the fact and notion denoted by the word "I," comes into manifestation at the bidding, and under the influence, of the objects which induce the sensations accompanying it. One fact admitted on all hands is, that our sensations are caused by certain objects presented to our senses; another fact assumed on all hands is, that our consciousness of sensations falls under the same law, and is likewise induced by the presence of these objects. But consciousness and sensation are each other's opposites, and exist as thesis and antithesis-therefore, according to this doctrine, we find two contradictory effects attributed at the same moment to the same cause, and referred to the same origin -just as if we were to affirm that the same object is at the same moment and in the same place the cause at once of light and of the absence of light, or that the sun at one and the same instant both ripens fruit and prevents it from ripening. To illus trate this by our former example (for a variety of illustrations adds nothing to the clearness of an exposition), let us suppose a sentient being to experience the smell of a rose. So long as this being's state is simply sentient, its sensation is absorbing, effective, and complete; but as soon as consciousness, or the realization of self blends with this feeling, it from that moment becomes weaker and less perfect. It is no longer pure and unalloyed, and consequently its integrity is violated, and its strength in some degree impaired :—yet, according to our ordinary psychologists, the same object, namely, the rose, which induces the strength of the sensation, also brings along with it that suspension or weakening of the sensation which con sciousness is. We are called upon to believe that the same cause at the same moment both produces and destroys a particular effect-a creed too contradictory and unintelligible to be easily embraced when thus plainly exposed. If a particular object induce a particular sensation, surely the suspension of that sensation, or, in other words, the consciousness which impairs it, and prevents it from being all-absorbing, cannot be induced by the same cause. And, besides, if our consciousness depended on our sensations, passions, or any other of our "states of mind," would not its light kindle, and its energy wax in proportion as these were brightened and increased? We have seen, however, that the reverse of this is the case, and that consciousness never burns more faintly than during man's most vivid paroxysms of sensation and of passion. This argument, which is, however, rather a fact presented to us by experience than an inference, entirely disproves the dependency of man's consciousness upon the external objects which give birth to his sensations. It thus radically uproots that false fact by which man is made the creature and thrall of causality in his intercourse with the outward world, and the passive recipient of its impressions. At the same time the displacement of this false fact opens up to us a glimpse of that great truth, the view and realization of which it has hitherto obstructed the liberty of man. In order to get a nearer and clearer prospect of this grand reality, let us extirpate still more radically the spurious fact we have been dealing with, until not a fibre of it remains to shoot forth anew into sprouts of error. CHAPTER III. The earliest speculators among mankind were, as we have before remarked, mere naturalists or physici. They looked at every thing and conceived every thing under the law of cause and effect. After a time, when speculation began to be directed upon man, or became what is now termed " metaphysical," this law still continued to be regarded as supreme, and the spirit of the old method was carried on into the new research. But as no instance VOL. XLIV. NO. CCLXXIV. of causality could be conceived without the existence of a thing operated on, as well as of a thing operating, they were forced to postulate something in man (either physical or hyperphysical) for the objects of external nature to act upon. Thus, in order to allow the law of causality an intelligible sphere of operation, and at the same time to lift man out of the mire of a gross materialism, they devised or assumed a certain spiritualized or at Q At sua qui noscat pectora rarus adest." It is time, however, that this sub stance, and the doctrines and facts taught in connexion with it, were test ed in a more rigorous and critical spirit-not, indeed, upon their own ae count, but on account of those greater and more important truths whose places they have usurped. How, then, do we propose testing this substance? In this way. The word "mind" is exceedingly remote and ambiguous, and denotes-nobody knows what. Let us then substitute in place of it that much plainer expression which every body makes use of, and in some degree, at least, understands-the expression "I" or "me" and let us see how mind, with its facts and doctrines, will fare when this simple, unpretending, and unhypothetical word is employed in its place. "External objects take effect upon mind, and perception is the result." This doctrine lies at the very threshold of our ordinary metaphysics, and forms the foundation-stone upon which their whole superstructure is erected. But is it true? Let us come to a more