Opinion of the court. 2. Next error assigned is that the court erred in charging the jury that the correspondence showed an agreement between the parties distinct from the prior written agreement which was litigated in the equity suit, but the court is of the opinion that the charge was correct, as it is well-settled law that written instruments are always to be construed by the court, except when they contain technical words, or terms of art, or when the instrument is introduced in evidence collaterally, and where its effect depends not merely on the construction and meaning of the instrument, but upon extrinsic facts and circumstances, in which case the inference to be drawn from it must be left to the jury.* Where the question was whether there was a contract between two parties to be deduced from correspondence, Parke, Baron, said: "The law I take to be this: that it is the duty of the court to construe all written instruments. If there are peculiar expressions used in the instrument, which have, in particular places or trades, a known meaning attached to them, it is for the jury to say what is the meaning of those expressions, but it is for the court to decide what is the meaning of the contract." Contracts are frequently made by correspondence between the parties, and in such a state of the evidence it was held, in the case of Begg v. Forbes,† that the question was exclusively for the court; Jervis, C. J., remarking, "Surely the construction of written documents is for the judge, whether many or few in number." Exceptional cases arise where the contract rests partly in the correspondence and partly in oral communications, in which it is held that the question whether or not there is a contract is a question. for the jury. Courts of justice, however, are not denied the same light and information the parties enjoyed when the contract was executed, but they may acquaint themselves with the persons and circumstances that are the subjects of * Levy v. Gadsby, 3 Cranch, 186; Bliven v. N. E. Screw Co., 23 Howard, 432; Etting & The Bank, 11 Wheaton, 75; Barreda v. Silsbee, 2 Black, 168. 30 English Law and Equity, 508. 168. Bolckow v. Seymour, 17 C. B. (N. S.), 107; Barreda v. Silsbee, 2 Black, Opinion of the court. the statements in the written agreement, and are entitled to place themselves in the same situation as the parties who made the contract, so as to view the circumstances as they viewed them, and so to judge of the meaning of the words and of the correct application of the language to the things described.* Proof of service at the request of the defendant was full and uncontradicted, and the Circuit Court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was "entitled to recover in the case such sum as the reasonable quantum meruit value of his services, upon the evidence, you may regard to be proper;" adding that the instruction "includes a consideration by you of what his services were, the entire scope of the trade, and his qualifications for those services at the time he rendered the same, in reference" to that voyage, and the consideration of how much those services were in bulk or in value before the close of the year, and the consideration of his services after that date, and whether they are to be diminished after by any payment or allowance which ought to be charged against the plaintiff on account of any compensation he may have received as a member of the firm to which he belonged; and stating, in conclusion, to the effect, that the court left the whole case to the jury as a question of fact for their determination. Most of the other exceptions to the charge of the court are shown to be without merit, by that instruction, which submitted the whole evidence to the jury. Beyond all question the plaintiff was entitled to interest from the commencement of the suit, and it is not perceived that there is any error in the rule prescribed as to the rate, as it is the rule of the lex fori, especially as no rate is fixed in the contract and no place designated for its performance. Separate examination of the numerous other exceptions as to the ruling of the court, in admitting and rejecting evidence, will not be attempted, as none of them are of any *Shore v. Wilson, 9 Clarke & Finelly, 569; Addison on Contracts, 846; Blossom v. Griffin, 13 New York, 569; O'Neill v. James, 48 Id. 84-92. General statement of the case. general importance. Suffice it to say they have all been examined and the court is of the opinion that they must severally be overruled, and that there is no error in the record. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Mr. Justice STRONG dissented from this judgment and from the preceding opinion respecting the construction and legal effect of the written agreement between the parties. Mr. Justice HUNT also dissented. WILLIAMS V. BAKER. CEDAR RAPIDS RAILROAD Co. . DES MOINES NAVIGATION CO. 1. The history given of the legislation of the land grants for the improvement of the Des Moines River, and of the grants for railroad purposes, which have been supposed to conflict. 