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EQUITY. See Laches; Parties; Partnership.
1. Capital stock or shares of a corporation--especially the unpaid sub-

scriptions to such stock or shares-constitute a trust fund for the
benefit of the general creditors of the corporation, and this trust can-
not be defeated by a simulated payment of the stock subscription, nor
by any device short of an actual payment in good faith. Sawyer v.

Hoag, Assignee, 610.
2. Equity will not exercise its jurisdiction to reach the property of a

debtor applicable to the payment of his debts, unless the debt be
clear and undisputed, and there exist some special circumstances re-
quiring the interposition of the court to obtain possession of, and apply

the property. Board of Public Works v. Columbia College, 521.
3. A decree in, reversed, as made on evidence not competent and in the

face of answers responsive to the biil. Moore v. Huntington, 417.
4. Where a cross-bill and answers are filed in a case, and the decree un-

dertakes to dispose of the whole case, it should dispose of the issues
raised in them. Ib.

ERROR. See Court and Jury; Practice, 11-14.
ESTOPPEL. See Recitals.
This subject largely investigated, and the nature and effect, extent and

limits of estoppels, both legal and equitable, defined. Branson v.
Worth, 32.

EVIDENCE. See Deposition; Estoppel; Judgment; Necessaries in a For-

eign Port, 1; North Carolina, 1; Practice, 1, 3; Res Judicata, 2.
1. Conversations occurring during the negotiation of a loan, or other

transaction, as well as the instruments given or received, being part
of the res gesta, are original evidence and competent to show the
nature of the transaction, and the parties for whose benefit it was

made, where that fact is material. Bank v. Kennedy, 19.
2. Where the cashier of a bank effects a loan, and it becomes material to

ascertain whether it was made for his own account or for the use of
the bank, evidence of the negotiation and circumstances may be given
for that purpose, whatever may be the form of the securities given
or received, when the latter are introduced only collaterally in the

16.
3. When papers or documents are introduced collaterally in the trial of a
cause, the

purpose and object for which they were made, and the rea-
son why they were made in a particular form, may be explained by

parol evidence. 16.
4. The purpose or quality of an act may be stated by a witness who was

present and cognizant of the whole transaction, as whether the de-
livery of money by one man to ánother was by way of payment or

otherwise. 16.
5. Parol, how far received to explain a bill of lading. The Star of Hope,

651.
6. Parol, inadmissible to show how all the parties in interest understood

a long and rather intricate transaction, from its commencement to its

cause.

VOL. XVII.

EVIDENCE (continued).

consummation; the same being all in writing. Bailey v. kailroad

Company, 96; and see Bank v. Kennedy, 19.
7. Evidence of fraud, not required to be more direct and positive than that

of facts and circumstances tending to the conclusion that it has been

practiced. Rea v. Missouri, 532.
8. A memorandum found upon the record of a patent and put there by

some unknown person eight years after the patent had issued is inad-

missible to contradict the record. Branson v. Worth, 82.
9. Evidence of a vendor of land, being positive, is sufficient to rebut a

presumption, arising from taking a note with surety for the payment
of the purchase-money of the land, that the vendor's lien had been

displaced. Cordova v. Hood, 1.
10. A decree in equity reversed as made on evidence not competent and in

the face of answers responsive to the bill. Moore v. Huntington, 417.
11. On a question by a creditor of A. of a fraudulent assertion by B., of

ownership of goods levied on as A.'s, any statements made by B. in
the absence of C., which are afterwards assented to by the latter or

were part of the res gesta, are evidence. Rea v. Missouri, 532.
12. Ordinarily, a witness who testifies to an affirmative is entitled to credit

in preference to one who testifies to a negative. Stitt v. Huide kopers,

384.
13. When one party gives notice to another to produce on trial a written

instrument, and the party who so receives the notice produces and
offers to veriry it by his oath, the other party cannot refuse to use
that puper and introduce a copy in the first instance, on the allegation
that the first is not genuine, although he might show wherein it was

erroneous or defective after it was once introduced. Ib.
14. Although a written agreement between persons not parties to the suit