distinct understanding of it by changing it into the following statement, and we shall see what gross though deep-lurking falsities are brought to light by the alteration. Let us say "external objects take effect upon me, and perception is the result." We now then ask, To what period of our life is this proposition meant to have reference: Does the philosopher of "mind" answer that it may be applied to us during any period, from first to last, of our existence? Then we tell him, in return, that, in that case, the doctrine is certainly false, for it is not the fact that things take effect upon "me" at the birth or during the ear lier years of that particular Being which afterwards becomes "I"-there being at that time no "me" at all in the case-no "me" for things to take effect upon, as was proved in the preceding problem, where it was shown that no man is born conscious, or, in other words, that no man is born "I." It is true that things take effect, from the very first, upon that particular Being which, after a time and after a certain process, becomes "I." But this particular Being was not "I" at its birth, or until a considerable time after it had elapsed, and, therefore, the proposition, "things take effect upon me," is seen to be untrue when applied to one period of human life at least, and thus the ego, or that which, in the case of each individual man, is "1," or, in other words, his true Being, is liberated from the control of the law of causality, during the earlier stages at least of his existence, in the most conclusive and effectual way possible -namely, by our showing that at that time this "I" has no manner of existence or manifestation whatsoever. Does the philosopher of mind, giving up this point, maintain that the proposition quoted has, at any rate, a true and intelligible application to us in our grown or advanced condition? Then we tell him that, in that case, the affirmation, or dogma, is altogether premature, because, before it can be admitted, he is bound to explain to us how the particular Being given and contemplated, which was not "I" or "me" at first, became converted into "me." Before any subsequent averment connected with this "me" can be listened to, it is, first of all, incumbent upon him, we say, to point out to us how this con. version is brought about-to explain to us the origin and significance of this "I"-the circumstances out of which it arose, for, as we have already said, the particular Being which now appropriates it was certainly not sent into the world a born or ready-made "1." Suppose, then, that the metaphysician should say that this Being becomes "1" under the law of causality, and beneath the action of the external objects which produce impressions upon it, then we would like to know how it happened that these outward objects, which induced the human Being s sensations at the very first, did not cause him to become "I" then. When he being filled and monopolized by the was first born he was just as sensitive same, it never rises above it, but yieldas he ever was afterwards,-no doubt ing to its influence, it becomes altomore so, but for long his sensations gether the slave of the law of causacontinued pure and unalloyed. After lity, or of the force that is working on a time, however, they were found to it. But if this substance be conscious be combined with the notion and rea- of the impression made upon it, then lity of self-a new notion and reality it is absolutely necessary, in the eye altogether. The human Being has of reason, that a portion of this being now become ego; from a thing he has should stand aloof from the impresbecome a person. But what new cir- sion-should be exempt from the accumstances were there in his sensa- tion of the object causing it-in short, tions, or their exciting causes, by which should resist, repel, and deny it in the they brought about this new fact and exercise of a free activity; otherwise, phasis of existence? The metaphysi- like animals and inferior things, being cian cannot answer us. He must ad completely absorbed and monopolized mit that the sensations and their causes by the influence present to it, it would remain, after the manifestation of the no more be able to become conscious of ego, precisely what they were before it than a leaf can comprehend the gale it came into existence, and, therefore, in which it is drifting along, or the tiger that they can never account for its the passion which impels him to slake origin. his burning heart in blood. It is obvious, that the point in man at which he becomes aware of his impressions must be free from these impressions, and must stand out of their sphere, otherwise it would be swallowed up by them, and nothing save the impressions would remain. But man is not made up of mere impressions-passions, sensations, "states of mind," or whatever they may be. He is not engulfed and borne along in their vortices. There is a point from which he looks down upon them all, and knows himself to be free. He stands within a circle more impregnable than enchanter's ring—a circle which, however much they may assault it, they cannot overpass; and this point or circle of freedom-this true life of humanity, is that which, in the case of each man, is "I." But we have already, in the preceding chapter, disproved still