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maxim leads, by inevitable results, to the downfall of our republican institutions, and the consolidation of all power in that branch which shall possess the strongest influence over the public mind. Upon the independent exercise of the powers confided to each department, uncontrolled, directly or indirectly, by the encroachments of either, depends the security of life, liberty and property, and the stability of that constitution which is the pride of our country and the admiration of mankind. The honorable gentleman from Georgia has adverted to the opinions of the immortal author of the letters of Publius, the late chief magistrate of the United States; and the honorable Speaker has also invited our attention to that great constitutional lawyer. They triumphantly ask, what he would say on the present question, were he a member of this House? I will not follow the example of these gentlemen, by substituting declamation for historical truth, or vague surmises, and assumed premises, for record evidence; but, while I accord to the distinguished statesman and patriot, whose exertions so eminently contributed to the establishment of this government, and whose exposition of its fundamental principles cannot be too highly appreciated, all the merit of a useful life, devoted to the public service, guided by wisdom, virtue and integrity; I appeal, with pleasure and confidence, to his able pen, in support of the position which I have advanced, and which I deem an important point in the case under consideration. In the view taken by Mr. Madison, of the meaning of the maxim which requires a separation of the departments of power,' he repels the arguments of the opponents to the adoption of the constitution, founded on the apprehension of executive supremacy over the legislative and judiciary, which it was contended, would ultimately render that branch the sole depository of power, and subject the people of this country to the despotic will of a single individual. Comparing the powers delegated to the executive, with those granted to the legisla

ture, and the probable danger of an assumption by either of the functions appertaining to the other, he says, 'in a government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of a hereditary monarch, the executive department is very justly regarded as the source of danger, and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire. In a democracy, where a multitude of people exercise in person the legislative functions, and are continually exposed, by their incapacity for regular deliberation and concerted measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their executive magistrates, tyranny may well be apprehended, on some favorable emergency, to start up in the same quarter. But, in a representative republic, where the executive magistracy is carefully limited, both in the extent and duration of its power, and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired, by a supposed influence over the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength, which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this department, that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy, and exhaust all their precautions.

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• The legislative department derives a superiority in our government from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments.' The correctness of the reasoning and predictions of this great and good man, who is called by the honorable Speaker the father of the constitution, has been often demonstrated in the practical operations of this body, and never more forcibly than on the present occasion. Scarcely a session of Congress passes without some effort to enlarge

the scope of our powers, by construction or analogy; and unless these systematic advances in this House, to crush the co-ordinate departments, by an unlimited exercise of authority over all subjects involving the general welfare, be resisted with firmness and perseverance, they will, at no distant period, eventuate in the destruction of those salutary checks and balances, so essential to the duration of our happy form of government, and to the security of civil and political liberty. I deprecate every measure calculated to establish a precedent, which, in its effects, may lead to such dangerous consequences. An enlightened statesman has said, that the concentrating all the powers of government in the legislative body is of the very essence of despotism; and it is no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. An elective despotism was not the government we fought for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among the several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others.'

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Sir, whenever these principles shall cease to be respected by the councils of this country, I shall consider the grand experiment which we have made in the administration of a government of limited powers, founded on a written instrument, in which they are specified and defined, as altogether abortive, and as affording strong proof of the regal maxim, that man is incapable of self-government. If honorable gentlemen mean any thing by the reverence which they profess to feel for the constitution, I conjure them to look to its provisions, and forbear to adopt a measure in direct violation both of its letter and spirit. By article second, section second, it is provided that "The President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of

the several states, when called into actual service;" and by the eighth section of the first article, Congress is vested with power to "make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." Congress has long since fulfilled this duty rules and articles of war have been sanctioned, and have continued to govern the army, from its organization, up to the present time; in these, the great principles of subordination and responsibility are graduated and established, from the commander-in-chief down to the most petty officer and common soldier. The President is placed by his country at the head of its physical force," to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion;" he is the ultimate tribunal to decide all questions touching the operations of the army, and the conduct of the officers who compose it. If there be any power, clearly and exclusively belonging to the executive, it is that which appertains to the government of the army and navy of the United States. Our whole system of laws recognizes it; and until this extraordinary attempt to erect the House of Representatives into a court martial, with a view to cast an indelible stain on the character of general Jackson, without a fair and impartial trial, in which he might confront his accusers, and be heard in his defence, no instance can be shown, since the foundation of the government, where the President has been interrupted in the full exercise of his legitimate authority over the military officers under his command. The abuse of this power, or the improper direction and application of the public force, by the chief magistrate, or by any subordinate officer, with his privity and assent, in a manner, or for the accomplishment of objects dangerous to the liberties of the people, or subversive of the laws and constitution of the union, will find a ready and suitable corrective in this House, by an application of its power to originate impeachment against the President, vice-president, and all civil officers, for treason, bribery, or other high

crimes and misdemeanors. In this sense only can we be regarded as the grand inquest of the nation, and not to the unlimited extent for which gentlemen have contended. The power to impeach the President is expressly delegated; all other civil officers are liable to the same scrutiny, and the total omission, in the article of the military department, is, to my mind, conclusive evidence that they were never intended to be subject to the control of Congress, except in the usual course of legislation, under the power to raise and support armies. And this opinion is strengthened by the clause of the constitution to which I have referred, directing Congress to provide for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. The principle of official responsibility is to be found in every page of the constitution; not a vague, uncertain responsibility, but that which is unequivocal, certain and definite. We are answerable, at stated periods, to the people by whom we have respectively been chosen. The President is accountable to the nation at large, at the expiration of his term of service; and, in the mean time, we hold a salutary check over his ambition, if he evince such a disposition, by means of impeachment. In like manner, the whole civil department may be punished for a wanton prostitution of their official functions. The military and naval officers who command our army and navy are responsible directly to the executive, who is their chief, and, through him, indirectly, to the representatives of the people. Every link in the chain is essential to the beauty and symmetry of the whole; and, if preserved unbroken, affords the most ample security against any usurpation of power without a prompt and efficient remedy to detect and restrain it. It is now proposed to make this House the focus of every power granted to the federal government; to mount the ramparts which separate the departments, and compel every man who holds a commission to bow with submission to the gigantic strength of this numerous assembly.

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