ther-country. To give an idea of the indignation which the First Consul must have felt, it may suffice to mention that Toussaint not only assumed authority over the colony during his life, but invested himself with the right of naming his successor; and pretended to hold his authority, not from the mothercountry, but from a soi-disant colonial assembly which he had created: and as ToussaintLouverture was the most moderate of all the black generals; as Dessalines, Christophe, Clervaux, &c. were more violent, disaffected, and hostile to the authority of the mothercountry, there was no longer room for deliberation. The former scheme was now impracticable: it was inevitably necessary to adopt the latter, and to make the sacrifice which it required.

NOTE II.

VOL. II. CHAP. XI.

Colonel Vincent's connexions with the blacks, and the confidence which Toussaint-Louverture reposed in him, had long excited the suspicion of government, although it continued to employ this officer for the purpose of influencing the blacks, and convincing them, as far as possible, of its good intentions towards them. But when he presented himself as bearer of the decla

ration of independence published by the blacks, and even seemed inclined to defend it, he excited a sentiment of disgust, which was, however, dissembled, in order to avoid alarming Toussaint, and to collect the valuable information which this Colonel possessed, respecting the military position of the blacks, and the fortifications which they had constructed in the hills. As soon as this was effected, Colonel Vincent was ordered to keep himself, for the future, a stranger to the affairs of Saint-Domingo: he was placed at the disposal of the minister at war, to be employed in his military duties; and as he wished to be sent to a warm country, he obtained the direction of the fortifications of Tuscany. He afterwards attended as director of fortifications, for several years successively, at the January council of works which was held in presence of the Emperor: he there got his plans adopted for the chateaux Despresides, of Florence, Leghorn, and Porto-Ferrajo. He was partial to Florence, where one of his daughters was married. All this ought not to have given rise to libellous assertions which disgrace an historical work. The First Consul could not possibly have communicated his projects respecting Saint-Domingo, which required profound secrecy, and were to be exe

cuted in a few months; to a person who was the agent of Toussaint, and whose secret machinations were no longer a mystery. He could not possibly have imparted to him his negotiations with the Court of London, and that with respect to the expedition of Saint-Domingo, and by a preparatory note; since neither notes, conferences, nor negotiations with England, relative to the expedition of Saint-Domingo, ever passed, or took place.

NOTE III.

VOL. II. CHAP. XIII.

This contains the departure of the CaptainGeneral Le Clerc's army from France, its arrival at Saint-Domingo, and its subsequent operations. It is said:

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1st, That Napoleon had several functionaries of the colonies in his private cabinet, who drew up secret instructions, without ever calling in the experienced nautical officer who at that time held the portefeuille of the marine, to give his opinion, even on the naval details of the expedition: he had nothing to do but to sign as a true copy, the instructions already approved and signed by the First Consul; that the time occupied by the fleets of Brest, Rochefort, and L'Orient, in rallying at Cape Samana, prevented the expedition from surprising Toussaint-Louverture; 2dly, That the negotiations set on foot by the Cabinet of Saint-Cloud with foreign ́Cabinets, relative to the expedition, had made known the details of the plan; 3dly, That the secret instructions for

the expedition of Saint-Domingo contained a positive order to admit of no vacillation in the principles of their execution; which was the reason that General Le Clerc was obliged to lose a day in effecting the landing and surprising the Cape: -that the d-propos is every thing in war—and that it is always dangerous to prescribe the details of measures in the instructions, &c. &c."

Throughout this business the First Consul acted only through the medium of his ministers. Had he not placed confidence in Decrès, the minister of marine, what could have prevented him from dismissing that minister and selecting another? Was it the influence which he possessed over the constituted authorities, or the nation; the naval victories he had gained; or the great affection which the navy had for him? Absurd. This minister drew up all the naval instructions. If he judged it necessary to appoint three rallying points for the squadrons of Brest, L'Orient, and Rochefort; the first at Cape Finisterre, the second at the Canaries, the third at Cape Samana, it was because such was the usage in his time, and particularly in the war of 1778. Were a minister to sign instructions contrary to his opinion and experience, he would be the most base and infamous of men. Why, then, calumniate an old minister and general officer, in an historical work, by attempting to justify

him? An injudicious friend is often more dangerous than an enemy.

Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse was forty-six days on his passage from Brest to the Cape, that is to say, four or five days more than the average passage of a convoy; but this circumstance is of no importance with respect to the burning of the Cape, and the fate of Saint-Domingo. It was impossible to surprise Toussaint-Louverture: the armaments which had been making in the ports of France had attracted the attention of the whole world, and the blacks had agents and friends at Paris, Nantes, Bourdeaux, Rochefort, Antwerp, Amsterdam, and London. The American ships covered the ocean; not a day passed but several of them arrived in the ports of the colony. The American ships are fast sailers: besides a vessel sailing alone has a great advantage over a convoy, in point of expedition. The armament of Admiral Gantheaume at Brest, in January 1801, had put the blacks on their guard; from that time they had begun to erect fortifications in the interior, and to collect magazines of powder and provisions; they had also come to a resolution to burn the Cape and the towns, if they should be unable to defend them, and Their works had been

to retire to the hills.