more effectually the fact, that the ego comes into existence in consequence of the influence of external objects. We there showed that consciousness not only does not manifest itself in obedience to their action, but that it actually tends to be suppressed and obliterated thereby. Now, consciousness is the very essence and origin of the egoconsciousness creates the ego-without consciousness no man would be "I." Therefore the ego is also exempt from the influence of outward objects, and manifests itself, and maintains its place, not in consequence, but in spite of them. Consciousness developes and preserves itself by refusing to take part or identify itself with the sensation, passion, or whatever it may be that is striving to enslave the man ; and the ego, which is but the more personal and vital expression of consciousness, exists merely by refusing to imbibe the impressions of external things. Thus, so far is it from being true that outward objects take effect upon me, that " I," in truth, only am by resisting and refusing to be impressed by their action. When an effect or impression is produced on any substance, whether it be motion, as in the case of a struck billiard ball, or sensation, as in the case of animals and men, the substance impressed is either conscious of the impression, as is the case with men ; or unconscious of it, as is the case with animals and billiard balls. If it be unconscious of the impression, then This view disposes of a question which has been ever regarded as forming the opprobrium of metaphysics. We allude to the problem respecting the mode and nature of the intercourse which takes place between the external universe and man-or, as metaphysicians say, "Mind." This question is now given up-not because it has been solved-not because it is regarded as too contemptible and irrelevant to be entertained by speculative philosophy, but (pro pudor!) because it is considered insoluble, inscrutable, and beyond the limits of the human faculties. Oh, ye metaphysicians! ye blind leaders of the blind! How long will ye be of seeing and understanding that there is no communication at all be Know tween man, in his true Being, and the universe that surrounds him—or, that if there be any, it is the communication of non-communication? ye not that ye are what ye are only on account of the antagonism between you and it that ye perceive things only by resisting their impressions, by denying them, not in word only, but also in vital deed: that your re fusal to be acted upon by them, constitutes your very personality and your very perception of them; that this perception arises, not in consequence of the union, but in consequence of the disunion between yourselves and matter; and, in fine, that your consciousness, even in its simplest acts, so far from being in harmony and keeping with the constitution of nature, is the commencement of that grand disruption between yourselves and the world, which perhaps ye will know more about before ye die? Of all difficult entails to be broken through, the most difficult is the entail of false facts and erroneous opinions. If, however, the foregoing observations be attended to, we trust we have done something to cut off speculators yet unborn from their inheritances of error. Of all the false facts involved in the "science of the human mind," the greatest is this, that, starting from the assumption of "mind" as a given substance, we are thereby led to believe that the ego or central and peculiar point of humanity comes into the world ready-made. In opposition to this belief, the true fact is that the ego does not thus come into the world, but that the being which is now "I" was not "I" at first, but became "I" after a time and after a process, which it is the business of the philosopher to explain. Various other fictitious facts spring out of this tap-root of error. Thus, if we start from mind as a given substance, we, of course, are compelled to make this, in the first instance, passive, and only active through a species of reaction. But the ego is never passive. Its being is pure act. To hold it passive is to hold it annihilated. It is for ever acting against the fatalistic forces of nature. Its free and antagonist power shows itself equally to the eye of reflection, in our simplest perceptive, as in our highest moral acts. It lives, and has a being, only in so far as it refuses to bow under the yoke of causality; and whenever it bends beneath that yoke, its life and all its results are gone.* One word to those who imagine that the ego is merely a variety of expression, signifying nothing more than the proper name of the person employing it. There cannot be a greater philosophical error than to conceive that the non-manifestation of the ego is merely a verbal or logical defect, and that the reality of it may exist in a being, where the notion of it is wanting. Yet this appears to us to be one of the commonest errors in psychology. Metaphysicians, undisciplined by reflection, when contemplating the condition of a young child, and observing its various sensitive, passionate, or rational states, are prone, in the exercise of an unwarranted imagination, also to invest it with a personality-with consciousness-in short, with that which, in their own case, they call "I," transferring over