Opinion of the court. satisfied."* And this rule is repeated by this court in Harrey v. Tyler,† where it is said: "It is a rule of construction that all statutes are to be considered prospective, unless the language is express to the contrary, or there is a necessary implication to that effect." The plaintiff contends that the application of this rule to the statute in question would have the effect of restricting its application to actions accruing after the passage of the act. But this is not a necessary conclusion. A statute of limitations may undoubtedly have effect upon actions which have already accrued as well as upon actions which accrue after its passage. Whether it does so or not will depend upon the language of the act, and the apparent intent of the legislature to be gathered therefrom. When a statute declares generally that no action, or no action of a certain class shall be brought, except within a certain limited time after it shall have accrued, the language of the statute would make it apply to past actions as well as to those arising in the future. But if an action accrued more than the limited time before the statute was passed a literal interpretation of the statute would have the effect of absolutely barring such action at once. It will be presumed that such was not the intent of the legislature. Such an intent would be unconstitutional. To avoid such a result, and to give the statute a construction that will enable it to stand, courts have given it a prospective operation. In doing this, three different modes have been adopted by different courts. One is to make the statute apply only to causes of action arising after its passage. But as this construction leaves all actions existing at the passage of the act, without any limitation at all (which, it is presumed, could not have been intended), another rule adopted is, to construe the statute as applying to such existing actions only as have already run out a portion of the statutory time, but which still have a reasonable time left for prosecution before the statutory time expireswhich reasonable time is to be estimated by the court-leav * United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch, 413. 2 Wallace, 347. Opinion of the court. ing all other actions accruing prior to the statute unaffected by it. The latter rule does not seem to be founded on any better principle than the former. It still leaves a large class of actions entirely unprovided with any limitation whatever, or, as to them, is unconstitutional, and is a more arbitrary rule than the first. A third construction is that which was adopted by the court below in this case, and which we regard as much more sound than either of the others. It was substantially adopted by this court in the cases of Ross v. Du-val and Lewis v. Lewis.† In those cases certain statutes of limitation-one in Virginia and the other in Illinois-had originally excepted from their operation non-residents of the State, but this exception had been afterwards repealed; and this court held that the non-resident parties had the full statutory time to bring their actions after the repealing acts were passed, although such actions may have accrued at an earlier period. "The question is," says C. J. Taney (speaking in the latter of the cases just cited), "from what time is this limitation to be calculated? Upon principle, it would seem to be clear, that it must commence when the cause of action is first subjected to the operation of the statute, unless the legislature has otherwise provided." It is true, that in the subsequent case of Murray v. Gibson,‡ this court followed the decisions of the Supreme Court of Mississippi in its construction of a statute of that State, and held that it applied only to actions accruing after the statute was passed. But that decision was made in express deference to those of the State court, which were regarded as authoritative. In the present case we are not bound by any decisive construction of the State court on this point. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 13 Peters, 62. 7 Howard, 778. 15 Id. 421. Statement of the case. UNITED STATES V. LAPÈne. In February, 1862, while the whole State of Louisiana, including the city of New Orleans, was under the civil and military control of the rebels of the late rebellion, a mercantile firm in New Orleans sent their agent into certain interior parishes of the State to collect, money due to the firm and to make purchases of cotton. After the agent had got into the interior parishes, but before he had bought any cotton, the city of New Orleans, where his principals were, was captured (April 27th, 1862), by the forces of the United States, and remained from that time under the control of the government, the interior parishes, however, still remaining in the control of the rebels. Subsequently to this the agent made purchases of cotton from persons in these interior parishes, still, as just said, under the control of the rebels. Held that the firm was guilty of trading with the enemy, and that the property