NOTES

ON THE FIRST EIGHT VOLUMES

OF THE WORK, INTITLED

SUMMARY OF MILITARY OCCURRENCES,

OR

HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE CAMPAIGNS

FROM 1799 TO 1814.*

It justi

THIS work is written with facility. fies its title. A great number of observations have been occasioned by its perusal in the four following Notes we shall however treat only of what relates, 1st, to the policy of Mr. Pitt; 2dly, to General Moreau; 3dly, to the naval armistice; 4thly, to the different assertions respecting the wars in Egypt.

NOTE I.-PITT'S POLICY.

VOL. III. PAGE 1, 1800.

"This celebrated minister, said he, speaking of Pitt, faithful to the principles of the old insular policy, admitted of no guarantee so long as France should possess Belgium, and the

*Précis des Evènemens Militaires; ou Essais Historiques su les Campagnes, de 1799 à 1814.

disposal of the maritime forces of Holland, and should retain a position hostile to England.-After the cession of the Low Countries to France, consented to by the House of Austria at the treaty of Campo Formio, the object of the war was lost to the English Government, which exerted every effort to regain it. Mr. Pitt was convinced that to wrest this fine conquest from the French, it was necessary to exhaust the resources of France, and to consume her by carrying into her bosom a war which the long-restrained fury of parties, and the indignation of humbled powers, must render for ever fatal to her, if she should become the theatre of its ravages. The conquest of Italy, and all the advantages gained by the Allies during the campaign of 1799, were insufficient to bring the retrocession of Belgium in question, because these successes were counterbalanced, on the Rhine by the victory of Zurich, and in the North by the failure of the expedition to the coast of Holland. The continuation of the war was therefore irrevocably determined on by the English ministry, before the overtures made by Bonaparte. These gave rise to animated debates in Parliament. The leading Opposition speakers traced the war to its original causes. They attributed its existence, its disasters, its intended perpetuation, to those who wished to establish the immutability of governments, and the irrevocable alienation of the sovereignty, as the fundamental basis of a social compact, for the maintenance of which all powers ought to be tributary for ever. Erskine, Fox, and Sheridan, distinguished themselves in this memorable discussion. In opposition to the doctrine of the governments of modern Europe, they adduced the most powerful arguments that could be drawn from the principles of natural and political rights, the spirit and progress of the age, the examples afforded by their own history, and the change of system in France, which they considered favourable to the reestablishment of peace."

I. 1st, Was it possible for the English minister to reject the overtures which were made to him by the First Consul, in 1800, without rendering himself responsible for the disasters of the war? 2dly, Was such rejection politic and conformable to the interest of the English nation? 3dly, Was war at that time desirable for France? 4thly, What was, under these circumstances, the interest of Napoleon?

Pitt refused to enter into a negotiation, in hopes that by continuing the war he should compel the French to recall the princes of the House of Bourbon, and to restore Belgium to the House of Austria. If these were just and legitimate objects, he could equitably refuse to treat for peace; but if they were both illegitimate and unjust, he rendered his country responsible for all the miseries of the war Now the Republic had been acknowledged by all Europe: England herself had recognised it in 1796 by empowering Lord Malmesbury to treat with the Directory. This plenipotentiary had successively attended at Paris and at Lisle; he had negotiated with Charles Lacroix, Letourneur, and Maret, ministers of the Directory; besides, the object of the war was not the restoration of the Bourbons. Belgium had been ceded by the Emperor of Austria at the treaty

of Campo Formio, in 1797: England had recognised its union with France by the negotiations of Lord Malmesbury at Lisle. It constituted, by the law of nations, a part of the Republic. To separate them could only be to usurp over, to tear to pieces, to dismember an established state. These two objects were therefore unjust and unlawful.

II. Was this policy of the minister, Pitt, truly conformable to the interests of England? Could he reasonably flatter himself with the hopes of obtaining Belgium, by continuing the war? Would it not have been more prudent to have given peace to the world, and at the same time to have secured the real, solid advantages which he might have obtained? The Kings of Sardinia and Naples, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the Pope, would have been restored and established on their thrones; the Milanese would have been secured to the House of Austria; the French troops would have evacuated Holland, Switzerland, and Genoa; the influence of England might have been established in those countries; Egypt would have been restored to the Grand Signor; the Isle of Malta to the Grand Master; Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope would have strengthened the English power in the two Indies. What

splendid results from the campaign of 1799! These advantages were certain; but as to the hopes to which they were sacrificed, was there even a probability of their accomplishment? In 1799, the coalition had been victorious in Italy, but it had been vanquished in Switzerland, in Holland, and in the East. France had just changed her government. Five persons, disunited, and of no great abilities, were succeeded by a man whose military knowledge and talents were unquestionable; he had been elevated by the consent of the nation: at his name alone La Vendée had already submitted: the Russian armies had commenced their march to repass the Vistula. Lord Grenville himself admitted, that even if the First Consul were willing to cede Belgium, the French nation, en masse, would oppose the measure. The object of the war was, then, popular in France. The Courts of Berlin, of Vienna, and of London, were deceived in 1792; the circumstances were so novel! But could any thing excuse the statesmen of England for falling into the same error in 1800? It was then probable, that the campaign of 1800 would be favourable to France; that she would reconquer Italy; and, in short, even supposing the success of the campaign to be doubtful, contrary Miscellanies.—VOL. I.

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