so many prisoners were made in the early part of the campaign. It was not, however, at that time, able to engage the Austrian cavalry in line; nor was it until it arrived on the Mincio that it first appeared to advantage, manœuvred in the plain, made successful charges and emulated the infantry.

NOTE II. (CHAP. XXVI.)

BATTLE OF LODI.

I. Ought the army of Italy, instead of crossing the Po at Placenza, to have effected its passage at Cremona? In moving from Tortona to Placenza, down the right bank of the Po, it left its flank exposed, during a march of eighteen leagues, to the enemy, who, furnished with pontoons, was posted on the left bank: many inconveniences would have resulted from prolonging this march for seven leagues more; and what end would have been attained by it? Placenza, on the right bank, afforded all the resources of a great town to facilitate the construction of bridges; Cremona, on the opposite side, would have remained in the power of the enemy until the passage had been effected. Besides, Placenza is the nearest point on the Po to Milan, whence Cremona is much more

distant, and is separated by the Adda. If Beaulieu had crossed to the right bank of the Adda, and thrown a bridge across opposite Placenza, the French army would have been divided into two parts on the two banks. Flank marches are to be avoided, and when they are inevitable, they ought to be made as short and with as much rapidity as possible.

II. If the French army had possessed a pontoon train, it would have arrived at Milan before the Austrian army; but it lost sixty hours in collecting boats and constructing a bridge over the Po, which gave the enemy's general time to pass the Adda.

III. Colli's corps, which was advancing towards the bridge of Cassano, had not come up. Napoleon was in hopes of cutting it off from the Mincio, which determined him to attack and force the bridge of Lodi. In fact, at the very moment when he carried the bridge, Colli crossed at Cassano, whence he was enabled to retreat without molestation. If the army had been provided with pontoons, it would have passed the Adda on the evening of the battle of Fombio.

Napoleon arrived in person within musquet shot of Pizzighettone: he sent up and down the river to collect boats, and if he could have

procured only eight or ten, he would have passed; even during the night he would have taken up positions on both sides of the Adda.

IV. Beaulieu, in the night after the battle of Fombio, did not attempt to surprise Codogno: he did not even know what had passed in the afternoon, and thought himself still master of Fombio. He came, without the least suspicion, to take up his quarters at Cazal, intending to pass the night there. One of his cavalry regiments, which intended to occupy Codogno, fell in with the bivouacs of Laharpe's division: it was received with a brisk fire of musquetry, and retired precipitately. General Laharpe left his camp, with some officers of his staff, to collect at the nearest farm-houses some information respecting the strength of the corps which had just made its appearance. Returning, an hour after midnight, to his head-quarters by a different road to that by which he had set out, he was fired upon by the sentinels, and thus killed on the spot by the bullets of his own soldiers, who had always been much attached to him, and were struck with consternation at this fatal mistake.

V. General Colli, who commanded the Piedmontese, was an officer of the Austrian army. he did not, therefore, quit the service of the

King of Sardinia after the armistice of Che

rasco.

VI. Augereau's division actually passed the Mincio by the bridge of Borghetto: the demonstrations near Peschiera were merely a feigned attack to occupy the attention of General Lyptai, whilst Augereau was manœuvring to cut him off from the Verona road.

VII. There were in the fort of Urbino 800 of the Papal soldiers, instead of 200. This fact is of little importance in itself; it is only noticed here from a regard to truth.

It has been said that the army ought not to have remained on the Adige; that it should have passed the Julian Alps, and advanced on Vienna; but these opinions are very absurd.

After the battle of Lodi, Napoleon received a decree of the Directory, ordering him to march on Rome and Naples with 20,000 men, and to give up his army to Kellerman, who was coming to conduct the blockade of Mantua. Napoleon represented in energetic terms all the disadvantages of this scheme, and offered his resignation, determined not to become instrumental to the destruction of his army. The government recalled its decree: it had been seduced by a temptation irresistible to the revolutionary heroes, that of planting the French

colours on the Capitol, and of punishing the court of Naples for its manifold offences. The conduct of Napoleon towards the King of Sardinia was dictated by sound policy; but such dispassionate circumspection was beyond the comprehension of the statesmen of that period. It was not without difficulty that he made them understand all the importance of maintaining tranquillity in Piedmont; and convinced them that revolutions, revolts, and the fermentation of the passions, always produce disasters; and that tranquillity and security, above all things, were requisite in the rear of the army.

NOTE III. (CHAP. XXX.)

BATTLE OF CASTIGLIONE.

I. Too much reliance is placed on the reports of the Aulic Council, which, being defeated, tried to represent matters in the most favourable light. At this period, Wurmser had not less than 100,000 men, 15,000 of whom were in Mantua. The French army consisted of 40,000 men, of whom 10,000 were employed in the blockade of that place; 30,000 formed the army of observation which was to keep in check an army of relief of upwards of