2. This court on full consideration affirms the decision in the cases of Wolcott v. The Des Moines Company (5 Wallace, 681), and Reily v. Wells (declared by this court to have nothing to distinguish it from that case, and therefore not reported), namely, "that the title to those lands never passed to the railroad company by the grant under which it claimed, because, by the express terms of the proviso, they were reserved from the grant; and that by the Joint Rosehition of Congress of 1861, and the act of 1862, on the same subject, the State of Iowa did receive the title for the use of those to whom she had sold them as part of the original Des Moines River grant." 3. The decision of Wolcott v. The Des Moines Company, as an authoritative exposition of the law of this case, is not weakened by the supposed collusion of the parties to that suit, it being shown by the record that all the questions were fully argued by other parties who intervened, and that the court maturely and deliberately considered the question which they were now asked to reconsider. Nor does this court look with approval upon a labored effort to prove by testimony that its judgment was obtained by collusion, when the judgment is cited in another case only to establish principles of law, and not by way of evidence or estoppel. [Though the two cases here reported were decided in order of time prior to that of the Homestead Company Valley Statement of the case in the opinion. Railroad next in order of place (beginning on page 153), and are referred to in it, yet the reader who is not already acquainted with the facts of what is known in Iowa as the Des Moines River land litigation may, possibly, find it as well to read, before reading the cases now immediately given, the later one, beginning, as already said, on page 153, and in which a diagram will assist his comprehension of a topogra phy common to both cases.] ON appeals from the Circuit Court for the District of Iowa. These were two suits in chancery, brought originally in the State courts of Iowa, and transferred to the Circuit Court of the United States for that district, to quiet title to real estate. In the first case the complainant was Baker, who held title under the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company. The defendant was Williams, and he held under the Cedar Rap, Is Railroad Company. In the second case, the Cedar Rapids Railroad Company was complainant, and the Navigation and Railroad Company, with others, defendants; and in this suit the complainant set up that suits at law had been commenced against numerous persons, its grantees, which were harassing and expensive, and prayed that its title and the title of its said grantees should be quicted. The defendants in that suit denied the title thus set up, and alleged that their own title, that of the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company, was the true title. The court below decided, in both cases, in favor of the parties claiming under the latter title, and in both cases the adverse side appealed to this court. Messrs. I. Cook and B. R. Curtis, for the title under the Cedar Rapids Railroad Company; Mr. T. F. Withrow, contra, for that under the Des Moines Company. Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. The foundations of the title on each side of this controversy rest on acts of Congress, and the decision of the cases requires their construction. The cases are identical, except that as the holder of each of the conflicting titles becomes Statement of the case in the opinion. plaintiff in turn, he is thrown upon the strength of his own title, rather than the weakness of the opposing one. The title of Baker has its inception in the act of August 8th, 1846, the material part of which is in these words: "There is hereby granted to the Territory of Iowa, for the purpose of aiding said Territory in improving the navigation of the Des Moines River from its mouth to the Raccoon Fork, so called, in said Territory, one equal moiety in alternate sections of the public lands remaining unsold and not otherwise disposed of, incumbered, or appropriated, in a strip five miles in width on each side of said river, to be selected within said Territory by an agent or agents, to be appointed by the governor thereof, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States." It was also provided that the lands should become the property of the State of Iowa on her admission as such into the Union, which was soon expected. The State of Iowa passed laws for the work of improving the navigation of the river, which contemplated a series of locks and dams, and after prosecuting the work for some time under a State board of public works, made a contract with a corporation called the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company for the further progress of this improvement. By this contract the lands of the Congressional grant, which constituted the sole fund for making the improvement, were to be conveyed by the State to the company, at fixed prices, as they earned them in the progress of the work. The Secretary of the Treasury, as the lands were selected by the agent of the State and the selections approved by him, certified the approved lists to the State, and this was, and always has been, considered the appropriate mode of evidencing the title of the State under the grant. The State conveyed by patent to the navigation company the lands so certified as the progress of the work authorized it, according to the terms of the contract. All the lands in controversy here have been so certified to the State by the Secre |