing any thing which may be improper, in or for carrying on the undertaking, work, or business in or about which such workman or servant shall be employed by or on account of his master, then such workman or servant shall be entitled to recover from his master damages for such injury by an action at law; provided always, such injury shall not have been suffered in consequence of any wilful act or omission of a fellow-workman or fellow-servant, for which such fellow-workman or fellow-servant is punishable as a criminal offence; and provided also, such action shall be commenced within twelve calendar months after such injury shall have occurred." The second section extends Lord Campbell's Act to the cases described in the preceding section. The existing law is fairly open to inquiry, because it is comparatively new. The case which is always cited as the first and leading case, Priestley v. Fowler, (3 M. & W., p. 1,) dates only 1837. The general principles of the law relating to accidents are old enough and well established; but for several reasons the application of them to cases involving the relation of master and servant has not, until recent times, fallen under the consideration of our courts of law. First, changes in circumstances. The general introduction of machinery has necessarily multiplied accidents, and serious accidents; thus in 1861, in factories alone, and from machinery alone, notwithstanding our special statutory precautions and our inspectors to enforce them, there were about 4,000 accidents. (Report, October, 1861.) Again, the construction of great works by "division of labour," has brought prominently forward new relations between employer, contractor, sub-contractor, and the servants of all these. Secondly, changes in the law. The old quasi-religious law of deodand, whereby the chattel or part of a chattel causing the death of a man was forfeited to the Crown or the lord of the franchise, was abolished in 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 62); and in the same year was passed Lord Campbell's Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93), which gave for the first time a remedy to the families of persons killed by negligence. The Factory Regulation Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict. c. 15), and other statutes of the like kind, gave fresh rights or defined and confirmed old ones; and lastly, the institution of County Courts, and the general cheapening of legal procedure, have rendered the means of redress far more available than formerly to the working classes. The subject is accordingly novel, and hitherto has been brought piecemeal only before the courts, as this or that case with its own peculiar circumstances might chance to demand consideration. The whole matter, therefore, deserves and requires discussion. I will begin by stating shortly the general objects of a law pur porting to regulate the liability of masters towards servants in cases of accident occurring in the course of the employment. The first object should be, To prevent accidents. The law should make it the interest of every person to be careful in his work, careful of himself, careful of others; the master careful, in selecting his servants, in superintending them, in choosing right methods of work, in providing sound machinery; the servant careful, not only of his master's property, but also of his own life and of his fellow-servant's. For, in truth, it is very difficult to make men careful: the risk of injury appears so distant, so doubtful, and the very thought of it is so unpleasant; whereas the thought, trouble, and it may be expense to avoid the risk, are certain and immediate. Sheffield workmen, it is notorious, even resent improvements that render their work less dangerous, lest wages should fall; and many out of mere indolence, some out of mere bravado, will not avail themselves of precautionary means actually provided. Employers again do not like accidents; accidents do them no good, and they have humanity enough to be sorry for those who suffer; yet how few, from want of consideration or from mean economy, will voluntarily take the pains or incur the expense to maintain due arrangements for the safety of their workmen! The necessity of our Factory Acts, Colliery Acts, and other statutes of the kind, too surely shows this. Against all such selfishness of employers, and unmanly recklessness of workmen, a law making persons responsible for injury occasioned by their negligence to others, and excluding them from compensation for injury caused to themselves by their own negligence, is a valuable protection. The second object should be, To furnish rules whereby, when injury actually occurs, justice may be done between the parties. This appears rather a vague matter, but is a very real one, and in the present day of special importance. Our population being indus trial, and every day more and more so, the social relation, including the legal relation, of master and servant, needs in all respects to be clearly on a right basis,—to appear just in the sight of men. In particular, accidents involving, as they do, grievous personal loss and pain, rouse a sense of wrong, which co-operates with other causes to work dissension between class and class, and sometimes even leads to acts of lawless revenge. The recent murder in Manchester may illustrate this. The retributive law in cases of accident should be just; by being just, I mean founded on a fair consideration of the capital facts which mark the relation of master and servant, and the consequence of accidents arising in the course of the employment,-fair equitable consideration. This position is not denied, it is freely admitted, and the law purports to be based upon a construction of the contract of service, which it is to be remembered is, so far as express terms go, silent as to liability. But if the law has in any respect gone wrong, it will be from misapprehending or insufficiently appreciating some of these characteristic facts. The principal of these facts seem to be as follow: 1. The master and servant are engaged in a common work for the benefit of both. There is a virtual partnership between them. No one, least of all a lawyer, when he remembers the duty of the master to take reasonable care of his servant, can say the contract is for money wages and nothing else. 2. The servant works with his hands for wages, is a poor man, generally of imperfect education, and belongs to a class traditionally improvident. The master is a person of more or less capital, employs many servants, keeps accounts, and in the course of his business is accustomed to make pecuniary calculations based on complex contingencies. 3. The choice of servants, the selection of machinery and materials, the determination of the method of work, is with the master, and the master only. Practically, and with few exceptions, this is absolutely so. 4. The master and servant are equally aware of the dangers incident to the employment. I say equally; for though the servant may be practically more familiar with some dangers, there are others which the employer may well understand better; and of all he must be presumed in law to know adequately. 5. When an accident to a workman occurs, it may be accompanied or not by damage to the master's property, sometimes very great damage; but in all such cases the workman suffers with his body, literally with his flesh and blood, perhaps with his life. In a great number of instances the prospects of himself and his family are ruined. On the other hand, the master may lose heavily through the negligence of a servant without the servant suffering any injury; and in all such cases the master has practically no redress. Railway accidents and collisions at sea, involving thousands of pounds, are commonly of this kind. This is true, but not in my opinion very material. Such facts, which lie at the root of the subject, ought to |
