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Argument for the appellant.

States," and the citizens of the rest of the United States should "cease and be unlawful so long as such condition of hostility shall continue."

By proclamation of August 16th, 1862,* the President declared the State of Georgia to be in such state of insurrection.

By the act of July 2d, 1864,† the prohibitions upon commercial intercourse with the territory in rebellion, are made to apply to all commercial intercourse by and between persons residing or being within districts within the present or future lines of National military occupation in the States or parts of States declared in insurrection, whether with each other or with persons residing or being within districts. declared in insurrection, and not within those lines."

It was not denied by Cutner, or Schiffer & Co., or at the bar, that the sale had been made in Savannah.

In this state of things Cutner, suing for the use of Schiffer & Co., filed a petition in the court below, under the provisions of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, asking for restitution of the proceeds of the cotton in the Treasury.

The Court of Claims held:

1. That Schiffer was the real and beneficial claimant in this suit, although Cutner was the nominal one.

2. That the pretended transfer of the cotton by Cutner to Schiffer, on 6th March, 1865, was in violation of the nonintercourse acts of Congress and the President's proclamations made subsequent thereto, and therefore inoperative to clothe the real claimant, Schiffer, with a valid title to the cotton, or to vest in him a right to the proceeds thereof. The court accordingly dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal.

Messrs. A. G. Riddle and A. L. Merriman, for the appellant: There was no violation of the law restricting commercial intercourse in this transaction. However the subject of † 13 Id. 876, 8 4.

* 12 Stat. at Large, 1262.

Opinion of the court.

sale is described in the bill of sale, the property sold was a claim against the United States for thirty bales of cotton or the proceeds of them, and, as a matter of course, was situated at the seat of government. Then the purchasers were、 loyal citizens of a loyal State, and being such, could not be presumed to have intended to send the fruits of such contract to the aid of the insurrectionary government, even if it were possible (which it was not) to have obtained the subject-matter of the trade from the government before sale thereof.

Messrs. G. H. Williams, Attorney-General, and C. H. Hill, Assistant Attorney-General, contra:

In any view the sale was unlawful. The State of Georgia, in which Savannah was, had been declared by a proclamation of the President, "in a state of insurrection against the United States." Though occupied by our forces, the "state of hostility still continued." The case comes, therefore, within the act of July 13th, 1861. It comes also within the later act of July 2d, 1864; for the sale and purchase the "commercial dealing"-was made "with each other" by and between parties "being within districts within the lines of National military occupation, in a State declared in insurrection.”

Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. Intercourse between the inhabitants of the two belligerent sections was still prohibited when this sale was made. It was, therefore, clearly illegal, unless Schiffer & Co. had a license to trade in Savannah, which the case expressly finds they had not. The sale being illegal, the suit cannot be sustained for the benefit of the vendees. It cannot be sustained for Cutner's own benefit, because he received the full consideration of the cotton and has no interest remaining. DECREE AFfirmed.

Statement of the case.

BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS v. COLUMBIA COLLEGE ET AL.

1. A personal judgment, rendered in one State against several parties jointly, upon service of process on some of them, or their voluntary appearance, and upon publication against the others, is not evidence outside of the State where rendered of any personal liability to the plaintiff of the parties proceeded against by publication.

2. The clause of the Federal Constitution which requires full faith and credit to be given in each State to the records and judicial proceedings of every other State, applies to the records and proceedings of courts only so far as they have jurisdiction. Wherever they want jurisdiction the records are not entitled to credit.

3. No greater effect can be given to any judgment of a court of one State in another State than is given to it in the State where rendered. So held in a case where a party, relying upon a decree of an inferior State court, objected to the character given to the decree as interlocutory by the highest appellate court of that State, and insisted that it should be treated as a final decree.

4. A court of equity will not exercise its jurisdiction to reach the property of a debtor applicable to the payment of his debts, unless the debt be clear and undisputed, and there exist some special circumstances requiring the interposition of the court to obtain possession of, and apply the property.