was rightly taken by the Federal government. APPEAL from the Court of Claims; the case being thus: "On the 20th of February, 1862, while the whole State of Louisiana, including the city of New Orleans, was in the possession and under the control of the rebels, Lapène & Ferré, a mercantile firm in the said city, sent their travelling clerk from the said city of New Orleans into certain parishes in the interior of the State, to collect moneys due to the firm there, and gave him authority to purchase sugar and cotton for the firm. "In March or April, 1862, they requested one Aveguo, who was then going from New Orleans to the said parishes, to remit to their said clerk the sum of $5000, and to assist the said clerk in the business of buying sugar and cotton. Avegno agreed to do this; and, in pursuance of his agreement, did deliver the said sum to the said clerk, in the said interior parishes, then in the possession and under the control of the rebels. "While the said clerk and the said Avegno were in the said parishes, on the 27th day of April, 1862, the city of New Orleans was captured by the United States forces, and thenceforth through the whole term of the rebellion was held by those forces. 66 Opinion of the court. After the said capture, the said clerk with the said sum of $5000 and other moneys collected by him in the said parishes, which parishes were, when the purchases were made, in the possession and under the control of the rebels, bought in different lots a quantity of cotton, and left it at the places where it was purchased. "He returned from those parishes to New Orleans on the 14th of July, 1862, There was no evidence of any communication having been had between him and Lapène & Ferré, in relation to the said purchases of cotton, between the capture of New Orleans and his own return to that city, except the aforesaid delivery to him by Avegno of the said $5000. "The cotton so purchased remained at the points at which it was purchased until April and May, 1863, when it was captured by military forces of the United States and shipped to and received by the Federal authorities at New Orleans.” Hereupon Lapène & Ferré filed a petition in the Court of Claims, claiming the cotton or the proceeds of it as their property; and the Court of Claims decreed that it belonged to them. From this decree the United States took the present appeal. Mr. S. F. Phillips, Solicitor-General, for the appellant, relied on Griswold v. Waddington,* United States v. Grossmayer,† and Montgomery v. United States.‡ Mr. W. P. Clarke, contra, sought to distinguish the case from the cases mentioned, and relied on United States v. Anderson.§ Mr. Justice HUNT delivered the opinion of the court. All commercial contracts with the subjects or in the territory of the enemy, whether made directly by one in person, or indirectly through an agent, who is neutral, are illegal and void. This principle is now too well settled to justify * 15 Johnson, 57; 16 Id. 438. 9 Wallace, 72. ? 9 Id. 56. Opinion of the court. discussion.* No property passes and no rights are acquired under such contracts. In March, 1862, the whole of the State of Louisiana wast in the military possession of the Confederate forces. Intercourse between the inhabitants of the different portions thereof was legal, and contracts made between them were legal. On the 27th of April, in the same year, the city of New Orleans was captured by the military forces of the United States, and thereafter remained under their control. From that time commercial intercourse between the inhabitants of that city and the inhabitants of other portions of the State of Louisiana which remained under the Confederate rule became illegal. Ordinarily the line of non-intercourse is the boundary line between the territories of contending nations. The recent war in the United States was a civil war, in which portions of the same nation were engaged in hostile strife with each other. The State of Louisiana, although one of the United States, was under the control of the Confederate government and their armies, and was an enemy's country. While the city of New Orleans was under such control it was a portion of an enemy's country. When that city was captured by the forces of the United States, the line of non-intercourse was changed, and traffic before legal became illegal. This line was that of military occupation or control by the forces of the different governments, and not that of State lines. This principle was expressly decided in Montgomery v. United States. There the cotton sold was in the parish of La Fourche, a parish of the State of Louisiana, and belonged to Johnson, an enemy domiciled in an enemy's country; to wit, the parish of La Fourche, in the same State. The sale was made by an agent of Johnson, in the city of New Orleans, to Montgomery, a British subject. This court held the sale to be void and that no title passed to Johnson. Like that in Montgomery's case, the agency here was cre * Woolsey's International Law, 117; Montgomery v. United States, 15 Wallace, 395. + Supra. |