pass the Lavis, directing his march on Trent, and menacing Bassano and Verona. It would have been impossible for the French army to extend itself on its right, whilst the Archduke continued on the upper Brenta; and the French would have been compelled to carry the war into the Tyrol, which would have been advantageous to the Archduke in three ways: 1st, it would have enabled him to unite his army twenty days earlier; for Inspruck is near the Rhine, whilst Conegliano and Sacile are at a great distance from that river; 2dly, it would have afforded him an advantageous field of battle in a country the population of which was devoted to him, and extremely enthusiastic; 3dly, it would have afforded him the means of concentrating his operations, and of receiving new reinforcements from the army of the Rhine. By this one error of assembling the army in Friuli, instead of the Tyrol, the Aulic Council exposed the capital to the enemy, and decided the fate of the war.

II. The position of the Archduke behind the Tagliamento and in front of Codroïbo, was bad: he ought to have posted himself at SaintDaniel, securing his retreat by the passes; thence he should have prevented Massena from getting to Tarvis before him. His retreat on

the lower Izonzo, and by the passes of Cividal, was a great error, Massena being already at Tarvis.

III. The division of Guieux did not advance upon the Torre, but upon Udina, Cividal, and Caporetto. The head-quarters were moved successively to Palma-Nuova and Gradisca, with the divisions of Bernadotte and Serrurier: the division of Massena was at Tarvis. It has been asked why the divisions of Bernadotte and Serrurier did not march upon Cividal to support the division of Guieux? Because the Archduke had marched two divisions and his parks by the defiles of Cividal, and the division of Guieux was sufficient to harass them. This corps, on arriving at Caporetto, would continue its march upon Tarvis, its first destination; it would then be lost, and compelled to lay down its arms, as in fact it afterwards was; or else it would descend the Izonzo, on learning that Massena was already at Tarvis, and march to Gorizia, to get into Carniola; in this case it would be requisite to be in force to march against it, to drive it upon Caporetto, where Guieux would have arrived, and to compel it to lay down its arms in the passes of Caporetto. All this chapter requires revision; the movements are not correctly de

scribed. The Archduke was at the battle of Tarvis. Napoleon preferred Gradisca to Gorizia, as a point of support, because the left bank of the Izonzo commands the right bank as far as the road to Montefalcone.

IV. The instructions of General Joubert required him, after forcing General Kerpen beyond the Brenner, to move to the right, to descend the valley of the Drave, and to rejoin the army at Villach. This movement was regular, because Joubert was not introduced into these operations until after the successes of the army on the Tagliamento, and did not march by his right on the Drave until the head-quarters were at Clagenfurth. Napoleon sent his Aide-de-camp Lavalette to Lienz, and afterwards General Zajonzeck to Spital, with some squadrons of dragoons to meet Joubert.

V. Victor's division was never intended to stay in Romania: it had been sent on the expedition to Rome; and time was requisite for its return. It was to take up a position on the Adige, to form the nucleus of a corps of observation against the Venetians. It was at Padua during the massacre of Verona, on the 18th of April. It would have been an extraordinary piece of folly indeed to have left troops in lower Italy.

VI. After the passage of the Tagliamento, Napoleon wrote to the Directory, that on the 15th of April, he should be in Germany, in the capital of Carinthia; that it was, therefore, necessary that the armies of the Sambre and Meuse, and of the Rhine and Moselle, consisting of 140,000 men, should march without delay, and take up a position on the Ens; that on their arrival on that river he would direct the combined movement of the three armies upon Vienna. The Directory replied, that it was about to order its armies of the Rhine to commence operations; that when Napoleon should receive its courier, hostilities would already have commenced. But on the 1st of April he received intelligence, at Clagenfurth, that he must not reckon upon the co-operation of the armies of the Rhine; that Hoche's army might possibly take the field, but that Moreau's forces were not in a condition to pass the Rhine. This information awakened many suspicions in his mind. He had concluded a treaty offensive and defensive with the King of Sardinia; had guaranteed to that prince his dominions; and had obtained from him a contingent of 10,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of cannon. This division, which he would have marched into Germany,

would have secured his rear: every Piedmontese soldier would have been a hostage to him. The Directory, without censuring this treaty, deferred its ratification so long, that the campaign opened before the army could be reinforced with this division of valuable troops. This circumstance was the more vexatious, as these 12,000 men, having been rendered serviceable, might become dangerous. Napoleon had also reason to complain of the influence exercised by the minister Quirini, who knew how to open gates with a golden key, and threw impediments in the way of the settlement of the affairs of Venice. He became convinced of the necessity of making peace, and wrote to the Archduke the letter so well known. All the Paris couriers he received up to the 18th of April, confirmed him in the idea that the armies of Germany would not move. He did not learn their passage of the Rhine until after the signature of the preliminaries of Leoben, which he would not have signed except in Vienna, had he known that the two French armies of the Rhine would take the field; even if they had not been to pass the Rhine until the month of May--that would have sufficed for him.