may, as a general rule, be contradicted or explained by oral testi-
mony, this does not apply to an attempt to make good by parol evi.
dence contract which the law requires to be made in writing to

make it valid. Ib.
15. In an action of ejectment, a letter of the plaintiff's grantor, written to

the ancestor of the defendant, is not competent evidence to show that
the ancestor entered into possession under the license of the plaintiff's
grantor, without some evidence that such letter was received or acted
on about the time of such entry. by the ancestor. Smiths v. Shoe-

maker, 630.
16. The mere fact that the date found on the letter corresponds with the

time of such entry, is not of itself sufficient to show that the letter was

written at that time. Ib.
17. Where the purpose is to impeach a witness, the proper question is what

is the general “reputation" for truth of the witness ? rather than

what is general “ character" for truth? Knode v. Williamson, 587.
18. The extent to which a cross-examination is carried not reviewable on

Rea v. Missouri, 532.
FINAL DECREE. See Supersedeas.

The order of seizure and sale called "executory process," made in Louis-

error.

FINAL DECREE (continued).

iana when the mortgage " imports a confession of judgment,” is in
substance a decree of foreclosure and sale, and therefore a “ final de-
cree;''. especially when made after objections have been made and

heard. Marin v. Lalley, 14.
FORECLOSURE. See Appeal, 1; Final Decree.
FOREIGN VESSEL. See Navigation Laws.
FRAUD.
1. Evidence of it not required to be more direct and positive than facts

and circumstances tending to the inference of it. Rea v. Missouri, 582.
2. Where a creditor of B. levied on certuin goods as B.'s for which C. in-

terposed a claim of ownership, held that an intimate personal and
business relation between B. and C. having been shown, it was error
to instruct the jury that it was immaterial as to the ownership of the
goods how C. acquired his means, or whether his exhibit of them was

correct or not. Ib.
FRAUD ON REVENUE.
A device to avoid the revenue acts, and whose operation does avoid them,

is subject to no legal censure if the device be carried out by means of

legal forms. United States v. Isham, 496.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. See Fraud.
Under the statute of frauds of Missouri, a sale of household furniture in

a house occupied jointly by vendor and vendee, both using the furni-
ture alike, and there being no other change of possession than that the
vendor, after going around with the vendee and looking at the furni-
ture and agreeing on the price, turned it over to the vendee and exe-
cuted a bill of sale before a notary, both parties then, after the sale,
occupying the house and using the furniture exactly as before, is void

as against the vendor's creditors. Allen v. Massey, 352.
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR. See Contract, 2, 3, 5.
IMPEACHING WITNESS. See Witness, 1.
IMPLIED CONTRACT.
Where a person has unlawfully procured and sold securities belonging to

another, the principal and interest of which is capable of being ascer-
tained by computation, the owner from whom they have been taken,
may waive the fraud in the conversion of the bonds, and claim as on

an implied contract. Allen v. United States, 207.
INCOME TAX. See Internal Revenue, 3, 4.
INDIAN TRIBES. See Cherokees; Breach of Condition.
Capable of taking as owners in fce simple by purchase from the United

States; and a sale to them is properly made by treaty. Holden v. Joy,

211.
INDICTMENT.
Where a statute defining an offence contains an exception, in the enacting

clause of the statute, which is so incorporated with the language defin-

INDICTMENT (continued).

ing the offence, that the ingredients of the offence cannot be accu-
rately and clearly described if the exception is omitted, an indictment
foucded upon the statute must allege enough to show that the ac-
cused is not within the exception. But if the language of the section
defining the offence is so entirely separable from the exception, that
the ingredients constituting the offence may be accurately and clearly
defined without any reference to the exception, the indictment may
omit any such reference. The matter contained in the exception is
matter of defence, and to be shown by the accused. United States v.