5. This rule should be insisted upon with rigor whenever the property sought to be reached constitutes assets of a deceased debtor, which have already been subjected to administration and distribution; and some satisfactory excuse should be given for the failure of the creditor to present his claim, in the mode prescribed by law, to the representative of the estate, before distribution.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

This was a suit in equity to reach property belonging to the estate of a deceased debtor, and have it applied to the demand of creditors, and particularly funds distributed by the executor of the estate of the deceased to legatees.

The facts of the case were as follows:

In July, 1853, the firm of Selden, Withers & Co., which was engaged in the business of banking in the city of Washington, entered into a contract with the Board of Public Works of Virginia, to sell on its account certain bonds of

Statement of the case.

the State of Virginia, which had been issued for public improvements. In pursuance of this contract, the firm received from the complainant at different times bonds of the State amounting to over $4,000,000. In November, 1854, the firm suspended payment, being in insolvent circumstances, and made an assignment of its partnership assets to trustees for the benefit of its creditors. It was at the time indebted in a large amount to the complainant for the proceeds of bonds sold and not accounted for. The firm consisted of five partners, named Selden, Withers, Latham, Bayne, and Whiting; the two former having been of Alexandria, Virginia, the others mostly of Washington.

In December following, the said board instituted an action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, against the members of the firm, to compel them to account for bonds deposited with them, and to pay the proceeds received from their sale. In this action personal service of process was made upon two of the partners, Latham and Bayne. Whiting, another partner, voluntarily appeared by attorney. The other two partners, Selden and Withers, were not personally served, and did not appear in the action. Being non-residents of the State, only a constructive service by publication was made upon them. The answer of Bayne, which was filed in 1856, alleged various set-offs, and (referring to the general assignment of the partnership in 1854, and to that of Withers in 1855) set up for a further and separate defence, that since the filing of the bill there had been assigned to the said Board of Public Works, or to persons for it, bonds, real estate, and other property (which it alleged that the said board had accepted and received), to an amount sufficient to extinguish and satisfy the balance. The action proceeded on the pleadings to judgment, which was rendered in March, 1857, against all the partners for upwards of $500,000, including the allowance to the attorneys aud

costs.

In January, 1855, the defendant Withers, professing a desire, so far as he was able, to furnish sufficient security out of his private means for any balance of the debt of the firm

Statement of the case.

that might remain unsatisfied from the partnership assets, conveyed to Bocock, the Attorney-General of Virginia, and one Wylie, a resident of that State, in trust for that purpose, certain real property situated in Alexandria, Virginia, and in St. Louis, Missouri, and certain shares in the Cumberland Coal Company. The nominal value of the property thus conveyed exceeded $250,000.

In September, 1858, the said board instituted a suit in equity in the Circuit Court of Alexandria County, in Virginia, against the members of the firm, their assignees, and the trustees, Bocock and Wylie, to obtain a decree against all the partners for the amount due from them, and for the sale of the property conveyed by Withers to Bocock and Wylie, and the application of the proceeds to the payment of the debt. In this suit two of the partners, Selden and Withers, were personally served with process; the other partners being non-residents of Virginia, were proceeded against by publication. Withers filed an answer, setting up, among other things, the recovery by the complainant of the judgment in the New York Supreme Court against his copartners upon the same causes of action, insisting that those causes were merged in that judgment; and also that the partnership assets in the bands of the assignees exceeded in amount the indebtedness of the firm, and that his individual property conveyed to the trustees, Bocock and Wylie, could not be subjected to sale until the trusts of the deed to the assignees were fully executed. This defence does not appear to have made much impression upon the Circuit Court, for on the same day on which the answer was filed, it rendered its decree that the complainants recover against all the partners, as well against those brought in by publication as those personally served, the sum of $513,615; this sum having been ascertained and reported as due from them by a commissioner previously appointed in the case. decree, which was made June 1st, 1860, was accompanied by a direction that unless the amount was paid before the 1st of December following, the property conveyed by Withers to the trustees, Bocock and Wylie, should be sold and the

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