Opinion. with respect to all elections which were intended to be embraced by this section of the schedule all the requirements of article II should apply; not this or that section of article II, but article II as an entirety. Some of the sections of that articl are not self-executing and require legislative action to render them operative. The schedule refers in terms to many, if not all, the elections, State, county and municipal provided for by the Constitution, and it is a reasonable construction of the 18th section of the schedule to make it apply either to all elections ordained by the Constitution, or to all such as are mentioned in the schedule itself, if any election provided for by the Constitution be omitted; or, to put it more accruately, is such a construction so manifestly contrary to, unwarranted by and so plainly at war with the Constitution that it must be condemned by the courts? The word "all" is without doubt one of very comprehensive meaning, but the meaning to be given to it in any particular case must be determined by its context. It may have its broadest signification, or it may be limited in its meaning to all of a particular kind or class. This phrase "all elections" has been frequently construed by the courts of other States. In Birchmore v. Stale Board of Canvassers, 76 S. C. 461, 59 S. E. 145, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held, that an election to determine whether or not intoxicating liquor may be sold in a precinct is within a constitutional provision that all elections shall be by ballot. This case is reported in 14 Lawyers' Reports Annotated (N. S.), on page 850, and is the subject of an elaborate note, in which it is said that the position of the court, that the phrase "all elections," as used in the Constitution, was sufficiently broad to include not only elections for the selection of officers, but also elections to determine any particular or special question which might be submitted to the electors, "seems to be contrary to the weight of authority, as the general rule appears to be that the words 'election' or 'all elections' imply merely elections for the selec Opinion. tion of officers, and that elections for the decision of some stated proposition need not be conducted under the formal and prescribed rules, for elections for the selection of officers." In support of this criticism many cases are cited. In Valverde v. Shattuck, 19 Col. 104, 34 Pac. 947, 47 Am. St. Rep. 208, the Constitution in question provided, that "Every male person over the age of twenty-one years, possessing the following qualifications, shall be entitled to vote at all elections." The court said: "In our opinion the word 'elections' thus used does not have its general or comprehensive signification, including all acts of voting, choice, or selection. without limitation, but is used in a more restricted political sense-as elections of public officers." In Graham v. Greenville, 67 Tex. 62, 2 S. W. 742, article 503 of the revised statutes reads as follows: "Whenever a majority of the inhabitants qualified to vote for members of the State legislature of any territory adjoining the limits of any city accepting the provisions of this title, to the extent of one-half mile in width, shall vote in favor of becoming a part of said city, any three of them may make affidavit to the fact, to be filed before the mayor, who shall certify the same to the city council of said city." Under this law the court held that a petition signed by a majority of the qualified voters within a certain district was a sufficient vote to determine the question of annexation, although the Constitution said that in all elections by the people the vote should be by ballot; the court holding that this provision of the Constitution did not provide that the will of a limited number of people on any subject in which they might be interested should be ascertained in no other way than by ballot. In Porter v. Crock, 126 Ala. 600, 28 South. 745, the Constitution provided that all elections by the people should be by ballot, and that the General Assembly should pass laws to regulate and govern elections in the State, and all such laws should be uniform throughout the State; and that no classes Opinion. of qualified voters should be excluded from participating in the elections. The legislature passed a law providing for an election to establish a county seat, which law required ballots to be numbered, and that the election be restricted to voters within the county. The court said that it might well be doubted whether the provisions of the article of the Constitution cited above did not relate exclusively to elections held to select public officers; but that it was unnecessary to decide that question, as the power to locate or change a county seat was exclusively in the legislature, and it could prescribe any method. for selecting a location that it chose. In Pritchard v. Magoun, 109 Iowa, 364, 80 N. W. 512, 46 L. R. A. 381, a statute contained the following provisions: "That in all elections to be held after November 1, 1892, in the State, for public officers (except those elected at school elections), the voting shall be by ballots, printed and distributed at public expense as hereinafter provided; and no other ballot. shall be used." "The