Cook, 168.
INDORSER. See Negotiable Paper.
INFANT.
Need not himself have been free from fault to entitle him to recover dam-

ages resulting from the fault of another. Railroad Company v. Stout,

657.
INSOLVENT CORPORATION. See Equity, 1.
INTEREST.
Where allowed, not under contract, but by way of damages, the rate must

be according to the lex fori. Goddard v. Foster, 124.
INTERNAL REVENUE. See Trespass.
1. The words " memorandum, check,” in that part of the schedule of in-

struments required by the statute of June 30th, 1864 (13 Stat. at
Large, p. 298, 2 158), to be stamped, which in the printed statute-books
are printed with a comma between them, should read,“ memorandum-
check," with a hyphen instead of a comma. United States v. Isham,

496.
2. In settling whether an instrument should be stamped or not, regard is

to be bad to its form, rather than to its operation. Though the form
adopted may be a device to avoid the revenue acts, and though it may
avoid them, yet if the device be carried out by means of legal forms

it is subject to no legal censure. 1b.
3. Under the 116th, 119th, and 122d sections of the Internal Revenue Act

of June 30th, 1864, as subsequently amended, the interest due or divi-
dends declared by any railroad or canal company, &c., which accrued
prior to the 1st of January, 1870, were taxable under the act, though

payable on or after the date named. Barnes v. The Railroads, 294.
4. This tax is a tax on the creditor and not upon the corporation. United

States v. Railroad Company, 322.
5. Under the 110th section of the internal revenue act of 1864, as amended

by the act of July 13th, 1866, taxing deposits in banks, an entry
made in the depositor's pass-book of a deposit or payment, is “a cer-
tificate of deposit,” or “ check," or " draft” within the meaning of

the section. Oulton v. Savings Institution, 109.
6. Under the proviso to that section, savings banks are not exempt from

taxation if they have a capital stock, or if they do any other business
than receiving deposits to be lent or invested for the sole benefit of
the person making such deposits. Ib.

INTERNAL REVENUE (continued).
7. The fact that, by an agreement between the savings bank and the de.

positor, money deposited with the bank shall be reimbursed only out
of the first disposable funds that shall come into the hands of the
bank after demand, being a regulation adopted but for an emergency,
and not such as essentially impairs the just claim of a depositor, does

not change the case. Oulton v. Savings Institution, 109.
8. Under the 20th section of the act of July 20th, 1868, entitled “ An act

imposing taxes on distilled spirits,” &c., in the absence of a dis-
tiller’s having appealed to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (as
under the 10th section of the act he may do), for the correction of any
error made by the assessor in fixing the “true producing capacity"
of his distillery, it is lawful for the government to assess and collect,
as for a deficiency, the taxes upon the difference between the said
"producing capacity” as estimated by the assessor and the amount of
spirits actually produced by such distillery, even though the distiller
have in good faith reported and paid taxes upon his whole produc-
tion, and though such production have exceeded 80 per centum of the

producing capacity aforesaid. The Collector v. Beggs, 182.
INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT.
Not to be governed by what either party to the contract understood or be-

lieved, unless such understanding or belief was induced by the con-
duct or declarations of the other party. Bank v. Kennedy, 19; and

see Bailey v. Railroad Company, 96.
INTERPRETATION OF LANGUAGE. See Construction, Rules of.
JUDGMENT. See Appearance; Res Judicata.
On a note or contract operates as a merger of it; and when the judgment is

binding personally it can be introduced in evidence, and relied on as

a bar to a second suit on the note. Eldred v. Bank, 545.
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY. See Precedent, Value of.
JUDICIAL COMITY. See Rebellion, 2.
1. In the construction of the statutes of a State, and especially those affect-

ing titles to real property, where no Federal question arises, this court
follows the adjudications of the highest court of the State, whatever
may be the opinion of this court of its soundness. Walker v. The State

Harbor Commissioners, 648; and see Allen v. Massey, 351.
2. A personal judgment, rendered in one State against several parties

jointly, upon service of process on some of them, or their voluntary
appearance, and upon publication against the others, is not evidence
outside of the State where rendered of any personal liability to the
pluintiff of the parties proceeded against by publication. Board of

Public Works v. Columbia College, 521.
JURISDICTION. See Appeal; Constitutional Law, 2, 3.

I. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TIIE UNITED STATES.

(a) It has jurisdiction-
1. Under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, as well as under that of

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