sailers: if the rear-admiral had had three such frigates as La Justice and La Diane, he would have manœuvred much more boldly; he would have run races with the Tiger and the Theseus, Sir Sidney Smith's two eighty-gun ships.

To resume: the expedition to Egypt was completely successful. Napoleon landed at Alexandria on the 1st of July 1798; on the 1st of August he was master of Cairo, and of all lower Egypt; on the 1st of January 1799, he had conquered the whole of Egypt; on the 1st of July 1799, he had destroyed the Turkish army of Syria, and taken its train of 42 field-pieces and 150 ammunition waggons. At length, in the month of August, he destroyed the select troops of the army of the Porte, and at Aboukir took its train of 32 field-pieces. Kleber allowed himself to be intimidated by the Grand Vizier; he surrendered all the fortresses to him, and consented to a most extraordinary convention, that of El-Arisch. But Colonel Latour Maubourg, arriving on the 1st of March 1800, before Cairo had been surrendered, defeated the Grand Vizier, drove him into the Desert, and reconquered Egypt. In March 1801, the English landed an army of 18,000 men, without horses for the artillery, or cavalry: this army

must have been destroyed; but Kleber had been assassinated, and by an overwhelming fatality this brave army was consigned to the command of a man, who, although competent enough for many other purposes, was detestable as a military commander. The vanquished army, after six months feigned manoeuvres, landed on the coast of Provence, to the number of 24,000 men. The army of Egypt, on its arrival at Malta, in 1798, was 32,000 strong: it received a reinforcement of 2000 men there, but left a garrison of 4000; and arrived at Alexandria 30,000 strong. It received 3000 men from the wreck of the squadron of Aboukir, which increased it to 33,000 men. 24,000 returned to France: 1000 had previously gone home as wounded, or blind, in the frigates La Meuron, and La Carrere, in which Napoleon sailed; but a like number of troops had arrived in La Justice, L'Egyptienne, and La Régénérée. The loss, therefore, was 9000 men; of whom 4000 died in 1798 and 1799, and 5000 in 1800 and 1801, in the hospitals and in the field of battle. When Napoleon left the army at the end of August 1799, the amount of its force was 28,500 Frenchmen, including sick, veterans, persons belonging to the depôts, and other non-combatants following the army.

The English army, in 1801, consisted, at first, of only 18,000 men: but it received, in the months of July and August, 7000 men from London, Malta, and Port Mahon, and 8000 from the Indies, who landed at Cosseir, which increased the English force to 32,000, or 34,000. By adding 25,000 Turks to these, it will appear that the allied forces employed against Egypt amounted to nearly 60,000 men. If these had all attacked together, it would, undoubtedly, have been impossible to resist them; but as they came into action only at intervals of several months, victory must infallibly have declared for the French, if Desaix or Kleber had been at the head of the army; or indeed any general but Menou, who, nevertheless, had only to imitate the manœuvre which Napoleon had executed in 1799, when Mustapha Pacha landed at Aboukir. The religious fanaticism, which had been looked upon as the greatest obstacle to the establishment of the French in Egypt, had been tranquillized; all the ulemas and the great sheiks were now friendly to the French

army.

Saint-Louis, in 1250, landed at Damietta with 6000 men: had he acted as the French did in 1798, he would have triumphed like them, and would have conquered all Egypt;

and had Napoleon in 1798 conducted himself like the Crusaders of 1250, he would have been defeated. In fact, Saint-Louis appeared before Damietta on the 5th of June; he landed the following day, the Musulmans evacuated the town, which he entered on the 6th; but from the 6th of June to the 6th of December he never stirred. On the 6th of December he began his march, passing up the right bank of the Nile; he arrived on the 17th of December on the left bank of the Canal of Achmoun, opposite Mausourah, and encamped there two months: this canal was then full of water. On the 12th of February 1251, the waters having subsided, he passed this arm of the Nile, and fought a battle, eight months after his debarkation in Egypt. If SaintLouis, on the 8th of June 1250, had manœuvred as the French manoeuvred in 1798, he would have arrived at Mausourah on the 12th of June; he would have found the Canal of Achmoun dry, because at that time the waters of the Nile are at the lowest; he would have crossed it, and reached Cairo on the 26th of June; he would have conquered lower Egypt within a month after his arrival. When the first pigeon carried to Cairo the news of the landing of the infidels at Damietta, the

consternation was general; there were no means of resistance: the faithful crowded the mosques, and passed the days and nights in prayer; they were resigned to their fate, and awaited the French army: but in eight months the true believers had time to prepare for resistance. Upper Egypt, Arabia, and Syria, sent their forces; and Saint-Louis was defeated, put to flight, and made prisoner. Had Napoleon acted in 1798 as St.-Louis did in 1250, had he passed July, August, September, October, November, and December, without stirring from Alexandria, he would have met with insuperable obstacles in January and February. Damanhour, Rehmaniah, Rosetta, would have been fortified; Girch and Cairo would have been intrenched and defended by cannon and troops; 12,000 Mamelukes, 20,000 Arabs, 50,000 Arabian Janizaries, reinforced by the armies of Arabia, of the Pachalic of Damas, of Acre, of Jerusalem, and of Tripoli, flocking to the succour of that key of the holy Caba, would have frustrated all the efforts of the French army, which must have re-embarked. In 1250, Egypt was not in a condition to make so good a defence, but Saint-Louis knew not how to profit by its weakness: he lost eight months in deliberating with the Pope's