term 'city election' shall apply to any municipal election held in a city or incorporated town." The court held that the latter provision was not intended to apply to a special election, although held within the limits of a city, and the provisions, taken together, did not require that an election to decide the question of raising money to build a bridge should be by ballot. And the same laws were held not to apply to a special election held for the purpose of raising money to support a railroad. Bras. v. McConnell, 114 Iowa, 402, 87 N. W. 290. See also, Buckner v. Gordon, 81 Ky. 665; Belles v. Burr, 76 Mich. 1, 43 N. W. 24. In Hanna v. Young, 84 Md. 179, 35 Atl. 674, 57 Am. St. Rep. 396, 34 L. R. A. 55, the Supreme Court of Maryland construed a provision of the Constitution of that State which reads as follows: "All elections shall be by ballot and every male citizen of the United States of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, who has been a resident of the State for one year, Opinion. and of the legislative district of Baltimore city, or of the county, which he may offer to vote, for six months next preceding the election, shall be entitled to vote, in the ward or election district in which he resides, at all elections hereafter to be held in the State." "It is contended," said the court, "that this section of the Constitution plainly comprehends and includes within its express terms all elections, whether State, Federal, county, or municipal. Yet there is but one municipality mentioned in this section of the organic law, and, in fact, Baltimore city is the only municipality mentioned eo nomine in any part of the Constitution. This court in Smith v. Stephan, 66 Md. 381, 7 Atl. 561, 10 Atl. 671, Mr. Justice Bryan, delivering the opinion of the court, said: 'It is sufficient to say that no municipal elections except those held in the city of Baltimore are within the terms or meaning of the Constitution.' Whilst the Constitution, article III, section 48, authorizes and empowers the General Assembly to create corporations for municipal purposes, it nowhere prohibits the legislature from imposing upon the qualified voters, residing within the corporate limits of a town, any reasonable restrictions it may deem proper, when seeking the exercise of the right of elective franchise in the selection of its officers. In this respect the power of the legislature is unlimited." The contention before the Maryland court was, as here, that the act in question was void because the Constitution had conferred the right and prescribed the qualifications of electors at all elections, and the legislature was, therefore, without authority to change or add to them in any manner. Speaking to this proposition, the court said: "The Constitution of this State provides for the creation of certain offices, State and county, which are filled, either by election or by appointment; and we regard it as an unreasonable inference to suppose that municipal elections, held within the State (outside the corporate limits of Baltimore city), can be properly termed elections under the Constitution, such as State and county elections; or Opinion. that the framers of the Constitution ever contemplated that article I, section 1, of that instrument was intended to apply to municipal elections, such as the one now under consideration, which is the mere creature of statutory enactment." The court then refers with approval to the case of Attorney General v. Dillon, 32 Fla. 545, 14 South. 383, 22 L. R. A. 124, where it was held that the suffrage provision in the Constitution of that State, prescribing the qualifications of voters at all elections under it, does not apply to elections for municipal officers, but such elections are subject to statutory regulation; and, further, that it is competent for the legislature to prescribe the qualifications of voters at the same. Continuing, the Maryland court says: "It is only at elections which the Constitution itself requires to be held, or which the legislature under the mandate of the Constitution makes provision for, that persons having the qualifications set forth in said section 1, article I, are by the Constitution of the State to be qualified electors." See also McMahon v. Savannah, 66 Ga. 217, 42 Am. Rep. 65. We have freely used the notes to cases in Lawyers' Reports Annotated, and cheerfully acknowledge our obligation. To recapitulate the case made by the record: We find that the power which the order appealed from denies to the General Assembly has been exercised by that body under every Constitution of this Commonwealth from 1776 down to that of 1902. Down to the Constitution of 1850, the right to vote was expressly given by the Constitutions only as to members of the General Assembly. By the Constitution of 1850 the right was extended by adding the phrase "all officers elective by the people." The Constitution of 1864 used the same expression. In 1869 the constitutional provision was extended to "all questions submitted to the people," which was by direct vote of the people stricken out in 1876, and the right "to vote for members of the General Assembly and all officers elective by the people" was substituted for it. As we have seen, the principal object of calling the convention of 1901 was to purge |