BOOK trust I am entitled to infer, that the scene which XXIV. 1792. we are now contemplating is not the transient effect of accident, not the short-lived prosperity of a day, but the genuine and natural result of regular and permanent causes. The season of our severe trial is at an end; and we are at length relieved, not only from the dejection and gloom which a few years since hung over the country, but from the doubt and uncertainty which, even for a considerable time after our prospect had begun to brighten, still mingled with the hopes and expectations of the public. We may yet indeed be subject to those fluctuations which often happen in the affairs of a great nation, and which it is impossible to calculate or foresee; but as far as there can be reliance on human speculations, we have the best ground from the experience of the past to look with satisfaction to the present, and with confidence to the future. Nunc demum redit animus, cum non spem modo ac votum securitas publica, sed ipsius voti fiduciam et robur assumpserit." Such were the brilliant hopes which the nation was at this moment of exultation taught to indulge, and with such dazzling splendor rose the morn of a year destined to set in darkness, calamity, and blood! The papers relative to the Russian armament being laid on the table, Mr. Grey noticed several material omissions, and an entire chasm in the cor XXIV. 1792. respondence from October 31, 1790, to May 26, BOOK bread's mo On the evidence of the papers actually produced, Mr. Whitand the facts publicly ascertained, Mr. Whitbread tion of cenon the 27th of February (1792) moved a resolu-specting sure re Russia. BOOK tion of censure on the ministers, importing XXIV. 1792, "that Oczakow was not an object of sufficient importtance to justify the armed interference of this country." Mr. Whitbread said, “it was the most self-evident of all propositions, that no arrangement affecting Oczakow could in any way affect the political or commercial interests of Great Britain. We exported nothing thither, we imported nothing from it: the ostensible cause of the dispute, therefore, could not be the real cause. There was ground to believe the existence of a secret negotiation, by which Prussia flattered herself with the hope of obtaining Dantzic and Thorn as a compensation for permitting the empress of Russia to retain possession of Oczakow. It appeared that the empress had, so early as December 1789, requested the interference of Great Britain to effect a peace, upon the terms of extending her frontier to the Niester, and erecting the provinces of Moldavia, Bessarabia, and Wallachia, into an independent principality under a Christian prince. These terms were refused by the court of London, and the empress was told that no attention would be paid to any terms not resting upon the basis of a status quo. At length after blustering, threatening, and arming, came the humiliating memorial of the 29th of June, 1791, which at once conceded all that we had negotiated, threatened, and armed, to obtain." XXIV. 1792. The motion was ably supported by Mr. Grey, BOOK who remarked, "that since the affair of Holland the minister had become intoxicated with power, and fancied he could parcel out kingdoms and provinces at his pleasure. He seemed as much delighted with this idea as Don Quixote with books of chivalry, and amused himself with curvetting in this court, prancing in that, menacing here, vaunting there-in a word, out-Heroding Herod." Mr. Fox took a comprehensive view of the question, and dwelt with much energy and effect on the folly of making Oczakow a primary object of negotiation, and the inconsistency and disgrace of its subsequent abandonment. "Oczakow (said he) was every thing by itself; but when ministers added to Oczakow the honor of England, it became nothing. Oczakow and honor weighed nothing in the scale. Honor is, in the political arithmetic of ministers, a minus quantity to be subtracted from the value of Oczakow. Against the vain theories of men who project fundamental alterations upon grounds of mere speculative objection, the constitution may be easily defended; but when they recur to facts, and shew me how we may be doomed to all the horrors of war by the caprice of an individual, who will not even condescend to explain his reasons, I can only fly to this house, and exhort you to rouse from your lethargy of confidence, into the active mistrust XXIV. BOOK and vigilant control which are your duty and your office." On the division there appeared for the question 116, against it 244. 1792. A motion similar to that of Mr. Whitbread was nearly at the same time made by earl Fitzwilliam in the Upper House. It was opposed by the lords Grenville and Hawkesbury, the latter of whom threw much light on the real motives of the late interference, by expatiating largely on the ingratitude of Russia, and the injurious conduct of that power during the late war; and it evidently appeared, by the language of this secret adviser of public measures, that the ARMED NEUTRALITY of the empress, although twelve years had passed since the date of it, was not yet forgotten or forgiven. And lord Carlisle did not therefore express himself with perfect accuracy, when, in reviewing the political objects of the armament, his lordship said, "he believed they might ALL be resolved into the endeavour to obtain for Prussia Dantzic and Thorn." Lord Rawdon declared the conduct of ministers to be extremely culpable, "Prying into every cabinet of Europe, where they found amity they sowed discord; and where the spark of contention existed they had blown it into a flame. Of all the wretched policy of petty statesmen, (said his lordship) the most contemptible is that which threatened all and performed nothing." Lord Loughborough observed, "that it was a |