Opinion of the court.

and execution of the contracts, and the sums due or to become due upon the same, and upon all other questions arising out of the contracts between the contractors and the government. Whether the claimant ever appeared before the commission does not appear, but it does appear that the commissioners, on the 15th of May, in the same year, without the consent and against the remonstrance of the claimaut, decided and reported to the chief of ordnance that the contract of the claimant be confirmed, subject to all its terms, to the extent of 30,000 muskets, upon the condition that he, the claimant, shall, within fifteen days after notice of the decision, execute a bond, with good and sufficient sureties,, in the form and with the stipulations prescribed by law and the regulations in such cases, for the performance of the contract as thus modified, and that the contract shall be declared null and of no effect in case he fails or refuses to execute such a bond. Due notice was given of the decision to the claimant, and the chief of ordnance transmitted to him the draft of the contract and bond contemplated by the decision, with the request that he would execute and file the same within fifteen days from their receipt if he should accept the contract as confirmed by the commission, and the finding of the Court of Claims shows that he executed the written contract whereby he contracted and engaged to furnish to the United States 30,000 muskets of the Springfield pattern; and the Court of Claims also finds that the contract was performed by both parties, and that no other muskets were ever furnished to the United States by the claimant.

Much discussion of the case is certainly unnecessary, as it is as clear as any proposition of fact well can be, that the claimant voluntarily accepted the modification of the contract as suggested by the commissioners, and that he executed the new contract in its place, which he must have understood was intended to define the obligations of both parties. His counsel suggest that he accepted the new contract without relinquishing his claim for damages, arising from the refusal of the United States to allow him to fur

Opinion of the court.

nish the whole 100,000 muskets, but the court is unable to adopt that theory, as it is quite clear that he could not have acted with any such motives consistent with good faith towards the War Department, as he must have known that the chief of ordnance supposed when he, the claimant, returned the written contract duly executed, that the whole matter in difference was adjusted to the satisfaction of all concerned. Parties are bound to good faith in their dealings with the United States as well as with individuals, and the court is of the opinion that no party in such a case could be justified, after accepting such a compromise and executing such discharge, in claiming damages for a breach of the prior contract which had been voluntarily modified and surrendered, unless the new contract was accepted under protest or with notice that damages would be claimed for the refusal of the United States to allow the claimant to fulfil the contract which was modified in the new arrangement.

It is contended by the appellant that the case is different in principle from the case of United States v. Adams,* and the other casest of a corresponding character decided by this court, and the court is inclined to the same opinion, as it is a plain case of voluntary adjustment between the parties, which all courts hold is final and conclusive. None of those cases proceed upon the ground that such a commission possessed any judicial power to bind the parties by their decision, or to give the decision any conclusive effect. Nor can such a commission compel a claimaut to appear before them and litigate his claim, but if he does appear and prosecute it, or subsequently accepts the terms awarded as a final .settlement of the controversy, without protest, he must be understood as having precluded himself from further litigation.

Attempt is made in argument to show that the adjustment in this case, so far as the claimant is concerned, was the result of duress, but the charge is wholly unsupported by evi

* 7 Wallace, 463.

United States v. Child, 12 Wallace, 232; United States v. Justice, 14 Id.

Opinion of the Chief Justice, dissenting.

dence of any kind, except that the United States proposed to annul the old contract if the claimant refused to accept the modification, which is wholly insufficient to establish such a charge.

Apart from that, it is also suggested that the claimant at that time could have no remedy by suit against the United States, as the transaction preceded the passage of the law establishing the Court of Claims. But he might have applied to Congress for relief, as all other claimants were compelled to do from the organization of the government until the law was passed allowing such parties to prosecute suits against the United States.