upon it this notion and reality which exist only for them. For the child all this while does not think itself "I," and therefore it does not in reality become" I." It never can become "I" through their thinking. The "I" they think for it is a spurious and non-existent "I." To become "I" in reality, it must think itself "I," which it has not yet done. But what do we mean precisely by saying that the notion of "I" creates the reality of "I?" This we can best explain by a digression into the history of philosophy, and by rescuing a once famous dogma from the undeserved contempt into which it has generally fallen. "The false facts of metaphysics" ought to form no inconsiderable chapter in the history of philosophy. Those specified are but a few of them; but they are all that we have room for at present. To state, almost in one word, the fundamental error we have noticed in the text, we should say, that the whole perversion and falsity of the philosophy of man are owing to our commencing with a substance, " mind,"-and not with an act-the act or fact of consciousness. CHAPTER IV. The Cartesian philosophy is said to commence by inculcating a species of wide and deep-searching scepticism; and its fundamental and favourite tenet is that cogito ergo sum, which is now so universally decried. But abandoning altogether its written dogmas and formulas, let us only return upon them after we have looked forth for ourselves into the realities of things. When a man sees and thinks a mountain, it is obvious that his thought does not create the mountain. Here, then, the thought and the reality are not identical; nor does the one grow out of the other. The two can be separated, and, in point of fact, stand apart, and are quite distinct. In this case, then, it requires some degree of faith to believe that the notion and the reality correspond. It is evident that there is a sort of flaw between them which nothing but the cement of Faith can solder; a gap which no scientific ingenuity has ever been able to bridge; -in short, that here there is a chink in the armour of reason which scepticism may take advantage of, if it chooses; for the reality of the mountain being independent of the notion of the mountain the notion may also be independent of the reality, and, for any thing that can be shown to the contrary, may have been induced by some other cause. In short, the notion, even when the mountain appears present before us, may possibly exist without any corresponding reality, for it clearly does not create that reality. In looking out, then, for a sure and certain foundation for science, we must not build upon any tenet in which a distinction between our thought and its corresponding reality is set forth (as, for example, upon any proposition expressing the real existence of an external world), for here scepticism might assail us-possibly with success; but we must seek for some subject of experience, between the notion of which and the reality of which there is no flaw, distinction, or interval whatsoever. We must seek for some instance in which the thought of a certain reality actually creates that reality; and if we can find such an instance, we shall then possess an incon cussum quid which will resist for ever all the assaults of scepticism. But no instance of this kind is to be found, as we have seen, by attaching our thoughts to the objects of the universe around us. Our thinking them does not make them realities. If they are realities, they are not so in consequence of our thoughts; and if they are not realities, unreal they will remain in spite of our thoughts. Let us turn from the universe, then, and look to ourselves. "I." Now here is an instance in which there is no distinction or sundering between the notion and the reality. The two are coincident and identical-or rather, we should say, the one (that is, the notion "I") creates and enforces the other (that is, the reality "I"); or, at any rate, this appears to be the best way of logically exhibiting the two. Between the notion and the reality in this case scepticism can find no conceivable entrance for the minutest point of its spear. Let any man consult his own experience whether, the notion "I" being given, the reality "I" must not also necessarily be present, and also whether, the reality being present, the notion must not also accompany it. Let him try to destroy or maintain the one without also destroying or maintaining the other, and see whether he can succeed. Succeed he easily may in the case of any other notion and reality. The word mountain, for instance, denotes both a notion and a reality. But the notion may exist perfectly well without the reality, and the reality without the notion. notion "I," however, cannot exist without the reality" I," and the reality cannot exist with the notion" I," as any one may satisfy himself by the slightest reflection. The Here, then, we have found the instance we were seeking for. What is the notion "I?" It is consciousness, or the notion of self. What is the reality" I?" It is simply "I." Connect the two together in a genesis which makes the one arise out of the other, and you have the famous fundamental position of the Cartesian Philosophy, cogito ergo sum-a formula which is worthy of respect, for this reason, if for no other, that by it |