Duress, if proved, may be a defence to an action, and it would doubtless be sufficient to relieve a party from the effect of compromise which was procured by such means, but the burden of proof to establish the charge, in every such case, is upon the party making it, and if he fails to introduce any such evidence to support it, the presumption is that the charge is without any foundation.* Acceptance from the government of a smaller sum than the one claimed, even in a case where the amount relinquished is large, does not leave the government open to further claim on the ground. of duress, if the acceptance was without intimidation and with a full knowledge of all the circumstances; and the case is not changed because the circumstances attending the transaction were such that the claimant was induced from the want of the money to accept the smaller sum in full, which is not proved in this case.†

Examined in any point of view we think the decision of the Court of Claims is correct.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting:

DECREE AFFIRMED.

I am unable to concur in the opinion just read. The original contract was honestly and fairly made without taint of

* United States v. Hodson, 10 Wallace, 409; Brown v. Pierce, 7 Id. 214; Baker v. Morton, 12 Id. 157.

United States v. Child, 12 Wallace, 232.

Statement of the case.

fraud. This is not disputed. Large preparation at great expense was made by the claimant for the fulfilment of it on his part. It was violated by the United States without reasonable cause, as I think, as expressly found by the Court of Claims, without the consent, and against the remonstrances of the claimant. A modified contract, so called, but really a second contract, was then made between the parties, which was fulfilled on both sides; but there is nothing to show that this contract was freely made, or made at all by the claimant in place of the first, or that payment of the sums due under it from the United States was accepted by him in satisfaction of damages for the breach of the first. I think that the United States are not absolved in their dealings with citizens from the obligations of honesty by which individuals are usually controlled, and that the claimant is entitled to damages.

[See the case next following.]

SWEENY V. UNITED STATES.

The doctrine of United States v. Clyde (13 Wallace, 35), of Mason v. United States (supra, p. 67), and of other cases, affirmed, and the doctrine redeclared and applied, that where a claim is disputed by the government, and the claimant accepts a certain sum in settlement thereof and gives a receipt in full therefor, it is a bar to a subsequent action in the Court of Claims for any residue asserted to be due.

APPEAL from the Court of Claims; the case being thus: One Sweeny, owner of a steamer, chartered her at Louisville, March 3d, 1863, to the United States (the assistant quartermaster of the military department where she was, signing the charter-party in behalf of the government), at $175 per day; no term of service being specified. On the 10th the per diem was increased, in writing, to $200, and was

Statement of the case.

so paid till the 20th March. In that month she was ordered and went into another military department; and came under the control of an assistant quartermaster at St. Louis, Captain Parsons, under whose control she remained till the 17th of September, when she was discharged.

It was not conceded by Captain Parsons that the steamer was retained in the service under the charter-party. On the contrary, her account was stated by him on the 15th of September, 1863 (running from the 21st of March to the 31st of July, 1863), at $140 a day. This account was paid by him, and receipted for by the owner of the boat on the 22d of October following. Subsequent accounts for subsequent services were also stated and paid by Captain Parsons, and receipted for by the owners of the boat, none of which accounts or receipts referred in terms to any charter-party. The owner remonstrated at the rate allowed, and, on the 19th of December, 1863, a settlement was made with him by Captain Parsons, by allowing to him, from the 21st of March to the 31st of August, $5 per day, which amount was received and receipted for by the claimant, "as in full of the above account," being the account for the steamer's services.

But no release under seal was executed by the claimant, nor was any other consideration given by the government than that expressed of $5 per day for the term named.

Sweeny now filed a petition in the Court of Claims, asking for compensation at the charter rate of $200 per day for the one hundred and eighty-one days, between the 20th of March and the 17th of September.

The Court of Claims dismissed the petition on the ground that the demand of the claimant was a doubtful and disputed claim, which might be the subject of a valid parol compromise, and that the payment of the $5 a day for the term named, constituted a valid and binding compromise, which barred the claimant's action. From this action of the

Court of Claims the owner of the vessel appealed.

Mr. James Hughes, for the appellant; Mr. C. H. Hill, Assistant Attorney-General, contra.